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PART D 
SECURED TRANSACTIONS, EQUIPMENT 
FINANCE, AND GUARANTEES 
Chapter 15 is concerned with secured transactions as understood under English law. It 
also examines certain matters that are similar to or associated with such transactions. 
After an introduction dealing with matters that are relevant in a general sense to 
secured transactions, it then moves to consider concepts of property, interests in 
property and dealings therein, future property and attachment of proprietary interests, 
accretions to and the proceeds of assets, the forms of security, floating charges, 
security in financial assets, security over intellectual property, security over credit 
balances, rights of set-off, Quistclose trusts, registration requirements for corporate 
security, priorities, subordination of unsecured debt, upsetting prior transactions, and 
enforcement of security. 
Chapter 16 is concerned with equipment finance, sometimes called title finance. It 
examines the methods by which a financier might acquire title in equipment, the 
forms of transaction by which equipment is made available by the financier to its 
customer, the financier’s statutory responsibilities for the equipment and the 
effectiveness of attempts to exclude or restrict that responsibility, the rights and 
obligations of the parties following a default by the customer, the effect of the 
customer’s insolvency, the financier’s rights against third parties, and insurance 
arrangements. 
Chapter 17 concerns guarantees. It looks at the nature of a guarantee as contrasted 
with other types of instrument, preliminary matters in taking a guarantee, State 
guarantees under EC law, the types of guarantee, Export Credits Guarantee 
Department (ECGD) cover, the rights of the guarantor, reasons for the discharge of 
the guarantor, and provisions to save the beneficiary’s position under the guarantee. 
Chapter 18 relates to the case for reform of secured transactions under English law. It 
discusses the reasons why reform is needed and then reviews proposals that were put 
forward by the Law Commission to effect reform of the law. 
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14.1 Introduction and Preliminary Matters 
14.1.1 The nature of security 
Taking security involves the concept that one or more assets (in American 
terminology called ‘collateral’) is set aside or appropriated by the security giver to 
provide a right or interest in that asset or assets in favour of a security taker to secure 
an obligation owed by the security taker or another person1 In the event of a failure in 
the fulfillment of the underlying obligation for which the security has been taken, the 
creditor may have recourse to the asset, usually by selling it (there are other methods 
of enforcement or realisation of security that will also have to be discussed), so that 
the proceeds of the sale or other method of enforcement can be applied towards 
satisfying the unfulfilled obligation. It is said that the creditor, through taking its 
security, acquires a ‘proprietary’ interest in the asset, that is, a right in rem in the 
asset. Under English law the same asset may serve as security in favour of more than 
one creditor. Each such creditor may hold separate security from the obligor over the 
asset or the security may be held for them jointly, through a trustee acting on their 
behalf.2 In addition, security can be given to a person other than the creditor to whom 
the secured obligation is owed or a trustee for that person3. The security may be 
provided by either the obligor or a third party4.  
14.1.1.1 The asset (or assets) concerned may have some direct correlation to the 
finance provided by the creditor, because the finance was used to fund its purchase 
(‘purchase money security’). Alternatively, the security may be more remote, in the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 In this chapter, the expression ‘creditor’ or ‘security taker’ will be used to refer to the party that takes 
the benefit of security and the expression ‘obligor’ or ‘security giver’ will be used to describe the party 
that provides the security (even though, in some cases, the security giver may not be the obligor). 
2 For a recent example of the use of a security trustee, see Saltri Iii Ltd v MD Mezzanine Sa Sicar 
[2012] EWHC 3025 (Comm.) 
3 Lehman Brothers International (Europe) (In Administration) [2012] EWHC 2997 (Ch), [2014] BCC 
295. 
4	  Re Conley [1938] 2 All ER 127	  
 
sense that the asset is made available as security for liabilities which were not directly 
associated with the finance provided for the acquisition of that particular asset. The 
distinction usually does not matter in English law, although it might be relevant to a 
priority race, as will be discussed at a later point in this chapter. 
14.1.1.2 In terms of the assets which may form the subject matter of security, 
this chapter is concerned, by and large, with tangible personal property (e.g. goods) 
and intangible assets. Because of its entirely domestic nature under English law, the 
chapter will not be concerned with taking security over English real property, 
although much of the discussion is also relevant in the context of security over real 
property. 
14.1.1.3  It is useful to note at this stage that English law does not contain the 
concept of a single type of security interest, akin to that found, for example under the 
Uniform Commercial Code in the USA or Personal Property Security Acts in 
Canadian provinces, New Zealand, Australia or Jersey although a law reform 
incorporating such a concept continues to be considered.5 Under the current English 
law of secured transactions there are four traditional forms of consensual security 
interests, namely pledge, contractual lien, mortgage and charge6, distinguished 
broadly speaking on the basis of which concept of property is employed to create 
them and how it is created. As a result of this differentiation, the rules that govern 
priority, parties’ rights and duties, for example on enforcement, vary depending on the 
type of interest. In addition, while under English law it is also possible that some 
other proprietary interests in assets are used for the purposes of security, these are not 
considered as traditional forms of security and so different considerations follow. The 
details of the categorisation along with the various rights and duties of the parties as 
well as other rules applicable to each interest are discussed below.   
14.1.2 The equitable right to redeem  
It is inherent in the concept of security that an obligor has a right to redeem its 
security upon the payment or discharge of the liabilities covered by the security7, 
sometimes also referred to as ‘an equity of redemption’.8 Subject to any agreement 
between the creditor and the obligor to the contrary, there is no equitable right to 
redeem in part only and the creditor is entitled to the whole of its security until it has 
been fully repaid.9 Subject again to any agreement to the contrary, the obligor must 
tender unconditional and irrevocable payment or discharge in redemption of the 
secured liabilities.10 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 See Chapter 17. 
6 Re Cosslett (Contractors) Ltd [1998] Ch 495, 508. 
7 As to the relationship between a contractual provision for redemption and the equitable right to 
redeem, especially in the context of contingent and future liabilities due to the mortgagee, see Re Rudd 
and Son Ltd (1986) 2 BCC 98,955 (CA) and Law Debenture Trust Corp PLC v Concord Trust [2007] 
EWHC 1380 (Ch). 
8 The term ‘an equitable right to redeem’ is preferred here as it is free from the semantic burden carried 
by the phrase ‘an equity of redemption’. The latter term is often understood in a more technical sense in 
relation to a mortgage to signify the mortgagor’s residual equitable interest in the property after the 
mortgagee acquired title to it.  
9 Law Debenture Trust Corp PLC v Concord Trust [2007] EWHC 1380 (Ch), at [53] (Lewison J), cited 
with approval in Çukurova Finance International Ltd v Alfa Telecom Turkey Ltd (Nos 3 and 5) [2013] 
UKPC 25, at [17] (Lord Mance JSC) and [79] (Lord Neuberger). 
10 Ibid. 
14.1.2.1 In equity, it is not permissible to prevent an obligor from redeeming its 
security; for instance, by providing that the security may never be redeemed and a 
provision which is intended to prevent that entitlement (called a ‘clog on the equity of 
redemption’) is void11 although courts often have sought to mitigate its impact, 
treating it with some unease.12 The parties may agree that the right of redemption 
should be postponed for the period of the relevant facility,13 provided that is not an 
unreasonably long period.14 The position has been changed by legislation in relation 
to companies, which can issue perpetual debentures, including by way of security.15  
14.1.3 The reasons for taking security 
The principal reason for taking security over an asset is to provide the creditor with 
protection against the consequences of a default by the obligor or another debtor 
whose liabilities are covered by the security. The security provides the creditor with a 
right of recourse to the asset or its proceeds of realisation so as to meet the relevant 
liabilities. Although enforcement rights may arise in other circumstances, this is 
particularly relevant in a situation where the obligor or other debtor has become 
insolvent, so that it is unable to meet its obligations to its general body of creditors. 
Except where legislation has intervened to reduce its rights,16 the creditor is able to 
stand outside the insolvency to the extent of its security and enforce that security for 
its own benefit. This is because the proprietary right of the creditor in the asset is 
paramount. The asset is treated as not forming part of the insolvent debtor’s assets 
that are available to meet the claims of its unsecured creditors, except to the extent 
that there is any value left over once the liability covered by the security has been 
discharged.17 Without the benefit of security, an ordinary creditor will find itself 
enmeshed in the mire of the insolvency, sharing with the other creditors on a pari 
passu basis in whichever of the debtor’s free assets are available to meet their claims 
(that is, assets which are not subject to security or held on trust for a third party18). 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 Noakes & Co Ltd v Rice [1902] AC 24; Kreglinger v New Patagonia Meat and Cold Storage Co Ltd 
[1914] AC 25 (HL); Jones v Morgan [2001] EWCA Civ 995, [2002] 1 EGLR 125. Jones v Morgan 
[2001] EWCA Civ 995, [2002] 1 EGLR 125. 
12 See e.g. Earl of Halsbury LC in Samuel v Jarrah [1904] AC 323, at 325; Jones v Morgan [2001] 
EWCA Civ 995, [2002] 1 EGLR 125; see also Warnborough Ltd v Garmite Ltd [2003] EWCA Civ 
1544, [2004] 1 P & CR DG8 and Brighton & Hove CC v Audus [2009] EWHC 340, [2010] 1 All ER 
(Comm) 343. 
13 Teevan v Smith (1882) 20 Ch D 724; Williams v Morgan [1906] 1 Ch 804. 
14 Morgan v Jeffreys [1910] 1 Ch 620. 
15 S 739 of the Companies Act 2006, (previously s 193 of the Companies Act 1985). See Knightsbridge 
Estates Trust Ltd v Byrne [1940] AC 613. 
16 Principally with respect to making recoveries under floating charges available for preferential 
creditors, unsecured creditors and the liquidator for his expenses, pursuant to ss, 40, 175 (2)(b), 176A, 
and 176ZA of the Insolvency Act 1986 and s 754 of the Companies Act 2006 (formerly s 196 
Companies Act 1985). A floating charge holder also suffers certain disadvantages in an administration, 
such as under para 70 of Sched BI to the Insolvency Act 1986, which entitles the administrator to 
dispose of assets subject to a floating charge. The holders of both fixed and floating security are subject 
to a moratorium on their rights of enforcement in an administration of a corporate obligor pursuant to 
paras 43 and 44 of Sched B1 to the Insolvency Act 1986. Similar restrictions apply where a proposal 
has been made for a company voluntary arrangement of an obligor which is an eligible company 
pursuant to para 12 of Sched A1 to the Insolvency Act 1986. 
17 See the helpful summary provided by Lord Millett in Buchler v Talbot [2004] UKHL 9; [2004] 2 AC 
298, at [51]. 
18 As noted by Rose LJ (on behalf of himself, Saville and Millett LJJ) in Re Bank of Credit and 
Commerce International SA (No 8) [1996] Ch 245, at 256. Although the decision was the subject of an 
appeal to the House of Lords (decided at [1998] AC 214), this particular point was not controversial. 
The usual consequence is that very little is recovered by the unsecured creditors in 
satisfaction of what is owed to them.19 
Table 14.1 The Order of Claims in an English Liquidation 
1. Ownership of Assets, Fixed Security Over Assets, and Liquidation Set-off 
Rights 
 Ownership e.g.: 
  Conditional sale and Retention of title 
  Hire-purchase 
  Equipment leases 
  Receivables purchases 
  Quistclose claims  
 Fixed Security e.g.: 
  Legal mortgages 
  Equitable mortgages 
  Fixed equitable charges 
  Pledges 
  Liens20  
 Set-off in Winding up: Rules 2.85 and 4.90 Insolvency Rules 1986 (amended 
by SI 2005/527) 
 Note: 
 (i) Priority issues where there are competing claims 
 (ii) Existing and future assets 
2. Expenses of the insolvency proceedings: section 115 of the Insolvency Act 
(expenses of both kinds of voluntary winding up, whether members’ or 
creditors’); section 176ZA Insolvency Act 1986 (payment of expenses of 
winding up where property subject to a floating charge); section 156 of the 
Insolvency Act 1986 (winding up by court); paragraph 99 of Schedule B1 of 
the Insolvency Act 1986 (expenses of administration paid out of floating 
charge assets) 
Note: expenses are defined in rule 12.2 of the Insolvency Rules 1986. As to 
the priority order for payment of expenses in liquidation see rule 4.218 of the 
Insolvency Rules 1986.21  
3. Preferential creditors: sections 17522 and 386 Insolvency Act 1986 
 i.e.: occupational pension scheme contributions, employees’ remuneration, 
coal and steel contributions, debts owed to or deposits covered by the 
Financial Services Compensation Scheme or other deposits.  
4. The prescribed part of floating charge recoveries for the benefit of unsecured 
creditors: section 176A Insolvency Act 198623. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19 As Lord Hoffmann explained in Wight v Eckhardt Marine GmbH [2003] UKPC 37; [2004] 1 AC 
147, at [27], the liquidation of an insolvent company does not extinguish the debts due by an insolvent 
debtor to its creditors, but it has the practical effect that the creditors are confined in their remedies to 
lodging proofs of their claims against the debtor and receiving a pari passu dividend paid out of the 
available realised assets with respect to such claims. 
20 An exception is a lien or other right to retain possession of books, papers or other records of the 
company, which is unenforceable against the liquidator to the extent that its enforcement would deny 
the liquidator their possession under Insolvency Act 1986, s246(2). This does not apply to a lien on 
documents which give a title to property and are held as such under Insolvency Act 1986, s246(3). 
21 As to the priority order for payment of expenses in administration see rule 2.67(1) of the Insolvency 
Rules 1986. 
22 Applied in administration by paragraph 65(2) Schedule B1 of the Insolvency Act 1986. 
5. Floating charges over assets 
 Note: Crystallisation of the charge may raise such a charge to Category 1 for 
some purposes, but not to defeat categories 2, 3 and 4 
6. Unsecured creditors with provable debts (other than preferential creditors and 
distribution of the prescribed part): rule 4.181 of the Insolvency Rules 1986.24 
 Note: Possible ranking of certain unsecured creditors over subordinated 
creditors, otherwise rank equally. As to what constitutes a provable debt: rules 
12.3 and 13.12 (‘debt’) of the Insolvency Rules 1986.25  
7. Statutory interest on debts proved in a winding up: 189(2) of the Insolvency 
Act 198626 
8. Non-provable liabilities27  
9. Shareholders 
  Note: Ranking of different types of shareholders 
 Note: The above assumes: 
 (i) the due registration of the security; 
 (ii) that the security is not vulnerable under the relevant provisions of the 
Insolvency Act 1986 (e.g.: ss 238, 239, 245, and 423); 
 (iii) that the security was given by a company. 
14.1.3.1 Table 14.1 sets out the order of claims in an English winding up.28 It 
serves to demonstrate the value to a creditor of holding security or rights which have a 
similar effect, as well as indicating the relative rankings of claims. It might also 
provide a useful source of comparative reference for the reader in the study of this 
chapter and of the various issues and entitlements that may arise when the dead arm 
of insolvency, particularly liquidation, intervenes. 
14.1.3.2 Security endows the creditor with certain benefits even before debtor’s 
default in the form of control of the course of events in some cases. For example, the 
creditor holding the floating charge in certain circumstances,29 albeit quite narrow, 
may be able to appoint an administrative receiver to run the debtor’s company. That 
aside, secured creditors generally have a degree of control if the prospect of 
enforcement of security is seen as a deterrent against the debtor engaging in a more 
risky behaviour. The secured creditor need not monitor the debtor’s entire business 
every time but merely the asset in which security was taken. Another benefit in taking 
security is that it might give the creditor a priority right in the relevant asset which 
will rank ahead of, and may even defeat, the claim of another creditor in the same 
asset outside liquidation. When coupled with the ability to take enforcement without 
recourse to the courts, security provides the creditor with the ability to recover 
promptly and thus also relatively cheaply. More generally, the creditor with priority 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23 This section applies in both administration and liquidation. 
24 As to administration: rule 2.69 of the Insolvency Rules 1986. 
25 A creditor who has not proved a small debt (as prescribed by the rules) is taken as having proven the 
debt, para 13A in Schedule 8 of the Insolvency Act 1986, inserted by section 131 of the Small 
Business, Enterprise and Employment Act. A similar provision has been introduced in relation to 
bankruptcy. 
26 Rule 2.88(7) of the Insolvency Rules 1986 (administration). 
27 For example, claims in administration against a company for loss as a result of the conversion of 
debts from foreign currency into sterling at the start of the administration, see Lehman Brothers 
International (Europe) (In Administration) [2015] EWCA Civ 485, [2015] BCC 431. 
28 See Lord Neuberger in Re Nortel Companies; Bloom v Pensions Regulator [2013] UKSC 52, at [39]-
[40]; Lehman Brothers International (Europe) (In Administration) [2015] EWCA Civ 485, [2015] BCC 
431. 
29 See sections 72B – s72GA Insolvency Act 1986. 
may be able to desist from having to take enforcement action to recover funds or other 
facilities that it has provided to the debtor, or at least defer its decision to do so. This, 
of course, will depend upon the secured creditor being confident as to the adequacy of 
its security and its continued right of priority. There are various circumstances in 
which this sense of adequacy may be lacking. One example is that the creditor might 
lose its claim to priority for further advances it makes once it has notice of another 
security over the same asset, pursuant to s 94 of the Law of Property Act 1925. 
Another is that the holder of a floating charge cannot be confident that it will prevail 
against the claims of third parties who acquire an interest in the charged assets.30 
Thus, an execution creditor will prevail against the interest of the holder of a floating 
charge, provided that the execution has been completed before the charge 
crystallises.31  
14.1.3.3 In more general terms, the ability to provide security is of benefit to the 
prospective borrower as it may enable it to access finance which otherwise would be 
available: a creditor which is offered security may be willing to provide credit in 
circumstances where it might not be available on unsecured terms because the debtor 
is not considered to be a good risk. A creditor with security may also be more willing 
to continue providing credit to a debtor which finds itself in financial difficulties. 
Security is usually required to support financial rescues and work outs.32 
14.1.3.4 Holding security, as one type of credit risk mitigation technique, may 
also lead to regulatory benefits for the creditor, particularly if it is a bank. The 
security may entitle the bank to ascribe a lower risk weighting to an exposure than 
would be the case if the exposure was unsecured. This is explained further in Chapter 
2. 
14.1.4 The liabilities that may be covered by security 
The liabilities that the security purports to cover will be determined as a matter of 
construction of the relevant security instrument or other agreement under which the 
security was created. Sometimes the security may only relate to a specific transaction 
or even, more concisely, to a particular debt that is due to the creditor. Once the 
relevant liability has been satisfied then the security will cease to be effective. The 
risk that arises in this respect is that, either by the debtor appropriating one or more 
particular payments against the secured liability33 or by the application of Clayton’s 
case,34 the secured liability will be treated as having been discharged and the creditor 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
30 The position as to floating charges is discussed further below. 
31 Evans v Rival Granite Quarries Ltd [1910] 2 KB 979. 
32 One of the criticisms of administration as a regime that should lead to the rehabilitation of businesses 
in the UK, is that there is no statutory mechanism by which the administrator can raise fresh funds to 
support the business, such as by granting security over the company’s assets which would take priority 
over the rights of existing secured creditors under security granted before the administration 
commenced. This is unlike the position under Chapter 11 of the US Bankruptcy Code, where so-called 
‘super priority’ security can be conferred on creditors which are willing to provide such funding to the 
company.   A proposal to introduce such financing into English law (Insolvency Service, Encouraging 
Corporate rescue – A consultation (London : DTI, June 2009) attracted opposition and came to 
nothing. 
33 Provided the appropriation was communicated by the debtor to the creditor and the creditor did not 
refuse payment. See Thomas v Ken Thomas Ltd [2006] EWCA Civ 1504, [2007] Bus LR 429. 
34 Devaynes v Noble, Clayton’s Case (1816) 8 LJ Ch 256, 35 ER 767. See also Nourse J in Re Quest 
CAE Ltd (1985) 1 BCC 99,389, at 99,393. 
will find that it is unsecured for any other remaining or fresh liabilities of the debtor 
towards the creditor. 
14.1.4.1 In the alternative, the security might be in the form of an ‘all moneys’ 
security, with the intention that it should cover all of the liabilities (present and future, 
actual or contingent35) of the obligor or other debtor to the creditor. Even so, the 
courts may find some limitation in the liabilities that are covered by the security. For 
instance, as a matter of construction the courts would be reluctant to find that the 
security was intended to cover indebtedness that was not originally incurred to the 
creditor but of which the creditor had taken an assignment from a third party, 
although it would appear that by the use of express wording which is unambiguous or 
otherwise not open to question36 such an eventuality might be covered in terms of the 
intended application of the security.37 It is submitted, however, that as a matter of 
public policy such security should not be effective in an insolvency of an obligor, to 
the extent that it expressly purports to cover assigned debt that was previously 
unsecured. Otherwise, it could be employed as a device that might be entered into 
between an assignor (which had been an unsecured creditor of the debtor) and an 
assignee (which held security in a comprehensive form), by which the assignor 
received a payment from the assignee in return for the assignment, with the 
consequential effect of turning previously unsecured debt into secured debt held by 
the assignee, thereby, arguably, subverting the pari passu  principle or the anti-
deprivation principle.38 However, the pari passu principle does not apply to 
assignments taking place before liquidation or administration, and an assignment of 
debts in the way described is unlikely to be seen as a deprivation of the company’s 
assets so as to fall foul of the anti-deprivation principle.39 Another limitation, relating 
to current accounts, stems from the operation of the rule in Clayton’s Case. Where the 
security covers present and future liabilities stemming from an overdraft and the 
present debt is paid with a loan secured in favour of another creditor, the bank’s loses 
priority of its security in relation to any new overdraft if it had notice of another 
creditor’s secured debt being paid to the account.40 This presumption of fact can of 
course be rebutted by evidence showing the contrary intention of the parties, which is 
typically the case in modern banking transactions.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
35 An example of a contingent liability is one that exists under a guarantee. Until there is a default, the 
guarantor has no actual monetary liability to make a payment. Once the default occurs and the 
guarantor becomes liable to pay, however, the liability will crystallise into an actual liability of the 
guarantor. On the nature of contingent liabilities see Lord Sumption in Re Nortel GmbH (in 
administration) [2013] UKSC 52, at [130]-[132]. 
36 Lord Clarke in Rainy Sky SA v Kookmin Bank [2011] 1 WLR 2900 at [23] stating that if language is 
unambiguous courts must apply it but cf Lord Sumption in Sans Souci Ltd v VRL Services Ltd [2012] 
UKPC 6 at [14] suggesting an arguably wider scope for courts’ role in construction that the real 
concern is whether the language is open to question with ambiguity being only one of the reasons why 
might be so open, cited with approval in Napier Park European Credit Opportunities Fund Ltd v 
Harbourmaster Pro-rata CLO 2 BV [2014] EWCA Civ 984 at [36] (Lewison LJ). 
37 See Re Quest CAE Ltd (1985) 1 BCC 99,389, which concerned the construction of an all moneys 
clause in a debenture and Kova Establishment v Sasco Investments Ltd [1998] 2 BCLC 83, which 
concerned the construction of a guarantee and a charge. See also ING Lease (UK) Ltd v Harwoood 
[2007] EWHC 2292 (QB), in which a similar approach was taken in construing a guarantee.  	  
38 See Revenue and Customs Commissioners v Football League Ltd [2012] EWHC 1372 (Ch); [2013] 
1 BCLC 285, [4] and [5]. 
39 For further discussion, see L Hilliard, ‘Assignment of unsecured debts, security and insolvency’ 
[2014 BJIBFL 626. 
40 Deeley v Lloyds Bank [1912] AC 756 (HL). 
14.1.4.2 It is possible for a creditor to assign a liability that is due or owing to 
it, together with an assignment of the security for such a liability, so long as there is 
no contractual restriction that would prevent the assignment taking place41 and that 
the liability is one that can be assigned as a matter of law. This is recognised by 
section 114 of the Law of Property Act 1925 and by the Third Schedule to the Act,42 
which relate to transfers by way of deed of ‘mortgages’, which is defined to include a 
mortgage or charge of any property for securing money or money’s worth.43 
‘Property’ is defined comprehensively to include any action and any interest in real or 
personal property. It is clear, therefore, that section 114 is intended to apply to 
transfers by way of deed of security over all types of asset, with a specific exception 
for transfers of security bills of sale over chattels.44 Section 114 provides that an 
assignment by way of deed of a mortgage (as defined) is effective to assign the rights 
and benefit of the transferor in the security and in the liabilities that are secured by it, 
but this is expressly subject to the mortgagor’s right of redemption. Section 114 is a 
facilitative provision. It does not provide the only method by which a transfer of 
security can take place. 
14.1.4.3 Despite what has just been said concerning transfers of security, it is 
submitted that it is not possible to take a bare assignment of security without also 
taking an assignment of the liabilities to the transferor that were intended to be 
covered by such security, even if the security document states that the chargee or 
mortgagee under it includes the successors and assigns of the original beneficiary of 
the security. Accordingly, the transferee cannot rely upon the security to cover 
liabilities that the debtor has incurred directly to the transferee as, for instance, 
liabilities due or owing to the transferee prior to the assignment which were unsecured 
at the time of the assignment. There are three reasons for this. First, if such an 
assignment was possible then the effect would be that a previously unsecured creditor 
would be elevated to the position of being a secured creditor and that would have the 
effect of subverting the pari passu rules of insolvency as they would relate to the 
position of unsecured creditors of the obligor that had created the security.45 
Secondly, the granting of security for the liabilities that it is intended to secure is a 
consensual act, which requires agreement between the parties. It would be contrary to 
the requirement for such a consensus if liabilities that were originally intended to be 
unsecured could effectively become secured without the consent of the debtor. 
Thirdly, the effect of the assignment would be to deny to the obligor the benefit of its 
equity of redemption upon the discharge of the liabilities that were originally secured 
by the security. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
41 See 14.1.9.2 below.  
42 As to the effect of s 114 of the Act in relation to transfers of registered and unregistered land, see 
Credit & Mercantile PLC v Marks [2005] EWCA Civ 760, [2005] 1 WLR 3412 and Paragon Finance 
PLC v Pender [2005] EWCA Civ 760, [2005] 1 WLR 3412, Meretz Investments NV v ACP Ltd [2007] 
EWCA Civ 1303, [2008] Ch 244. 
43 See s 205(1)(xvi) of the Act. 
44 The exception is contained in s 114(5) of the Act. 
45 This point was adverted to in obiter comments in the decision at first instance in OBG Ltd v Allan 
[2001] Lloyd’s Rep Bank 365, at 373. Although the case went on appeal to the Court of Appeal ([2005] 
EWCA Civ 106, [2005] QB 762) and the House of Lords ([2007] UKHL 21), the point did not arise in 
the appeals. 
14.1.5 Non-recourse security 
In the usual case, security is taken to support the primary obligation or personal 
covenant of the obligor to pay, perform, or be responsible for the relevant liabilities. 
A consequence of this is that if the security is insufficient to cover the liabilities, the 
obligor will remain liable for the deficiency under its personal obligation, although 
that may be of small comfort to a creditor which is faced with an insolvent obligor.46 
It is possible, however, for the parties to agree that the creditor will confine its right of 
recourse or recovery to the secured assets, so that it will not have any personal right of 
recovery against the obligor.47 This model is sometimes used in project or property 
construction finance, under which the relevant financiers agree to take the risk that the 
project or property assets may not yield a sufficient value to see them whole. No 
doubt, the interest and fees that they charge for providing the finance will reflect that 
risk. 
14.1.5.1 Other methods of non-recourse financing 
There are other techniques by which finance might be provided on a non-recourse 
basis. Sometimes a transaction might involve a combination of them, together with 
the use of security without a personal covenant to pay. A brief description will now be 
given of such other techniques. 
14.1.5.1.1 A fairly simple method of achieving an element of non-recourse 
financing is for the finance to be provided to a subsidiary company in a group, on the 
basis that the other members of the group, including its parent company, may rely on 
the normal principle of separate identity in company law, so that they should not be 
responsible for the borrower’s debts and liabilities.48 However, there may be 
situations where the concept of separate identity may be overridden by statutory 
provisions or by courts, for example where the subsidiary and the parent company are 
a “single economic unit”49 but there is no general principle to pierce the corporate veil 
and courts will do so only very rarely.50  In addition, an action may be brought against 
the directors and other officers of the borrower if it could be shown that they had 
engaged in fraudulent or wrongful trading.51 It is also worth bearing in mind that the 
liabilities of a subsidiary may have to be included in the consolidated accounts for the 
parent company and its group. 
14.1.5.1.2 It is also possible for a lender to agree that a borrower’s obligation to 
make repayment of its debt, and to pay its other obligations, should be limited by 
conditions that are set out in the relevant credit agreement. For instance, the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
46 A secured creditor is entitled to value its security and prove in a liquidation as an unsecured creditor 
for any deficiency and it is also entitled to prove for a deficiency after it has realised its security: see 
Rules 4.75 (1)(e), 4.88, and 4.95 of the Insolvency Rules 1986. 
47 Mathew v Blackmore (1857) 1 H&N 762; De Vigier v IRC [1964] 1 WLR 1073; Levett v Barclays 
Bank PLC [1995] 1 WLR 1260, at 1271–1272 (Michael Burton QC). 
48 Salomon v A Salomon and Co [1897] AC 22 (HL) 
49 DHN Food Distributors Ltd v Tower Hamlets London Borough Council [1976] 1 WLR 852 (CA) 
860 (Lord Denning MR), Beckett Investment Management Group Ltd v Hall [2007] EWCA Civ 613, 
[2007] ICR 1539 para 18 (Maurice Kay LJ).  
50 See Lord Mance and Lord Clarke in Petrodel Resources v Prest; Prest v Prest [2013] UKSC 34, 
[2013] 2 AC 415, at [100], [102]-[103]. 
51 See ss 213 and 214 of the Insolvency Act 1986 (relating to the actions that can be brought by a 
liquidator). See also Small Business, Enterprise and Employment Act, ss246ZA and 246ZB (not yet in 
force) which empower administrators to such actions.  
borrower’s obligation to make payments might be made dependent upon meeting cash 
flow and other conditions or the prior payment of other creditors. 
14.1.5.1.3 In debt or receivables financing, the financier which purchases the 
debts might be prepared to do so on a non-recourse basis, so that if the underlying 
debtor defaults in payment of the debts that have been purchased, the financier will 
suffer the attendant loss. If the financier is not prepared to take that risk then it will 
require a right of recourse against the seller. 
14.1.6 Third party security 
It is possible for a guarantor or other type of surety to give security in support of its 
obligations under the guarantee or other relevant instrument. It follows from what has 
been said above concerning non-recourse security and as mentioned above that it is 
also possible for a person to give security over its own assets for the performance of 
another’s (the debtor’s) obligations by way of third party security without the giver of 
the security undertaking a personal obligation by way of guarantee.52 Security of the 
latter type is often referred to as collateral or third party security.53 
14.1.7 Security held by a trustee 
Where the obligor has liabilities that are owed to several persons and it is not practical 
for each of them to take separate security then it would be useful if the security could 
be taken and held by one person on their joint behalves. The utility of this would be 
further enhanced if that security could be held on behalf of the successors, transferees, 
and assigns for the time being of such persons, such as the bond holders under a bond 
issue, where the identity of the bond holders is capable of changing frequently during 
the lifetime of the issue, or the syndicate members under a syndicate loan facility 
which contemplates the transference of participations in the facility from time to time 
by way of novation. This can be achieved under English law by using a security 
trustee, which would take the security and hold it on trust on behalf of all the 
syndicate members or bond holders for the time being,54 the security being expressed 
to secure all of the present and future indebtedness, both actual and contingent, that 
might be due to them.55 To assist the trustee in pursuing recovery proceedings and in 
the enforcement of the security, the documentation under which the security is taken 
by the trustee is likely to contain a parallel debt provision, by which the indebtedness 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
52 Re Conley [1938] 2 All ER 127, in which it was held that the giver of the security would still fall to 
be considered as a ‘surety or guarantor’ for the purposes of the forerunners of ss 239 and 340 of the 
Insolvency Act 1986 (persons who might be preferred under the provisions dealing with preferences). 
53 See Rose LJ in Re Bank of Credit and Commerce International SA (No 8) [1996] Ch 245, at 254. 
Although the decision was the subject of an appeal to the House of Lords (decided at [1998] AC 214) 
this particular point was not controversial. 
54 One of the basic requirements for the validity of a trust is that there should be certainty as to the 
composition of the class of beneficiaries under the trust. Notwithstanding the fluctuating nature of the 
bond holders or syndicate members under such a trust, it is submitted that the appropriate test as to 
certainty of the beneficiaries in such a situation is that laid down in McPhail v Doulton [1971] AC 424, 
namely, whether at any particular time that it was relevant to determine the identity of the beneficiaries, 
the trustee could say with certainty that any particular person was or was not a member of the class of 
beneficiaries. 
55 The representative capacity of a security trustee in holding security on behalf of the banks as its 
beneficiaries, was discussed in British Power & Energy Trading Ltd v Credit Suisse [2008] EWCA Civ 
53. That case concerned a syndicated facility. This is subject, of course, to the terms of the trust deed or 
other documentation under which the trustee is appointed to hold the security on behalf of the syndicate 
members, which may place restrictions upon the powers of the trustee. 
that was due to the financiers would also be expressed to be due to the security 
trustee.56 
It had been thought that security could not be granted to a person unless he was a 
creditor or a trustee. However, in Lehman Brothers International (Europe) (in 
administration)57 Briggs J held that an agreement between a security holder and (B) 
security grantor (obligor, A) purporting to secure liabilities owed to B and a third 
party (C) had the effect of creating a right in favour B to resort to the property to 
discharge liabilities owed to B as well as C. As Briggs J noted, “B may have good 
business or personal reasons to wish to ensure that A pays his debt to C”.58 It is 
submitted that the decision should not be understood to mean that parties to a security 
agreement are able to create security in favour of third parties in the sense of making 
them all secured creditors.59 The decision, correctly understood, is an authority for the 
proposition that it is possible for parties to a security agreement to create a security 
interest which will secure debts owed to other parties. In other words, one security 
agreement can have the effect of creating one interest in favour of whoever is the 
party to the agreement, securing debts owed to that party as well as debts owed to 
others. The decision, however, is controversial. It is difficult, for example, to see how 
the secured party could enforce security for a debt he is not owed.  It is likely to be 
interpreted narrowly, and that, in most situations, a person taking security for a debt 
he is not owed will be held to be a trustee or an agent.  
14.1.8 Intention to create security 
The creation of security is a consensual act of the parties. English law does not 
automatically give a creditor security merely because it is a creditor or even a 
particular type of creditor, except in the case of certain creditors who may assert a 
possessory lien over goods (strictly speaking, this arises as an implied incident of the 
agreement under which possession of the goods was delivered to the lienee) or certain 
unpaid vendors of assets or purchasers of such assets who have pre-paid and are 
entitled to assert an equitable lien (although then the lien arises by operation of law 
rather than consensually). Apart from those unusual cases, if the creditor is to take and 
hold security then it must obtain the obligor’s or a third party’s agreement to give the 
security.60 It follows that a prerequisite to the creation of security is that the parties 
(and, crucially, the obligor or a third party security giver) should intend that security 
will be created. It will usually be fairly obvious that such was the intention of the 
parties although it is also possible that whilst the parties may intend to enter into a 
proprietary transaction other than by way of security, it may be characterised as being 
in the nature of a secured transaction. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
56 Such provisions usually go on to state that, to the extent that the indebtedness is paid in the ordinary 
course under the relevant financial documentation prior to default, such a payment will constitute a pro 
tanto reduction of the liability to make a payment that is due to the trustee. 
57 [2012] EWHC 2997 (Ch); [2014] 2 BCLC 295 at [43]-[44].	  
58 Lehman Brothers International (Europe) (in administration) [2012] EWHC 2997 (Ch), [2014] 2 
BCLC 295 at [44]-[46.	  
59 This is by contrast to a suggestion in the literature that the agreement creates security in favour of the 
party to the agreement as well as to a third party, see D Saoul, ‘Lehman: liens untied’ [2013] 3 BJIFBL 
143, 144. 
60 Palmer v Carey [1926] AC 703; Swiss Bank Corp v Lloyds Bank Ltd [1982] AC 584; Edwards and 
Smith v Flightline Ltd; Re Swissair Schweizerische Luftverkehr AG [2003] EWCA Civ 63, [2003] 1 
WLR 1200. In none of those cases was it found that the facts supported an agreement to create security. 
14.1.8.1 There are situations, however, where a transaction may have the 
superficial appearance of being in the guise of security but where, on closer 
examination, it turns out that the necessary intention was lacking, thereby leaving the 
creditor in an unsecured position. This difficulty is likely to arise where there has 
been an agreement that moneys should be set aside and only dealt with in a certain 
way,61 but it may also arise in other situations as well, such as where there has been 
an agreement to similar effect concerning securities.62 In Palmer v Carey63 the Privy 
Council drew a distinction between two situations in determining if the necessary 
consensual intention existed for the creation of a proprietary interest by way of 
security. First, when there was merely an agreement that moneys or other property 
should be paid into an account or otherwise isolated and could not be dealt with by the 
payor or other similar person except in an agreed manner. In that situation, no security 
would arise because there was just a contractual arrangement restricting the use to 
which the moneys or other property could be put. Even though such a restriction 
might be protected by the grant of an injunction restraining its breach, it would not 
amount to the grant of a proprietary interest by way of security. Secondly, the 
alternative situation was where it was agreed that the moneys or other property should 
be treated as creating a (specifically enforceable) right to resort to a fund that had 
been created to discharge a debt.64 In other words, that it had been agreed that a 
proprietary interest in favour of the creditor should be created in the fund or other 
property, to which the creditor could look for payment and discharge of the liabilities 
due to it. In the second case, there would be merely an agreement for the creation of 
security. It should be noted, however, that even though there may be an agreement to 
create security, it will still be necessary to show that the relevant assets exist and have 
been appropriated to the security.65 
14.1.9 Contractual impediments to the creation of security 
A person might be precluded by a contractual undertaking that it has given from 
creating security. The undertaking may be in the form of a negative pledge which 
restricts that person from entering into transactions by way of security in favour of 
third parties. Alternatively, the undertaking may amount to a restriction in a contract 
upon dealing with the rights that arise in that person’s favour under the contract. Each 
of those types of provision is discussed elsewhere in this book, so what follows is 
limited to a brief summary. 
14.1.9.1 Negative pledges 
Negative pledges are discussed in more detail in Chapter 3 and in Chapter 12.66 A 
negative pledge is a contractual undertaking in an agreement or security document by 
which a party (A) to that agreement or document agrees with the other party (B) that 
A will not create security over its assets, or dispose of those assets, in favour of 
anyone else (C). In the present context, A as the party that has agreed to be bound by 
the negative pledge would be the obligor that wishes to create security, and C as the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
61 As was the case in Palmer v Carey [1926] AC 703 and in Edwards and Smith v Flightline Ltd; Re 
Swissair Schweizerische Luftverkehr AG [2003] EWCA Civ 63, [2003] 1 WLR 1200. 
62 As in Swiss Bank Corp v Lloyds Bank Ltd [1982] AC 584. 
63  [1926] AC 703. 
64 Re TXU Europe Group plc [2003] EWHC 3105 (Ch), [2004] 1 BCLC 519, [35].	  
65 Mac-Jordan Construction Ltd v Brookmount Erostin Ltd [1992] BCLC 350. 
66 See also A McKnight,  ‘Restrictions on Dealing with Assets in Financing Documents: Their Role, 
Meaning and Effect’ [2002] JIBL 193.  
third party would be the creditor that is to receive such security. When considering the 
effect of a negative pledge, it is necessary to check carefully as to the types of 
transaction that fall within the overall compass of the clause. In addition, there might 
also be agreed exceptions to the restrictions contained in the clause, and the proposed 
transaction might come within a permitted exception. 
14.1.9.1.1 Negative pledge clauses arise in three different contexts. First, such a 
clause might be contained in an unsecured facility or other credit or debt raising 
instrument (such as in the terms and conditions of a bond issue), by which A as the 
debtor agrees with B as the lender or lenders that it will not create security in favour 
of third parties such as C. The intention behind such a clause is to maintain the 
lender’s pari passu unsecured position with respect to other claimants against the 
debtor and in the distribution of its assets, particularly in an insolvency of the debtor. 
Secondly, in a floating charge a negative pledge clause may be used to restrict the 
types of transaction that A as the chargor might otherwise be able to enter into within 
the general concept of the liberty to deal with the charged assets in the ordinary 
course of business. Thirdly, a negative pledge clause should invariably be contained 
in any security document by which it is intended to create fixed security, so that A as 
the chargor or mortgagor is precluded from engaging in any dealings with the assets 
that are the subject of the security. This is necessary to demonstrate that the security is 
not a floating charge. Under current English law any clauses which are contained in a 
document creating a charge and which seek to prohibit or restrict the obligor from 
creating further security ranking equally or ahead of the charge are registrable in the 
Companies House if the obligor is a company or a limited liability partnership.67  
Lack of registration within the prescribed period means that the clause is 
unenforceable against creditors, liquidators and the administrator.   Where a negative 
pledge clause is included in a floating charge, registration will usually serve as notice 
to prevent subsequent encumbrancers from obtaining priority.68  
14.1.9.1.2 The principal difficulty69 concerning negative pledges, especially the 
first kind, is in establishing the consequences, as against C, where A breaches the 
clause and enters into a prohibited transaction in favour of the third party. This comes 
down to making a determination as to whether the third party is liable to B for the tort 
of inducing or procuring a breach of the contract between A and B. If so, the third 
party would be liable in damages (which may not be of much practical utility) but, 
more importantly, an injunction might be available to B so as to prevent C as the third 
party from relying upon the benefit of the transaction.70 For B to succeed against the 
third party, it is necessary (in addition to showing that the relevant person (A) had 
breached the negative pledge) to demonstrate that the third party (C) had the 
necessary knowledge of the contract and the relevant restriction, that it realised that 
the relevant person (A) would breach it, and that the third party (C) intended to cause 
the breach.71 Such an intention will be lacking, for instance, if the third party had 
acted on legal advice to the effect that it would not be entering into a transaction 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
67 Section 859D (2)(c) of the Companies Act 2006.  
68 See section 14.13 below. 
69 For a discussion of other difficulties with the first kind of negative pledge, see L Gullifer (ed), Goode 
on Legal Problems of Credit and Security (Sweet & Maxwell 2013 5th edn) para 1-79 to 1-83. 
70 See Browne-Wilkinson J in Swiss Bank Corp v Lloyds Bank Ltd [1979] Ch 548. 
71 These aspects were explored by Lord Hoffmann in OBG Ltd v Allan; Douglas v Hello! Ltd; 
Mainstream Properties Ltd v Young [2007] UKHL 21, [2008] 1 AC 1. 
which amounted to a breach of the restriction72 or if it honestly believed that the 
relevant person (A) had received consent to enter into the transaction.73 
14.1.9.2 Restrictions within a contract upon dealing with rights arising under 
the contract 
Such restrictions would be relevant where an obligor wishes to create security over 
the benefit of contractual rights in its favour, such as a debt payable to it. It may be 
precluded from doing so by the terms of a restriction in the contract under which the 
right arises. These types of restriction are discussed in more detail in Chapter 12.74 
There are proposals to render contractual terms prohibiting or restricting assignment 
of receivables ineffective (with some exceptions).75 
14.1.9.2.1 When considering the effect of a contractual restriction, it is necessary 
to consider both the contractual rights to which it relates and the types of dealing with 
those rights that it prohibits or otherwise restricts. This will be a matter of 
construction of the contract.76 For instance, a distinction might be drawn in the terms 
of the restriction between dealing with unearned rights (such as a right to be paid 
which will only arise after a service has been performed), which might be prohibited, 
and dealing with accrued rights that have been earned under the contract (for instance, 
a right to be paid because the service has been performed).77 Similarly, a distinction 
might be drawn in the construction of the relevant wording between a statutory 
assignment, an equitable assignment, and a declaration of trust of a contractual right,78 
or between an assignment by way of mortgage and a charge. Thus, the clause may 
prevent one or more of those types of dealing but permit the others to occur. From the 
perspective of a contracting party in whose favour the restriction applies, the more 
comprehensive the wording of the restriction, the less opportunity the other party will 
have to enter into dealings relating to its contractual rights. From the perspective of 
the latter party, it is best to ensure that the terms of the restriction are specifically 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
72 Meretz Investments NV v ACP Ltd [2007] EWCA Civ 1303; [2008] Ch 244. 
73 Which was the position on the facts in Mainstream Properties Ltd v Young [2007] UKHL 21; [2008] 
1 AC 1. 
74 See also A McKnight, ‘Contractual Restrictions on a Creditor’s Right to Alienate Debts’ at [2003] 
JIBL 1 and [2003] JIBLR 43; Goode, ‘Contractual Prohibitions against Assignment’ [2009] LMCLQ 
300; GJ Tolhurst and JW Carter, ‘Prohibitions on assignment: a choice to be made’ [2014] CLJ 405.	  
75 Section 1 of the Small Business, Enterprise and Employment Act 2015 conferred a power to 
introduce a statutory measure to nullify contractual prohibitions against assignment, at the time of 
writing drafted as Business Contract Terms (Restrictions on Assignment of Receivables) Regulations. 
Under the draft regulations the nullification of bans on assignment would not apply to contracts to 
provide various financial services including lending (including consumer credit, mortgage credit, 
factoring and financing of commercial transactions), see the draft Business Contract Terms 
(Restrictions on Assignment of Receivables) Regulations, regs 2, 1. See further R Calnan, ‘Ban the 
ban: prohibiting restrictions on the assignment of receivables’ [2015] 3 JIBFL 136; H Beale, L Gullifer, 
S Patterson, ‘Ban on assignment clauses: views from the coalface’ [2015] 8 JIBFL 463 
76 See Lord Browne-Wilkinson in Linden Gardens Trust Ltd v Lenesta Sludge Disposals Ltd [1994] AC 
85. 
77 As, for instance, occurred in R v Chester and North Wales Legal Aid Area Office (No 12), ex p 
Floods of Queensferry Ltd [1998] 1 WLR 1496. 
78 Don King Productions Inc v Warren [2000] Ch 291; Devefi Pty Ltd v Mateffy Pearl Nagy Pty Ltd 
[1993] RPC 493, at 505 (Fed Ct of Aust); and Barbados Trust Co Ltd v Bank of Zambia [2007] EWCA 
Civ 148, [2007] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 495; for a succinct summary of principles see Stuart-Smith J in Co-
operative Group Ltd v Birse Developments Ltd (In Liquidation) [2014] EWHC 530 (TCC), [2014] 
PNLR 21, at [88].  See also Stopjoin Projects Limited v Balfour Beatty Engineering Services (HY) 
Limited [2014] EWHC 589 (TCC). 
confined to stated matters and that the relevant clause states what dealings are 
permitted. 
14.1.9.2.2 Because the restriction upon dealing goes to the very heart of the 
contractual right that it affects and defines the freedom of the relevant party to deal 
with the right, a purported dealing in favour of a third party that offends against the 
restriction will be ineffective to confer a proprietary right upon the third party.79 This 
will be the case, whether or not the third party was aware of the restriction or intended 
to cause a breach of it. 
14.1.9.3 Other types of restriction 
There may be other types of restriction, principally of a statutory nature, which may 
prevent a proprietary transaction from taking place, or place constraints as to the 
circumstances in which it can take place. An example of this is the prohibition upon a 
public company, or a subsidiary of such a company, giving financial assistance 
(including by way of giving a guarantee or security) in connection with an acquisition 
of shares in the public company.80 Similarly, a public company may not give financial 
assistance in connection with an acquisition of shares in a private company, if that 
company is its parent company.81 Another example concerns restrictions upon a 
company in entering into transactions with parties that are connected with it.82 A 
further example concerns dealing in assets that are subject to regulatory restrictions 
upon transfer or acquisition of such assets, such as the shares in an authorised person 
which carry ‘control’ of the authorised person, under Part XII of the Financial 
Services and Markets Act 2000. 
14.1.10 Conflict of laws and cross-border issues 
A number of issues might arise which may involve cross-border elements and the 
associated considerations that arise in the subject of conflict of laws. They may 
include the matters already referred to above and other issues as well, such as whether 
the relevant asset is capable of being taken as security, and if it is available as 
security, the liabilities that may be secured and the types of creditor that may hold 
security, the types of security that are available and the methods involved in taking 
the security, as well as the attendant procedures and formalities that must be observed 
(including, for instance, if it is necessary to notarise and register the security), the 
effectiveness of the security, the ranking and priority of different claimants in the 
same asset, the creditors which may have preferential claims in an asset, the right to 
enforce the security and the procedures for enforcement of the security, as well as the 
effect of an insolvency of the debtor. 
14.1.10.1 Those various issues will be examined in this chapter under English 
law, and the chapter will proceed on the basis that English law governs all of the 
aspects that are relevant to the subject matter. Nonetheless, conflict of laws 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
79 See, for instance, the strict approach that was taken by the Court of Appeal in Barbados Trust Co Ltd 
v Bank of Zambia [2007] EWCA Civ 148, [2007] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 495 as to the obligation to comply 
with the precise requirements of the relevant clause before an assignment of the lender’s rights could 
take place. 
80 S 678 of the Companies Act 2006 (which prospectively replaces the more comprehensive 
prohibitions to be found in s 151 of the Companies Act 1985). 
81 S 679 of the Companies Act 2006. 
82 See the provisions concerning substantial property transactions contained in s 190 et seq of the 
Companies Act 2006 (which replace the provisions of s 320 et seq of the Companies Act 1985). 
considerations are bound to arise in transactions that have a cross-border element, 
particularly where the relevant asset is located in another jurisdiction. In such cases, 
one or more foreign laws may govern the various relevant issues and it would be 
necessary to take advice in the jurisdictions concerned. The conflict of laws and cross-
border insolvency aspects are examined further in Chapters 4, 5 and 12. Reference 
should also be made to Chapter 17 where alternative systems for maintaining secured 
transactions are discussed. Although the discussion that is contained in this chapter 
concentrates on the way that English law analyses the issues and deals with them, the 
discussion may also serve to provide a point of reference for comparative purposes 
when conflict of laws and cross-border issues arise. 
14.2 Concepts of Property, Interests in Property, and Dealings in 
Property: An Introduction 
14.2.1 It is not really possible to comprehend the approach that English law takes to 
secured and other forms of proprietary transaction without understanding the types of 
interest that may exist in property (or assets) under English law, as well as the 
difference between law and equity and the methods by which dealings in property 
may take place. At the risk of over-simplification of a complex area of study, there 
now follows a general description of those matters. 
14.2.2 Concepts of property 
When a person has an interest in an asset, whether by an ownership or a security right, 
he is said to have a ‘proprietary’ interest in the asset.83 Traditionally, English law 
distinguishes between real property, which concerns land and certain interests in land, 
and personal property, which covers everything else (e.g. goods and all types of 
intangible assets). Somewhat confusingly, English law has also treated some interests 
in land as ‘chattels real’ and, thus, as being personal property (e.g. a tenant’s rights 
under a lease). English law also distinguishes between tangible and intangible 
property. Tangible property includes all forms of real property, as well as goods 
(sometimes called chattels). These assets have a physical presence. Intangible 
property covers the remainder, being rights of various kinds which do not have a 
physical quality, but which the law recognises and protects, whose quality and value 
is protected by being able to sue so as to enforce the right (e.g. for payment of a debt) 
or to protect the right against misuse by others (e.g. intellectual property).84 Intangible 
property therefore includes choses in action (e.g. debts) and intellectual property.85 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
83 Against the view that equitable interests are proprietary is the suggestion that they are merely 
persistent rights against another person with respect to the asset, see: B McFarlane, The Structure of 
Property Law (Hart 2008). The view taken in practice, and followed here is that equitable interests, at 
least equitable security interests are proprietary in the sense that they are enforceable against at least 
certain third parties: other creditors, insolvency officers and in some circumstances also purchasers. 
84 As to what constitutes intangible property, see National Provincial Bank Ltd v Hastings Car Mart 
Ltd [1965] AC 1175, applied for example in Armstrong DLW GmbG v Winnington Networks Ltd 
[2012] EWHC 10 (Ch), [2013] Ch 156, where allowances in relation to CO2 emissions amounted to 
property.  
85 English law also recognises as a chattel a documentary intangible (i.e. the physical document 
comprising an instrument such as a bill of exchange) where the rights of the holder, including the right 
to enforce it, are encapsulated in the instrument, so that possession of the instrument represents the 
proprietary entitlement to it and the rights it represents. For practical purposes, this means negotiable 
instruments. 
14.2.2.1 The above is the English law domestic classification of property and 
assets. Different concepts are employed in categorising assets where there is a foreign 
or extra-territorial element, involving issues outside the English domestic jurisdiction. 
This is the area of conflict of laws. The relevant categories in that situation are 
immovable property (i.e. land and interests in land) and movable property (i.e. the 
rest, which is split between tangible movables and intangible movables). 
14.2.3 Legal and equitable interests in assets 
English law distinguishes between legal and equitable interests in an asset. The 
distinction may be relevant to a security transaction for the following reasons. First, it 
will affect the method and structure of the transaction. Secondly, it will dictate the 
types of interest that may arise or be taken. Thirdly, it will be relevant to matters 
relating to attachment of the security to the relevant assets, as well as perfection and 
priority issues, and the enforcement of the security. 
14.2.3.1 Legal interests 
In the original understanding of English law there were only common law (or ‘legal’) 
interests, because only the common law existed. The common law recognised one 
ownership interest, the transfer of which depended on the existence of the asset in the 
possession of the owner and typically also the delivery of possession or completing of 
a formal act such as a deed. For example, the transfer of ownership of land depended 
upon a formal conveyance of the title from the old owner to the new owner; the 
transfer of ownership of goods in a contract of sale was exceptional as it only 
depended upon an intention to transfer the property (ownership) in the goods and 
delivery of possession was not necessary, although it usually accompanied the 
ownership transfer. Transfer of goods other than by sale required delivery or a deed.86 
The common law did recognise certain subservient interests in an asset, such as the 
rights of a tenant to occupy land and the rights of a bailee to possession of goods, but 
they were less than ownership and were limited. The common law was unable to 
recognise that the title in an asset might technically be held by one person but in 
reality or conscience he did so on behalf of a third party (e.g. because the third party 
was only an infant or a poor widow). On the other hand, the common law did 
recognise the concept of shared ownership of a legal interest, either as joint tenants or 
as tenants in common. 
14.2.3.1.1 It should also be noted that the common law has never been able to 
recognise proprietary interests in future property, including property yet to be 
acquired by the putative owner. It can only deal with what exists. Any transaction at 
common law concerning such future property could only give rise to a contractual 
obligation, for which damages could be awarded if the contract was breached. A 
claim for damages is not much use if the defendant has become insolvent. 
14.2.3.1.2 The creation of security at common law followed the same rigid 
pattern as for transfers of ownership. Security over land (before the 1925 property 
legislation) in essence involved a formal conveyance of the title by the obligor to the 
creditor. Discharge of the security required a formal re-conveyance back to the 
obligor once it had satisfied its obligations. At best, the obligor might be able to point 
to a contractual right to call for the re-conveyance, but it had no proprietary interest in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
86 See Cochrane v Moore (1890) 25 QBD 57 (CA). 
the land in the meantime because it had given up its title. Having no proprietary 
interest, the obligor was in a weak position. 
14.2.3.1.3 The position was a little different with goods. Security could be created 
by mortgage but historically, as a matter of convenience, it was often done by means 
of a pledge, which involved giving possession to the creditor and regaining possession 
once the debt had been paid off. In the case of a pledge, the common law was 
prepared to recognise two different legal interests, being that of ownership vested in 
the borrower (the ‘pledgor’) and the ‘special property’ of the security holder (the 
‘pledgee’) in the goods. The common law also recognised a right of retention by way 
of a lien over goods, which was asserted to protect a debt due to the person holding 
the goods by the person who had delivered possession to him. 
14.2.3.1.4 So far as concerned choses in action and other types of intangible 
property, the common law was unable to recognise dealings (‘assignments’) in such 
assets, by way of outright transfer or security. Traditionally, such transactions could 
only take place in equity. This was rectified by section 1 of the Policies of Assurance 
Act 1867, which allowed for policies of life assurance to be assigned at law for the 
first time, section 1 of the Policies of Marine Insurance Act 1868 (now section 50 of 
the Marine Insurance Act 1906), which allowed for the assignment of marine policies, 
and section 25(6) of the Judicature Act 1873, which is now section 136 of the Law of 
Property Act 1925, which concerns assignment at law of all other forms of legal 
choses. There are strict formal requirements that must be met to obtain the benefit of 
the statutory provisions.87 Although the effect of those statutory provisions was to 
impose upon the common law a system by which it would recognise assignments 
which met the requisite conditions, it also remained possible to effect transactions in 
equity to the same extent as had been the case before the passing of the statutes.88 
14.2.3.2 Equitable interests 
It was to overcome the rigidity of the common law that the separate and more flexible 
jurisdiction of equity was developed by the chancery courts. These courts (which 
historically operated separately from the jurisdiction at common law) were prepared 
to impose obligations upon the conscience of parties and also acted to overcome the 
rigid and formal requirements and restrictions of the common law. For instance, they 
regarded that as done which ought to be done. In consequence, there developed a 
recognition in equity of proprietary interests (called ‘equitable’ or ‘beneficial’ 
interests) which could be superimposed upon the simple legal title recognised at 
common law. In such a case, equity said that in addition to the underlying legal title 
held at common law, there was an equitable (or beneficial) title which the chancery 
courts would protect by directing the parties to take appropriate action, even by 
issuing restraining and other orders directed at action in the common law courts. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
87 Section 3 of the Policies of Assurance Act 1867 sets out need for written notice of the date and 
purport of such assignment given to the assurance company liable at their principal place of business 
and section 5 of the Act sets out any assignment may be made either by endorsement on the policy or 
by a separate instrument, needs to be duly stamped. It is interesting to note that the 1867 Act and the 
1868 Act pre-dated the provision for the legal assignment of other choses that was provided for by s 
25(6) of the Supreme Court of Judicature Act 1873. Formalities under section 136 of the Law of 
Property Act 1925 are discussed below (14.5.3.1.1). 
88 See Lord Macnaghten in William Brandt’s Sons & Co v Dunlop Rubber Co Ltd [1905] AC 454, at 
461. 
14.2.3.2.1 When there is an equitable interest there will also be an underlying 
legal interest in the asset. This usually, but not always (see Lord Browne-Wilkinson in 
Westdeutsche Landesbank Girozentrale v Islington LBC89), takes the form of equity 
forcing the holder of the legal interest to hold his interest on trust for the benefit of the 
person entitled to the beneficial interest. Equity thus developed the concept of the 
trust. In its simplest form, the trust will be express where it is made clear that one 
person (the ‘trustee’) will hold the legal title in identifiable assets (the ‘trust property’) 
for one or more other people (the ‘beneficiaries’). In other cases, equity may impose a 
trust where the circumstances so require, giving rise to a constructive trust or a 
resulting trust. Since legislation in the second half of the 19th century,90 the common 
law courts have also been given power to recognise and protect equitable interests and 
vice versa. 
14.2.3.2.2 Equity said that an obligor which had received credit and given a 
mortgage (the ‘mortgagor’) had an equity of redemption which equity recognised as 
being a proprietary interest in the asset. The equity of redemption gave the mortgagor 
the right to regain its legal title from the creditor (the ‘mortgagee’) upon discharge of 
the secured liability. The chancery court would enforce that right against the 
mortgagee, even to the extent of arranging for the re-conveyance to be executed if the 
mortgagee refused to do so.  Similarly, equity said that in the case of assets of a 
special or unique character, where the remedies of the common law were inadequate 
if the other party failed to honour its contract to transfer the asset, then equity would 
treat that as done which ought to be done and require fulfilment of the contract. In the 
meantime, equity would recognise a proprietary interest in the transferee.  
14.2.3.2.3 Equity was also prepared to recognise the effectiveness of transactions 
in the whole or parts of choses in action and other types of intangible property. It did 
this by the concept of an equitable assignment, to which it attached little in the way of 
requirements for the observance of formalities, so long as the intention to assign was 
clear (see Lord Macnaghten in William Brandt’s Sons & Co v Dunlop Rubber Co 
Ltd91). Such an assignment could be an outright transfer or by way of mortgage. 
14.2.3.2.4 Once equity had developed its concept of equitable proprietary 
interests, it then went on to develop its own concept of security. Such security might 
arise because the subject of the security was an equitable interest (e.g. the equity of 
redemption of the mortgagor or the right of a beneficiary under a trust). Alternatively, 
it might arise because the security was over a common law interest in an asset, but 
had not fulfilled all of the formal requirements for the creation of security at common 
law, so long as enough had been done or agreed for equity to recognise the intended 
consequences of the transaction. In addition, equity developed the charge, which 
differs from other forms of security in that it does not involve a concept, however 
notional, of a transfer of title, but simply a “proprietary impediment” upon the asset 
for repayment of the secured obligation.92 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
89 [1996] AC 669, 706–707. 
90 Principally under the Supreme Court of Judicature Act 1873. 
91 [1905] AC 454. But there must be, as a bare minimum, a sufficient outward evidence of an intention 
to assign the relevant subject matter: see Blackburne J in Finlan v Eyton Morris Winfield [2007] 
EWHC 914 (Ch); [2007] 4 All ER 143, [33]. 
92 See Atkin LJ in National Provincial and Union Bank of England v Charnley [1924] 1 KB 431, 449–
450 and Lord Hoffmann in Re Bank of Credit and Commerce International SA (No 8) [1998] AC 214, 
226. 
14.2.3.2.5 Equity was also prepared to go a step further than the common law in 
relation to transactions concerning future property. As mentioned above, the common 
law is only able to comprehend in a proprietary sense what exists. In certain 
circumstances, however, equity is prepared to give proprietary recognition to the 
effectiveness of contracts concerning future assets, by saying that a beneficial interest 
will attach to the property upon its acquisition, as if that interest had existed as from 
the time of contracting (see Lord Macnaghten in Tailby v The Official Receiver93). 
This can be very useful as a security device. 
14.2.3.2.6 There are some further points which should be noted. First, that 
equitable interests cannot exist in a vacuum; there must always be an underlying legal 
title in an asset.  Secondly, equitable and legal interests in the same asset cannot be 
vested in a sole person; a person can hold both an equitable and legal interest so long 
as there are some other equitable interest-holders or legal-title holders. If legal and 
equitable interest were to vest in one and the same person, there would simply be one 
all-encompassing legal title.94. Thirdly, in an ordinary sale of goods transaction, 
governed by the Sale of Goods Act 1979, equitable interests will not arise as a normal 
consequence of the transaction.95 Fourthly, that there cannot be several legal titles 
existing at the same time, except in the case of limited subservient entitlements, such 
as that of the lessee under a lease of land, the bailee of goods, and a pledgee or lienee 
of goods. Equity, however, has no such qualms and will merrily permit several 
equitable interests, as well as the underlying legal interest, to exist in the same asset. 
Fifthly, whilst it is perfectly possible to have equitable security over legal interests, it 
is not possible to have legal security over equitable interests. There is one possible 
exception to this that may arise under section 136 of the Law of Property Act 1925 in 
relation to assignments of equitable choses in action. Sixthly,  dealings in future 
property with a proprietary effect can only take place in equity. Seventhly, the 1925 
property legislation introduced previously unknown concepts in relation to real 
property. For example, it introduced the concept of a charge  by way of legal 
mortgage (which, hitherto, had only been an equitable security) and it also provided 
that there could be successive charges by way of legal mortgage over the same piece 
of land. It also left the legal title to the land in the mortgagor. Those “heresies” are 
confined to security transactions involving real property. 
14.2.3.2.7 There is a final point to raise concerning the willingness of equity to 
recognise and enforce the outcome of an intended proprietary transaction, which will 
be returned to later in this chapter. It concerns the extent to which equity requires the 
giving of value by the person who seeks equity’s assistance to recognise a transaction. 
Value need not always be required, depending upon the circumstances. Value in this 
context means real or substantial value, as opposed to the nominal value that is 
understood at common law as being required as the consideration to support a 
contract. Value, as understood in equity, may consist of a monetary amount, such as 
an outright payment or an advance by way of loan, or it might consist of some real 
detriment being suffered, such as the promise to do something, giving up a benefit, or 
the deferment of a right. In determining if value is required, there are two of equity’s 
famous maxims that are in play. One that has already been mentioned is that equity 
treats as done that which ought to be done. Another is that equity will not assist a 
volunteer (i.e. a person who has not given value). 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
93  (1888) 13 App Cas 523.  See also Holroyd v Marshall (1862) 10 HL Cas 161. 
94 See Re Bond Worth Ltd [1980] Ch 228. 
95 See Atkin LJ in Re Wait [1927] 1 Ch 606, 625–641. 
14.3 The Concepts of Future Property and Attachment 
14.3.1 In general terms, it is possible under English law to take security over just 
about every type of asset and interest in an asset. As has already been mentioned, 
English law is prepared to go even further and recognise the proprietary consequences 
of transactions involving future property, as well as the effect where an asset is 
converted into proceeds of disposition or other products made from it. There are, 
however, certain limitations upon the breadth of those statements, as will be seen 
from the discussion that follows. 
14.3.2 Future property 
Future property may be defined as property (including an interest in property) that an 
obligor does not hold at the time that it purports to create security over it (or, indeed, 
when it enters into any other type of transaction concerning such property). The 
relevant assets may not yet exist or, whilst existing, they may not yet be owned by the 
obligor.96 Future property will include goods which the obligor will acquire in the 
future,97 debts to become due to the obligor in the future,98 dividends not yet 
declared,99 copyright in works not yet written,100 an expectancy under the will or 
intestacy of a living person,101 and damages not yet sued for and awarded.102 
14.3.2.1 It is sometimes difficult to be sure whether the subject matter of a 
purported dealing is presently existing property or future property by way of a mere 
expectancy, such as income that might be earned in the future from the use of existing 
property.103 An analogy has been drawn in Australian case law between the ‘tree’, 
which is existing property, and the ‘fruit’ that the tree may produce tomorrow, next 
year, or thereafter, which is future property.104 The difference may be important for a 
number of reasons, including in determining the true subject matter of an assignment 
and whether the assignee is entitled to enforce the rights that have purportedly been 
assigned,105 the extent of a prohibition on assignment and whether it catches what has 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
96 See Performing Right Society Ltd v B4U Network (Europe) Ltd [2012] EWHC 3010 (Ch), [2013] 
Bus LR 664 para 62.	  
97 Holroyd v Marshall (1862) 10 HL Cas 191. 
98 Tailby v Official Receiver (1888) 13 App Cas 523. By contrast, a debt that has been incurred but is 
payable in the future is presently existing property. 
99 Norman v Fed Comr of Taxation (1963) 109 CLR 9. 
100 Performing Right Soc Ltd v London Theatre of Varieties Ltd [1924] AC 1; Peer International Corp 
v Termidor Music Publishers Ltd [2002] EWHC 2675 (Ch), [2004] RPC 22 (the case was subject to an 
appeal, which did not concern this point: [2003] EWCA Civ 1156, [2004] Ch 212). 
101 Re Lind, Industrials Finance Syndicate Ltd v Lind [1915] 2 Ch 345. 
102 Glegg v Bromley [1912] 3 KB 474. 
103 See, for instance, the different results (reached by majority decisions) in two Australian cases: 
Norman v Fed Comr of Taxation (1963) 109 CLR 9 and Shepherd v Fed Comr of Taxation (1965) 113 
CLR 385. 
104 The analogy was drawn by Kitto J in Shepherd v Fed Comr of Taxation (1965) 113 CLR 385, at 
396. 
105 See, for instance, Batey v Jewson Ltd [2008] EWCA Civ 18. In that case, if the assignment had only 
been of the proceeds of a claim (i.e. the fruit), rather than the right of action itself (i.e. the tree), then 
the assignee would have been unable to pursue the claim and assert it for the purposes of a set-off of a 
counterclaim that the assignee wished to establish as against the other party to the litigation. The 
assignor, having become insolvent and been struck off the register of companies, was not in a position 
to pursue the counterclaim. 
purportedly been assigned,106 the rights of set-off that may be enjoyed by the 
assignee,107 the method of transfer that is employed, and whether value is required to 
support the transaction108 and for priority purposes.109 It may also be important in the 
context of the discussion, below, as to whether accretions to an asset might be caught 
within security that is taken over the asset. 
14.3.2.2 Whilst the common law is unable to recognise the proprietary effect of 
transactions involving future property, equity is able to do so, provided that the 
conditions that it lays down are met. This was originally determined by the House of 
Lords in Holroyd v Marshall,110 which held that an agreement that was intended to 
vest a proprietary interest in future property in a transferee (in that case, by way of 
security over future goods) could be effective to do so when the property came into 
existence in the hands of the transferor. 
14.3.2.3 The concept of dealing with future property was developed further by 
the House of Lords in Tailby v The Official Receiver,111 which was a case concerning 
an assignment of future book debts. It was held that equity will recognise the effect of 
an agreement to assign future property, so that equity will treat the property as vesting 
in the intended transferee so long as the following conditions are met: 
(1) the transaction is supported by valuable consideration given at or following 
the time of the agreement (i.e. past consideration is insufficient to support the 
agreement);112 
(2) there is sufficient ascertainment in the identity of the relevant assets when they 
come into existence so that it is certain that they were intended to be caught by 
the agreement; and 
(3) the intention between the parties at the time of their agreement is that 
immediately the assets came into existence in the hands of the putative 
transferor (and without further condition or the exercise of discretion on the 
part of the transferor) the intended proprietary interest should vest in the 
transferee. Such a transferee could be either an absolute purchaser or someone 
taking security. The security could be by way of fixed or floating security. 
14.3.2.4 In Re Lind113 it was said that the effect of the principle is that the 
interest of the intended transferee is treated as having been effective from the date of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
106 See, for instance, R v Chester and North Wales Legal Aid Area Office (No 12), ex p Floods of 
Queensferry Ltd [1998] 1 WLR 1496. This is subject to what was said above about prohibitions on 
assignment, see 14.1.9.2. 
107 Batey v Jewson Ltd [2008] EWCA Civ 18. 
108 As it is not possible to assign future property at law and value is required to support an equitable 
assignment of future property. 
109 For the purposes of the priority rule in Dearle v Hall (Dearle v Hall, Loveridge v Cooper (1828) 3 
Russ 1), which concerns priorities as between competing assignments, it is not possible to give notice 
to a potential debtor of a debt that does not yet exist. See further the discussion of the rule in Chap 12.  
For an example of where the scope of an assignment affected priority, see Performing Right Society Ltd 
v B4U Network (Europe) Ltd [2012] EWHC 3010 (Ch), [2013] Bus LR 664. 
110  (1862) 10 HL Cas 191. 
111  (1888) 13 App Cas 523. See, in particular, the speech of Lord Macnaghten where the requirements 
are clearly set out. His Lordship also dispelled the red-herring linking the recognition of assignments of 
future property to a requirement that the transaction should be one that was capable of being the subject 
of a decree for specific performance, which had arisen from what had been said by Lord Westbury in 
Holroyd v Marshall (1862) 10 HLC 191, at 209 and 211. 
112 The requirement for valuable consideration in equity is examined further below. 
113  [1915] 2 Ch 345. In Peer International Corp and ors v Termidor Music Publishers Ltd & ors 
[2002] EWHC 2675 (Ch), [2004] RPC 22 Neuberger J said, [74]–[82], that he preferred the analysis in 
the agreement to assign and so will apply notwithstanding an intervening insolvency 
of the intended transferor which occurs after the date of the agreement to assign but 
before the asset comes into existence.114 For the same reason, the attachment of the 
security to the asset when it comes into existence, where that occurs after the 
commencement of a compulsory winding up, will not be treated as a ‘disposition’ for 
the purposes of section 127(1) of the Insolvency Act 1986. For the purpose of meeting 
the time limit for registration under section 859A(4) of the Companies Act 2006,115 
the relevant period commences to run from the date of the original agreement to 
create the security, not the date that the security attaches to the asset upon its coming 
into existence.116 It has also been said that a conditional agreement to give security 
would be treated as an agreement to give a floating charge and the agreement would 
be registrable.117 
14.3.3 Attachment 
An obligor may agree to create security over an asset but the security may not 
necessarily attach immediately to such asset, in the sense of the asset becoming 
subject to the security. For attachment to occur, the asset must be sufficiently 
identified and come into the ownership of the obligor, as well as being sufficiently 
identified for the purpose of the security. This is particularly relevant in the case 
where a debtor has agreed to give security over future assets (e.g. ‘all debts which 
may become owing to me in the future’ or ‘the car that I will buy next week’ or ‘next 
year’s wheat crop’). Until the relevant asset is in existence, is sufficiently identified 
for the purposes of the security, and is owned by the obligor, there is nothing on 
which the security can attach.118 The same analysis will be relevant where the obligor 
owns an asset but does not identify it with sufficient certainty for security to attach to 
the asset. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Re Lind to that of the Court of Appeal in Collyer v Isaacs (1881) 19 ChD 342, which had doubted that 
the agreement would be treated as effective, in a proprietary sense, as from the date of the agreement 
rather than the date the property came into existence. It should be noted that Collyer v Isaacs pre-dated 
the decision of the House of Lords in Tailby v The Official Receiver. See further the discussion by 
Meagher, Gummow & Lehane, Equity: Doctrines and Remedies (5th edn, 2015), paras 6-275 to 6-330. 
The Supreme Court of Canada recently relied on the correctness of Re Lind  in Royal Bank of Canada v 
Radius Credit Union Ltd, 2010 SCC 48, 325 DLR (4th) 635, [20]. 
114 Where, however, the purported assignor subsequently becomes bankrupt and an asset arises in the 
course of the trustee in bankruptcy running the business, such an asset will vest in the trustee, despite 
an earlier purported assignment executed before the assignor became bankrupt: Re Jones, ex p Nichols 
(1882) 22 ChD 782. This is consistent with s 306 of the Insolvency Act 1986, by virtue of which 
property comprised in the bankrupt’s estate vests in the trustee. The position may be different in a 
winding up, as the assets of the insolvent company do not vest in the liquidator unless the court, at his 
request, makes an order vesting the property in the liquidator pursuant to s 145(1) of the Insolvency 
Act 1986: see Lord Hoffmann in Cambridge Gas Transportation Corp v Official Committee of 
Unsecured Creditors of Navigator Holdings PLC [2006] UKPC 26, [2007] 1 AC 508 and Ramsey J in 
Ruttle Plant Hire Ltd v Secretary of State for the Environment and Rural Affairs [2007] EWHC 2870 
(TCC), [2008] 2 All E.R. (Comm) 264. 
115 Formerly s 870 of the Companies Act 2006. 
116 See also Independent Automatic Sales Ltd v Knowles [1962] 1 WLR 974; The Annangel Glory 
[1988] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 45. 
117 See Lord Scott in Smith (Administrator of Cosslett (Contractors) Ltd v Bridgend CBC [2001] 
UKHL 58; [2002] 1 AC 336, [63]. 
118 As discussed above, once the security has attached, it may be treated as having done so from the 
time of the agreement to give the security. 
14.3.3.1 Attachment is a different concept to enforcement. The consequence of 
attachment of security is that the creditor obtains a proprietary interest in the relevant 
asset which rests there until such time as the obligor defaults, following which the 
creditor can move to enforce the security and deprive the obligor of its interest in the 
asset. Obviously, enforcement cannot take place if the security has not attached to an 
asset, but the reverse is by no means true. It will be necessary to consider, however, if 
the foregoing distinction between attachment and enforcement is necessarily the case 
in relation to floating charges. 
14.3.3.2 The rules for attachment differ as between goods and intangible 
property, so it will be necessary to look at them separately. 
14.3.3.3 Goods 
The rules governing the passage of property (ownership) in goods are relevant for at 
least one reason. Attachment of security depends on the obligor’s power to dispose of 
goods. Since this typically refers to the obligor’s ownership of the goods, the relevant 
question becomes whether the obligor is the owner.  If the obligor is a buyer who has 
agreed to give security over the goods that it is to buy, the security cannot attach to 
the goods until the buyer acquired an interest in them.  
At general law, property (ownership) cannot pass under a contract for the sale of the 
goods until the goods have been specifically ascertained and appropriated to the 
contract.119 This is the consequence of section 16 of the Sale of Goods Act 1979 and 
that consequence used to follow even where the goods formed part of a homogenous 
bulk120 in the hands of the seller and it had been agreed that the purchaser’s order 
would be satisfied out of that bulk. Until the specific goods to be supplied to the 
purchaser had been appropriated to the contract by being physically separated from 
the bulk, property could not pass to the buyer (nor did any interest in the bulk pass to 
the buyer), even if the buyer had paid for the goods that were to be purchased.121  
14.3.3.3.1 While the law in relation to transfer of property in bulk has changed to 
a certain extent, as discussed below, the consequences just described continue to 
follow with respect to a purported transaction by way of security over unspecified 
goods or a portion of a homogenous bulk of goods already owned by the obligor.122 
The security cannot attach until the goods have been identified or, in the case of a 
bulk, the relevant portion has been identified and separated from the bulk. However, if 
the obligor agrees to give security over all of the goods it owns or all of its goods 
meeting a certain sufficient description to make them identifiable (e.g. every red car 
owned by the obligor), the security will attach to those goods when and if the obligor 
has ownership of goods that fall within the description. 
14.3.3.3.2 The position  with respect to a transaction by way of a sale of goods 
that form part of a bulk123 is governed by the Sale of Goods Act 1979 and is rather 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
119 Re Wait [1927] 1 Ch 606; Re London Wine Co (Shippers) Ltd [1986] PCC 121; and Re Goldcorp 
Exchange Ltd [1995] 1 AC 74. 
120 An appropriate definition of the concept of a bulk is that now contained in s 61(1) of the Sale of 
Goods Act 1979, which is set out below. 
121 Re Wait [1927] 1 Ch 606. 
122 Unless, perhaps, it is intended that the creditor should receive security over the relevant portion of 
each and every item comprised in the bulk: Re London Wine Co (Shippers) Ltd [1986] PCC 121. 
123 Bulk is defined in section 61(1) Sale of Goods Act 1979 as follows: ‘bulk means a mass or 
collection of goods of the same kind which (a) is contained in a defined space or area; and (b) is such 
different.     Unless a contrary intention appears, where the buyer has made payment 
for all or some part of its order, which it has been agreed will be satisfied out of an 
identified bulk,124 the buyer obtains in consequence of that agreement a proportionate 
interest in the bulk, the proportion representing the ratio of its payment to the overall 
bulk.125 There are provisions to deal with a scaling down of the proportion where the 
bulk is insufficient for all the orders to be satisfied from it and also to impose a 
deemed consent to dealings in the bulk.126 Further,  (unless a different intention 
appears), where the contract is for the sale of part of a bulk and all other orders to be 
satisfied from the bulk have been fulfilled then the purchaser will become the owner 
of what remains (whether or not it has made any payment) provided that the quantity 
of the bulk has been reduced to no more than is sufficient to satisfy the purchaser’s 
order.127 It should be noted that these provisions only apply to transactions by way of 
sale of goods; they do not apply to a transaction by way of a purported grant of 
security over part of a bulk of goods.128 
14.3.3.4 Intangible property 
Once again, for security over intangible property to attach to the relevant assets, it is 
necessary that the obligor should own the property and that it is sufficiently identified 
for the purposes of certainty under the security. The position is different from that 
relating to goods, however, in a case where the interest over which ownership or 
security is asserted forms part of a bulk or fund of fungible property of the same kind, 
provided that the bulk or fund is itself sufficiently identified and that the intended 
proportionate interest is also clear. In such a case, it is possible to assert the relevant 
proprietary interest.129 It is not clear if a claimant in such a bulk or fund holds its 
interest as a tenant in common with other claimants or on some other basis, 
particularly if the composition of the interests in the bulk or fund is changing from 
time to time. There are also likely to be difficulties where it transpires that the bulk or 
fund is insufficient to satisfy the claims of all of those interested in it. This issue is 
addressed further in Chapter 10. 
14.3.4 Security bills of sale130 
Where security is granted in writing over personal chattels131 by an individual it is 
necessary to comply with requirements set out in the Bills of Sale Acts 1878-1882.132 
Under section 5 of the 1882 Act an individual is precluded from giving security over 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
that any goods in the bulk are interchangeable with any other goods therein in the same number or 
quantity.’ 
124 Such agreement being either at the time of contracting or by subsequent action by the parties. 
125 Section 20A 
126 Section 20A(4) and section 20B 
127 Section 18 rules 5(3) and 5(4).   This is as a form of ascertainment by exhaustion. 
128 S 62(4) of the Sale of Goods Act 1979 provides that the provisions of the Act which concern 
contracts of sale of goods do not apply to security transactions. 
129 See Hunter v Moss [1994] 1 WLR 452; Re Harvard Securities, Holland v Newbury [1997] 2 BCLC 
369; Re CA Pacific Finance Ltd [2000] 1 BCLC 494; see Briggs J in Re Lehman Brothers International 
(Europe) (In Administration) [2012] EWHC 2997 (Ch); [2014] 2 BCLC 295, in particular at [43]-[44], 
[49]-[52]. See further the discussion in Chap 10. 
130 See discussion in chapter 17 of the Law Commission’s consultation paper on reform of the law on 
bills of sale. 
131 See Chapman (t/a Chapman & Co Solicitors) v Wilson [2010] EWHC 1746 (Ch). See also further 
below as to the meaning of ‘personal chattels’. 
132 Bills of Sale Act 1878 and Bills of Sale Act (1878) Amendment Act 1882. 
chattels of which he was not the true owner at the time the security was taken. Lack of 
compliance makes the security bill relating to such future chattels void except the 
grantor. It should be noted that a general assignment by a trader of book debts, 
whether absolutely or by way of security, should also be registered under Bills of Sale 
Act 1878 pursuant to s 344 of the Insolvency Act 1986. 
14.3.5 Static and transient assets 
English law permits security to be taken in both static assets, that is, assets which are 
intended to have a degree of permanence in the hands of the obligor, and (where the 
obligor is not an individual) in revolving or transient assets which of their nature are 
turned over or consumed by an obligor as part of its business. As will be discussed 
later in this chapter, the latter are best encompassed within a floating charge, whereas 
the former can be subject to either fixed or floating security. 
14.4 An Asset, Fruits of and Substitutions for the Asset, and the 
Proceeds of Sale of the Asset 
14.4.1 In the context of taking and holding security over an asset, it may be necessary 
to consider if the security will extend to fruits of the asset, such as income earned by 
the asset, as well as substitutions for the asset and the proceeds of sale of the asset. In 
one sense, the original asset and such fruits, substitutions, and proceeds are all distinct 
assets, but a question which arises is the extent to which a security interest in the 
original asset will extend to those other assets. These matters were considered by 
Arden LJ in Buhr v Barclays Bank PLC.133  While the true ratio of the Buhr case may 
be open to question, the courts have so far chosen not to engage in an extensive 
discussion of the issues.134 The conclusions which her Ladyship drew were as follows, 
although it is submitted that each of them would be subject to any express agreement 
to the contrary as agreed between the security giver and the security holder, save in so 
far as a bona fide purchaser might be affected. 
14.4.2 Fruits and substitutions 
Security over an asset, whether it be land, goods, or intangible property, carries with it 
an inherent security right in the fruits of the asset, considered in Buhr as accretions to 
it, such as rent or income earned by the asset. The security will also extend to any 
asset which is substituted for the original asset, such as upon renewal of a leasehold 
interest that had been the subject of the security. To that extent, the mortgagor or 
chargor will be treated as a fiduciary which holds the benefit of the fruits or 
substitutions for the mortgagee or chargee. 
14.4.3 Proceeds of sale of an asset 
If with the consent of all the parties an asset is sold subject to the continuance of fixed 
security over the asset then the security will continue to exist over that asset. The 
security holder will not be entitled to claim that its security over that asset has been 
converted into security over the proceeds of sale (although it is submitted that this 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
133  [2001] EWCA Civ 1223; [2002] BPIR 25. Lord Woolf LCJ and Tuckey LJ agreed. In reaching her 
conclusions, Arden LJ drew heavily upon commentary that had been provided by Professor Sir Roy 
Goode in Commercial Law (2nd edn, 1995) pp 667–688 and Legal Problems of Credit & Security (2nd 
edn, 1988) p 16. 
134 Menelaou v Bank of Cyprus plc [2013] EWCA Civ 1960, [2014] 1 WLR 854 para 51 (Floyd LJ). 
should not prejudice any security over the proceeds that the security holder may hold 
separately or additionally to the security over the asset that has been sold). If a 
mortgaged or charged asset is sold with the consent of the security holder, but on the 
basis that the asset will be sold free of the security, then the security will cease to exist 
over that asset. Instead, the security holder will be entitled to claim security in the 
proceeds of the sale. It is traditionally understood that if the asset is sold without the 
consent of the holder of fixed security, it will be entitled, at its election, to continue to 
assert its security over the asset, or it will be entitled to treat its security as converted 
into security over the proceeds of sale. However, an argument has been made that the 
security holder may be able to assert security in both the asset and its proceeds of sale 
so long as this does not lead to an excessive recovery.135 Of course, if its security was 
effectively overreached by the sale, as where the purchaser takes free of the security, 
the security holder may be left effectively to elect that its security should be converted 
to the proceeds or otherwise it will lose its security. Following the reasoning in Buhr, 
where the security is converted to security in the proceeds of sale, the mortgagor or 
chargor will be treated as a fiduciary holding the proceeds for the security holder. 
14.5 Forms of Security 
14.5.1 A distinction is drawn in English law between possessory and non-possessory 
security. There are different forms of security that fall within those two types of 
security.136 Some types of security arise at common law and some arise in equity. The 
position was summarised by Millett LJ in Re Cosslett (Contractors) Ltd137 as follows: 
There are only four kinds of consensual security known to English law: (i) 
pledge; (ii) contractual lien; (iii) equitable charge; and (iv) mortgage. A pledge 
and a contractual lien both depend upon the delivery of possession to the 
creditor. The difference between them is that in the case of a pledge the owner 
delivers possession to the creditor as security, whereas in the case of a lien the 
creditor retains possession of goods previously delivered to him for some 
other purpose. Neither a mortgage nor a charge depends on the delivery of 
possession. The difference between them is that a mortgage involves a transfer 
of legal or equitable ownership to the creditor, whereas an equitable charge 
does not. 
What follows will expand upon that summary. In addition to the forms of consensual 
security to which his Lordship made reference, it will also be relevant to refer to two 
forms of non-consensual security: the possessory lien and the equitable lien. 
14.5.2 Possessory security 
There are two types of possessory security. They both concern tangible personal 
property, such as goods and documentary intangibles capable of transfer by delivery, 
including negotiable instruments, and they both arise at common law. They are the 
pledge and the contractual or possessory lien. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
135 See M Raczynska, ‘An Uneasy Case of Multiple Tracing Claims in English Law’ in L Gullifer and 
O Akseli (eds) Secured Transactions Law Reform: Principles, Policies and Practice (Hart 2016 
forthcoming). 
136 The discussion that follows does not include maritime liens or statutory liens, such as that given to 
an unpaid seller of goods under ss 39(1)(a) and 41 of the Sale of Goods Act 1979. 
137  [1998] Ch 495, at 508 (affd [2001] UKHL 58, [2002] 1 AC 336). 
14.5.2.1 Pledges 
A pledge involves the pledgor (the obligor) giving possession of the relevant 
property138 to the pledgee (the creditor) as security for an obligation owed by the 
pledgor to the pledgee.139 A power of sale for enforcement of the security is an 
inherent consequence of the security.140 There are two types of possession that may be 
taken to constitute the pledge. One type is actual possession, by which the pledgee 
obtains the physical control of the property.141 The other type of possession is 
constructive possession, by which the person with possession of the property 
undertakes to hold the property for the pledgee by entering into an attornment in 
favour of the pledge,142 under which it ‘attorns’ to the pledgee. 
14.5.2.1.1 It is also possible to constitute a pledge of goods by the pledgee being 
given possession of the document of title to goods;143 the only such document of title 
which is known to English law is the bill of lading.144 This procedure is a valuable 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
138 Since the property must be tangible personal property, such as goods or documentary intangibles, it 
is not possible to have a pledge of the owner’s benefit of hire purchase agreements by a deposit of the 
agreements, and an agreement to do so will amount to a registrable charge: Independent Automatic 
Sales Ltd v Knowles and Foster [1962] 1 WLR 974. 
139 Simply obtaining possession on its own is not sufficient without evidence of the intention to create a 
pledge. This is because possession may be taken for other reasons and so may not evidence the creation 
of a pledge. For instance, possession might be given to permit the goods to be retained and used, or 
possession may be taken as a consequence of the creditor enforcing its charge over the goods: Re 
Cosslett (Contractors) Ltd [1998] Ch 495 (upheld on appeal: [2002] 1 AC 336). Evidence that 
possession was given so as to create the pledge may be recorded in a memorandum, but care must be 
taken that the memorandum does not constitute an agreement to create a pledge, which might be taken 
to constitute a bill of sale with the attendant requirements as to formalities and registration under the 
Bills of Sale Act (1878) Amendment Act 1882 (see section 14.3.4) or, if given by a company, such a 
pledge might be recharacterised as a charge and require registration (see below 14.13): Re Townsend 
(1886) 16 QBD 532; Dublin City Distillery Ltd v Doherty [1914] AC 823 (HL, Ir) 847 and 852-853 
(Lord Atkinson and Lord Parker, respectively, stating that where there is no constructive delivery there 
is no attornment, but contrast the analysis of Lord Sumner at 865 in the same case) or even as having 
no effect at all (see Howes v Ball 108 ER 802; (1827) 7 B & C 481 and se Lord Blackburn in Sewell v 
Burdick (1884) 10 App Cas 74 (HL) 96). 
140 Pothonier & Hodgson v Dawson (1816) Holt 383; Cotton LJ in Re Morritt, ex p Official Receiver 
(1886) 18 QBD 222, at 232. 
141 For example, Wrightson v McArthur and Hutchinson (1919) Ltd [1921] 2 KB 807, where the goods 
were contained in a separate room in a warehouse which contained no other goods and the pledgee was 
given the only keys to the room and a licence to enter and remove them. This should be contrasted with 
Dublin City Distillery Ltd v Doherty [1914] AC 823, where the key that was given to the creditor did 
not give it access, as a second key was also needed. 
142 In theory, the debtor could itself attorn to the creditor to constitute a pledge but this would have to 
be accompanied by a surrendering of the obligor’s ability to use and control the goods: Dublin City 
Distillery Ltd v Doherty [1914] AC 823. Further, where there is an attornment by the obligor, it may be 
recharacterised as a bill of sale or a company charge, with attendant registration requirements,  see 
above 14.3.4 (for formalities in relation to bills of sale) and below 14.13 (relating to registration of 
charges granted by companies). Note that company charges are now registrable even if they are not in 
writing   
143 North Western Bank Ltd v Poynter Son and Macdonalds [1895] AC 56. The procedures for doing 
this are illustrated by Lloyds Bank Ltd v Bank of America National Trust and Savings Assoc [1938] 2 
KB 147. 
144 Not, for instance, a delivery warrant: Dublin City Distillery Ltd v Doherty [1914] AC 823 or a 
warehouse receipt: see e.g. Impala Warehousing and Logistics (Shanghai) Co Ltd v Wanxiang 
Resources (Singapore) PTE Ltd [2015] EWHC 811 (Comm); [2015] 2 All ER (Comm) 234, para 55 
(Blair J). Nor will the deposit of hire purchase agreements constitute a pledge of the goods let on hire 
by the owner under the agreements: Independent Automatic Sales Ltd v Knowles and Foster [1962] 1 
adjunct to the provision of finance by way of the issuance of a documentary letter of 
credit, in pursuance of which the issuing bank is presented with the bill of lading 
under the letter of credit and thereby obtains a pledge of the goods as security for 
reimbursement by its customer, being the party on whose behalf the letter of credit 
was opened. 
14.5.2.1.2 A trust receipt is a document that is executed by the pledgor in favour 
of the pledgee, under which the pledgor is allowed to take possession of the goods 
subject to a pledge and sell them. By virtue of the arrangement, the pledgor obtains 
possession as trustee for the pledge and so acts on behalf of the pledgee and not on its 
own account. The consequence of this is that the security under the pledge continues 
until the goods are sold, when it transfers to the proceeds of sale.145 
14.5.2.2 Contractual liens 
A possessory lien depends upon the relevant creditor (the lienee) obtaining possession 
of goods146 which it may keep until it has been paid by the obligor (the lienor). It can 
arise by operation of law (statute or under the common law) or by agreement between 
the parties.   The parties can also extend by contract the scope of a possessory lien 
which would, in any event, arise by operation of law.  Unlike a pledge, a lien does not 
give rise to a power of sale although a statutory provision147 and probably also the 
parties148 may provide otherwise. It is simply a right to detain the goods.149 It arises in 
a context where the goods are delivered to the lienee for some purpose other than by 
way of security, such as for storage, carriage, or repair in consideration of a payment. 
The lien may be excluded by the terms of the contract between the parties but it does 
not mean that it arises as an implied term.150 A lien may be specific, where it relates to 
indebtedness incurred by the lienor to the lienee in relation to the particular goods 
concerned, or it may be a general lien, where the lienee is entitled to keep goods of 
the lienor for other types of indebtedness. It is possible for the parties to agree that a 
specific lien should be turned into a general lien. A lienee’s rights are subject to ss 
246 and 349 of Insolvency Act 1986, regarding enforceability of the lien of books, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
WLR 974. In relation to intangible property, certificates of registration of patents or trade marks cannot 
be pledged so as to create security over the intellectual property. 
145 However, the right of the pledgee can be defeated by a dealing by the pledgor acting as a mercantile 
agent: Lloyds Bank Ltd v Bank of America National Trust and Savings Assoc [1938] 2 KB 147. 
146 An argument that intangibles such as databases could be subject to a common law possessory lien 
was rejected in Your Response Ltd v Datateam Business Media Ltd [2014] EWCA Civ 281, [2015] QB 
41, paras 9-34 (Moore-Bick LJ). 
147 Sale of Goods Act 1979, ss 38-39, 41-43 and 48. Note that the seller has right to resell goods not by 
way of an enforcement of a security but because he accepts the buyer’s repudiatory breach of contract: 
the contract terminates and the seller acquires ownership of goods: see Ward (RV) v Bignall [1967] 1 
QB 534 (CA). Thus, the seller need not account for surplus proceeds: Ward (RV) v Bignall [1967] 1 
QB 534 (CA) 543 (Sellers LJ). 
148 In theory, such a lien should be recharacterised as a pledge.  However, little turns on this distinction, 
and it would appear that the validity of the lien will not be imperiled if the parties agree that the lienee 
should have a power of sale: see Great Eastern Rly Co v Lord’s Trustee [1909] AC 109;Re Hamlet 
International PLC, Trident International Ltd v Barlow [1999] 2 BCLC 506; London Flight Centre 
(Stansted) Ltd v Osprey Aviation Ltd [2002] BPIR 1115; Chellaram & Sons (London) Ltd v Butlers 
Warehousing & Distribution Ltd [1978] 2 Lloyd’s Rep, 412 (CA); Jarl Tra AB v Convoys Ltd [2003] 
EWHC 1488 (Comm), [2003] 2 CLC 1072. 
149 The very act of detention, however, has been held to amount to enforcement of security in the 
context of an administration of the lienor: see Bristol Airport plc v Powdrill [1990] Ch 744. See also 
London Flight Centre (Stansted) Ltd v Osprey Aviation Ltd [2002] BPIR 1115. 
150 Tappenden v Artus [1964] 2 QB 185 (CA) 194-195 (Diplock LJ). 
papers and other records of the bankrupt or an insolvent company, and paragraphs 
43(2) and 44 of Schedule B1 to the Insolvency Act 1986, relating to enforceability of 
security in company’s administration.  
14.5.3 Non-possessory security 
Non-possessory security may arise at common law or in equity. The security involves 
acquisition of a proprietary right in the asset by the creditor but until enforcement 
action is taken the obligor is entitled to remain in possession of the relevant property. 
In each case, the security arises by virtue of the terms of the agreement between the 
parties and is dependent upon that agreement, as it is not constituted by the yielding of 
possession of the relevant asset by the obligor to the creditor.151 The forms of non-
possessory security are as follows. 
14.5.3.1 Legal mortgage 
In technical terms (except in the case of land), a legal mortgage involves a formal 
conveyance or transfer of the mortgagor’s (the obligor’s) legal title in the relevant 
asset to the mortgagee (the creditor). The mortgagor is protected by its equity of 
redemption152, in consequence of which it is entitled to a re-conveyance or re-transfer 
of the property upon discharge of the security. The position is different for land as the 
security will be in the form of either a charge by way of legal mortgage or a demise 
for a term of years absolute.153 
14.5.3.1.1 Where the property which is to be the subject of the security consists 
of a debt154 or other legal chose in action155 a legal mortgage can take place by way of 
a statutory assignment or novation (although there may also be a requirement of 
registration156 or of additional action157 for a legal mortgage to have the intended 
effect). A statutory assignment of a book debt or other chose in action requires 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
151 Re Cosslett (Contractors) Ltd [1998] Ch 495 (upheld on appeal: [2002] 1 AC 336). 
152 As discussed above above 14.1.2. 
153 See ss 85–87 of the Law of Property Act 1925 and s 51 of the Land Registration Act 2002. By virtue 
of the latter provision, a mortgage of registered land, upon registration, is a charge by way of legal 
mortgage. 
154 It will still be a debt for this purpose even though litigation for its recovery was contemplated at the 
time of the assignment: Camdex International Ltd v Bank of Zambia [1998] QB 22. 
155 Which may include a right of action in tort or contract if, prior to 1873, equity would have 
compelled the assignor to pursue the defendant for the benefit of the assignee: Compania Colombiana 
de Seguros v Pacific Steam Navigation Co [1965] 1 QB 101. In other words, the legal chose must be of 
a type that equity would have regarded as being assignable prior to 1873: Tolhurst v Associated 
Portland Cement Manufacturers [1903] AC 414, at 424; G&T Earle (1925) Ltd v Hemsworth RDC 
(1928) 140 LT 69. 
156 See section 14.13. 
157 For instance, shares in a company, where legal title vests upon being entered in the relevant register: 
Torkington v Magee [1902] 2 KB 636, so that it will be necessary in the case of a mortgage of shares in 
an unlisted company for the mortgagee to obtain the mortgage instrument, the share certificate, and the 
relevant share transfer instrument, the latter two of which must be submitted to the appropriate registrar 
so that the mortgagee can be entered in the register. The position as to shares in a listed company is 
referred to below. In the case of certain types of intellectual property, it will be necessary for the 
mortgagee to be registered on the statutory register (i.e. trade marks, patents, and registered designs). 
With respect to a mortgage of a negotiable instrument, it is necessary for the mortgagee to obtain 
possession (and, perhaps, endorsement) of the instrument, as well as obtaining execution of the 
mortgage instrument (as opposed to a pledge of the instrument, where possession (and, perhaps, 
endorsement) is required to constitute the pledge). 
compliance with section 136 of the Law of Property Act 1925.158 The requirements 
are that the mortgage must take the form of an absolute written assignment of a (legal 
or equitable159) chose under the hand of the mortgagor as the assignor,160 of which 
written notice must be given to the debtor. The assignment should be absolute and not 
conditional or incomplete.161 It must be of the whole of the chose162 and it must not 
purport ‘to be by way of charge only’. Therefore, when drafting the documents the 
form of the mortgage by way of assignment and the written notice of it should not be 
expressed as being limited or only effective until the secured liabilities have been 
discharged. The absolute and unconditional character of the assignment is not affected 
if the mortgagee agrees with the mortgagor that the mortgagee will re-convey the 
chose back to the mortgagor once the secured liabilities have been discharged, thereby 
recognising the mortgagor’s equity of redemption.163 Once the statutory requirements 
are fulfilled, the mortgagee (as a statutory assignee) can sue in his own name.164  
Whilst in a technical sense the mortgage effects a transfer of the mortgagor’s rights, 
the latter retains its equity of redemption so that the mortgage will not affect the 
validity of the underlying chose that is assigned, nor its recoverability. Accordingly, if 
the subject of the assignment is the benefit of a contract for the rendering of work or 
services to the mortgagor and the contract is breached by the other contracting party, 
so that there is a claim for damages suffered by the mortgagor, the damages will be 
recoverable even though the breach occurred after the date of the mortgage. It is not a 
defence to the claim for damages that the mortgagee has suffered no loss. The 
damages will remain recoverable after a re-conveyance back following discharge of 
the mortgage.165 
Novation involves substitution of the person of the creditor, replacing an existing debt 
which was owed to person A with a new debt now owed to person B.  It results in a 
change of parties and requires the consent of all parties involved.  Unlike in a legal 
mortgage effected by way of a statutory assignment, in novation the person of the 
debtor may not have any equities against the person of a new creditor (B) merely 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
158 Or the equivalent under s 1 of the Policies of Assurance Act 1867, for policies of life assurance, and 
s 50 of the Marine Insurance Act 1906, for marine policies. As to the requirements of s 136, see Chap 
12. 
159 There is considerable authority that  it is possible to assign at least one type of an equitable chose in 
action pursuant to s 136 of the Law of Property Act 1925 because, whilst the section speaks of the 
assignment of a ‘debt or other legal chose in action’, it then contemplates that notice of the assignment 
might be given to a trustee: see Younger J in Re Pain; Gustavson v Haviland [1919] 1 Ch 38, at 44, and 
see also Torkington v Magee [1902] 2 KB 427, 430–31; Compania Colombiana de Seguros v Pacific 
Steam Navigation Co [1965] 1 QB 101, 121.  
160 An assignment by way of deed, although not being under hand, will meet this requirement: 
Marchant v Morton Down & Co [1901] 2 KB 829. In the case of security interests over securities, cash 
(bank accounts) or credit claims (receivables owed to banks etc) an assignment may be subject to Reg 
4(3) of the Financial Collateral Arrangements (No 2) Regulations 2003 (SI 2003/3226) as noted later in 
this chapter. 
161 Re Williams, Williams v Ball [1917] 1 Ch 1. 
162 Jones v Humphreys [1902] 1 KB 10. 
163 Tancred v Delagoa Bay & East Africa Rly Co (1889) 23 QBD 239; Hughes v Pump House Hotel Co 
[1902] 2 KB 190. 
164 Section 136(1) of the Law of Property Act 1925. This difference between a statutory and an 
equitable assignment does not always matter in practice: while an equitable assignee is generally 
required to join the assignor, this will not be insisted upon unless necessary: see e.g. Three Rivers DC v 
Bank of England [1996] QB 292 (CA) 313 (Peter Gibson LJ), Bexhill UK Ltd v Razzaq [2012] EWCA 
Civ 1376. 
165 Bovis International Inc v Circle Limited Partnership (1995) 49 Conv LR 12, [1995] NPC 128. 
because they held them against the previous creditor (A).166 An example of a 
mortgage by novation is in relation to taking security in registered securities where 
the taking of security involves an entry of a transfer on the issuer’s register.  
14.5.3.1.2 In contrast to certain forms of equitable transaction, to which further 
reference is made below, it is not necessary that the mortgage should be supported by 
valuable consideration.167 Accordingly, a legal mortgage of a chose (or indeed, other 
types of property) may be taken as security for an existing debt, although the 
transaction may still be vulnerable under various provisions of the Insolvency Act 
1986 that are concerned with the re-opening of prior transactions that might constitute 
a transaction at an undervalue or a preference.168 
14.5.3.1.3 So long as there are no impediments relating to a disposition of the 
particular asset concerned169, it is possible to take a legal mortgage over just about 
any type of existing legal property of an obligor. However, an individual who gives a 
mortgage (a security bill of sale) of personal chattels170 must comply with the 
requirements of the Bills of Sale Act (1878) Amendment Act 1882.171 That includes 
identifying correctly the mortgaged chattels under section 4 of the Act and meeting 
the requirements as to attestation and registration of the bill, which must also contain 
a true statement of the consideration for which it was given, pursuant to section 8 of 
the Act. The form of the bill must comply with the requirements of section 9 of the 
Act.172 Otherwise it will be invalid, either absolutely, or as to the security contained 
within it.  
14.5.3.1.4 A legal mortgage of a ship, or a share in a ship, must comply with the 
requirements of the Merchant Shipping (Registration etc) Act 1993, including as to 
registration of the mortgage in the register. An unregistered mortgage can only be 
equitable and will suffer in terms of priority as against other registered interests. The 
position is different for mortgages of aircraft, as a failure to register a mortgage under 
the Mortgaging of Aircraft Order 1972173 or in the International Registry under 
Regulation 14 of the International Interests in Aircraft Equipment (Cape Town 
Convention) Regulations 2015174 is relevant to priorities but not the nature of the 
security. Registration requirements also exist in relation to a mortgage over certain 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
166 The precise effect of the novation in this regard is a matter of agreement between the parties, see 
Graiseley Properties Limited v Barclays Bank plc [2013] EWCA Civ 1372. 
167 Nanney v Morgan (1887) 37 ChD 346, at 352; Re Westerton, Public Trustee v Gray [1912] 2 Ch 
104; Walker v Bradford Old Bank Ltd (1884) 12 QBD 511. 
168 Ss 238, 239, 339, and 340 of the Insolvency Act 1986. 
169 These may become void in some circumstances if the draft Business Contract Terms (Restrictions 
on Assignment of Receivables) Regulations 2015 are adopted, see discussion 14.1.9.2. 
170 Strictly speaking, the expression ‘bill of sale’ is narrower than the concept of a mortgage and the 
expression ‘personal chattels’ is narrower than simply referring to goods. By virtue of s 3 of the 1882 
Act, both expressions have the definitions given to them by s 4 of the Bills of Sale Act 1878. The 
consequence of this is that there are various exclusions from what might normally be thought of as 
being included within a chattel mortgage, including mortgages of ships, goods in foreign parts or at sea, 
bills of lading, and the assets of companies, wherever incorporated (see also s 17 of the 1882 Act and 
Slavenburg’s Bank NV v Intercontinental Natural Resources Ltd [1980] 1 WLR 1076). Aircraft are also 
excluded by virtue of Art 16(1) of the Mortgaging of Aircraft Order 1972 (SI 1972/1268). There is also 
an exemption for certain imported goods under s 1 of the Bills of Sale Act 1890. 
171 The Law Commission’s recent Consultation Paper on reform of the law on bills of sale is discussed 
below in chapter 17. 
172 Which must be in the form of a deed of indenture: see the Schedule to the Act. 
173 SI 1972/1268. 
174 SI 2015/912. 
types of intellectual property, namely trade marks175, patents176, and registered 
designs177. 
14.5.3.2 Equitable mortgage 
An equitable mortgage takes the form of an equitable transfer or assignment of the 
relevant property.178 It may arise because: 
(i) the subject matter of the security is equitable property (for instance, a 
mortgagor might wish to mortgage its equity of redemption or a person that 
has a beneficial interest may wish to give security over that interest); 
(ii) the formalities that are required for a legal mortgage of legal property have not 
been fulfilled (for instance, where notice of an assignment of a chose in action 
has not been given to the debtor or where the security is by way of an 
uncompleted agreement to give a legal mortgage); 
(iii) the property is not transferable at law (as was the position prior to 1873 with 
respect to choses in action and remains the case with respect to an assignment 
of only part of a chose);179 or 
(iv) the form of transaction could not meet the requirements for a legal assignment 
(for instance, an assignment that is expressed to be by way of security until 
discharge of the secured obligations which is, in the words of section 136 of 
the Law of Property Act 1925, by way of charge only). 
14.5.3.2.1 There is little that is required by way of formalities for an equitable 
mortgage, but it must at least be clear in the case of intangible property (and the same 
should apply to other types of property as well) that the mortgagor, as the equitable 
assignor, clearly intends the transaction to take place,180 and that such intention is 
manifested in some outwardly observable manner.181 There are, however, two further 
requirements that may have to be met in certain (but not all) circumstances. They 
concern the need for the security to be in writing and that the creation of the security 
should be supported by the giving of valuable consideration. Those two requirements, 
when they are applicable, will apply whether the transaction is in the form of an 
equitable mortgage or an equitable charge. The necessity to meet those requirements 
is discussed in Chapter 12. Although those passages address the assignments of debts, 
what is said there will also apply to taking security over both tangible and intangible 
property more generally. What follows is intended merely to provide a summary. 
14.5.3.2.2 Writing is required where the subject matter of the security that is to be 
taken consists of an equitable interest in property.182 An agreement in writing signed 
by both parties is also required for the creation of any security over an interest in 
land,183 including by way of a deposit of title deeds.184 For practical reasons, however, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
175 S 25 of the Trade Marks Act 1994. 
176 Ss 30-33 of the Patents Act 1977. 
177 S 19 of the Registered Designs Act 1949. 
178 For a fuller discussion as to equitable assignments, which is also relevant in this context, see Chap 
12. 
179 Bank of Liverpool and Martins Ltd v Holland (1926) TLR 29. 
180 See the famous statement of Lord Macnaghten in William Brandt’s Sons & Co v Dunlop Rubber Co 
Ltd [1905] AC 454, at 462. 
181 See Blackburne J in Finlan v Eyton Morris Winfield [2007] EWHC 914 (Ch); [2007] 4 All ER 143, 
at [33]. 
182 S 53(1)(c) of the Law of Property Act 1925. 
183 S 2 of the Law of Property (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1989. 
184 United Bank of Kuwait v Sahib [1995] 2 All ER 973. 
it is always sensible that the security should be in a written form, so that there can be 
no doubt as to the scope of the security and the relevant terms that should apply to it, 
as well as demonstrating that the obligor intended to create the security. It should also 
be noted that the powers of enforcement of security under section 101 of the Law of 
Property Act 1925 depend upon the security being in the form of a deed. 
14.5.3.2.3 The question of value arises in connection with the taking of security 
for outstanding and unsecured liabilities that already existed at the time the security 
was taken. The concept of value in equity means real and substantial value, such as 
the making of further advances or the suffering of a real detriment,  giving up a right 
or postponing it for some meaningful period, or  a forbearance to sue for repayment of 
outstanding indebtedness.185 Value is always required in connection with any 
proprietary dealing with future property.186 Value is also required to support the 
giving of an equitable charge.187 Even in cases where value is not required in an 
equitable sense to establish the validity of the security, the transaction may still be 
vulnerable under various provisions of the Insolvency Act 1986 that are concerned 
with the re-opening of prior transactions that might constitute a transaction at an 
undervalue or a preference.188 
14.5.3.2.4 It is sometimes thought (and indeed it was the view expressed in the 
previous edition) that it is not possible for an individual to give a written form of 
equitable security, whether by way of equitable mortgage or equitable charge, over 
goods.,. However, section 4 of the Bills of Sale Act 1878 defines “bill of sale” as 
including “assignments (…) and also any agreement, whether intended or not to be 
followed by the execution of any other instrument, by which a right in equity to any 
personal chattels, or to any charge or security thereon, shall be conferred”. This 
suggests that equitable mortgages and charges are within the scope of the 1878 Act 
and so the preferable view is that an individual is able to give a written form of 
equitable security. 189 
14.5.3.3 Equitable lien 
An equitable lien arises by operation of law and does not depend upon the lienee 
gaining possession of the relevant property. In many senses, the consequence of such 
a lien is similar in effect to an equitable charge. However, because the lien arises by 
operation of law and so is not ‘created’ by the lienor, it is not a registrable charge for 
the purposes of section 859A of the Companies Act 2006.190 
14.5.3.3.1 An equitable lien arises to secure to a vendor of property payment of 
the purchase price.191 It will also arise to secure to a purchaser repayment of any part 
of the price already paid if the transaction fails to proceed to completion.192 A person 
who extends credit which is used to pay the vendor is entitled to be subrogated to the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
185 See Glegg v Bromley [1912] 3KB 474. 
186 Tailby v The Official Receiver (1888) 13 App Cas 523. 
187 Re Earl of Lucan, Hardinge v Cobden (1890) 45 Ch D 470. 
188 Ss 238, 239, 245, 339, and 340 of the Insolvency Act 1986. 
189 See s 9 of and the Schedule to the Bills of Sale Act (1878) Amendment Act 1882. See also 
discussion above in section 14.3.4. 
190 Formerly s 860 of the Companies Act 2006. See London and Cheshire Insurance Co Ltd v 
Laplagrene Property Co Ltd [1971] Ch 499. 
191 Re Birmingham [1959] Ch 523. 
192 Rose v Watson (1864) 10 HL Cas 672; Chattey v Farndale Holdings Inc [1997] 1 EGLR 153, in 
which it was said that the principle did not depend upon the availability of specific performance. 
seller’s lien.193 However, if the party that would be entitled to the lien agrees to take 
security for the relevant obligation, then the lien will not arise,194 even if the security 
is or becomes unenforceable, for instance through failure to register in the Companies 
Registry.195 
14.5.3.3.2 Generally speaking, an equitable lien can arise in relation to most types 
of property,196 although it probably cannot arise under an ordinary contract for the 
sale of goods. This is because the Sale of Goods Act 1979 provides a complete code 
as to the passing of title, and equitable interests cannot arise in consequence of the 
contract.197 However, where the contract is one for the building and supply of goods 
to a special order or specification, an equitable lien can arise, at least in favour of a 
purchaser which has prepaid and a person who has financed the purchaser.198 
14.5.3.4 Equitable charge 
An equitable charge (sometimes called a hypothecation199) differs from an equitable 
mortgage in that it does not involve the concept, however notional, of a transfer of 
title. Instead, it effects a proprietary impediment upon the asset by way of security for 
repayment and discharge of the secured obligation.200 There are two types of equitable 
charge, namely, the fixed charge and the floating charge. The floating charge is dealt 
with separately below, so the present discussion will focus on the fixed charge. 
14.5.3.4.1 A fixed equitable charge may be taken in the same circumstances in 
which an equitable mortgage may be taken, with respect to both present and future 
property, and the comments that are made above in relation to the requirements in 
taking an equitable mortgage (particularly as to need for writing and valuable 
consideration) are also applicable to taking a fixed equitable charge.201 There is no 
particular form that is required to create a charge, so long as the intention to do so is 
clear.202 An agreement to create a trust over an asset as security for performance of an 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
193 Orakpo v Manson Investments Ltd [1978] AC 95. 
194 Capital Finance Co Ltd v Stokes [1969] 1 Ch 261; London and Cheshire Insurance Co Ltd v 
Laplagrene Property Co Ltd [1971] Ch 499. 
195 Orakpo v Manson Investments Ltd [1978] AC 95; Capital Finance Co Ltd v Stokes [1969] 1 Ch 261; 
London and Cheshire Insurance Co Ltd v Laplagrene Property Co Ltd [1971] Ch 499; Burston 
Finance Ltd v Speirway Ltd [1974] 1 WLR 1648. The position may be different if the security was 
invalid from the outset: Nottinghamshire Permanent Benefit Building Soc v Thurstan [1903] AC 6; 
Orakpo v Manson Investments Ltd. 
196 It applies to real property: Rose v Watson (1864) 10 HL Cas 672; Re Birmingham [1959] Ch 523; 
and personal property: Re Stucley, Stucley v Kekewich [1906] 1 Ch 67 (apart from goods). 
197 Transport and General Credit Corp Ltd v Morgan [1939] Ch 531; Re Wait [1927] 1 Ch 606 (CA) 
(Sargant LJ dissenting). 
198 Swainston v Clay (1863) 3 De GJ & Sm 558, 562; Hewett v Court (1983) 149 CLR 639; 
International Finance Corp v DSNL Offshore Ltd [2005] EWHC 1844 (Comm), [2007] 2 All ER 
(Comm) 305. 
199 Lowe v National Insurance Bank of Jamaica [2008] UKPC 26. 
200 See Atkin LJ in National Provincial and Union Bank of England v Charnley [1924] 1 KB 431, at 
449–450; Slade J in Re Bond Worth Ltd [1980] Ch 228, at 250; and Lord Hoffmann in Re Bank of 
Credit and Commerce International SA (No 8) [1998] AC 214, at 226. 
201 The giving of valuable consideration is a pre-requisite for an equitable charge: Re Earl of Lucan, 
Hardinge v Cobden (1890) 45 ChD 470. 
202 See Romer J in Cradock v Scottish Provident Institutions (1893) 69 LT 380, at 382 (affd (1894) 70 
LT 718). 
obligation will constitute security, most probably in the form of a charge (which 
might be either a fixed or floating charge, depending upon the circumstances).203 
14.5.3.4.2 For most purposes, the distinction between a fixed equitable charge 
and an equitable mortgage is of little relevance, as they will each confer an effective 
form of equitable security, the consequences for priority purposes will be the same, 
and, provided the security document that is used is in the form of a deed, the same 
enforcement remedies will arise under section 101 of the Law of Property Act 1925. 
Indeed, the two are often conflated and referred to in the same way, even by statute.204 
In strictly technical terms, the discharge of a charge does not result in a re-conveyance 
or re-transfer of the secured property to the chargor as no conveyance of title occurred 
when the charge was granted. In more practical terms, the distinction may have some 
relevance in considering the effect of taking security over a credit balance or other 
contractual right that is owed by the chargee to the chargor, which will be referred to 
at a later point in this chapter. It is also relevant where the subject of the security is a 
chose in action against a third party. As there is no transfer of the chargor’s title in the 
chose, the chargor must remain as the person that should sue the third party for 
performance, and the chargor will also be the person who can grant a good discharge 
to the third party.205 If the chargor refuses to co-operate then the chargee will need the 
assistance of the court to compel the chargor to act.206  
14.5.3.5 Debenture 
The expression ‘debenture’ is used in various different contexts in English law. For 
instance, in section 738 of the Companies Act 2006 it is defined to include ‘debenture 
stock, bonds and any other securities of a company, whether or not constituting a 
charge on the assets of the company’. By contrast, in relation to the giving of security 
the expression is used to mean a security document by which a company gives 
comprehensive security for indebtedness due to a creditor such as a bank, such 
security being over all or substantially all of its assets. The security will normally be 
by way of a combination of fixed security over those assets that are susceptible to 
such security and floating security over the remainder of its assets. When the term 
“debenture” is used in a contract, it will be given its ordinary meaning (unless there is 
a reason to do otherwise) of any document that creates or acknowledges a debt, such 
as a simple loan agreement, which need not include a charge.207 
14.6 Floating Charges 
14.6.1 Introduction 
It has already been seen that English law developed the concept that security could be 
taken over future assets, so that the assets would come within the security when they 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
203 See Slade J in Re Bond Worth Ltd [1980] Ch 228, at 250 and Jonathan Parker J in Re ILG Travel Ltd 
[1996] BCC 21, at 44–45. 
204 See s 859A(7) of the Companies Act 2006 (formerly s 861(5) of the Companies Act 2006).  
205 This may be contrasted with the position where there has been an assignment by way of mortgage 
under s 136 of the Law of Property Act 1925 and, it would appear, where the assignment was equitable, 
at least if notice of the assignment was given to the debtor: William Brandt’s Sons & Co v Dunlop 
Rubber Co Ltd [1905] AC 454; Three Rivers DC v Governor and Co of the Bank of England [1996] 
QB 292. 
206 A power of attorney taken under s 4 of the Powers of Attorney Act 1971 would be an alternative. 
207 Fons Hf v Corporal Ltd [2014] EWCA Civ 304. 
were acquired by the obligor. It then became necessary to consider if security could 
be taken, not just over assets that the chargor might wish to acquire from time to time, 
but also over assets (often the same assets as those that might be suitable candidates to 
fall within an after-acquired property clause in a security instrument) that it might 
wish to deal with, that is, dispose of or consume, in the course of its business, without 
the necessity of obtaining specific releases from the creditor each time a disposal or 
consumption was to take place. Taking the continuum of such types of asset from 
acquisition to disposal or consumption, in the context of their acquisition and use for 
the purposes of the chargor’s business, it could be said that the assets were of a 
fluctuating or circulating nature. In other words, that they would be turned over in the 
course of the business, with the likelihood that assets would be acquired on a fairly 
repetitive basis to replace those that were, also repetitively, disposed of or consumed. 
If such assets were not available as security then a considerable portion of a 
company’s current assets would be ignored in determining the availability of credit, 
and financiers might not be so willing to extend finance to the company to assist in 
the financing of the business. On the other hand, if such assets upon acquisition were 
tied up in a form of fixed security, without the right to deal with them and use them, 
then the company would be unable to carry on its business. The equitable floating 
charge was developed in the second half of the nineteenth century to permit 
incorporated business to give such security over assets which were of a fluctuating or 
circulating nature.208 
14.6.1.1 The state of affairs under which the chargor is able to deal with the 
charged assets under a floating charge continues until such time as the right to do so is 
taken away. At that point, the charge is said to ‘crystallise’, when it becomes a fixed 
charge with respect to the assets then or thereafter within its compass. This is also 
called the process of ‘crystallisation’. 
14.6.1.2 A word of caution must be introduced at this point. Whilst it is helpful 
in understanding the historical development of the floating charge to describe the 
matter in the context of assets that typically are of a circulating or fluctuating 
character, that is not the determinative test for ascertaining in any particular case if a 
charge is a floating charge or a form of fixed security. As was made clear in Agnew v 
Commissioner of Inland Revenue,209 often referred to as the Brumark case after the 
name of the company which had given the security in that case (to which reference is 
made below) and other cases as well, what is important is whether the chargor is able 
to deal with the charged assets free of the security, freely and without the chargee’s 
consent, or whether, on the other hand, that liberty has been entirely removed so that 
the assets are subject to the real control of the chargee. It is only in the latter case that 
there will be fixed security. The reason why the requisite element of control is not 
present is usually because the assets are needed for use by the chargee in dealing with 
them in its business, and that is typified by assets that are characteristically of a 
circulating or fluctuating nature. Nonetheless, it is possible to take a form of fixed 
security over an asset that is normally associated with a floating charge, if the 
chargor’s ability to deal with it is frozen. Similarly, it may be found that an asset that 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
208 As Lord Millett pointed out in Agnew v Commissioner of Inland Revenue (also known as Re 
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209  [2001] UKPC 28, [2001] 2 AC 710. 
is usually associated with fixed security is subject only to a floating charge because 
the chargor has been given a liberty to deal with the asset. 
14.6.1.3 Floating charges were developed as a form of corporate security.210 
Largely for historical reasons to do with the doctrine of reputed ownership in 
bankruptcy, which no longer applies, they were not available as a form of security that 
might be given by individuals.211 In addition, as a consequence of legislation, an 
individual cannot give a floating charge over most types of personal chattels.212 
14.6.1.4 A valuable explanation of the historical development of the floating 
charge and of the essential nature of a floating charge, as compared with fixed 
security, was provided by Lord Millett in giving the advice of the Privy Council in 
Agnew v Commissioner of Inland Revenue.213 The advice that his Lordship delivered 
in that case should be regarded as required reading for anyone who wishes to study 
this subject. 
14.6.2 The importance of the distinction between fixed security and 
floating charges 
Before progressing further in examining the nature and characteristics of a floating 
charge, it is worth mentioning briefly the importance of the distinction between fixed 
security and floating charges. Many of the reasons for the distinction will be dealt 
with in more detail at a later stage, so what follows is by way of summary to give a 
general perspective. The discussion will begin by examining the advantages of taking 
floating security. It then turns to the disadvantages of such security. From the overall 
perspective of a creditor which wishes to take security, it has to be admitted that the 
advantages are outweighed by the disadvantages. 
14.6.2.1 Advantages 
In the first place, as adverted to above, a floating charge can be taken over fluctuating 
or circulating assets of a business in circumstances where it would not be possible, in 
a practical sense, for the assets to be the subject of fixed security, as the company 
would be unable to carry on its business if it was subject to the restrictions associated 
with giving fixed security. This is because it is of the essence of fixed security that the 
obligor cannot deal with the assets without the consent of the creditor, which means, 
for instance, that the obligor cannot have access to the secured assets to dispose of 
them and it cannot use the proceeds of such a disposition to make payments. In this 
sense, it might be said that the floating charge provides security where it might not 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
210 Lord Hoffmann made a passing reference to this in Aquachem Ltd v Delphis Bank Ltd [2008] UKPC 
7, [2008] BCC 648. The fact that the security was developed in a corporate context is clear in the 
famous statement that is taken from the judgment of Romer LJ in Re Yorkshire Woolcombers’ 
Association Ltd [1903] 2 Ch 284, at 295, which is quoted below.	  
211 See Lord Millett in Agnew v Commissioner of Inland Revenue [2001] UKPC 28; [2001] 2 AC 710, 
at [8]. Apart from personal chattels that are the subject of the Bills of Sale Act (1878) Amendment Act 
1882, there would appear to be no reason why the courts should not now be able to recognise the 
ability of an individual to give a floating charge, particularly over business assets, but it may now be 
too late for this development to occur.  
212 This is the consequence of ss 4 and 5 of the Bills of Sale Act (1878) Amendment Act 1882, to which 
there is an exception in s 6 of that Act (although the ambit of that exception is cut down by s 9 of the 
Act). Further exceptions arise with respect to agricultural assets under the Agricultural Credits Act 
1928.  For discussion of reform proposals, see Chapter 17. 
213  [2001] UKPC 28, [2001] 2 AC 710. 
otherwise be available, and it permits the company to carry on its business, and thus 
its ability to generate cash flow, for the benefit of all concerned. 
14.6.2.1.1 Secondly, the presence of a floating charge as part of a package of 
comprehensive security over the whole or substantially the whole of a company’s 
assets formally permitted the creditor to appoint  an administrative receiver of the 
company and its assets.214. The right to make such an appointment, however, was 
abolished by section 72A of the Insolvency Act 1986,215 except in relation to certain 
types of charges, mainly to do with the financial markets and project finance.216.A 
creditor which is the ‘holder of a qualifying floating charge’217 may appoint an 
administrator out of court or, if another person makes an application to the court for 
an appointment of an administrator, may indicate its candidate, whom the court 
cannot refuse unless the particular circumstances of the case so dictate.218 This  is 
useful in determining who should be appointed,219 although, at least in theory, the 
creditor cannot influence what should happen thereafter in the conduct of the 
administration.220  In rare cases where the holder of the qualifying floating charge 
applies to court for an appointment of an administrator, it benefits from an absolution 
from the requirement to show that the company is unable to pay its debts.221 When the 
company is in liquidation the holder of a qualifying floating charge enjoys the benefit 
of an exception to the restriction on administration applications.222 Upon making the 
order for administration pursuant to such an application the court discharges the 
winding-up order.223   
14.6.2.2 Disadvantages 
The disadvantages of a floating charge are all borne by the creditor which holds such 
a charge. 
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company and dealing with its assets (See, for instance, s 42 of and Sched 1 to the Insolvency Act 
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within one of these exceptions, an administrative receiver is appointed, the creditor by doing so is able 
to defeat the subsequent appointment of an administrator (paras 17(b), 25(c), and 39(1) of Sched B1 to 
the Insolvency Act 1986) and the commencement of a moratorium with respect to an eligible company 
where there is a proposal for a voluntary arrangement of the company (para 4(1)(c) of Sched A1 to the 
Insolvency Act 1986). 
217 Which is defined in paras 14(2) and 14(3) of Sched B1 to the Insolvency Act 1986.  
218 See para 36 of Sched B1 to the Insolvency Act 1986. 
219 See para 14 of Sched B1 to the Insolvency Act 1986. 
220 In practice, a floating charge holder may well put pressure on the directors of the company to 
appoint an administrator out of court under para 22 of Sched B1 of the Insolvency Act 1986  rather 
than make the appointment itself. 
221 See para 35 of Sched B1 to the Insolvency Act 1986. See AIB Group (UK) Plc v St John Spencer 
Estates and Development Ltd [2012] EWHC 2317 (Ch), [2013] 1 BCLC 718. 
222 See paras 37(1) and 37(2) of Sched B1 to the Insolvency Act 1986. 
223 See para 37(3) of Sched B1 to the Insolvency Act 1986. See Re Albany Building Ltd [2007] BCC 
591 for the effect of dispositions made under a discharged winding-up order. 
14.6.2.2.1 The first and most general disadvantage results directly from the 
chargor’s liberty to deal with the assets without the chargee’s consent in the ordinary 
course of its business. The chargee’s interest in the charged asset may be defeated by, 
or subordinated, to an interest of a buyer or anyone with whom the chargor deals in 
relation to the charged assets. As will be seen from what is said below, the concept of 
dealing in the ordinary course of business has been developed rather liberally by the 
case law. 
14.6.2.2.2 Secondly, there are a number of statutory provisions which confer 
priority on various persons with respect to floating charge assets and their proceeds of 
realisation, ahead of the interests of the holder of the floating charge (irrespective of 
whether the charge has crystallised). These are referred to in greater detail below. 
14.6.2.2.3 Thirdly, the rights of the chargee suffer if the chargor is in 
administration or if a moratorium is in force with respect to a proposed voluntary 
arrangement of a chargor. If the chargor is in administration, the administrator has the 
right to deal with the charged assets as if they were free of the charge, although the 
holder of the floating charge is given the same priority over assets acquired in 
substitution for the charged assets.224 If a CVA moratorium is in place, it is not 
possible to crystallise the charge nor to restrict the right of the chargor to dispose of 
the charged assets.225 In addition, a provision in a floating charge is void if it provides 
that obtaining a CVA moratorium or doing anything to that end will cause the charge 
to crystallise, lead to a restriction on the right of the chargor to dispose of charged 
assets, or be a ground for the appointment of a receiver.226 
14.6.2.2.4 Fourthly, under section 245 of the Insolvency Act 1986 floating 
charges are subject to an additional ground on which they might be avoided in the 
event that the chargor goes into winding up or administration, which does not apply to 
fixed security. Section 245 is addressed in further detail later in this chapter. 
14.6.3 The nature of a floating charge 
In two early cases, Lord Macnaghten provided explanations as to the nature of a 
floating charge. In Governments Stock and Other Securities Investment Co Ltd v 
Manila Rly Co227 he said that: 
A floating security is an equitable charge on the assets for the time being of a 
going concern. It attaches to the subject charged in the varying condition in 
which it happens to be from time to time. It is of the essence of such a charge 
that it remains dormant until the undertaking charged ceases to be a going 
concern, or until the person in whose favour the charge is created intervenes. 
In Illingworth v Holdsworth228 his Lordship contrasted a specific charge (a fixed 
security) with a floating charge and said: 
A specific charge, I think, is one that without more fastens on ascertained and 
definite property or property capable of being ascertained and defined; a 
floating charge, on the other hand, is ambulatory and shifting in its nature, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
224 See para 70 of Sched B1 to the Insolvency Act 1986. 
225 See para 13 of Sched A1 to the Insolvency Act 1986. 
226 See para 43 of Sched A1 to the Insolvency Act 1986. 
227  [1897] AC 81, at 86. 
228  [1904] AC 355, at 358. In the Court of Appeal, the case was called Re Yorkshire Woolcombers’ 
Association Ltd [1903] 2 Ch 284, to which further reference is made below. 
hovering over and so to speak floating with the property which it is intended to 
affect until some event occurs or some act is done which causes it to settle and 
fasten on the subject of the charge within its reach and grasp. 
14.6.3.1 It is clear from what Lord Macnaghten said in the first of those cases 
that a floating charge is a present form of security which extends to the assets that 
come within its compass from time to time;229 it is not an agreement to give future 
security.230 It follows that the receipt of new assets within the charge after the 
commencement of winding up of the chargor is not invalidated as a new disposition in 
favour of the chargee by section 127(1) of the Insolvency Act 1986.231 
14.6.3.2 What is not very clear from the two statements is the extent of the 
interest of the chargee prior to crystallisation of the charge, bearing in mind the 
freedom of the chargor to deal with the assets as if they were free of the charge.232 In 
the first of the two passages, Lord Macnaghten appears to be saying that the security 
can be treated as attaching to the assets that come within its compass from time to 
time. However, in the second of the two passages quoted above Lord Macnaghten 
appears to be saying that the charge does not attach to the charged assets until 
crystallisation, as he says that it does not ‘settle and fasten on’ the assets prior to that 
point. On some views there is a form of security interest in the charged assets prior to 
crystallisation (a security interest in the fund) but it is not sufficient to be regarded as 
having attached to the assets.233 On other views, the security interest is attached to 
individual assets prior to crystallisation although the chargor has a licence to deal free 
of charge in the ordinary course of business (defeasible fixed charge theory)234 or the 
security interest is overreached when disposed in the ordinary course of business 
(overreaching theory).235 Both sets of views explain why third parties can acquire 
rights in the charged assets which are superior to the chargee’s proprietary right and 
why the chargor is able to deal with the assets as if they were free of the charge and 
confer entitlements on third parties which may be by way of absolute ownership or 
otherwise take priority over the interest of the chargee.236 Views have also been 
expressed against a proprietary character of the floating charge prior to crystallisation. 
One view (now considered in incorrect) was that a floating charge is merely an 
agreement to give security.237 More recently, it has been suggested that the floating 
charge is right against another person’s right238 or a power in rem to acquire an 
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230 Cf the controversial statement of Lord Scott in Smith (Administrator of Cosslett (Contractors) Ltd) v 
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231 See Re Margart Pty Ltd (1985) 9 ACLR 269. 
232 See further the commentary provided in Chap 13 of WJ Gough, Company Charges (2nd edn, 1996). 
233 See L Gullifer (ed), Goode on Legal Problems of Credit and Security (Sweet & Maxwell 2013 5th 
edn) para 4-04. 
234 See S Worthington, ‘Floating Charges: An Alternative Theory’ [1994] CLJ 81. 
235 See R Nolan, ‘Property in a fund’ (2008) 120 LQR 108; D Sheehan, ‘Property in a Fund, Tracing 
and Unjust Enrichment’ (2010) JoEq 4. 
236 See, for instance, Fletcher Moulton and Buckley LJJ in Evans v Rival Granite Quarries Ltd [1910] 2 
KB 979, at 994 and 999–1002, respectively. 
237 W Gough, Company Charges (2nd edn, 1996) 97–101, 341–48. 
238 See B McFarlane, The Structure of Property Law (Hart 2008). 
interest in the future239 although in either case it would be enforceable at least against 
some third parties. Deciding which view is correct involves systemic and theoretical 
questions about the nature of property and proprietary interests, which are not 
addressed here. Suffice it to say that a floating charge prior to crystallisation at the 
very least confers more than a contractual interest and that from a practical 
perspective an analogy with a fund has thus far worked well to explain this type of 
security. 
14.6.3.3 It is possible to take a floating charge over the whole of a company’s 
undertaking and assets or over only one asset or some part of its assets. It is common, 
but not necessary for its validity, that the instrument of charge will contain the power 
for the chargee to appoint a receiver of the charged property,240 or, if the charge, 
together with any fixed charges, relates to all or substantially all the property of the 
charger, an administrator.241 
14.6.3.4 The relationship between the chargor and the chargee, which arises 
from the contractual agreement between them contained in the charge, governs much 
of the consequences of the security, including as to the circumstances in which the 
charge crystallises so that it attaches to the charged assets in the manner just 
described. This was made clear by Hoffmann J in Re Brightlife Ltd.242 
14.6.4 The essential characteristic of a floating charge 
The most commonly quoted description of the usual characteristics of a floating 
charge was that provided by Romer LJ in Re Yorkshire Woolcombers’ Association 
Ltd,243 as follows: 
I certainly do not intend to attempt to give an exact definition of the term 
‘floating charge’, nor am I prepared to say that there will not be a floating 
charge within the meaning of the Act [i.e. Section 14 of the Companies Act 
1900], which does not contain all the three characteristics that I am about to 
mention, but I certainly think that if a charge has the three characteristics that I 
am about to mention it is a floating charge. (1) If it is a charge on a class of 
assets of a company present and future; (2) if that class is one which, in the 
ordinary course of the business of the company, would be changing from time 
to time; and (3) if you find that by the charge it is contemplated that, until 
some future step is taken by on or behalf of those interested in the charge, the 
company may carry on its business in the ordinary way as far as concerns the 
particular class of assets I am dealing with. 
14.6.4.1 Despite the reticence shown by Romer LJ in providing an exact 
definition, it was confirmed by the Privy Council in the Brumark case and by the 
House of Lords in Re Spectrum Plus Ltd244 that the essential hallmark or characteristic 
of a floating charge is the third of the three characteristics that were identified by 
Romer LJ, namely, the liberty of the chargor to deal with the charged assets in the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
239 See R Stevens, ‘Contractual Aspects of Debt Financing’ in D Prentice and A Reisberg (eds), 
Corporate Finance Law in the UK and the EU (OUP 2012) 213 at 221-223. 
240 See Re Cimex Tissues Ltd [1994] BCC 626, at 634–635. 
241 The inclusion of such a power is one of the ways in which a charge can become a qualifying floating 
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ordinary course of business until the charge is crystallised.245 As Lord Millett 
remarked in the Brumark case, the first two of the characteristics may typically be 
found in the case of a floating charge but are not an essential ingredient of such a 
charge and they may also be present in a fixed charge,246 for instance, in a fixed 
charge over future property. Furthermore, it is possible to take a floating charge over a 
declining stock of assets, which is not being replenished. Cases which had been 
decided before the decisions of the Privy Council and the House of Lords on the basis 
that all three of the criteria had to be present before there could be a floating charge, 
and thus that an absence of either or both of the first two criteria meant that the 
security should be treated as a fixed charge, should now be regarded as having been 
incorrectly decided.247 
14.6.4.2 Taking the decisions in the Brumark and Spectrum Plus cases together, 
the consequence is that only if the chargor has been effectively deprived in full and 
from the outset of the liberty to deal with the charged assets in a proprietary sense, so 
that the assets have truly been set aside as security for payment of the secured 
obligations, can it be said that there is a fixed charge. To achieve a fixed charge, the 
chargee has to be in control of the assets, so that the chargee must consent, within its 
discretion, to their release from the security before they can be dealt with by the 
chargor. In practice, the distinction in characterising the nature of the security comes 
down to a practical factual analysis in relation to the security, the assets concerned, 
and the means by which they can be exploited. It is also important to ensure that the 
restrictions from dealing that are contained in the security instrument have been 
followed through in practice and, to that extent, it is relevant to take into account the 
conduct of the parties subsequent to the creation of the charge,248 although the precise 
analysis of why this is relevant is rather problematic.    The conduct referred to is 
post-contractual conduct,249 which is not usually admissible when the court is 
interpreting a contract, unless it is alleged that the contract is a sham.250  Since a sham 
involved dishonesty, this is unlikely to be a route taken in many commercial disputes. 
A more satisfactory analysis is that, where the parties’ conduct is not consistent with a 
charge being fixed, this operates as a variation or waiver.251  The label ascribed by the 
parties to the security, whilst indicating their subjective intention, is not determinative 
of its nature. The courts’ approach is, first, to ascertain the nature and the rights and 
obligations which the parties intended to grant each other in relation to the assets and, 
secondly, to categorise the relationship so ascertained as a matter of law.252 
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Furthermore, as Hoffmann J had remarked in In re Brightlife Ltd253 and Millett LJ had 
also said in Re Cosslett (Contractors) Ltd,254 a partial restriction would not be a 
sufficient deprivation of the chargor’s liberty to deal with the assets for there to be a 
fixed charge. In addition, a third party will only be affected by a partial restriction if, 
on normal principles, it was aware of the restriction and took its interest with the 
intention of causing the chargor to breach the restriction. 
14.6.5 The liberty to deal 
In light of its central importance in determining if security is by way of fixed or 
floating security, as well as the consequences of such a determination, it is necessary 
to consider the approach that the courts have taken in considering what is meant by 
the concept of the liberty to deal or, to describe it more fully, dealing in the ordinary 
course of business with the charged assets. Transactions that take place within the 
scope of the liberty to deal will have the effect of conferring on the third party that 
deals with the chargor either an outright ownership right or otherwise a right in the 
assets that takes priority over the interest of the chargee. 
14.6.5.1 The concept has been given a wide and liberal meaning, bearing in 
mind the proprietary consequences to third parties which deal with the company in 
reliance upon its liberty to deal with its assets. It refers to general concepts of carrying 
on business, not the particular business of the chargor.255 It has been held that an 
unprecedented or exceptional transaction, in terms of the transactions usually entered 
into by the chargor, may still be within the ordinary course of business.256 The fact 
that the directors may exceed their powers or that the transaction might amount to a 
preference of the chargee does not necessarily mean that it would fall outside what 
might be considered as being in the ordinary course of business.257 A disposal of a 
substantial part of the chargor’s assets, even by one transaction, may still be regarded 
as being in the ordinary course of business if it is not done with a view to the 
permanent cessation of the business.258 However, if it is done with a view to the 
permanent cessation of the business of the company, that is, the company intends to 
cease business, it will be outside the ordinary course of business and it will cause the 
charge to crystallise.259 
14.6.5.2 The following types of transaction involving charged assets have been 
held to fall within the ordinary course of business: 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
respectively. The application of the rule is illustrated by The Russell Cooke Trust Co Ltd v Elliott 
[2007] EWHC 1443 (Ch), [2007] 2 BCLC 637 and Re Harmony Care Homes [2009] EWHC 1961 
(Ch),[2010] BCC 358, in each of which it was held that a charge which was described as a floating 
charge was, nonetheless, a fixed charge because the chargor was effectively prevented by the charge 
instrument from being able to deal with the charged assets. 
253  [1987] Ch 200, at 209. 
254  [1998] Ch 495, at 510. 
255 Kay LJ in Driver v Broad [1893] QBD 744, at 748–749; Ashborder BV v Green Gas Power Ltd 
[2004] EWHC 1517 (Ch), at [227] (Etherton J). 
256 See Willmot v London Celluloid Co (1886) 34 ChD 147; Re Borax Co [1901] 1 Ch 326. 
257 See Willmot v London Celluloid Co (1886) 34 ChD 147; Ashborder BV v Green Gas Power Ltd 
[2004] EWHC 1517 (Ch), at [227] (Etherton J); Bulbinder Singh Sandhu (trading as Isher Fashions 
UK) v Jet Star Retail Limited (in administration) [2011] EWCA Civ 459, para 10 (Moore-Bick LJ). 
258 See Re Florence Land and Public Works Co, ex p Moor (1878) 10 Ch D 530; Hubbuck v Helms 
(1857) 56 LJ Ch 536; Re Borax Co [1901] 1 Ch 326. 
259 See Re Woodroffes (Musical Instruments) Ltd [1986] Ch 366; Re Real Meat Co Ltd [1996] BCC 
254. 
(1) disposals of assets whilst trading,260 even if it is a quick sale to raise cash;261 
(2) use of the proceeds of sale of assets to meet the expenses of the business;262 
(3) the creation of rights of set-off, either arising as legal set-offs or equitable set-
offs;263 
(4) a sale and lease-back of assets;264 
(5) the grant of fixed security over the assets;265 and 
(6) the grant of a limited floating charge,266 but the grant of a general floating 
charge is not in the ordinary course of business.267 
14.6.6 Fixed v floating security in the context of particular 
transactions 
It is relevant to consider what conditions or requirements may have to be fulfilled, in 
any particular case, so that the creditor can be sure that it has taken fixed security. 
This is particularly important if one takes into account the comparative advantages to 
a creditor of holding fixed security, as opposed to floating security. The question has 
arisen most strikingly in relation to security over book debts, but it could also arise in 
many other instances. 
14.6.6.1 In theory, it should be possible to take fixed security over any asset,268 
but to achieve fixed security, the chargee has to be in control of the charged assets. It 
is not enough that the chargor has been deprived of control in its own right as, for 
instance, where the charged assets are subject to an external restriction, where control 
has been vested in a third party, or where there is joint control between the chargor 
and chargee.269 It is submitted that it is similarly not sufficient if another creditor 
already holding a charge is in control, so that a creditor seeking to take a charge in 
assets in which a fixed charge already exists cannot take a second fixed charge relying 
on the first chargee’s control. It is also submitted that if, on the other hand, the second 
chargee purports to exercise control over the already charged assets the (second) 
charge can be fixed even if assets are in control of the first chargee so long as the 
control exercised by the second chargee is separate from the control exercised by the 
first chargee. Control in this sense means that the chargee must be in the position that 
the assets can only be dealt with by the chargor if they have been released from the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
260 Re Florence Land and Public Works Co, ex p Moor (1878) 10 Ch D 530. 
261 Hamer v London, City & Midland Bank Ltd (1918) 87 LJKB 973. 
262 Re Panama, New Zealand and Australian Royal Mail Co (1870) 5 Ch App 318. 
263 Biggerstaff v Rowatt’s Wharf Ltd [1896] 2 Ch 93; Edward Nelson & Co Ltd v Faber & Co [1903] 2 
KB 367; Rother Iron Works Ltd v Canterbury Precision Engineers Ltd [1974] QB 1. The right of a 
third party to set-off a liquidated cross-claim that it has against the chargor will cease with respect to 
cross-claims that arise after the third party has received notice that the charge has crystallised: Business 
Computers Ltd v Anglo-African Leasing Ltd [1977] 1 WLR 578. 
264 Reynolds Bros (Motors) Pty Ltd v Esanda Ltd (1984) 8 ACLR 422. 
265 Re Castell and Brown Ltd [1898] 1 Ch 315; Re Benjamin Cope & Sons Ltd [1914] 1 Ch 800. 
266 Re Automatic Bottle Makers [1926] Ch 412. 
267 Re Benjamin Cope & Sons Ltd [1914] 1 Ch 800. It would appear that this point was overlooked by 
Morritt J in Griffiths v Yorkshire Bank PLC [1994] 1 WLR 1427. 
268 A point that had initially been recognised by Slade J in Siebe Gorman & Co Ltd v Barclays Bank 
Ltd [1979] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 142. 
269 See, for instance, Re ASRS Establishment Ltd [2000] 2 BCLC 631, in which the Court of Appeal 
held that there could not be a fixed charge over the benefit of a bank account where, vis-à-vis the 
chargee, the chargor would have access to the relevant account, which was maintained with a third 
party, even though there were restrictions inherent in the nature of the account which precluded the 
company from unrestricted dealing with the account.  
security with the consent of the chargee, which it should be at liberty to grant within 
its discretion on a case-by-case basis. Thus, a standing arrangement or understanding 
that assets will be released from the charge (with or without meeting certain 
requirements) will result in the security being in the nature of a floating charge rather 
than by way of fixed security. For a charge to be fixed the chargee cannot be 
compelled to provide consent.270 This probably means either that the chargee ought to 
be completely free whether to give consent or not, or, at the very least, the agreement 
can only provide that consent cannot be refused capriciously, or unreasonably.271 It 
must also be borne in mind that the question cannot be resolved simply by looking at 
the title in the asset, without also considering the constituent elements of the asset and 
its practical or commercial utility. Nor is the answer dictated by the label or form of 
the security272; thus, a security which calls itself a legal mortgage or a fixed charge 
might turn out to be no more than a floating charge when it has been subjected to 
proper scrutiny.273 The distinction in characterising the nature of the security will 
often come down to a factual analysis of the assets concerned, taking into account the 
true nature of the assets and the means by which they can be exploited and realised in 
a practical sense. Where the charge document is drafted to cover a list of assets within 
a single charge and there is no express power to dispose conferred in the agreement 
but most of the assets are such that are normally disposed in the ordinary course of 
business then a power to dispose will be implied in relation to all assets in the list. 
This is because it is thought that parties intend all assets to be treated in the same way: 
if the parties intended for any assets to be dealt with differently, they would have 
included a separate clause in the agreement.274 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
270 See Gray v G-T-P Group Ltd [2010] EWHC 1772 (Ch), [2011] BCC 86  where a charge was held to 
be floating in circumstances in which a chargee, who held the assets, was obliged to transfer the assets 
without having a right to refuse to do so. Gray casts doubt on the case of Queen's Moat Houses plc v 
Capita IRG Trustees Ltd [2004] EWHC 868 (Ch), [2005] BCC 347 where the chargor’s right  
unilaterally to require a chargee to release property from a charge was held consistent with a fixed 
charge (in that case a floating charge was thought to be a charge in which the chargor can deal with 
assets without “a reference to” those chargee, which is, it is submitted, different from ability to deal 
without consent by the chargee).	  
271 ‘Unreasonableness’ in relation to refusal of consent is likely to be in the sense referred to in cases 
such as Commercial First Business Ltd v Atkins [2012] EWHC 4388 (Ch) and International Drilling 
Fluids Ltd v Louisville Investments (Uxbridge) Ltd [1986] 1 Ch 513, 519–521 discussed below 
14.17.1.3. 
272 See discussion above 14.6.4.2 
273 It was on this issue that it is respectfully submitted that Slade J fell into error in Siebe Gorman & Co 
Ltd v Barclays Bank Ltd [1979] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 142. He concluded that the necessary element of control 
over the proceeds of the collections of the charged book debts could be assumed to be in favour of the 
chargee because the parties had intended that the security should be by way of fixed charge. To put it 
colloquially, he put the cart before the horse. For criticism of the approach in Siebe Gorman, see Re 
Spectrum Plus Ltd [2005] UKHL 41; [2005] 2 AC 680, in particular see Lord Nicholls at para [1] 
(stating that he agreed the decision in Siebe was wrong and should be overruled), Lord Hope at paras 
[57], [64] and [75] (stating that the decision in Siebe was impossible to come to in that case and not 
defensible “on any rational basis”), Lady Hale at para [162] (stating that Siebe should be overruled), 
Lord Scott at paras [110]-[120] (dismissing the approach in Siebe) and Lord Walker at paras [154]-
[155] (also seems to disapprove of Siebe but in a more cautious way, similarly to Lord Scott). 
274 Re GE Tunbridge Ltd [1995] 1 BCLC 34, [1994] BCC 563; see also H Beale, M Bridge, L 
Gullifer, E Lomnicka, The Law of Finance and Title-based Financing (Oxford University 
Press 2nd edn 2012) para 6.103. 
14.6.6.2 Book debts (receivables) 
Both the Brumark and the Spectrum Plus cases involved attempts to take fixed 
security over the present and future book debts of the chargor.275 What follows applies 
the approach that was taken in those cases. 
14.6.6.2.1 The essential nature of book debts as assets, in a practical and 
economic sense, rests in the ability to turn them into cash proceeds and to use such 
proceeds. This can be achieved by selling the debts or by getting in payment of the 
debts. That has to be borne in mind in characterising the nature of security over book 
debts and the necessity to take control of the debts and the practical utility that they 
represent. In both the Brumark case and the Spectrum Plus case it was said that it was 
not sufficient to draw a line between the debts in their uncollected state and the 
proceeds of their collection.276 To achieve a fixed charge, the chargor has to be 
deprived from the outset of both the power to dispose of the debts before collection 
and the effective use of their proceeds after collection. The deprivation has to be 
enforced from the very beginning of the security. It matters not whether one views the 
book debts and their proceeds of collection as two separate assets or that one is the 
emanation of the other. In reality, the proceeds of collection are ‘merely the traceable 
proceeds of the [debt] and represent its entire value’.277 It makes no commercial sense 
to treat them separately, in the sense of attempting to isolate the debts from their 
proceeds of collection. What follows will assume that the chargor has been precluded 
from dealing with the book debts prior to their collection. It will concentrate on how 
the collection should be achieved and what should be done with the proceeds of the 
collection. 
14.6.6.2.2 Where the chargee is a bank and is able to provide an account which 
the chargor can use to receive collections of the book debts, it is possible to achieve a 
fixed charge by requiring the chargor to collect payment of the debts through the 
account. However, it is not sufficient merely to provide that the chargor is obliged to 
collect the debts by paying them into its account with the chargee, if the chargor may 
then have effective use of the proceeds of collection by drawing on the account into 
which they had been paid.278 Thus, in a case where the proceeds are paid into an 
overdrawn account, if that goes towards restoring the overdraft limit in consequence 
of which the chargor could make further withdrawals from the account, then there 
would not be an effective or practical limit to the chargor’s ability to use the proceeds 
of collection. It follows that the proceeds must be paid into a blocked account to 
which the chargor is denied access, so that the balance on the account may only be 
released to the chargor on a case-by-case basis. The facts must substantiate that the 
account is blocked in practice and not just in theory. Hence, it is insufficient that the 
chargee simply reserves the right to block the account in the future. The necessary 
procedures can be achieved by using the model in the Irish case of In re Keenan Bros 
Ltd.279 In that case, the chargor was obliged to pay its collected debts into a blocked 
account at the chargee bank. The bank retained complete discretion and day-to-day 
control over withdrawals from that account, which could only be made with prior 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
275 A number of other cases also involved the same issue, including Siebe Gorman & Co Ltd v Barclays 
Bank Ltd [1979] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 142 and Re New Bullas Trading Ltd [1994] 1 BCLC 485. 
276 As had been done erroneously by the Court of Appeal in those cases 
277 Per Lord Millett in the Brumark case at [2001] UKPC 28; [2001] 2 AC 710, at [46]. 
278 Which had been the view taken by Slade J in Siebe Gorman & Co Ltd v Barclays Bank Ltd [1979] 2 
Lloyd’s Rep 142.  
279  [1986] BCLC 242. 
written consent. Keenan Bros was referred to with approval in both the Brumark case 
and the Spectrum Plus case. 
14.6.6.2.3 An alternative method would be for the debts to be assigned by way of 
mortgage to the financier from the outset, with notice of the assignment being given 
to the debtors, such that the debtors would be directed to make payment directly to the 
financier. The financier would then collect payment itself and retain the proceeds as 
security or use them in discharge of the secured liabilities.280 As Lord Millett pointed 
out in the Brumark case, this structure may not be commercially practical, unless the 
financier was able to undertake the administrative work of receiving and processing 
the payments.281  It is, however, a model sometimes used in receivables financing. 
14.6.6.2.4 A further alternative, which might be useful if the financier is not a 
bank, is that there would be an unnotified equitable assignment by way of mortgage 
of the debts. The assignor (i.e. the financier’s customer) would declare itself to be the 
trustee of the financier for the purpose of collecting the debts, having been given the 
authority of the financier to do so on behalf of the financier. The assignor would be 
required to open a separate account at a bank into which the debts would be collected. 
The account would itself also be subject to a trust in favour of the financier, with 
notice given to the bank of the security. It would be necessary that all concerned 
should agree that no withdrawal could be made from the account without the 
financier’s consent.   Again, this model is often used in receivables financing, as an 
alternative to an absolute assignment under a whole turnover agreement.282    
14.6.6.2.5 Whichever of the above methods is used, it is bound to be rather 
cumbersome. It is also unlikely to appeal to the chargor/assignor when borrowing 
from a bank under an all assets debenture, because the chargor/assignor will not have 
ready access to the proceeds of collection of the book debts and so will be denied the 
economic use of the proceeds of collection of its receivables. Therein, of course, lies 
the basis of the decisions by the Privy Council and the House of Lords.   In asset-
based lending, where the financier is lending against specific assets (here, the 
company’s receivables) this is not so much of an issue.     
14.6.6.2.6 Thus, in a receivables financing transaction, the financier will usually 
enter into a debt purchase transaction with its customer, such as a factoring, invoice 
discounting, or block discounting transaction. Such transactions involve the purchase 
by the financier of the customer’s book debts and do not have to give way to the 
claims of a liquidator for liquidation expenses or the claims of the preferential 
creditors in an insolvency of the customer, nor will they suffer from the depredations 
inflicted on the realisations of assets subject to a floating charge pursuant to section 
176A of the Insolvency Act 1986. In Lloyds & Scottish Finance Ltd v Cyril Lord 
Carpets Sales Ltd283 the House of Lords held that the invoice discounting arrangement 
in that case was to be regarded as a purchase of the relevant debts, rather than a loan 
with security. As such, it did not constitute a registrable charge within the equivalent 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
280 This alternative, and the one that is next mentioned, were canvassed briefly by Lord Hope in Re 
Spectrum Plus Ltd [2005] UKHL 41; [2005] 2 AC 680, [54]. See also Lord Millett in the Brumark case 
at [2001] UKPC 28; [2001] 2 AC 710, [17]. 
281 Per Lord Millett in the Brumark case at [2001] UKPC 28; [2001] 2 AC 710, at [17]. 
282 This model has the advantage that the fixed charge is registrable, so that the financier can give 
notice of it to those who might take an interest in the debts, while an absolute assignment made by a 
company is not registrable.  For suggestions for reform, see Chapter 17. 
283  [1992] BCLC 609. 
in Northern Ireland of section 859A of the Companies Act 2006.284   Even where 
receivables financing is effected by the purchase of debts, as described in this 
paragraph, the financier will typically take a (registrable) fixed charge over ‘non-
vesting’ debts.285 
14.6.6.3 Other assets 
Although the decisions in Spectrum Plus and Agnew were specifically concerned with 
transactions involving book debts or receivables, they have a wider implication, 
particularly in the emphasis that they place on three matters in distinguishing fixed 
from floating security. First, that the crucial matter in determining the character of the 
security lies in whether or not the chargee is in control of the assets so that the chargor 
has been fully deprived of the liberty to deal with the assets. Secondly, that the first 
two of the characteristics mentioned by Romer LJ in the Yorkshire Woolcombers case 
are not defining criteria, so that their presence or absence will not be conclusive. 
Hence, it is possible that a floating charge may be taken over a single or itemised 
asset or assets and such a charge may exist over a diminishing number of assets which 
may not be replenished. Thirdly, that it will not be sufficient to judge the first issue by 
looking at a particular asset in isolation and removed from its practical nature and 
utility, as well as its effective exploitation as an asset. 
14.6.6.4 Plant and equipment 
If it is wished to take fixed security over items of plant and equipment or similar types 
of ‘fixed asset’ (as described in accounting terms), it is suggested that it would not be 
safe to rely on cases286 where it was held that if the charge covered specific plant or 
equipment which was itemised (or otherwise identified) in the security document then 
that was a sufficient indication of an intention to grant fixed security to be 
determinative, even though the chargor was given a limited licence to dispose of the 
assets, for instance if they were to be replaced. In Re Cosslett (Contractors) Ltd,287 
which was a case concerning equipment, Millett LJ had emphasised the importance of 
the control test as to dealings with the relevant equipment, that is, control in the hands 
of the chargee. On this basis, a fixed charge can only be taken if the chargor is 
precluded from disposing of the asset (in the sense of disposing of it or granting 
proprietary entitlements in it) without the permission of the chargee.288 In this regard, 
it is relevant that quite a lot of computer and other electronic equipment has a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
284 Formerly s 860 of the Companies Act 2006. 
285 These are debts which contain a clause restricting assignment.   In some circumstances such clauses 
will no longer be enforceable if the draft Business Contract Terms (Restrictions on Assignment of 
Receivables) Regulations are enacted, see 14.1.9.2. 
286 Such as National Provincial Bank of England Ltd v United Electric Theatres Ltd [1916] 1 Ch 132 
and Re Cimex Tissues Ltd [1994] BCC 626. Although the latter case referred to Holroyd v Marshall 
(1862) 10 HL Cas 191 as an early authority for the view that it was consistent with a fixed charge that 
the chargor might have a limited licence to dispose of charge assets, it is submitted that the House of 
Lords in that case did not have this particular point in mind (after all, Re Panama New Zealand and 
Australian Royal Mail Co (1870) LR 5 Ch App 318, which came some years later, is generally 
regarded as the first case in which the concept of the floating charge was recognised). Furthermore, the 
grantor of the bill of sale in Holroyd v Marshall was an individual trader and not an incorporated entity. 
287  [1998] Ch 495 (affd at [2001] UKHL 58, [2002] 1 AC 336). 
288 The one possible qualification to this could be that the chargor might safely be given a licence to 
dispose of equipment once it has reached a state of such longevity that it has no value, provided that 
adequate precautions are in place to demonstrate that fact before a disposal takes place. This would be 
because the chargee would not be affected in a practical sense by such a disposition. 
relatively short life before it falls due for replacement and so it looks more like 
circulating assets than long-term permanent or semi-permanent assets, which adds 
further necessity to the requirement for control in the hands of the chargee.289 It is also 
submitted that the chargor should be precluded from entering into other types of 
dealing in the asset, by way of bailment, which may affect, in a substantial sense, the 
entitlement to take possession of the asset or the long-term value of the asset. On the 
other hand, a permission that is given to the chargor to grant bailments at will, which 
can be immediately terminated, or relatively short-term periodic bailments, should not 
affect the nature of the security, because they do not threaten the chargee’s interest to 
any material extent. 
14.6.6.5 Equipment leases or hire purchase transactions and rental payable 
under them 
One issue which remains outstanding in relation to the characterization of charges as 
fixed or floating, is to determine, in any given fact situation, over what assets the 
charge needs to exercise control for the charge to be fixed.    For example, in the case 
of a charge over a debt, the proceeds generated when the debt is paid are seen as part 
of the ‘charged assets’.     However, a piece of machinery may produce widgets which 
are of value, yet it is not necessary for the chargee to control the widgets for there to 
be a valid fixed charge over the machinery (providing the machinery itself is 
controlled).   The difficulty is to isolate the precise criteria on which to draw the line 
between these two extremes.    It is suggested that there are three relevant factors.   
The first is how directly the asset generates the income.290 The second is how close 
the generation of income comes to being the sole value of the asset, and the third is 
whether the asset is destroyed by the generation of income.291  
The application of this analysis, and of the decisions in the Brumark case and the 
Spectrum Plus case to the earlier decisions in Re Atlantic Computer Systems plc292 
and in Re Atlantic Medical Ltd,293  leave the status of the latter cases in great doubt, 
particularly in relation to the charge over rentals under the security in those cases. In 
the Atlantic Computers case, the company was in the business of leasing equipment to 
end users. It obtained finance for the cost of its acquisition of the equipment through 
entering, as hirer, into a hire purchase agreement or, as lessee, into a leasing 
agreement of the equipment, which it had already agreed to sub-hire or sub-lease to 
the end users. As security for the performance of its own obligations, it had given 
security to the financier over the benefit of the sub-leases, including the rentals 
payable to it thereunder. The subleases were identified in a schedule to the security. 
There was no contractual restriction as to the collection or use of such rentals by the 
company, at least prior to enforcement, and whilst the court noted that there was no 
specific permission given to the company as to the exercise by it of its rights under the 
sub-leases, there would appear to have been no specific conferral of control over those 
rights in favour of the chargee. The Court of Appeal held, nonetheless, that the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
289 See the approach taken in Re GE Tunbridge Ltd [1994] BCC 563. 
290 In the case of the piece of machinery referred to in the text, the number of steps that have to be gone 
through before the widget and the income from it is generated means that control of the widget or the 
income is not necessary for a fixed charge over the equipment. 
291 See H Beale, M Bridge, L Gullifer and E Lomnicka, The Law of Security and Title-Based 
Financing, (2nd edn, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012) 6.130 for a more detailed 
discussion. 
292  [1992] Ch 505. 
293  [1992] BCC 653. 
company had given fixed security over both the sub-leases and the rental payable 
thereunder because the relevant assets were in existence and identified when the 
security was given and should therefore be distinguished from a floating charge where 
the charge was ambulatory and covered present and future assets. This analysis draws 
upon the first two of Romer LJ’s characteristics in the Yorkshire Woolcombers 
case,294 whilst saying little in relation to the third of those characteristics. The court 
noted specifically that its decision was not affected by the fact that the company had 
unrestricted access to the rentals and the use of their proceeds. 
14.6.6.5.1 The position was almost the same in the Atlantic Medical case, except 
that the security extended to cover any future leases of the equipment and the rentals 
payable under such leases. Vinelott J followed the Court of Appeal in the Atlantic 
Computers case and held that the extension of the security to cover the future 
subleases was not material as they would be in replacement of the identified existing 
sub-leases and therefore amounted to much the same thing. He also held that it was 
not realistic to distinguish, for security purposes, between the sub-leases and the 
rentals payable under them, as in taking security over the benefit of the subleases the 
security would also attach to the rentals. The two were inextricably linked. 
14.6.6.5.2295 Applying the analysis in 14.6.6.5 to these two cases shows that, in both 
cases, the rentals were part of the ‘charged assets’ so that lack of control over them 
should render the charges floating. First, the lease generates the income without the 
need for any act on the part of  the chargor except to collect in the income, making the 
situation comparable to receivables, and different from, for example, assets which 
generate income by being sold. Second, to the lessor of chattels, the whole value of 
the lease is in the rentals generated. Third, although the payment of rentals does not 
immediately destroy the lease, this happens once the last rental is paid and the term 
expires.   Although this could be said to be a point of distinction from the receivables 
situation, this would mean that all contracts under which payment was due in 
installments would fall within this category, even where the chargor had total freedom 
to use the sums paid. This would give an odd distinction between receivables payable 
on one occasion and on a number of future occasions.296  
 
14.6.6.6 Insurance policies 
The necessity of establishing control in the hands of the chargee will apply to 
situations where it is desired to take fixed security over an insurance or assurance 
policy and any claim or proceeds of a claim made under the policy. This requirement 
was found to have been met in Re CCG International Enterprises Ltd,297 where the 
charge required the chargor to take out and maintain the relevant policy and that the 
proceeds of any claim should, at the option of the chargee, be paid to the chargee or 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
294  [1903] 2 Ch 284. 
295 For more detailed argument, see H Beale, M Bridge, L Gullifer and E Lomnicka, The Law of 
Security and Title-Based Financing, (2nd edn Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), paras 
6.133 – 6.135. 
296 See S Worthington, ‘Floating Charges: the use and abuse of doctrinal analysis’ in J Getzler and J 
Payne (eds), Company Charges: Spectrum and Beyond (2006) 34, F Oditah, ‘Fixed charge over book 
debts after Brumark’ (2001) 14 Insolv Int 49, 54 and F Oditah, ‘Recurrent Issues in Receivables 
Financing’ in J Armour and J Payne (eds) Rationality in Company Law: Essays in Honour of DD 
Prentice (2009) 339- 340.   
297  [1993] BCC 580. 
applied in re-instatement of the damaged property to which the claim related. The 
chargee was in control and could decide how it wished the proceeds of the claim to be 
applied. It would have been different if that option had rested in the chargor. It is not 
uncommon to find situations where the chargor is given such an option with respect to 
the proceeds of claims, either altogether or up to certain monetary levels. It is 
submitted that such situations would result in there being only a floating charge over 
the policy and claims under it, even in cases where the total claim exceeded the 
stipulated level, because the claim is one chose in action and indivisible. In line with 
the Brumark case and the Spectrum Plus case, the chargee must be in control of the 
policy and claims made and payable under it, if it wishes to take fixed security, 
including both its uncollected state and its proceeds of collection or recovery.298 
14.6.6.7 Shares in a company 
A question arises about characterisation of a charge over shares owned by a company 
who does not deal in shares, which is relevant where the charge falls outside the 
Financial Collateral Arrangements (No 2) Regulations. In particular, the issue that 
arises is whether dealings in the dividends are relevant to the characterisation of the 
charge.  
14.6.6.7.1 One view might be that, analogously to a charge over book debts, a 
charge cannot be fixed without the chargee taking control over the dividends.299  
However, a better view is that the ability of the chargor to exercise the rights of 
receiving dividends does not render the charge floating. This is supported by the 
decision in Arthur D Little (in administration) Ltd v Ableco Finance LLC.300 In that 
case the terms of the charge were such that the company was not free to dispose of the 
shares without the chargee’s consent but could use the dividend and redemption 
moneys in the ordinary course of business. The charge over shares was held to be a 
fixed charge. The correct analogy is therefore with a tree and fruit, not with book 
debts.301  
14.6.6.7.2 Shares encompass not only rights to receive dividends, either by way 
of the distribution of income or of capital, but also rights to vote as a shareholder, and 
to require that the affairs of the company are properly conducted in accordance with 
the memorandum and articles of association.302. Insofar as voting rights are 
concerned, it would be unfortunate if the secured creditor taking a fixed charge would 
be required to take ‘control’ over voting rights. Such a position would give rise to 
practical problems. For example, the security holder could find that the company will 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
298 There must be a query, in this regard, as to the effect of s 83 of the Fires Prevention (Metropolis) 
Act 1774, which provides that the proceeds of any claim arising from a fire causing damage to a 
building shall be applied in re-instatement and repair of the building, if so requested by any person 
interested in the building. This must detract from the chargee’s control as to the application of such 
proceeds. 
299 This was the view expressed in the previous edition that effective fixed security could not be taken without the 
control of those rights being surrendered to (or at least under the control of) the chargee and so, the view expressed 
there was that simply preventing dealings with the title in the shares, without also taking account of those other 
aspects within the scope and coverage of the security, was insufficient to constitute fixed security over the shares. 
For those reasons, it was thought that the decision in Arthur D Little Ltd v Ableco Finance LLC [2002] EWHC 701 
(Ch), [2003] Ch 217 was wrongly decided. 
300  [2002] EWHC 701 (Ch), [2003] Ch 217. 
301 See H Beale, M Bridge, L Gullifer and E Lomnicka, The Law of Security and Title-Based Financing, ( 
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012, 2nd edn) para 6.136. 
302  See Cambridge Gas Transport Corp v The Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors of Navigator Holdings 
PLC [2006] UKPC 26; [2007] 1 AC 508, at [26] referring to Farwell J in Borland’s Trustee v Steel Brothers 
[1901] 1 Ch 279, 288. 
be treated as being its ‘subsidiary’303 or ‘subsidiary undertaking’.304 Although such 
risk could be overcome by providing that, prior to enforcement of the security or 
except to preserve its value, the relevant rights are held for, and are exercisable for the 
benefit of, the giver of the security305 but this would have to be outside security to 
avoid the risk of recharacterisation. It seems that a much simpler solution would be to 
say that a charge is fixed without taking control over rights attached to shares. 
 
14.6.6.8 Contractual rights 
If fixed security is to be taken over other types of intangible rights, such as contractual 
rights, the chargee should ensure that the chargor cannot deal with those rights and 
this may extend to their constituent elements without the chargee’s consent. The 
scarcity of case law and detailed guidance in this area has led some to take a cautious 
approach in practice which ensures that the chargee is fully entitled to receive and 
control the fruits or the proceeds of those rights and other entitlements relating to 
them.  
14.6.6.9 Intellectual property 
There may also be difficulties associated with taking fixed security over intellectual 
property, particularly if the chargor is permitted to continue in the exploitation of the 
rights concerned, such as by granting licences to third parties or, indeed, if the 
structure requires that an exclusive licence back should be granted to the giver of the 
security by the party taking the security.306 An exclusive licence will usually be 
granted where the security has taken the form of an absolute or legal assignment by 
way of mortgage of the rights concerned, such a mortgage having the consequence 
that the legal title in the rights is vested in the mortgagee. That may have the effect of 
depriving the mortgagor of the right to assert the rights in infringement proceedings 
and to deal with them by granting licences, unless the mortgagee joins in the 
proceedings and in the granting of licences. To avoid such difficulties, the mortgagee 
may grant an exclusive licence to the mortgagor for the period of the security or, at 
least, until its enforcement. 
14.6.6.9.1 From a security perspective, however, the granting of an exclusive 
licence may have unfortunate consequences in terms of ascertaining whether only a 
floating charge has been granted. This is because an exclusive licence has the effect 
that the licensee is granted the exclusive right to exploit the licensed rights to the 
exclusion of the licensor during the period of the licence. Even where there is not a 
requirement for the grant of an exclusive licence, such as where the security is by way 
of equitable mortgage or charge, if the security giver is permitted to carry on with the 
exploitation of the relevant rights as if it were the owner of them then there is a real 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
303 See s 1159 of the Companies Act 2006. 
304 See s 1162 of the Companies Act 2006. 
305 See para 7 of Sched 6, and para 8 of Sched 7, to the Companies Act 2006 (formerly s 736A(7) of, and para 8 of 
Sched 10A to, the Companies Act 1985). 
306 As is likely to be the case where the security takes the form of an assignment of the relevant 
intellectual property. An exclusive licence will usually be granted back to enable the 
assignor/mortgagor to continue using and exploiting the rights and to enable it to take proceedings in 
defence of the rights. 
risk that the security may be characterised as only being by way of a floating 
charge.307 
14.6.6.10 Real property 
Given its permanent and enduring nature, the ownership of real property (whether it 
be a freehold or a leasehold interest) is a prized form of ownership under English law 
and, accordingly, such an asset should be a suitable subject over which fixed security 
may be taken. However, commercial, farming, and other types of investment property 
is often leased out on leases of varying length and, indeed, a tenant under a lease is 
recognised as capable of having a legal estate in land which is separate and distinct 
from the estate in fee simple.308 A sub-lease has the same consequences with respect 
to the head lease out of which it has been granted. Section 99 of the Law of Property 
Act 1925 expressly recognises and authorises the power of a mortgagor to grant leases 
(or sub-leases) for substantial periods, subject to any contrary provision in the 
mortgage instrument. With that in mind, it is not uncommon to find in a mortgage of 
an interest in land (strictly speaking, such an instrument is called a legal charge) 
where the interest is not held for investment purposes (investment purposes in this 
sense principally comprising the granting of leases) to find that the security document 
forbids the mortgagor from granting leases, no doubt because a lease of any 
substantial period would have a detrimental effect on the value of the reversionary 
interest. 
14.6.6.10.1 A question must therefore arise as to the effect on a mortgagee’s 
security where the mortgagor has the right to enter into leases or sub-leases or, indeed, 
licences, except where the tenant or licensee can be dispossessed of its occupation 
quickly and without difficulty. Whilst in theory the freehold or leasehold interest of 
the grantor of the lease or licence is separate from the interest that arises under the 
lease or the right of occupation under the licence, the practical or economic effect of a 
lease or licence upon the value of the grantor’s reversion could be substantial. The 
difficulty arises most acutely where the interest that is to be mortgaged is held for 
investment purposes, because the whole reason why the mortgagor as owner holds its 
interest is to rent it out and derive an income from it. Indeed, a substantial part of the 
value of the interest may lie in its suitability to be used for that purpose. 
14.6.6.10.2 It is submitted that the answer to the dilemma may be found in the 
point that has just been made, bearing in mind that the question must be examined by 
considering where the practical value and utility of the asset lies. The point of holding 
investment property is that the asset should be exploited by entering into leases. If, by 
so doing, the value of the holding is preserved or even enhanced, rather than 
diminished, then the legal estate of the mortgagor over which the security is taken 
should be recognised as a valuable asset in itself, which is not imperilled by the 
granting of leases. On the other hand, if the grant of a lease means that the value of 
the reversionary interest is undermined (for instance, because the grant is for such a 
long period that, as a result of the grant, there would be little value left in the 
reversion) then that should be a matter that needs to be controlled by the mortgagee so 
that it can be confident that it has a fixed security interest. The cautious approach, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
307 The position described in these two paragraphs is unfortunate as it makes it difficult for small 
businesses to obtain loan finance on the security of intellectual property: the lender does not want to 
lend on the security of merely a floating charge, but the borrower does not want to lose its right to 
exploit the intellectual property, since that is a vital part of the income of the business. 
308 See s 1 of the Law of Property Act 1925. 
however, would be to prevent the mortgagor from having the right to grant leases or 
licences without the mortgagee’s consent, with the mortgagor having to rely upon the 
mortgagee to take a common-sense approach in deciding if it will grant consent when 
an application is made to it for consent. 
14.6.7 Crystallisation 
The right of the chargor to deal with the charged assets under a floating charge 
continues until such time as the right to do so is taken away. At that point, the charge 
is said to ‘crystallise’, when it becomes a fixed charge with respect to the assets then 
or thereafter within its compass.309 This is also called the process of ‘crystallisation’. 
The consequence is that the chargor is no longer authorised to deal with the charged 
assets. If the security is comprehensive this has the practical effect that the chargor 
can no longer carry on its business. 
14.6.7.1 The circumstances in which crystallisation may occur 
In principle, a floating charge will crystallise in accordance with the terms of the 
agreement contained in the charge, which will be those implied by law in 
consequence of that agreement (unless inconsistent with the express terms of that 
agreement310), together with any additional grounds that may have been specifically 
agreed.311 
14.6.7.1.1 The grounds that are implied by law are as follows. First, the winding 
up of the chargor, whether it is a compulsory winding up or a solvent or insolvent 
voluntary winding up.312 It is the making of the winding-up order or the passing of the 
resolution to wind up which causes the charge to crystallise on this ground, not action 
preliminary thereto.313 Secondly, the appointment by the chargor of a receiver and 
other action to enforce the security.314 It should be noted that the appointment of a 
receiver by another creditor will not cause the charge to crystallise unless it also 
provides another of the grounds for the charge to crystallise.315 Thirdly, the company 
permanently ceasing to carry on business, to the extent not already encompassed 
within the other two grounds.316 A company will not necessarily cease its business 
simply because another creditor takes enforcement action, such as by appointing a 
receiver or because an administrator has been appointed. The receiver (if he has 
power to do so) or administrator may decide to continue the business.317 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
309 NW Robbie & Co Ltd v Witney Warehouse Co Ltd [1963] 1 WLR 1324; Re The Real Meat Co Ltd 
[1996] BCC 254. 
310 There must be an overt and real inconsistency. The implied grounds will not be treated as 
overridden simply because there are also express terms which do not also contain the grounds that 
would be implied: see Re The Real Meat Co Ltd [1996] BCC 254, at 261. 
311 Re Brightlife Ltd [1987] Ch 200. 
312 Re Panama New Zealand and Australian Royal Mail Co (1870) LR 5 Ch App 318; Evans v Rival 
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313 Re Victoria Steamboats Co [1897] 1 Ch 158; Stein v Saywell (1969) 121 CLR 529. 
314 Evans v Rival Granite Quarries Ltd [1910] 2 KB 979. 
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316 Re Woodroffes (Musical Instruments) Ltd [1986] Ch 366; Re The Real Meat Co Ltd [1996] BCC 
254. 
317 Re Woodroffes (Musical Instruments) Ltd [1986] Ch 366; Re The Real Meat Co Ltd [1996] BCC 
254. 
14.6.7.1.2 It is now clear that a charge will also crystallise on any additional 
grounds that are specified in the charge, such as pursuant to events of default-type 
provisions.318 The charge may require that the chargee should give notice to the 
chargor that the charge has crystallised following upon the occurrence of such an 
event, or it may provide, just as effectively, that the charge will crystallise 
automatically.319 
14.6.7.1.3 Obviously, an automatic crystallisation clause is not in the interests of 
the chargor, which should resist the inclusion of such a clause in the charging 
instrument. An automatic crystallisation clause does not advance the interests of the 
chargee as against creditors that enjoy a statutory right of priority against the chargee, 
because those rights apply even if the charge has crystallised. Nonetheless, it may be 
helpful in defeating the claim of an execution creditor,320 and it may also prevent the 
chargor from disposing of charged assets to the detriment of the chargee. Care should 
be taken, however, in being overzealous in the drafting of an automatic crystallisation 
clause. This is because of the risk that the charge might crystallise on obscure grounds 
without the chargee realising that it has done so. That could lead to arguments that the 
chargee has waived its right to rely on the clause or that it is estopped from doing so. 
It is best that the clause should be limited, so that it operates to provide protection in 
situations where the interests of the chargee in charged assets might be at risk of being 
jeopardised, such as in execution proceedings. 
14.6.8 Priorities 
It is relevant to consider how the interest of a chargee under a floating charge might 
fare vis-à-vis the interests of third parties, such as those that enter into transactions 
with the chargor concerning the charged assets. The discussion as to priorities will be 
divided into three parts. The first part will describe the position with respect to 
transactions with third parties that the chargor enters into prior to the crystallisation of 
a floating charge. The second part will discuss the position where such transactions 
occur after the charge has crystallised. The third part will address statutory priorities 
that arise in favour of certain prescribed classes of third parties. 
14.6.8.1 It is always open to private parties to enter into a priority agreement, 
by which they agree as to the ranking of their respective interests, which will override 
the outcome that would otherwise apply as a matter of general law.321 If they do so, 
however, they must be mindful of the decision in Re Portbase Clothing Ltd,322 to 
which reference will be made after the discussion concerning statutory priorities. 
14.6.8.2 Transactions that take place before crystallisation 
So long as such transactions fall within the inherent authority of the chargor under a 
floating charge to deal with the charged assets in the ordinary course of business, third 
parties which take under them will prevail as against the interest of the chargee. If 
such a third party is an outright purchaser then it will acquire ownership of the asset 
free of the charge. If it takes fixed security, or a limited second floating charge, its 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
318 Re Brightlife Ltd [1987] Ch 200. 
319 Re Manurewa Transport Ltd [1971] NZLR 909; Re Brightlife Ltd [1987] Ch 200. 
320 An example can be drawn from Evans v Rival Granite Quarries Ltd [1910] 2 KB 979, where the 
execution creditor prevailed against assets that were only subject to an uncrystallised floating charge. 
321 Cheah Theam Swee v Equiticorp Finance Group Ltd [1992] 1 AC 472. 
322  [1993] Ch 388. 
security will rank ahead of the interest of the chargee under the floating charge, 
including as to the consequences of enforcement of the third party’s security. This 
will be the case even if the third party had notice of the existence of the floating 
charge, as such notice on its own does not serve to negative the inherent ability of the 
chargor to deal with the assets as if they were free of the charge.323 In similar vein, an 
execution creditor which completes its execution against the charged assets before the 
charge crystallises will take free of the charge.324 Similarly, rights of set-off for claims 
that have accrued before crystallisation will be enforceable notwithstanding the 
charge.325 
14.6.8.2.1 There is an important qualification to what has just been said, which 
concerns the effect of a negative pledge provision in the floating charge.326 Under 
such a provision, the chargor will typically undertake in favour of the chargee that the 
chargor will not enter into certain types of transaction with third parties concerning 
the charged assets without the prior consent of the chargee. Such transactions are 
likely to include the granting of security to third parties and other types of transaction, 
such as receivables sales, that are primarily in the nature of raising finance or which 
have the effect of reducing the overall value of the charged property. Clearly, such a 
restriction will have contractual effect as between the chargor and the chargee, but it 
will not serve to turn the charge into a fixed charge.327 The important question is the 
effect that it might have on the validity and enforceability of the interest purportedly 
acquired by the third party that is concerned in an impugned transaction. 
14.6.8.2.2 In answering that question, it must be remembered that the assumption 
which is inherently associated with a floating charge is that the chargor has the right 
to deal with the charged assets as if it were the outright owner of them, so long as the 
transaction is of a type that would fall within the very general concept of the ordinary 
course of business as it has been interpreted by the case law. A third party which deals 
with the chargor is generally entitled to rely on that assumption. To assert a remedy 
against a third party, the chargee must displace the assumption, which will not be an 
easy burden although the 2013 reform of the law governing charges granted by 
companies has gone a long way to make the burden lighter. If the third party has taken 
its interest with notice of the restriction it takes subject to the restriction and therefore 
to the floating charge,328 if it takes without notice  the interest it  takes is free of the 
effect of the restriction.329 Prior to the reform it was clear that notice (including 
constructive notice) of the existence of a security did not give notice of its contents.330 
Since the 2013 reform of company charges, the chargee has now the ability to indicate 
in the statement of charge particulars, which are filed and registered alongside a copy 
of the charge instrument, whether the terms of the charge comprise a clause 
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prohibiting or restricting the chargor from creating security which ranks equally with 
or ahead of the charge. Thus, a person who is considered to have notice of the charge 
(including constructive notice) based on the registered particulars331 (such as a 
subsequent chargee) will also have notice (including constructive notice) of a negative 
pledge clause if one is registered as part of particulars.332 Thus, assuming the negative 
pledge clause is included in the registered particulars, it will be easier for the claimant 
to show that the third party knew of the restriction.  
14.6.8.2.3 If a transaction takes place which is outside the ordinary course of 
business then it will be a question of competing priorities, as between the interest of 
the chargee and that of the third party taking under the transaction. If the party to the 
transaction had notice (including constructive notice) of the existence of the floating 
charge then it is submitted that the interest of such a party would defer to that of the 
chargee, because that party should be aware that the chargor had no authority to enter 
into the transaction and, accordingly, that the transaction amounted to a breach of the 
contractual authority of the chargor. That would certainly be the position if the 
transaction followed upon a decision to cease business, thereby causing the floating 
charge to crystallise.333 
14.6.8.2.4 Priority as between a floating charge and subsequent floating charges 
depends, it is submitted, on the question of the extent of the chargor’s authority to 
dispose of the asset under the floating charge. For example, in Re Automatic Bottle 
Makers Ltd334 an instrument created a general floating charge over company’s all 
undertaking and assets both present and future but reserved to the company power to 
create in priority to that charge over certain property and in the ordinary course of 
business. A subsequent charge created by the company as a result of the exercise of 
the power in the agreed manner took priority over the first charge. However, if there 
had been no agreement with the first floating charge holder a company would not 
have been in a position to create a second floating charge to have priority to, or to 
rank pari passu with, another floating charge already created.335 In light of these 
authorities, it is submitted, with respect, that the conclusion reached by Morritt J in 
Griffiths v Yorkshire Bank PLC336 was incorrect. It was held in that case that where a 
second general floating charge crystallised before an earlier floating charge, the 
interest of the holder of the crystallised charge would have priority over the interest of 
the holder of the earlier charge, which crystallised later. This was because the second 
charge had become a fixed charge before the first charge had done so, and thus was to 
be treated as if it were the first in time. However, an approach consistent with the 
earlier-mentioned authorities would be to say that the granting of the second general 
floating charge fell outside the ordinary course of business and so the chargor did not 
have authority to grant the second general floating charge; nor had the holder of the 
first charge consented to the granting of the second charge. On that basis, the rights 
and interest of the holder of the second charge should have been subject to those of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
331 It is not clear under current law of what the registration is notice (whether the particulars, the charge 
instrument or both provide notice) and to whom. For further discussion, see 14.13. 
332 See English & Scottish Mercantile Investment CO v Brunton [1892] 2 QB 700, 708-709. 
333 Re The Real Meat Co Ltd [1996] BCC 254. In that case, not only was the purchaser under the 
transaction affected by knowing that the charge had crystallised but so also was the bank which lent the 
money to fund the purchaser and took security over the purchased assets for its loan. The consequence 
was that the holder of the crystallised charge took priority over both the purchaser and the bank. 
334 [1926] Ch 412. 
335 Re Benjamin Cope & Sons [1914] 1 Ch 800. 
336  [1994] 1 WLR 1427. 
the holder of the first charge and the crystallisation of the second charge should not 
have affected the outcome. 
14.6.8.3 Transactions that take place after crystallisation 
Upon crystallisation of the charge, the liberty of the chargor to deal with the assets is 
withdrawn. As between the chargor and the chargee, the chargor no longer has 
authority to enter into any transactions on its own account with third parties 
concerning the charged assets. The interest of the chargee becomes that of the holder 
of a fixed equitable charge over any assets that then or thereafter come within the 
compass of the charge. The position as between the chargee and any third party that 
purportedly acquires an interest in the charged assets thereafter becomes a matter of 
priorities between competing interests. The general priority rules (which are referred 
to later in this chapter) should apply, with the following modifications. 
14.6.8.3.1 Where the third party had acquired an interest in a charged asset prior 
to crystallisation that prevailed against the charge at that time, the interest will 
continue to prevail notwithstanding that the charge has crystallised. Accordingly, if 
that interest could have been enforced by an order for specific performance, the fact 
that the charge has crystallised (for instance, by the appointment of a receiver) should 
not affect that interest.337 The position regarding an option to purchase charged assets 
that had been granted by the chargor to a third party prior to the crystallisation of the 
charge but had not been exercised prior to the crystallisation was addressed in an Irish 
case, in which it was held that the optionee had only a contractual right and had not 
acquired a proprietary right that would prevail as against the crystallised charge.338 
14.6.8.3.2 Where the third party acquired an interest which would be subject to 
the charge if the third party had notice of the charge when it acquired its interest, it is 
submitted that the third party will not be defeated by knowledge of the charge if it was 
only aware (including due to having constructive notice, for instance, by registration 
of the charge) that the charge was a floating charge and did not know that it had 
crystallised. This would be because the knowledge it possessed was that the chargor 
had authority to deal with the assets and that entitled it to assume that it could safely 
deal with the chargor. This would be relevant, for instance, in the application of the 
rule in Dearle v Hall,339 under which a claim by a subsequent purchaser or 
incumbrancer may be denied the benefit of the rule, and so unable to assert priority 
over a prior interest, if the subsequent party had notice of the prior interest at the time 
that it gave value for its interest. It is submitted that the third party would not be 
defeated on that ground if it only knew that the charge was a floating charge and did 
not know that it had crystallised. 
14.6.8.3.3 The position with respect to set-offs that a third party may wish to 
assert against the chargor (and, thus, the chargee) depends upon the nature of the set-
off and whether the claim of the chargor against the third party falls within the assets 
subject to the charge. In this discussion, it will be assumed that the latter does fall 
within the charged assets. The position is as follows. The right of the third party to 
plead the set-off of a liquidated cross-claim as a legal set-off will cease with respect to 
cross-claims that arise after the third party has received notice that the charge has 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
337 Freevale Ltd v Metrostore (Holdings) Ltd [1984] Ch 199. 
338 Re Tullow Engineering (Holdings) Ltd [1990] 1 IR 452. 
339 Dearle v Hall, Loveridge v Cooper (1828) 3 Russ 1. 
crystallised.340 Rights of equitable or transaction set-off that arise in consequence of a 
transaction that existed between the chargor and the third party prior to crystallisation 
of the charge will continue to be available to the parties.341 
14.6.8.4 Statutory priorities 
There are a number of statutory provisions which confer priority on various persons 
with respect to floating charge assets and their proceeds of realisation, ahead of the 
interests of the chargee (irrespective of whether the charge has crystallised342), as 
indicated above343. In summary, they are as follows: 
(1) in a liquidation or administration of the chargor, the expenses of the winding 
up will enjoy priority, in so far as the assets available to the general body of 
creditors are insufficient to meet such expenses;344 
(2) preferential creditors of the chargor have a claim on such assets either ahead 
of the rights of the chargee or to the extent that the assets available to general 
creditors are insufficient to meet the claims of the preferential creditors;345 and 
(3) a prescribed part of such assets have to be set aside to meet the claims of 
unsecured creditors of the chargor.346 
These provisions only affect the entitlement of the floating charge holder. Subject to 
what is said next concerning the decision in Re Portbase Clothing Ltd,347 they do not 
affect the right of a holder of fixed security in the charged assets.348 
14.6.8.4.1 The position becomes more complicated where either a fixed security 
is expressed to rank behind a floating charge or if there is a priority agreement 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
340 Business Computers Ltd v Anglo-African Leasing Ltd [1977] 1 WLR 578. 
341 Ibid. 
342 This is because the provisions refer to ‘a charge which, as created, was a floating charge’. See, for 
instance, the definition of ‘floating charge’ in s 251 of the Insolvency Act 1986. 
343 See above 14.1.4 and table 14.1.  
344 S 176ZA of the Insolvency Act 1986, which came into force on 6 April 2008. As to the expenses 
that qualify for such priority, see rules 4.218 and 4.218A–4.218E of the Insolvency Rules 1986. In 
relation to administration, see para 99 Sched B1 Insolvency Act 1986. 
345 See s 754 of the Companies Act 2006 (formerly s 196 of the Companies Act 1985) and ss 40 and 
175(2)(b) of the Insolvency Act 1986. Section 175 is applied when an administrator makes a 
distribution by para 65(2) Sched B1 Insolvency Act 1986. The list of preferential debts is set out in 
Sched 6 to the Insolvency Act 1986 
346 See s 176A of the Insolvency Act 1986 (applied when an administrator makes a distribution by para 
65(2) Sched B1 Insolvency Act 1986. The Insolvency Act 1986 (Prescribed Part) Order 2003 (SI 
2003/2097) sets out the way in which the prescribed part is to be calculated. While an application can 
be made to court to disapply this section, it can only be granted exceptionally. For instance, a very 
small return to the unsecured creditors (such as 1.5 pence in a pound) was held not be such an 
exception, see Re Airbase Services (UK) Ltd  [2008] EWHC 124 (Ch), [2008] 1 WLR 1516 and Re 
International Sections Ltd (In Liquidation), Re [2009] EWHC 137 (Ch), [2009] BCC 574. The High 
Court has held that s 176A applies only for the benefit of creditors who hold no security at all, so that a 
secured creditor cannot participate as an unsecured creditor with respect to that part of its claim that is 
not effectively covered by its security (i.e. not even for its shortfall): see Re Permacell Finesse Ltd 
[2007] EWHC 3233 (Ch), [2008] BCC 208 and Re Airbase Services (UK) Ltd [2008] EWHC 124 (Ch). 
However, it is open to a secured creditor to elect to surrender its security and thereby adopt the status 
of an unsecured creditor (even after the commencement of liquidation or administration) and so 
become an “unsecured creditor” within the scope of s 176A, see: Kelly v Inflexion Fund 2 [2010] 
EWHC 2850, [2011] BCC 93; Re J T Frith Ltd [2012] EWHC 196 (Ch), [2012] BCC 634 This is based 
on rule 4.88(2) of the Insolvency Rules 1986 under which a secured creditor can voluntarily surrender 
his security for the benefit of the general creditors.  
347  [1993] Ch 388. 
348 Re Lewis Merthyr Consolidated Collieries Ltd, Lloyds Bank Ltd v The Company [1929] 1 Ch 498. 
between the holder of the fixed security and the holder of the floating charge to that 
effect. Chadwick J in Re Portbase Clothing Ltd349 held that, in either case, this would 
affect the rights of the two securities in a proprietary sense, so that the statutory 
priority of the preferential creditors over the floating charge would also prevail over 
the security held under the fixed charge. This was because the fixed charge was 
subordinate to the floating charge which was itself subordinate to the claims of the 
preferential creditors.350 The same consequence should follow with respect to the 
priority entitlements that are statutorily conferred by sections 176ZA and 176A of the 
Insolvency Act 1986.   The conclusion in Re Portbase has been heavily criticized,351 
on the grounds that the preferential creditors are unfairly elevated about the fixed 
charge because of the priority agreement.   The subrogation solution adopted without 
argument in Re Woodroffe’s (Musical Instruments) Ltd352 is preferable. 
14.6.8.4.2 Chadwick J  did suggest that it might be possible to avoid this 
consequence if the agreement did not purport to govern the priorities of the two 
securities but, instead, provided that the fixed chargee would hold any recoveries it 
received on enforcement of its security on trust for the benefit of the other chargee. 
There is a risk, however, that the agreement to hold its recoveries on trust might imply 
an agreement by the fixed chargee as to the underlying security. It is suggested that a 
safer course would be that the fixed chargee, rather than agreeing to hold its 
recoveries on trust, should simply agree to pay to the other chargee an amount 
equivalent to whatever it received under its security. Of course, the other chargee 
would be taking a risk that the fixed chargee might default in the observance of its 
obligation, particularly should it have become insolvent in the meantime.   It should 
be noted that the situation discussed in the this and the last paragraph is rarely likely 
to occur in practice, since if it is possible to take a fixed charge over an asset a 
secured creditor will usually do so, so that there is unlikely to be a priority battle or 
agreement between the holder of a fixed and a floating charge. 
14.7 Taking Security Over Shares and Other Financial 
Securities 
14.7.1 The types of financial securities over which security may be taken are 
numerous and may encompass shares in public companies, including listed and 
unlisted companies, shares in private companies, bonds and other debt instruments, 
government securities, and units in collective investment funds and other types of 
funds. Sometimes such securities may be held directly by the person that is to give the 
security and sometimes they may be held on its behalf by an intermediary, in which 
case it is likely that the entitlement will be held as part of a pool of like securities or 
entitlements that is held by the intermediary for a number of people. There may or 
may not be a physical instrument representing the relevant securities. Where there is 
no instrument at all, the securities are said to be ‘dematerialised’, in the sense that the 
entitlements in the securities are represented by entries recorded in electronic 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
349  [1993] Ch 388. In reaching his conclusion, Chadwick J followed and applied the decision of 
Nicholson J in the Victorian (Australia) case of Waters v Widdows [1984] VR 503. 
350 Morritt J in Griffiths v Yorkshire Bank PLC [1994] 1 WLR 1427 disagreed with the approach taken 
in the Portbase case, and said that an agreement as to priorities would not have the proprietary effect 
contemplated by Chadwick J in the Portbase case. 
351 L Gullifer (ed), Goode on Legal Problems of Credit and Security (Sweet & Maxwell 2013 5th edn) 
paras 5-61 to 5-62. 
352 [1986] Ch 366, 368, 375 
registers. Even if there is an instrument, it may be a global instrument, in which case 
it will be isolated and removed from circulation so that dealings in it and the 
recording of entitlements in it may take place again through electronic means, in 
which case it is said that the instrument is ‘immobilised’. Security interests over  
certain financial securities, taken in a particular way and based on an agreement 
between two non-natural persons may fall within the Financial Collateral 
Arrangements (No 2) Regulations 2003353, resulting in a different treatment, which is 
discussed towards the end of the section. 
14.7.1.1 If security is to be taken, particularly over shares in a company, it is 
necessary to check that there are no provisions in the memorandum and articles of 
association of the issuer (or its other constitutive documents) or in any other relevant 
agreement (such as a shareholders’ agreement) which would restrict the right of the 
security giver to create the security or which might restrict the enforcement of the 
security. Care needs to be taken to check both of those points because a permission to 
create security over securities may not necessarily imply a right for the securities to be 
sold upon enforcement of the security. It is also possible that a condition might be 
imposed as part of any relevant permission, which might have the effect that a 
purchaser of the securities would be required to accept restrictions concerning the 
securities, including as to its right to transfer them. 
14.7.1.2 There may also be competition law aspects that should be considered, 
both in terms of taking the security and in the disposal of the shares upon exercise of 
the security. If the company operates in the regulated sector, there could also be 
regulatory matters that would be relevant. 
14.7.1.3 There is a further point which concerns listed securities. The City Code 
on Takeovers and Mergers contains requirements as to building stakes or interests in 
the share capital of listed companies. Under Rule 9 of the Code, if a person acquires 
30 per cent or more of the voting capital, or in any class of its share capital, it is 
required to make a mandatory bid for the company, unless a waiver has been granted 
by the UK Panel on Takeovers and Mergers. This requirement might be relevant both 
in terms of taking security and with respect to its enforcement. 
14.7.2 Equitable interests in shares 
Section 126 of the Companies Act 2006 provides that: 
No notice of any trust, expressed, implied or constructive, shall be entered on 
the register of members of a company registered in England and Wales or 
Northern Ireland, or be receivable by the registrar. 
This is often extended by the articles of association to any other type of equitable 
interest that might arise in the company’s shares. The statutory provision, and 
probably its extension via the articles, has obvious consequences in terms of priorities, 
because it means that it is not possible to protect beneficial interests by serving notice 
of them on the company or its registrar. In terms of priorities, the safest course is for 
the security holder to perfect a legal mortgage and be registered as the holder of the 
shares.354   Where shares are uncertificated, this will involve registration in the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
353 SI 2003/3226 (as amended). 
354 See Société Générale de Paris v Walker (1885) 11 App Cas 20. Where there has been underhand 
dealings, it might be possible to obtain a ‘stop notice’ issued by the court and then served on the 
company, the effect of which is to prevent the company from registering a transfer for a limited period 
CREST register.355  If they are held through an intermediary, a legal mortgage is not 
possible.356 
14.7.3 Certificated securities and physical instruments 
If the financial security is directly held by the obligor that is to give security over its 
entitlement and that entitlement is represented by a certificated security or physical 
instrument, then it will be necessary to determine if title passes by physical delivery 
of the certificate or instrument or if title passes by entries made in a register. 
14.7.3.1 If the instrument is in bearer form, then it is likely that the instrument 
is negotiable and, accordingly, that title will pass by delivery of the instrument. 
Similarly, if title in the instrument passes by endorsement together with delivery then 
it is likely to be a negotiable instrument.357 Such a document is sometimes called a 
documentary intangible. Title is represented by the instrument, including title in the 
payment and other rights encapsulated by the instrument. Examples of such 
instruments include bills of lading, bills of exchange, promissory notes, certificates of 
deposit, bearer bonds and bearer shares (share warrants). It should be noted that as of 
26 May 2015358 UK companies may no longer issue bearer shares and there are 
provisions for cancellation and conversion of them into registered shares.359 Security 
in bearer instruments may be taken in a possessory form, by pledge or lien, where the 
creditor obtains possession of the instrument (endorsed in blank, if necessary). 
Alternatively, security may be taken in a non-possessory form, but that is much more 
risky, as the obligor has been left armed with the instrument and can confer a superior 
title on an innocent third party who obtains the instrument without notice. A middle 
ground, which has no particular advantage over the use of possessory security, is to 
take security by way of mortgage or charge but also to take possession of the 
instrument. 
14.7.3.2 If the transfer of the entitlement represented by the instrument requires 
registration in a register that is kept by or on behalf of the issuer, the instrument 
would not be negotiable. A typical example would be the shares in an English private 
company. In such a case, it is not possible to have an effective pledge or lien over the 
instrument and the entitlements that it represents.360 Worthwhile security can only be 
taken in the form of a mortgage or charge. A legal mortgage requires that the 
mortgagee is registered as the holder of the relevant entitlement. An equitable 
mortgage requires an agreement that the entitlement should be transferred, together 
with the means to obtain the transfer, such as an executed form of share transfer and 
the relevant share certificate. Technically, a charge does not require the executed 
share transfer, but it is sensible to obtain it for ease of enforcing the security, should 
that be necessary. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
pending an application to the court for an injunction, but this is of limited effect: Re Holmes (1885) 29 
ChD 786. 
355 See 14.7.4. 
356 See 14.7.5 below. 
357 As to negotiable instruments, see the discussion in Chap 10. 
358 The date of entry into force of the Small Business, Enterprise and Employment Act 2015, section 
84, which added section 779(4) of the Companies Act 2006. See also sections 85-86 of the Small 
Business, Enterprise and Employment Act 2015. 
359 Schedule 4 of the Small Business, Enterprise and Employment Act 2015. 
360 The effect of attempting to obtain such security is merely to create a pledge or lien over the piece of 
paper, but not the rights to which it refers, see Colonial Bank v Cady & Williams (1890) 15 App Cas 
267 (HL) 
14.7.4 Uncertificated securities 
Such securities are most likely to be issued by listed361 or other large companies, 
sovereign or governmental issuers, supra-national bodies, and similar institutions. In 
the UK, uncertificated (or dematerialized) securities are held through the CREST 
system, which is run by Euroclear (UK and Ireland) Ltd (EUI).    
14.7.4.1 The CREST system 
The Uncertificated Securities Regulations 2001362 provide the legislative basis for the 
establishment and operation of the CREST system, under which rules and conditions 
have been formulated for the operation of the system. The operator of the system is 
EUI. In summary of a rather complex system, the operator maintains a computerised 
system in which are recorded entitlements in dematerialised securities issued by 
eligible issuers, which are mostly UK incorporated issuers, but also include some 
foreign issuers (the discussion will assume that the securities have been issued by a 
UK issuer). The system maintains accounts to record entitlements of its participating 
members in the relevant securities. Such members may be direct users, who have 
direct computerised access to the system, or sponsored members who connect to the 
system via a direct user.363 Whichever type of member it may be, the system will 
record entitlements credited to its account. Members may hold a recorded entitlement 
for themselves or on behalf of one or more third parties, in which case the member 
would be acting as an intermediary on behalf of the third parties. 
14.7.4.1.1 A member’s account in the system will distinguish between each issue 
of securities that are held in the member’s account. For each such issue, the account 
will also distinguish between securities that the member holds for itself and those that 
it holds for other persons, where it is acting as an intermediary. It is also possible for 
the account to designate securities that are held under escrow, where a transaction 
cannot take place without the authority of the designated ‘escrow agent’, being 
another member of the system. 
14.7.4.1.2 The eligible securities of an issuer may be held in dematerialised form 
through the CREST system or in certificated form outside the system. The recorded 
holder of a security has the right to require that a security be removed from the system 
and re-issued in certificated form, or that the opposite should occur, by surrendering 
the certificated form of the security (together with a form of transfer) so that it is 
credited in dematerialised form to a member’s account in the system. Whichever form 
is used, the relationship between the issuer (if it is a UK issuer) and the registered 
holder remains the same and, in that sense, the CREST system does not act as an 
intermediary.364 It is simply acting as a system for recording the legal position as 
between the issuer and the account holder. Legal ownership of the securities rests in 
whoever is recorded as owner, either through the system or in physical records kept 
by the issuer or its registrar.365 Where a security is held through the system, a back-up 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
361 All shares traded on the London Stock Exchange must be eligible for electronic trading ie must be 
potentially available in uncertificated (ie dematerialised) form: FCA Handbook, LR 6.1.23-6.1.24 
362 SI 2001/3755 (as amended). The regulations were made under s 207 of the Companies Act 1989 and 
continue pursuant to ss 783–788 of the Companies Act 2006. 
363 Even individuals can be sponsored members. 
364 The position is different for securities issued by non-UK issuers. 
365 Though note that the CREST register is only prima facie evidence of title, and can be rectified, see 
Uncertificated Securities Regulations 2001, reg 24(6) in relation to shares and 24(8) in relation to 
eligible debt securities,     
record will be kept by the issuer or its registrar (which will be notified by the system 
of any transfers), but it is the entitlement as recorded in the system which is decisive 
of legal ownership.366 
14.7.4.1.3 A legal mortgage of uncertificated securities in the CREST system can 
be accomplished by a transfer to the account of the mortgagee, if it has an account in 
the system. Any other form of transfer within the system will only achieve a form of 
equitable security and no notice of any trust can be entered on the system. Where the 
security giver is a member of the system, it can transfer the charged securities to its 
escrow account, by way of charge. Alternatively, where the chargor is not a member 
of the system, it could instruct its intermediary to transfer the securities to the 
intermediary’s escrow account. The consequence of this is that the securities cannot 
be transferred from the escrow account without an instruction from the designated 
escrow agent, which would be the chargee (if it is a member of the system) or (if the 
chargee is not a member of the system) a member acting as its agent. 
14.7.4.1.4 The alternative procedure to taking security over uncertificated 
securities in the CREST system, particularly shares, is for the securities to be taken 
out of the system so that they are converted into certificated securities and then made 
subject to the more traditional methods for establishing security as described earlier. 
14.7.5 Intermediated securities 
It is extremely common for securities (either equity or debt) to be held through an 
intermediary.     This may be because the securities are issued in the form of a global 
instrument, which is immobilized and held by a depositary for an International 
Central Securities Depositary (ICSD): in Europe the ICSDs are Euroclear (which is in 
Belgium) and Clearstream (which is in Luxembourg).367  The ICSDs act as 
intermediaries for their own account holders, who are banks, and whom may hold for 
their own account or for the account of others.   Securities may also be held through 
an intermediary when the root of legal title is the CREST register or (though this is 
unlikely in practice) where the top tier intermediary holds certificated or bearer 
securities.    Intermediation brings a number of benefits, which vary somewhat 
depending on the characteristics of the ultimate holder.368    For those individuals and 
institutions who hold securities for the long term, in order to benefit from capital 
growth as well as income, intermediation provides management and administration 
services provided by the intermediary, as well as the custodial security and ease of 
transfer, if and when desired.   For those institutions, such as hedge funds, who 
acquire and hold securities in order to trade them, and to make profits through 
arbitrage, the advantages of intermediation are the speed and ease of transfer through 
the use of pooled accounts, as well as the finance provided by the intermediaries (such 
as prime brokers) for the acquisition of the securities (secured on the securities 
themselves).369 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
366 Uncertificated Securities Regulations 2001 reg 24(2). 
367 Most global immobilised securities are bearer securities, but it is also possible to have a registered 
global security held through Euroclear or Clearstream.   The US system of holding (usually through the 
ICSD Deposit Trust Company) is based on registered global immobilised securities. 
368 For an analysis of the different types of ultimate holder, and the differences that this should make to 
the regulation of this area of law, see J Benjamin, ‘The law and regulation of custody securities: cutting 
the Gordian knot’ (2014) 9 Capital Markets Law Journal 327. 
369 See L Gullifer and J Payne, Corporate Finance Law : Principles and Policy (2nd edn, Hart 
Publishing 2015), 4.6.4. 
14.7.5.1 The legal analysis of intermediated securities 
Where securities are held through an intermediary, there are typically at least three 
tiers of holding, often a great deal more.  The top tier is, under English law, the legal 
owner of the securities.   Where securities are represented by a global security, this 
will be the depositary who is the holder of a global bearer security, or the registered 
owner of a global registered security.    If securities are registered in CREST, the 
person in whose name they are registered is the legal owner.    In all cases, under an 
English law analysis,370 the legal owner holds the securities on trust for the next 
person down the chain (the first tier intermediary).  In Europe, in the case of a global 
security, this person will be Euroclear and/or Clearstream.371   The first tier 
intermediary therefore has a beneficial proprietary interest in the securities.    It is 
unlikely, however, to be the ultimate beneficiary.   Instead, it will hold its interest 
under the trust on a sub-trust for its account holders, who may themselves hold their 
interest under the sub-trust on a sub-sub-trust for their own account holders, and so on 
down the chain.372    The details of each holding are recorded in accounts maintained 
by each participant in the chain.    The person at the bottom of the chain, the investor, 
has the main economic interest in the securities, but will not have any relationship 
with the issuer; instead, its relationship is only with its own intermediary.  Indeed, this 
is the case in relation to each person in the chain.   The ‘no look-through’ principle 
means that only the legal owner can sue the issuer for payment, and that each person 
in the chain can only sue those directly above or below them in the chain in relation to 
the contract and trust relationships between them.373   In fact, they are usually 
unaware of the identity of other participants in the chain.   Thus, what any person in 
the chain owns (apart from the legal owner at the top of the chain) is an equitable 
interest in whatever interest (legal or equitable) the intermediary above them in the 
chain owns.   There have been various names for this asset: ‘interest in securities’, 374   
‘security entitlement’375 and ‘book entry securities’376.  Here, the first will be used, 
that is, ‘interest in securities.’. 
14.7.5.2.  Interests in securities are transferred by book entry in the books of the 
lowest tier intermediary common to both transferor and transferee.   If both transferor 
and transferee hold with the same intermediary, and the interests in securities are held 
in a pooled account, the entries are made merely in the books of that intermediary.  If, 
on the other hand, the transferor and transferee have accounts with different 
intermediaries, entries will need to be made in the books of both intermediaries, plus 
their intermediaries and so on up the chain until a common intermediary is reached.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
370 English law may well not apply to this relationship: Euroclear is based in Belgium and Clearstream 
in Luxembourg and national law is likely to determine the precise legal nature of the relationship. 
371 There is a ‘bridge’ arrangement by which most global securities are held for both Euroclear and 
Clearstream as first tier intermediaries. 
372	  See Re Lehman Brothers International (Europe) (in administration) [2010] EWHC 2914 (Ch), 
[226]; Re Lehman Brothers International (Europe) (in administration) [2012] EWHC 2997 (Ch), - 
[2014] 2 BCLC 295, [163].	  
373 See Secure Capital SA v Credit Suisse AG [2015] EWHC 388 (Comm), [2015] 1 Lloyd's Rep 556 
[10], [15] and [58] 
374 J Benjamin, Interests in Securities (Oxford University Press 2000) 
375 US Uniform Commercial Code (Article 8) 
376 Financial Collateral Directive 2002 (Directive 2002/47/EC) and other EU legislation. 
The legal analysis of such transfers is not entirely clear, but the preferable analysis is 
that it takes place by novation.377 
14.7.5.1.2.  As mentioned above, intermediaries often hold interests in securities in 
a ‘pooled’ or ‘omnibus’ account.  This means that the intermediary’s own account, 
with the person above them in the chain, records the entire nominal amount of 
securities of a particular issue that it holds for clients.378 The books of the 
intermediary record the separate nominal amounts of those securities held for each of 
its clients.   This has two advantages.  The first is ease of transfer, as described above.  
The second is that the intermediary can use the whole pool of securities to generate 
income for itself and its clients, either through securities lending transactions, or as 
collateral, via repos or security financial collateral arrangements.379 While there was 
initially some disquiet that securities held in a pooled account380 could not form the 
subject matter of a valid trust, it is now clear that both the nature of an issue of 
securities itself and the manner of holding means that investors actually have a co-
ownership interests which can be the subject matter of a valid trust.381 
14.7.5.3.  Since the interest of any account holder in the system of intermediated 
securities is necessarily an equitable interest (only the depositary or registered owner 
has a legal interest), security over such an interest can be granted only by equitable 
mortgage or by fixed or floating charge.382    The former can be created by the transfer 
of the interest into the name of the mortgagee in the books of an intermediary, or by 
an assignment of the mortgagor’s account to the mortgagee.  The latter method suffers 
from the disadvantage that the assignee takes subject to equities.    A charge can be 
created by agreement, although if it is to be a fixed charge, the charge will have to 
provide that the chargor cannot deal with its interest without the consent of the 
chargee, and the chargee will probably have to give notice of this to the 
intermediary.383    The degree of possession or control necessary for a security interest 
to be a security financial collateral arrangement is discussed in the next section.   
 
14.7.5 The Financial Collateral Arrangements (No 2) Regulations 2003384 
These Regulations purport to implement in the UK the EC Directive on financial 
collateral arrangements.385 The Regulations have the effect of modifying certain 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
377 See L Gullifer and J Payne, Corporate Finance Law: Principles and Policy (2nd edn, Hart 
Publishing 20159.2.6.2. 
378 The intermediary may well have a separate account recording the securities it holds for itself. 
379 See 14.7.6.  
380 This is a shorthand term for what is actually interests in a sub-trust held in a pooled account. 
381 See L Gullifer (ed) _Goode on Legal Problems of Credit and Security (Sweet & Maxwell 5th wed 
2013) paras 6.14 to 6.19, and In The Matter Of Lehman Brothers International (Europe) (In 
Administration) [2009] EWHC 2545 (Ch) [56]; Lehman Brothers International (Europe) (in admin) 
[2010] EWCA Civ 917 [171]; Re Lehman Brothers International (Europe) (in administration) [2010] 
EWHC 2914 (Ch) [232] and [2011] EWCA Civ 1544 [69] et seque. 
382 Note that where securities are issued as a global security, there is usually provision for definitive 
certificated securities to be issued in certain circumstances.   Often this is limited to events of default, 
but sometime the beneficial owners have a right to call for such definitive securities, in which case a 
legal mortgage could be then granted.   However, issuing definitive securities is an expensive and 
lengthy process. 
383 See section 14.6.6.2.2. 
384 SI 2003/3226. 
385 Directive on Financial Collateral Arrangements 2002/47/EC of the European Parliament and 
Council of 6 June 2002, OJ L 168/43 (as amended). 
formalities and requirements of the law in the UK with respect to such an 
arrangement, extending the rights of a recipient under such an arrangement by way of 
security to the use and appropriation of financial collateral, and providing a conflict of 
laws rule where financial collateral is held through an intermediary. The latter aspect 
is discussed in Chapter 10. 
14.7.5.1 Scope of application 
An arrangement will not be treated in a manner provided for in the Regulations unless 
it falls within their scope. The Regulations apply to certain arrangements, evidenced 
in writing386, involving financial collateral entered into by non-natural persons. Each 
of these elements is defined in the Regulations and is outlined below. 
14.7.5.1.1 The Regulations apply where each of the parties to a financial 
collateral arrangement is a ‘non-natural person’ (i.e. not an individual). In this respect, 
the Regulations go further than merely implementing the Directive, because the 
Directive requires that at least one of the parties should be a specially designated type 
of entity.387 Motivated by this and because the Regulations were made pursuant to 
power conferred on HM Treasury under s 2(2) of the European Communities Act 
1972, it was questionable if they were validly made, at least in so far as they seemed 
to go further than the Directive required or permitted. This issue was raised in R (on 
the application of Çukurova Finance International Ltd) v HM Treasury388 but it was 
not fully considered because the court held the claimants were not entitled to an 
extension of time within which to challenge the Regulations. A limited assessment of 
the issue was made in light of the question whether the merits of the claimant’s case 
were so strong so as to justify hearing the matter notwithstanding what would 
otherwise constitute undue delay. In that context, the wider scope of the Regulations 
was considered sufficiently closely connected to the purpose of the Directive, which 
were protection of major entities in the financial markets and protection against 
systematic risk. It remains questionable, however, whether this rationale is engaged in 
every case, for example where the Regulations apply to business financing 
arrangements389 rather than financial market agreements. 
14.7.5.1.2  Financial collateral takes one of three forms: ‘cash’, ‘financial 
instruments’ and (since 6 April 2011390) ‘credit claims’. ‘Cash’ is basically the credit 
balance, in any currency, on an account or a similar claim for repayment, including 
money market deposits and sums due or received in relation to certain financial 
markets operations. ‘Financial instruments’ is widely defined to include shares in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
386 See the definitions of “security financial collateral arrangement” and “title transfer financial 
collateral arrangement” in regulation 3(1) of the Financial Collateral Arrangements (No 2) Regulations 
2003. 
387 These are basically (a) a public authority; (b) a central bank, the European Central Bank, 
multilateral development bank, the IMF, BIS, or EIB; (c) a financial institution subject to financial 
supervision; or (d) a central counterparty, settlement agent or clearing house): see Art 1(2) of the 
Financial Collateral Directive.  
388 [2008] EWHC 2567 (Admin). 
389 Such as those found in Gray v G-T-P Group Ltd; Re F2G Realisations Ltd (In Liquidation) [2010] 
EWHC 1772 (Ch), [2011] BCC 869. See further L Gullifer, ‘What Should We Do About Financial 
Collateral?’ (2012) 65 CLP 377.	  
390 The date of entry into force of the Financial Markets and Insolvency (Settlement Finality and 
Financial Collateral Arrangements) (Amendment) Regulations 2010/2993 implementing Directive 
2009/44 amending Directive 98/26/EC on settlement finality in payment and securities settlement 
systems and Directive 2002/47/EC on financial collateral arrangements as regards linked systems and 
credit claims.  
companies,391 bonds and similar debt instruments tradeable on the capital market, and 
other types of securities and financial instruments and claims and rights derived 
therefrom. ‘Credit claims’ are essentially claims for repayment of loans made by 
credit institutions.392  
14.7.5.1.3 Financial collateral arrangements take the form of either a title transfer 
financial collateral arrangement or a security financial collateral arrangement. The 
former involves an outright transfer of title to the collateral taker with an obligation to 
re-transfer equivalent collateral at a later time for the purpose of securing a financial 
obligation.393 It includes a repurchase agreement (or ‘repo’) A ‘security financial 
collateral arrangement’ is an agreement or arrangement under which the collateral 
provider creates a security394 over financial collateral and a requirement is fulfilled, 
which is that the collateral must be placed in the possession or under the control of the 
collateral taker. The Regulations provide that possession or control is not defeated if 
the collateral provider has rights to substitute or withdraw excess collateral. While the 
Regulations provide that security can take the form of a pledge, lien, mortgage 
(whether legal or equitable), fixed charge or a floating charge, what is critical is the 
requirement that the collateral taker takes “possession or control” and whatever 
security is taken it has to comply with this requirement if it is to fall within the 
Regulations.  
14.7.5.1.4 The meaning of “possession or control” has been subject to extensive 
debate, two first instance decisions395 and a 2010 amendment to the Regulations. The 
amendment defined in regulation 3(2) the term “possession” in relation to cash 
collateral and financial instruments396 as including a situation where collateral is 
credited to an account in the name of the collateral taker provided that any rights of 
the collateral provider are limited to the right to substitute financial collateral of the 
same or greater value or withdraw excess collateral. The term “control” has been 
interpreted by the courts to mean legal control (ability to permit or prohibit acts based 
on parties’ security agreements), not factual control (actual ability of the collateral 
taker to dispose of the collateral or to prevent the collateral provider from disposing of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
391 Once again, the Regulations depart from the text of the Directive. The Regulations encompass all 
types of shares in companies, including private and unlisted companies. However, it appears from the 
definition of ‘financial instruments’ in Art 2(1) of the Directive that shares in a company should be 
tradeable on the capital market, which would exclude shares in a private or unlisted company. 
392 Defined as an undertaking whose business is to take deposits or from the public and to grant credits 
for its own account: see Article 4(1)(1) of Regulation (EU) 575/2013 on prudential requirements for 
credit institutions and investment firms and including institutions listed in Article 2(5)(2) to (23) of 
Directive 2013/36/EU.  The key types of institution falling within the definition are banks, central 
banks and post office giro institutions.  
393 While the Financial Collateral Arrangement (No 2) Regulations 2003 refers to “financial obligations 
owed to the collateral taker” these words should be interpreted in light of the Directive’s less restrictive 
formulation of “relevant financial obligations”, which suggests that at the very least the Regulations 
cover financial obligations owed to trust beneficiaries where the collateral taker is a security trustee, 
see R Parsons and M Dening, ‘Financial Collateral – an Opportunity Missed’ (2011) FMLR 164, 174. 
394 Under the Financial Collateral Arrangement (No 2) Regulations 2003 the arrangement or agreement 
must be for the purposes of security of a financial obligation owed to a collateral taker but the Directive 
is less prescriptive in this respect since there is no mention of a secured obligation, which could open 
the Regulations to an interpretation that a security arrangement could exist even if the obligation did 
not (it would not be possible to enforce it but it might matter for other reasons). 
395 Gray v G-T-P Group Ltd; Re F2G Realisations Ltd (In Liquidation) [2010] EWHC 1772 (Ch), 
[2011] BCC 869 and Re Lehman Brothers International (Europe) (In Administration) [2012] EWHC 
2997 (Ch), [2014] 2 BCLC 295. 
396 Regulation 3(2) of the Financial Collateral Arrangements (No 2) Regulations 2003. 
the collateral). However, an argument could be made that factual control should be 
more important because it provides some outward indication to other parties whereas 
contractual agreement does not.397 Courts further found that control must be negative 
that is, the chargor is not able to deal with the collateral without the consent of the 
chargee. Positive control, in the sense of the ability of the collateral taker to dispose of 
the collateral without a further involvement of the collateral provider, is neither 
sufficient nor necessary. While it is clear that the collateral provider’s rights to 
dispose of the collateral (other than when coupled with substitution) are inconsistent 
with the collateral taker’s control or possession, it would be unfortunate if the 
collateral provider’s other rights, such as rights to dividend or income, voting rights or 
rights to require a third party custodian to transfer collateral if collateral taker is 
insolvent would also be so inconsistent although the literal interpretation of regulation 
3(2) of the Financial Collateral Arrangements (No 2) Regulations would so suggest.398  
14.7.5.2 Modifications to formal and registration requirements under English 
law 
The Regulations make the following modifications to the requirements of English law 
relating to formalities and registration, in so far as financial collateral arrangements 
are concerned: 
(1) With respect to guarantees, the requirement as to writing and the necessity for 
a signature under section 4 of the Statute of Frauds 1677 shall not apply 
(Regulation 4(1)) although it is difficult to see that this formality would 
generally apply to a financial collateral arrangement. 
(2) With respect to dealings in equitable interests, the requirement as to writing 
and the necessity for a signature under section 53(1)(c) of the Law of Property 
Act 1925 shall not apply (Regulation 4(2)). 
(3) With respect to an absolute assignment of a chose in action, the requirement 
that the assignment should be signed by the assignor or his agent under section 
136 of the Law of Property Act 1925 shall not apply (Regulation 4(3)). 
(4) Sections 859A and 859H of the Companies Act 2006 (the obligation on the 
registrar to register company charges and the consequences of its lack of 
registration shall not apply (Regulation 4(4)).   This has the effect that security 
financial collateral arrangements fall within section 859A(6)(c) as ‘a charge 
excluded from the application of this section by … any other Act’.399 
(5) The obligation to file information relating to charges under section 4 of the 
Industrial and Provident Societies Act 1967 shall not apply. 
14.7.5.3 Modifications to English insolvency law 
Enforcement of a financial collateral arrangement on insolvency is meant to be quick, 
easy and predictable as to its consequences. As a result, the Regulations make the 
following modifications to the provisions of English insolvency law under the 
Insolvency Act 1986 (the ‘Act’), in so far as financial collateral arrangements are 
concerned: 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
397 L Gullifer (ed), Goode on Legal Problems of Credit and Security (Sweet & Maxwell, 5th ed, 2013) 
para 6.35. 
398 See S Goldsworthy, ‘Taking possession and control to excess: issues with financial collateral 
arrangements under English law’ [2013] JIBFL 71. 
399 See generally 14.13. 
(1) The restrictions on enforcement of security in an administration and to the 
appointment of a receiver400 do not apply, nor may the administrator deal with 
the charged property401 (Regulations 8 (1) and (2)). 
(2) The provisions concerning the effect of a moratorium for an eligible company 
that is the subject of a proposal for a voluntary arrangement, as they relate to 
disposals of charged property and enforcement of security,402 shall not apply 
(Regulation 8(5)). 
(3) Section 127 of the 1986 Act shall not apply to avoid any disposition or 
creation of property under such an arrangement or to prevent a close-out 
netting provision403 from taking effect (Regulation 10(1)). 
(4) Section 88 of the 1986 Act shall not apply to any transfer of shares under such 
an arrangement (Regulation 10(2)). 
(5) Section 40 and 175 of the 1986 Act (preferential debts) shall not apply to any 
debt secured by a charge under such an arrangements (Regulation 10(2A)).404 
(6)  Section 176ZA of the 1986 Act (expenses of winding up) nor paragraph 99 
Schedule B1 of the 1986 Act (expenses of administration) shall not apply to 
any claim or property arising under such an arrangements (Regulations 8(1) 
and 10(2B)). 
(7) Section 176A of the 1986 Act shall not apply with respect to any floating 
charge within a security financial collateral arrangement (Regulation 10(3)). 
(8)   Section 178 of the 1986 Act shall not apply with respect to any such 
arrangement (Regulation 10(4)). 
 (9)  Section 245 of the 1986 Act shall not apply to any floating charge within a 
security financial collateral arrangement (Regulation 10(5)). 
 (10)  Section 754 of the Companies Act 2006405 shall not apply to any floating 
charge within a security financial collateral arrangement (Regulation 10(6)). 
 (11)  A close-out netting provision is to take effect notwithstanding the winding up, 
administration, or voluntary arrangement of a party, provided that the party 
asserting the provision lacked notice or awareness that the proceedings had 
been commenced or were pending when it entered into the financial collateral 
arrangement or when the relevant secured obligations arose (Regulation 12). 
(12) A party entering into a financial collateral arrangement or taking possession or 
control of such collateral will not be affected, as against third parties, by the 
making of a winding-up order against, or the appointment of an administrator 
of, a party to the arrangement on the day it entered into that arrangement or 
took possession of collateral (even if after the making of the order or 
appointment) if it was not aware (or should not have been aware) of the 
making of the order or appointment of administrator (Regulation 13). 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
400 Under, respectively, paras 43(2), 44, 41(2) to the 1986 Act. 
401 Under paras 70 and 71 of Sched B1 to the 1986 Act. 
402 Under, respectively, paras 20 and 12(1)(g) of Sched A1 to the Insolvency Act 1986. 
403 A ‘close-out netting provision’ is a provision for netting or set-off that is contained in a financial 
collateral arrangement or an arrangement of which a financial collateral arrangement forms a part or 
any similar legislative provision, under which upon the occurrence of an ‘enforcement event’ (which is 
widely defined) either (a) the obligations of the parties are accelerated or terminated with a balance 
sum due which represents the estimated current value or replacement cost, or (b) an account is taken of 
the parties’ obligations and a balance sum is due one way or the other, see regulation 3(1) of the 
Financial Collateral Arrangement (No 2) Regulations 2003. 
404 This also has effect in administration as these sections expressly apply there as well by dint of para 
65(2) Sched B1 Insolvency Act 1986. 
405 Formerly s 196 of the Companies Act 1985. 
14.7.5.4 The right to use  financial collateral 
As mentioned earlier, intermediaries often wish to make money from using interests 
in securities (particularly those held in omnibus accounts) in repos or securities 
lending transactions.406  Such activities is also commonly done by collateral takers (in 
fact, intermediaries are often themselves collateral takers under a security financial 
collateral arrangement to secure advances made to their clients to acquire interests in 
securities: prime brokerage). The use of securities in this way has the effect of 
reducing the cost of finance and of intermediation. Under title transfer financial 
collateral arrangements there are no difficulties in principle for the collateral taker to 
re-use the collateral.  The collateral taker becomes the owner of the collateral, and can 
therefore transfer its interest freely to the repo or securities lending counterparty.      
14.7.5.4.1 The position is not so in relation security.   A secured party is usually 
not permitted to dispose of the secured assets in a way that jeopardises the equity of 
redemption of the security provider407 (it is possible to grant a sub-mortgage or a sub-
charge, that is, to create an interest only over the security taker’s interest.)  However, 
part 4 of the Financial Collateral Arrangements (No 2) Regulations makes provision 
for the holder of security under a security financial collateral arrangement to use and 
dispose of the collateral before enforcement of the security. if the terms of the 
arrangement permit it to do so (and subject to those terms). This does not apply to 
credit claims.408  
14.7.5.4.1 Under Regulation 16, the right of use and disposal prior to enforcement 
is exercisable by the security holder as if it were the outright owner of the collateral, 
but there is a (personal) obligation to replace what has been used and disposed of 
prior to the due date for performance of the secured obligations, by transferring back 
to the other party equivalent financial collateral409  to that which was used, or (if 
permitted by the terms of the arrangement) by setting-off the value of what has been 
used against the secured obligations.410 Where securities are held by way of a trust, 
the right of use could be considered inconsistent with the trustee’s duties. However, 
there is some support in the cases for the view that this is still a trust, albeit an unusual 
trust, especially given the clear intention of the parties.411 In one sense, the provider of 
the collateral is taking a risk by permitting the security holder to use and dispose of 
the collateral, as the obligation to restore equivalent collateral is merely a personal 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
406 In a repo the securities (or the interest in securities) is sold to another party and then repurchased at 
a later date.  The purpose of the transaction is for the buyer to provide finance to the seller.    The 
structure of a securities lending transaction is the same, but the purpose is for the purchaser to ‘borrow’ 
securities to support short selling (the transaction is not a true loan, but is similar to the Roman law 
mutuum.     
407 The position is, of course, different on default.  A secured party then has a right of sale which is 
implied by law (and is usually included in the security agreement): Re Morritt (1886) LR 18 QBD 222, 
223; Stubbs v Slater [1910] 1 Ch 632, 639, and in relation to mortgage by deed exists by virtue of 
section 101 of the Law of Property Act 1925.   See below 14.17. 
408 Regulation 16(1) of the Financial Collateral Arrangement (No 2) Regulations 2003. 
409 ‘Equivalent financial collateral’ means, for cash, the same amount in the same currency, and, for 
financial instruments, means (unless otherwise specified in the arrangement) instruments of the same 
issuer, amount, currency, class and description: regulation 3(1) of the Financial Collateral Arrangement 
(No 2) Regulations 2003. 
410 For a similar analysis that there is nothing inherently inconsistent in the parties’ contractual 
agreement that the mortgagee can dispose of the mortgage property, see Lift Capital Partners Pty Ltd v 
Merrill Lynch International [2009] NSWSC 7, (2009) 73 NWS 404 at 136-137 (Barrett J). 
411 See Briggs J in Re Lehman Brothers International (Europe) (In Administration) [2009] EWHC 2545 
(Ch) at [52] and [63]-[64].  
obligation of the security holder. The risk can be minimised if it is also provided that 
a failure by the security holder to do so will result in an automatic set-off of the value 
of the collateral against the secured obligations.412 The risk is not entirely removed, 
however, as the collateral provider will suffer to the extent that the value of the 
collateral exceeds the amount of the secured obligation.  
14.7.5.5 The right to appropriate financial collateral 
Under regulation 17,  it the terms of the arrangement provide for it, the security holder 
may exercise a power of appropriation of the collateral, without having to obtain an 
order for foreclosure from the court.413 Appropriation, broadly speaking, is a self-help 
remedy whereby the collateral taker is able to take the collateral in satisfaction of the 
secured obligation, but owes a personal obligation to the collateral provider to account 
for any surplus value (calculated in accordance with the terms of the agreement, and, 
in any event, in a commercially reasonable manner).414 
A question has arisen as to what is required to constitute an ‘appropriation’ of the 
collateral for the purposes of regulation 17.   Where the collateral taker has a legal 
mortgage, it will acquire full legal title on appropriation.     However, where the 
security interest is equitable,415 it will acquire full equitable (beneficial) title.   This 
can be effected by merely giving notice to the collateral provider416: there is no need 
to carry out the formalities required to transfer legal title. 417     The 2010 amendment 
to the Regulations provided that the security collateral taker acquires legal and 
beneficial title: this is plainly a drafting error and is very unfortunate. It is submitted 
that the provision should be understood that the appropriation can take place by 
acquiring either equitable or legal title.418   
14.8 Taking Security over Intellectual Property 
14.8.1 When considering assets that might fall within the compass of security, a 
creditor will usually think of tangible assets (land or goods) and intangible assets in 
the nature of choses in action (debts or receivables), but increasingly one of the most 
important available assets is the  obligor’s intellectual property (IP). Pure IP differs 
from other types of intangible rights because, whilst being intangible property, it is 
largely constituted by a monopoly in its use and exploitation. Although the rights in 
IP may be asserted against third parties, their essence is in protecting that monopoly 
and exploiting the rights associated therewith, rather than simply being founded upon 
a chose in action. The IP rights concerned relate to trade marks, patents, registered 
designs, copyright, unregistered design rights, and database rights. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
412 Collateral providers under prime brokerage agreements are now to be made aware of the risks of the 
right of use. Such agreements should now have a disclosure annex laying out the risks clearly, see 
CASS r.9.3.1. 
413  Appropriation has not been known to English law. Sale of the asset by the mortgagee to oneself was 
not permitted even if at market price, see Hodson v Deans [1903] 2 Ch 647. 
414 Regulation 18. 
415 This could be the only type of security interest available in the circumstances, if the collateral 
provider’s interest is merely equitable, for example, an interest of an account holder in intermediated 
securities. 
416 ‘Taking thought’ is not enough, see Cukurova Finance International Limited, Cukurova Holding 
A.S v Alfa Telecom Turkey Ltd [2013] UKPC 19, [35]. 
417 Cukurova Finance International Limited, Cukurova Holding A.S v Alfa Telecom Turkey Ltd [2013] 
UKPC 19, [34]. 
418 See L Ho, ‘The Financial Collateral Directive’s Practice in England’ (2011) JIBLR 151, 172; L 
Gullifer (ed), Legal Problems of Credit and Security (Sweet & Maxwell 5th edn 2013) 6.50. 
14.8.1.1 At the same time, it may also be relevant to think of other rights and 
assets (which could be tangible or intangible) which are associated with or similar to 
IP rights or which may have been derived by the application or exploitation of IP 
rights. Accordingly, it may be advisable to deal with physical assets which represent 
the physical embodiment or use of the relevant right and rights derived from the 
exploitation or use of IP rights. An important point to note from this is that in 
attempting to deal with one aspect, it may be necessary to deal separately with a 
related aspect and not to confuse the two. By way of two examples, a contrast can be 
made between the bare IP right and a licence that is granted or received to use that 
right. A contrast may also be made between the IP right and a physical asset made 
from using it or to which the IP right is applied. 
14.8.1.2 A distinction which also needs to be made is between pure IP rights 
and rights that have similar characteristics but which may not be susceptible to the 
usual forms of dealing with property rights. This will be relevant to rights associated 
with confidential information, business reputation (including a right to sue for passing 
off), and know-how. There is a right to protect them, such as by preserving them from 
disclosure or from wrongful interference, but it is not a transferable right. It may not 
be possible to take security over such rights except in the sense of including them 
within a general charge over the undertaking and goodwill of the business of the 
chargor or by taking security over the benefit of claims for damages where such rights 
have been infringed. 
14.8.1.3 Some businesses are almost entirely dependent upon their IP, such as 
those which rely upon brand names, copyright, or patents. The value of IP lies in the 
ability of the holder to exploit its monopoly right (either by its own use or by 
licensing others to do so), although the accounting profession has wrestled with how 
such value should be defined and recorded (if at all) for accounting purposes. The 
valuation of IP and associated rights suffers from challenges not typically present in 
relation to other assets and methods of IP valuation are being examined and 
developed.419  Further, even if a business considers itself to be the owner of the IP, it 
may lose its monopoly right as, for instance, by a failure to exploit the right, by a 
failure to keep its registration of the right up to date, by expiry of a statutory right, or 
due to a challenge to the essential validity of the right.420 There may also be an issue 
as to the true ownership of the IP rights. For instance, if the rights were created under 
contract by a contractor rather than by an employee acting within the course of his 
employment, the rights may have vested in the contractor rather than the person who 
engaged the contractor.421 In such a case, it will be necessary to ensure that the 
contract provides adequately with respect to the rights. When drafting an instrument 
creating security over IP rights the creditor may wish to include express warranties, 
for example relating to non-infringement or freedom from licences, as well as to seek 
to rely on the various implied convents and guarantees of title under Law of Property 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
419 See generally Intellectual Property Office, ‘The role of intellectual property and intangible assets in 
facilitating business finance. Final report’ (2013/34), available at www.ipo.gov.uk (last accessed 
September 2015). In addition, the research and evaluation priorities for 2015/16 published by the 
Intellectual Property Office on 9th September 2015 include value of IP, available at 
https://www.gov.uk. Separately from this, various tools are being developed to help business value 
their IP, see: www.inngot.com.  
420 For instance, that a patent may be challenged on the basis that, when granted, it was not novel or 
that it did not involve an inventive step. 
421 See, for instance, s 11(2) of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988 and contrast that with 
Regs 14 and 15 of the Copyright and Rights in Databases Regs 1997 (SI 1997/3032). 
(Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1994.422 Notwithstanding the various protection 
mechanisms, the IP rights may be open to challenge, so the creditor should also take 
into account the likelihood of this happening and may wish to consider taking 
insurance or obtain waivers where possible423. These issues as to ownership and value 
and as to the strength of IP and associated rights will also be relevant to a creditor in 
assessing the strength of the borrower’s business and the reliance to be placed upon its 
IP and associated rights as security.  
14.8.1.4 From a different perspective, it may also be necessary for a creditor to 
consider the strength of its borrower when the borrower is dependent upon the ability 
to use an IP right which is licensed to it by a third party. If the licence is taken away 
then the borrower’s business may collapse. In addition, the licence will have to be 
examined to determine if it permits the borrower to grant security over its rights under 
the licence and, if it does, if there are any restrictions upon transferring the benefit of 
the licence if the security is enforced. In similar vein, it will be necessary to determine 
if the licence might be revoked upon a change in ownership or control of the 
borrower. 
14.8.1.5 In seeking to take security over IP rights, the creditor will consider the 
usual forms of security (i.e. legal mortgage, equitable mortgage, fixed charge, and 
floating charge) but some situations will call for one type of security rather than 
another. While unregistered IP rights tend to be covered by a floating charge424, 
registered IP rights are generally subject to fixed security, even by way of legal 
mortgage,425 but the difficulties in doing this, in terms of vesting control in the 
creditor (as discussed earlier in this chapter), must be borne in mind. A legal mortgage 
would involve a full assignment to the creditor of all of the relevant rights, subject to 
a right of redemption. From the perspective of the creditor an assignment is often not 
a preferred option because it is likely to expose the creditor to certain risks and 
involve it in the on-going matters needed to maintain and exploit the IP right (e.g. in 
granting licences, suing infringers, and maintaining registrations). Accordingly, the 
creditor may find that it has to grant an exclusive licence back to the borrower to 
enable the borrower to act of its own volition but, as noted earlier, this may imperil 
the nature of the mortgage as fixed security.   
14.8.2 Taking security over statutory IP rights in the UK 
Some IP rights exist by virtue of registration of the owner of the right. Other IP rights, 
whilst existing under statute, do not have a registration system. For the sake of 
simplicity, the following refers to domestic UK law, without reference to the 
expanded position under EU law. IP rights that exist in the UK by virtue of 
registration are trade marks (under the Trade Marks Act 1994, the ‘TMA’), patents 
(under the Patents Act 1977, the ‘PA’), and registered designs (under the Registered 
Designs Act 1949, the ‘RDA’). Those that exist under statute but do not have a 
registration system are copyright (under the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
422 For the covenants to be implied the assignor must either assign ‘with full title guarantee’ or with 
‘limited title guarantee’ and not use the previously common phrase ‘as beneficial owner’. There is no 
need for the assignment to be for valuable consideration. 
423 For example, when taking security in copyright the lender might seek a waiver of the author’s moral 
rights. 
424 One exception is business goodwill which tends to be subject to fixed security.  
425 Particularly in relation to copyright and unregistered design rights, for the purposes of preserving 
priority. 
the ‘CDPA’), unregistered design rights (also under the CDPA) and database rights 
(under the Copyright and Rights In Database Regulations 1997426). 
14.8.2.1 Registered rights 
A patent is granted for a period of 20 years, subject to payment of the necessary fees 
for continued registration in that period. It is personal property and security may be 
taken over a patent, but it must be in writing signed by both parties.427 Despite judicial 
dicta that priority is by date of registration,428 this is not entirely the case.     Section 
33(1) Patents Act 1977 provides that a later transaction (T2) has priority over an 
earlier transaction if the earlier transaction (T1) is not registered, and the person 
taking the later interest does not have knowledge of the earlier one.429   It does not, 
however, appear from the wording of the statute that T2 must be registered in order to 
have priority over T1.430  Further, this can lead to strange consequences: if T1 is not 
registered at the time of T2, then T1 would not be able to obtain priority over T2 by 
registering before T2, but this would only relate to the position between T1 and T2.  
If, after the time of T2, T1 registers and T2 does not, T1 will gain priority over T3 
while the unregistered T2 will not (thus creating a circularity problem). Moreover, as 
far as the element of knowledge is concerned it is not clear whether registration of a 
charge over a patent or a trade mark in the  company charges register431 would be 
sufficient to constitute prior knowledge: while a party searching the company charges 
register would clearly have actual notice of a registered charge, it is not clear whether 
registration is constructive notice and the cautious approach would be to assume that 
it does not.      A trade mark is personal property432 capable of continued existence, 
subject to the periodic renewal of its registration and the requirements as to use. It 
may be the subject of security, which may be registered.433   The discussion about 
priority in relation to patents also applies to trade marks..434 A registered design is 
personal property and is valid for 25 years, subject to payment of renewal fees. It can 
be the subject of security.435 For security purposes, there is a requirement for 
writing436 and, for priority purposes, the security should be registered, since a 
transmission of a registered design437 is subject to ‘any rights vested in any other 
person of which notice is entered in the register of designs, or in the case of 
applications, notice is given to the registrar.’438   While, then, a later secured party 
takes subject to an earlier registered secured party, if the first party’s interest is not 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
426 SI 1997/3032. 
427 PA, s 30. 
428 Fraser v Oystertec plc [2003] EWHC 2787, [2004] FSR 22 [70]; Finecard International Ltd v 
Urquhart Dyke & Lord [2005] EWHC 2481 (Ch) [2006] F.S.R. 27 [15]. 
429 In Transfer Systems v International Consultants BL O/1/05 (cited in CIFA guide to the Patents Act, 
33-04) an earlier unregistered assignment had priority over a later registered assignment as the later 
assignee took with knowledge of the earlier assignment. 
430 CIFA guide to the Patents Act, 33-03.    See also M Bridge, L Gullifer, G McMeel and S 
Worthington, The Law of Personal Property (London, Sweet & Maxwell, 2013) 36-023. 
431 Note that the particulars which must be registered include a tickbox as to whether there is security 
over IP, see section 859D(2)(d) of the Companies Act 2006. 
432 TMA, s 22. 
433 TMA, ss 24 and 25.  
434 The relevant section is TMA, s 25(3). 
435 RDA, s 19. 
436 RDA, s 20. 
437 This expressly includes an assignment, but only includes a mortgage or other security interest by 
implication. 
438 Section 15B(2) Registered Designs Act 1949. 
registered at the time of the second interest, it would appear that normal rules of 
priority apply and that this cannot be changed by subsequent registration.439 
14.8.2.2 Unregistered rights 
Copyright, unregistered design rights, and database rights, whilst existing by virtue of 
statute, do not have a registration system. Copyright exists, in most cases, for the life 
of the author etc. plus 70 years. It is personal property that is capable of assignment in 
writing, including the assignment of future copyright.440 There is no system for the 
protection of priority (although the company charges register now provides a 
reasonably effective means of giving notice to those who search the register) and, 
accordingly, the general rules should apply, so that equitable interests will rank in 
accordance with the date of their creation and the holder of a legal interest should take 
free of a prior equitable interest of which it had no knowledge. Unregistered design 
rights exist for a duration of either 10 years from first manufacture of the article 
incorporating the design or 15 years from creation. They are personal property and are 
capable of assignment in writing.441 Database rights exist for a period of 15 years 
from compilation or publication. They are personal property capable of assignment in 
the same way as copyright. 
14.8.3 Companies Act registration 
Any charge, whether fixed or floating, granted by a company over any IP right is 
registrable in the company charges register at  Companies House.442 This is 
irrespective of any registration in an IP register, which means that a creditor seeking 
to protect its security in a patent, trade mark or a registered design ought to file in 
both registers. The particulars which must be delivered to Companies House  include 
a ‘tickbox’ to indicate whether a fixed charge has been created over ‘intellectual 
property’ which will alert searchers to this fact without them having to read the charge 
instrument. The term ‘intellectual property’ is defined for this purpose to be any 
patent, trade mark, registered design, copyright, or design right, as well as any licence 
under or in respect of any such right.443 
14.9 Taking Security over Receivables 
14.9.1 The issues that arise in taking security over receivables  (that is,  trade debts or 
book debts have already been addressed, so this section refers briefly to the key steps 
required to take security from the perspective of a prospective secured creditor. 
Subject to any impediment that may be placed upon the ability of the security giver to 
create the security, particularly under a contractual restriction affecting its ability to 
dispose of its rights444, it should be possible to create security over both present and 
future receivables although the steps may vary depending on whether future debts are 
involved or not. Unlike a mortgage over existing debts, a  mortgage over future 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
439 Laddie, Prescott and Vitoria, The Modern Law of Copyright and Designs (4th edn 2011) 56-28. 
440 CDPA, ss 90 and 91. 
441 CDPA, ss 222 and 223. 
442 S 859A of the Companies Act 2006.  
443 S 859D(5) of the Companies Act 2006. This is the same definition as under the former s 861(4) of 
the Companies Act 2006. Curiously, database rights are still not included in the definition. 
444 Such contractual restrictions of may become nullified if the Business Contract Terms (Restrictions 
on Assignment of Receivables) Regulations, are adopted, see: https://www.gov.uk/ (last accessed 
August 2015).  See 14.1.9.2. 
receivables can only take effect in equity. If parties seek to create a legal mortgage by 
way of a statutory assignment of a debt, it is necessary that the assignment be 
absolute, of the whole debt (which must be a present debt) and in writing under the 
hand of the assignor with notification to the debtor.445 If the parties seek to create a 
mortgage by way of novation, it is necessary to effectuate the substitution of the new 
creditor (the mortgagee, B) for the previous creditor (the mortgagor, A): again 
(perhaps obviously) the debt must be a present debt. If the mortgagor and mortgagee 
hold accounts with the same bank, novation takes place by an in-house transfer of 
books of the bank. This effectively involves merely a change of the person of the 
creditor (from A to B). If they hold accounts with different banks, the substitution of 
the parties requires involvement a higher-tier bank with whom banks of both parties 
hold their accounts, so as to give effect to the transfer by an in-house transfer. This 
requires not only the change of the person of the creditor but also the change of the 
person of the debtor.446 
An equitable assignment of book debts by way of mortgage requires fewer steps to be 
taken compared to legal mortgage. The mortgagor must evince a clear intention to 
irrevocably assign an identifiable receivable by way of mortgage. This can take place 
in one of three ways.447 For clarity, in what follows the intending mortgagor is 
referred as “A” while the prospective mortgagee is “B”. First, A may send to B a 
signed written transfer or A and B may conclude an agreement that A will transfer the 
receivable. Second, A may declare himself or appoint another as a trustee of the debt 
or the collected debt (debt as they are paid by the person who owes them) for B. 
Third, A directs the debtor to pay B, either following A and B’s previous agreement 
to this or this was communicated to B.448  
14.9.2 Any security over receivables created by a company is registrable at  
Companies House except where it falls within one of the exceptions such as a 
financial collateral arrangement.449 If an individual who is engaged in business gives 
security over his book debts then it should be registered pursuant to section 344 of the 
Insolvency Act 1986. 
 
14.10 Taking Security over Credit Balances and Other 
Obligations Owed by a Creditor 
14.10.1 Charge-backs 
A dilemma that has arisen concerns whether security can be taken by a creditor over 
the benefit of an obligation that the creditor owes to the debtor (sometimes referred to 
as a ‘charge back’). The creditor may wish to take security over the obligation so as to 
secure a debt or some other liability, particularly a contingent liability that is owed by 
the debtor or a third party to the creditor. In the hands of the debtor, the obligation of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
445 See above 14.5.3.1.1. 
446 L Gullifer (ed), Goode on Legal Problems of Credit and Security (Sweet & Maxwell 2013 5th edn) 
para 3-03.  
447 L Gullifer (ed), Goode on Legal Problems of Credit and Security (Sweet & Maxwell 2013 5th edn) 
para 3.15-3.19. 
448 Curran v Newpark Cinemas Ltd [1951] 1 All ER 295. 
449 S 859A of the Companies Act 2006. For discussion of what constitutes a financial collateral 
arrangement, see above  14..7.5.. 
the lender is an asset, being a claim (a chose in action) that the debtor has against the 
creditor.450 It may be of considerable value and of good quality. On normal principles, 
there should be no difficulty in the asset (that is, the benefit of the claim) being 
provided as security to a third party for a liability that is owed to the third party.451 
The problem arises where the security is to be provided to the person against whom 
the claim is enforceable. In effect, that person is seeking to take security over its own 
liability. In traditional terms, this has been the subject of set-off of one claim against 
the other, rather than the taking of security. 
14.10.1.1 Two examples will serve to illustrate the type of claim or asset that 
might be involved. The first is the credit balance on an account that the debtor may 
have with a bank which, in turn, may wish to take security over that credit balance. 
The second is the benefit of a life policy issued by an  insurance company and held by 
the debtor. The insurance company may have provided credit to the policy holder or 
some other party (for instance, by way of a loan to purchase a house) and wish to take 
security over the policy.452 
14.10.1.2 The reasons for preferring security to set-off. 
There are various reasons why the creditor (the bank or the life company in the two 
examples given above) may wish to take security rather than be content to rely upon 
its rights of set-off. In the first place, a right of set-off may not exist as, for instance, 
where the credit balance or life policy is intended to stand as security for the 
obligations that are owed by a third party to the creditor, without the person holding 
the balance or policy incurring a personal liability by way of guarantee which could 
be the subject of a set-off.453 Secondly, set-off may not be available in an insolvency 
of one or other (or both) of the parties because the insolvency proceedings might take 
place in a foreign jurisdiction which does not permit such a set-off.454 Thirdly, set-off 
may not be available to cover the type of liability which is intended to be secured or 
there may be practical difficulties in establishing and quantifying the claims and their 
relative amounts for the purposes of the set-off.455 Fourthly, set-off requires mutuality 
as between the holders of the respective cross-claims at the time the set-off is 
asserted. Mutuality will be lost if one of the claims has been assigned prior to the time 
that it is wished to assert or apply the set-off, with the consequence that the assignee 
will be unable to rely upon the set-off that the assignor might have enjoyed.456 This 
will be a particular problem in an insolvency of the assignor, if it continues to be 
liable on the claim due by it.457 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
450 See Foley v Hill (1848) 2 HL Cas 28. 
451 See Lord Hoffmann in Re Bank of Credit and Commerce International SA (No 8) [1998] AC 214, at 
226–227. 
452 In this example, the problem is likely to surface if the life company seeks to assign the loan and the 
‘security’ that it holds for the loan, as a claim to set-off cannot be assigned. 
453 That was the position in Tam Wing Chuen v Bank of Credit & Commerce Hong Kong Ltd [1996] 
BCC 388 and in Re Bank of Credit and Commerce International SA (No 8) [1998] AC 214. The 
unusual feature in each case was that because the bank was insolvent, it did not wish to assert a right of 
set-off against the credit balance over which it purported to hold security. 
454 As is demonstrated by the lack of insolvency set-off in Luxembourg, as discussed in Re Bank of 
Credit and Commerce International SA (No 10) [1997] Ch 213. 
455 These sorts of difficulties are now commonly avoided by the use of close-out netting.  
456 Although the obligor should be able to assert the set-off for its own benefit, particularly where it can 
rely upon equitable or transaction set-off: Business Computers Ltd v Anglo-African Leasing Ltd [1977] 
1 WLR 578. 
457 Re City Life Assurance Co; Stephenson’s Case [1926] 1 Ch 191, at 214. 
14.10.1.3 Set-off as a topic in its own right is addressed separately below. 
14.10.1.4 The conceptual impossibility argument 
The dilemma referred to above was addressed initially by Millett J in Re Charge Card 
Services Ltd,458 in which his Lordship held that it was a conceptual impossibility for a 
party to take security over its own obligation.459 This was because the taking of 
security by way of mortgage would theoretically involve a re-assignment back to the 
security taker of its own obligation, which would have the effect of discharging that 
obligation. Clearly, that would not be what the parties had intended to achieve. He 
held that an attempt to take a charge in such circumstances would amount to no more 
than an agreement for contractual set-off because the secured creditor cannot sue 
itself, appoint a receiver to collect from itself or sell its own obligation. As an 
agreement for contractual set-off, it would cease to apply in the liquidation of one (or 
both) of the parties, although insolvency set-off could apply.460 It is interesting to 
note, in passing, that his Lordship applied this analysis even though the security 
would, if valid, have been by way of charge, rather than an assignment by way of 
legal or equitable mortgage. 
14.10.1.5 The view that was taken in the Charge Card case was overturned 
ultimately by the decision of the House of Lords in Re Bank of Credit and Commerce 
International SA (No 8),461 in which the leading speech was delivered by Lord 
Hoffmann, with whom the other Law Lords who sat on the appeal agreed. Lord 
Hoffmann said that the conceptual impossibility argument was misconceived and that 
it was possible to take the security. In passing, his Lordship remarked that the law 
should not deny the use of a form of security which was seen to have practical utility 
in the banking and commercial community. In arriving at his conclusion, his Lordship 
looked at the essential characteristics of security. The person taking the security only 
has a limited entitlement in the asset that is the subject of the security, being the right 
to resort to it to satisfy the liability secured by it. The giver of the security retains its 
equity of redemption, which is its entitlement to have the asset fully restored to it 
when the liability has been discharged. The only difference between a creditor 
seeking to take security over its own liability and taking security over any other type 
of asset was in the method of enforcement of the security, as in the former case it will 
take place by a book entry, by which the asset would be appropriated against the 
amount of the secured liability. In all other aspects, the rights and consequences 
attached to the security would be the same. In particular, given the presence of the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
458  [1987] Ch 150, at 175–176 (the case was the subject of an appeal, which did not deal with this 
aspect: [1989] Ch 497). 
459 This view was followed in the single judgment of the Court of Appeal (of which Millett LJ was a 
member) in Re Bank of Credit and Commerce International SA (No 8) [1996] Ch 245, at 257–262. 
460 For further discussion of conceptual problems and policy issues, which were not argued, see R 
Goode, Commercial Law in the Next Millenium (the 1997 Hamlyn Lectures) (Sweet & Maxwell 1998) 
69-71. 
461  [1998] AC 214. It might be argued that the decision on this aspect was merely obiter, as the House 
dismissed the appeals to it by deciding that, in any event, the two sets of depositors would not be able 
to force the liquidators to return the deposits or to apply the rules of insolvency set-off, because the 
liquidators were not obliged to repay the deposits, due to the ‘flawed asset’ provisions, and because 
there was no mutuality between the claims due to the company in liquidation (the bank) and the claims 
due by it to the depositors, who were not the borrowers and had not undertaken a personal liability for 
payment of the claims due by the borrowers to the bank. However, the issue currently under discussion 
was raised and fully argued in the appeals and formed part of reasons for the decision to dismiss the 
appeals and, on that basis, should be regarded as being a binding authority of a unanimous decision by 
the House. 
equity of redemption, there would not be a merger of interests, as the giver of the 
security retains its interest, but subject to the security. The consequence of this is that 
taking security over a deposit does not effect an outright re-assignment of the liability 
that the deposit represents. The security giver’s equity of redemption serves as the 
point of distinction and prevents a merger of the interests from taking place. 
14.10.1.6 Lord Hoffmann’s analysis is based on the security being in the form of 
a charge. As previously discussed, the creation of a charge does not involve any 
concept of a conveyance or transfer of title in the charged asset and that is the clearest 
method of avoiding the conceptual impossibility argument. However, the analysis that 
his Lordship employed should also apply if the security is in the form of a legal or 
equitable mortgage, given the importance that he attached to the continued presence 
of the equity of redemption which prevents the merger of the interests of the parties 
and of the underlying security with the liability it secures.462   The position, however, 
is not entirely clear and it is therefore highly advisable for security over a debt owed 
by the secured party to be drafted as a charge.  
14.10.1.7 It is apparent from what he said that Lord Hoffmann saw no difficulty 
in the method of enforcement of this type of security being by way of application of 
the deposit against the secured liability, without the necessity of having recourse to 
the traditional methods of enforcement of security, such as by sale or (with a court 
order) foreclosure. He did not explain how this might be different from the position 
when a right of set-off is exercised, which achieves the same thing. It might be 
argued, in consequence, that his Lordship impliedly invented a new method for 
enforcing security, which would apply to this type of security. However, it is 
submitted that the same method of enforcement would apply if a third party took 
security over a deposit. It is hardly likely that the third party would have to sell the 
deposit to realise its security. In reality, it would simply require that the amount of the 
deposit should be paid to it, which it would then apply against the outstanding secured 
liability. 
14.10.1.8 A charge over credit balance granted by a company will be registrable 
under section 859A of the Companies Act 2006463 except where it falls within the 
scope of Financial Collateral Arrangements (No 2) Regulations 2003, which is likely 
where banks or brokers conclude with their client (who is a non-natural person) a 
security transfer collateral agreement over the balance (which is likely to constitute 
“cash” for the purposes of the Regulations).464  
14.10.2 Insolvency set-off  relating to the deposit taken by the bank 
An issue that remains outstanding concerns the relationship between a charged 
deposit or similar asset of the type just discussed and the rules as to insolvency set-
off, which are discussed below. The context in which the question may arise is as 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
462 See also the argument made in H. Beale, M. Bridge, L. Gullifer and E. Lomnicka, The Law of 
Security and Title-Based Financing, 2nd edn (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012) para 6.24. 
463 Prior to 6th April 2013 a charge over a bank balance was registrable if it were floating charge or a 
fixed charge over book debt (under the now repealed section 860 of the Companies Act 2006). On the 
point whether the credit balance on a bank account could have constituted a book debt, Lord Hoffman 
declined to express a view. However, he did refer to the view taken in Northern Bank Ltd v Ross [1990] 
BCC 883 (which, in turn, had relied on what Lord Hoffmann had said in Re Brightlife Ltd [1987] Ch 
200 and in Re Permanent Houses (Holdings) Ltd (1989) 5 BCC 151) which suggested that it was 
unlikely that the security would be considered to be a charge on book debts. 
464 See above 14.7.6.1.	  
follows.465 The company (C) borrows money from bank B but seeks protection 
against credit risk. Three options should be considered. First, the repayment of the 
loan owed by C to B may be guaranteed by way of a personal guarantee given by the 
company director (D) who also holds a deposit account with B. The guarantee may be 
expressed so that D is the principal debtor as between D and B or drafted as payment 
on demand. Secondly, D may give security over the funds deposited with B without 
giving a personal guarantee. Thirdly, the company C may grant security over its funds 
deposited with B. In each of these three variants when the bank becomes insolvent the 
question arises whether D (or C) can set-off the claim for the return of the deposit 
against the debt owed to B.   These situations will first be considered on the basis that 
there is no charge-back, and then the question as to whether the charge-back breaks 
the necessary mutuality for a set-off will be discussed. 
14.10.2.1  Where the personal guarantee is drafted with a principal debtor clause, 
the guarantor is jointly and severally liable with the borrower to pay the borrower’s 
debt. The guarantor’s duty to pay is not contingent. If C is insolvent, there will be no 
insolvency set-off as there is no mutuality, but the bank can claim against D on the 
guarantee.  If D or the bank is insolvent, there is  an automatic set-off of the deposit 
against the obligation while discharging the borrower’s (C’s) repayment obligation.   
If the bank is insolvent, the depositor (D) will then be left to prove as an unsecured 
creditor for the remaining amount of the deposit. If the personal guarantee is payable 
on demand, that fact that the debt is contingent  is no longer an obstacle for 
insolvency set-off to apply, whether it is D or the bank who is insolvent: the current 
Insolvency Rules 1986 allow set-off in relation to contingent debts owed both by and 
to the insolvent party, although in the latter case, the liability is only accelerated to the 
extent of the set-off. 466    The liquidator or administrator undertakes the quantification 
of the debt unless the contingency occurs before the account is taken.467  
14.10.2.2 Where the depositor (D) creates a security over its deposit held with 
bank without giving a personal guarantee, insolvency set-off of the deposit against the 
debt is not available whether it is D or the bank who is insolvent.468 This is because 
the debts are not owed from the same party: deposit is a debt owed by B to D while 
the loan is a debt owed by C to B. This means there is no mutuality of debts, which is 
strictly required for set-off.469 To allow otherwise would defy the pari passu 
principle.470  
14.10.2.3 The more difficult and thus far unresolved question arises where the 
depositor (granting a security over a deposit held with the bank) and the debtor are the 
same person. If the debtor is insolvent, the bank might not wish insolvency set-off to 
apply, as it does, automatically at the commencement of insolvency proceedings.   
The bank might wish to until it can be sure that all of the liabilities that are covered by 
its security have crystallised, matured, and been dealt with and discharged to its 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
465 This is based on MS Fashions Ltd v Bank of Credit and Commerce International SA [1993] Ch 425, 
430 (Hoffmann LJ). 
466 See rr.2.85(5) (in relation to administration) and 4.90(5) (in relation to liquidation) of the Insolvency 
Rules 1986.  
467 Section 322(3) of the Insolvency Act 1986 (in relation to bankruptcy) and Insolvency Rules 1986, 
r.2.81, applicable to set-off by virtue of r.2.85(5) and r.4.86 in relation to liquidation.  
468 Re Bank of Credit and Commerce International SA (No 8) [1998] AC 214. 
469 See Lord Hoffmann in Re Bank of Credit and Commerce International SA (No 8) [1998] AC 214, at 
223. 
470 See British Eagle International Airlines Ltd v Compagnie Nationale Air France [1975] 1 WLR 758. 
satisfaction, especially if some are contingent.   While a liquidator or administrator 
will take into account contingencies eventuating before the date on which the account 
is taken, (the hindsight principle) it will have to estimate the value of debts remaining 
contingent at that point.  Even if the bank can delay the moment of calculation, 
though, it cannot delay it for ever: at some point the company will be wound up and 
dissolved.    Other reasons for not wishing to rely on insolvency set-off could be that 
the debt and the deposit are in different currencies, and the exchange rate at the date 
of commencement of insolvency proceedings471 was not favourable to the bank. 
14.10.2.4.      The question of whether a charge-back is subject to insolvency set-off 
(which applies automatically and would not enable the bank to have the choice 
referred to in the last paragraph) is unresolved472 and complex.    It splits into two 
parts, both of which are relevant.   First, it is usually the case that where a debt is the 
subject of a security interest, the mutuality necessary for insolvency set-off is broken 
to the extent of the security interest (but exists as to any balance).473     It is not clear 
why this reasoning should not apply when the security holder is the debtor: the dual 
capacity in which the bank acts (debtor and security holder) could be said to break the 
necessary mutuality.   Second, as the debt owed by the depositor is secured, the 
controversy (discussed below474) as to whether insolvency set-off applies when one 
debt is secured arises.   It is clear that where the debt owed to the insolvent party is 
secured, this can be the subject of insolvency set-off.475  Thus, when the bank is 
insolvent, the only reason why insolvency set-off should not apply is the lack of 
mutuality referred to above.  Here it would be unfortunate if some form of set-off did 
not apply, since otherwise the (insolvent) bank could enforce its security in full, 
leaving the depositor to prove for its debt.   If the lack of mutuality were to prevent 
insolvency set-off, though, the bank could still be said to have taken its security 
interest subject to the right of the depositor to set off its debt,476 since it knew of that 
right at the time when it took its security interest.    Where the depositor is insolvent, 
it is far less clear that insolvency set-off applies, since where a debt owed by the 
insolvent party is secured, there is a reasonably strong argument that it does not.477   
When this conclusion is coupled with the lack of mutuality mentioned above, it has 
the result that the bank does have a choice whether to enforce its security, or to 
surrender its security and rely on insolvency set-off.    In many cases the outcome will 
be the same, since the charge would be enforced by book entry.   Further, if the bank’s 
charge could be said to be floating, then the insolvency consequences would make it 
unattractive for the bank to rely on it in preference to insolvency set-off. In the 
insolvency of the bank, the liquidator or administrator would wish to argue that the 
insolvency set-off did not apply.  This is because the bank could then claim the full 
amount of the debt due to it, and the depositor would have to prove for the whole 
amount of the deposit. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
471 This is generally the date in relation to which the exchange rate is calculated, see Rule 4.91 
Insolvency Rules 1986. 
472 Lord Hoffmann referred to the debate but did not comment in Re Bank of Credit and Commerce 
International SA (No 8) [1998] AC 214, 225 
473 Re City Life Assurance Co; Stephenson’s Case [1926] 1 Ch 191, at 214.  See 14.11.3.3 below. 
474 14.11.3.3.1 
475 Ex p Barnett, re Deveze (1874) LR 9 Ch App 293, 295 
476 Probably both legal and equitable set-off. 
477 See the arguments made in 14.11.3.3.1 
14.10.3 ‘Flawed asset’ provisions478 
A ‘flawed asset’ provision is one which provides that a liability due by A to B (for 
instance, a liability of A as a bank to repay a deposit that has been placed with it by B) 
may be withheld and will not fall due for payment or discharge whilst any liability 
remains outstanding that is owing and undischarged by B (or a third party) to A. It 
will probably also provide for A to have the right to set off one liability against the 
other once they have both been fully established. Such provisions were developed 
with a view to overcoming the difficulty created by the decision in the Charge Card 
case; in fact, a ‘triple cocktail’ provision developed which included a set-off, a flawed 
asset and a charge-back, in the hope that at least one of these devices would be 
effective. Although they could not, in themselves, enable A to treat the deposit placed 
with it as security, it was intended that they might have much the same effect, as A 
would be able refuse to repay the deposit whilst any liability which the deposit 
‘secured’ remained outstanding and unsatisfied, particularly where the outstanding 
and unsatisfied liability was that of a third party. 
14.10.5.1 Flawed asset provisions have been considered in very few cases.479     
In Re Bank of Credit and Commerce International SA (No 8),480 the provision was 
considered by the Court of Appeal, who held that the charge-back provision was 
ineffective, but took the view that the bank was sufficiently protected by the flawed 
asset, since it would not be obliged to repay the deposit until the borrower’s 
obligation was paid.   In that case, the depositor had no personal liability to the bank. 
The deposit was simply intended to ‘secure’ the obligation of a third party to the bank.    
The Court of Appeal confirmed that the ‘flaw’ in the deposit continued despite the 
liquidation of the bank or the depositor, although in the latter situation, the court 
thought it would be likely that the depositor’s trustee or liquidator would wish to 
come to an arrangement with the bank, by which the bank would apply the deposit, so 
that the insolvency practitioner could obtain any balance remaining for the benefit of 
the depositor’s general body of creditors.   Lord Hoffmann in the House of Lords 
agreed with the analysis of the Court of Appeal and did not add any additional 
commentary.481 
 
14.10.5.2 The interrelationship between a flawed asset provision and insolvency 
set-off is not straightforward.   As mentioned above, no obligation to repay the deposit 
arises until the ‘secured’ obligation is paid in full, and this remains the position even 
in the insolvency of either party.     Insolvency set-off, though, applies to contingent 
debts as well as present (and future) debts, and it is the duty of the liquidator or 
administrator to value the debts when effecting the set-off, taking account of anything 
that has happened since the commencement of the insolvency proceedings.     Where 
the depositor is the person owing the ‘secured’ obligation and is insolvent, the 
obligation will not be paid (in full) by any method other than set-off; the deposit will 
never become payable and the liquidator will have to value it at zero.   Although 
insolvency set-off is therefore theoretically available as there is mutuality, its 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
478 See L Gullifer ‘Flawed Assets’ in G. Virgo and S. Worthington Commercial Remedies (Cambridge 
University Press, forthcoming). 
479 See Fraser v Oystertec [2004] EWHC 1582; Re Lehman Brother (Europe) (In Administration) 
[2012] EWHC 2997 (Ch) [47] – [48] as well as the BCCI case. 
480  [1996] Ch 245. 
481 [1998] AC 214, at 225. 
operation will leave the entire amount of the loan as a provable debt.   The bank, 
however, is protected by not having to repay the deposit, but it might be in the 
liquidator’s interest to pay the full amount of the loan in order to enable him to claim 
the full amount of the deposit from the bank, which gives the same economic effect as 
if there had been a set-off or an enforced security interest.   	  Where it is the bank that 
is insolvent, the ‘secured’ obligation is owed by B, a solvent party, and so will be 
paid.   Therefore, the likely solution is that the contingent debt (the bank’s obligation 
to pay) should be valued in full, and insolvency set-off should apply.482 However, as 
where B is insolvent, there are not mutual debts due at the same time: it is at the 
moment when the loan obligation is paid that the contingent debt arises, and so 
technically insolvency set-off could be said not to apply.  The position is very unclear, 
and it could be in the depositor’s interest to bargain for a provision that the bank’s 
obligation to repay arises automatically if it (the bank) becomes insolvent, though 
there is a danger that such a provision could be vulnerable under the anti-deprivation 
principle. 
14.10.5.3 Where the depositor is not the person owing the ‘secured’ obligation, 
insolvency set-off will not apply as there is no mutuality, unless the depositor has 
guaranteed the obligation. If that is the case, a combination of the analysis in the 
paragraphs 14.10.2.1, 14.10.2.2 and in the previous paragraph will apply.  Where the 
depositor is insolvent, any application of insolvency set-off will normally result in the 
flawed asset being valued at zero and the whole of the ‘secured’ obligation being a 
provable debt.   Where the bank is insolvent, as mentioned, the position is unclear.	  
14.10.5.3 In view of the decision of the House of Lords that true security can be 
taken over such a deposit, it is unlikely that a creditor would now need to rely on a 
‘flawed asset’ provision.483 
14.11 Set-off 
14.11.1 Set-off is the means by which opposing cross-claims between parties 
are applied or netted against each other to arrive at a net balance that is payable one 
way or the other. Whilst it is not, strictly speaking, a matter of security, the subject of 
set-off is important and relevant in the context of this chapter because it can be very 
similar in its consequences, and sometimes amount to in practical terms, to effective 
‘security’. This is because set-off can have the effect of reducing the risk exposure 
that a creditor has towards its counterparty, particularly in the event of a default by, or 
an insolvency of, the counterparty. There are, in addition, a number of other benefits 
that may accrue to a creditor which has a right of set-off. These include, first, the ease 
of valuation of the benefit it enjoys from the set-off; secondly, the ease with which a 
set-off can be exercised under contractual set-off and insolvency set-off, by a simple 
application of one claim against the other; and, thirdly, regulatory benefits which may 
allow a bank to treat the risk exposure referable to its counterparty as the net balance 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
482 The analysis in the text derives some support from the judgment of the Court of Appeal in MS 
Fashions Ltd v Bank of Credit and Commerce International (In Liquidation) (No 2) [1993] Ch 425. In 
relation to the High Street Services appeal, repayment of the deposit was conditional upon payment in 
full to the bank (at 445). Notwithstanding this Dillon LJ held that insolvency set off applied (at 448).   
483 However, if an agreement does not amount to a charge, it may be a contractual flawed asset 
arrangement, creating restrictions on the use of the contents of accounts, which could be relevant where 
a third party judgment creditor seeks a final third party debt order requiring third party to pay the 
creditor; the court need not exercise its discretion to make such an order under Civil Procedure Rules 
1998/3132 Part 72, r.72.2, see: Oystertec plc [2004] EWHC 1582. 
after taking into account the set-off, rather than the gross figure of its exposure before 
such an account is taken. In a more commercial context, set-off may have the effect of 
providing an abatement in the price of goods and services that have been supplied, so 
as to accommodate the loss because of defective performance. It may also avoid the 
necessity of pursuing separate proceedings for recovery of the cross-claim. 
14.11.1.1 In discussing the subject, it is necessary to distinguish between rights 
of set-off that are exercisable before the insolvency of one of the parties (or both of 
them) and the position as to mandatory insolvency set-off that arises in the winding up 
or bankruptcy of a party (and sometimes in the administration of a party). It will also 
be necessary to refer to the consequences where a party assigns a claim which would 
otherwise have been subject to a set-off between the original parties. 
14.11.2 Pre-insolvency set-off 
Outside the context of insolvency, the matters for examination concern the right of a 
party to assert, as against the other party, a legal set-off, an equitable set-off, and a 
contractual set-off, as well as its right to rely on a contractual provision which denies 
to the other party the right to exercise a set-off.484 It will also be necessary to consider 
the special rules that apply in the case of negotiable instruments. 
14.11.2.1 Legal set-off 485 
Legal set-off is a procedural device that arises in litigation for the convenience of 
avoiding a multiplicity of suits.486 It allows the defendant in the proceedings to plead 
in its defence the cross-claim that it has against the claimant. It is not necessary that 
there should be any connection between the claim and the cross-claim. The set-off 
may only be asserted, however, if the cross-claim is both liquidated (or capable of 
precise calculation or valuation) and due at the times when the defence is filed and 
when judgment is given.487 It is also necessary that the claim and the cross-claim 
should be between the same people and in the same right, that is, a requirement for 
mutuality as between the parties to the set-off.488 
14.11.2.1.1 When considering the parameters in which legal set-off may take 
place, it could be said that the set-off is wide in one sense and narrow in another. It is 
wide in the sense that there need be no connection between the claim of the claimant 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
484 While an alternative terminology and classification proposed by P Wood, English and International 
Set-Off (1989) has been met with some enthusiasm in the academia (see L Gullifer, Goode on Legal 
Problems of Credit and Security (Sweet & Maxwell 5th edn 2013) and by courts, the traditional labels 
appear to persist (see e.g. Fearns (trading as Autopaint International) v Anglo-Dutch Paint & 
Chemical Co Ltd [2010] EWHC 2366 (Ch), [2011] 1 WLR 366; Stemcor UK Ltd v Global Steel 
Holdings Ltd [2015] EWHC 363 (Comm); [2015] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 580); hence, their use here. 
485 See Hoffmann LJ in Aectra Refining & Marketing Inc v Exmar NV [1994] 1 WLR 1643, at 1649–
1653; Lord Hoffmann in Stein v Blake [1996] AC 243, at 251; and Clarke LJ in Glencore Grain Ltd v 
Agros Trading Co Ltd [1999] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 410, at 415–417. 
486 The procedural nature of this type of set-off is relevant in the context of conflict of laws, as 
discussed at Chap 4. 
487 It is still possible to plead the set-off even though the amount of the cross-claim might be disputed, 
in which case the court will have to determine the correct amount: Aectra Refining & Marketing Inc v 
Exmar NV [1994] 1 WLR 1643. 
488 A lack of mutuality at a beneficial level will prevent the set-off: see Sir George Jessell MR in Re 
Whitehouse & Co (1878) 9 ChD 595, at 597. Parke B in Briscoe v Hill (1842) 10 M&W 735, at 738, 
said that it is not possible to plead a joint liability against a several debt because the debts were not due 
in the same right. 
in the proceedings and the cross-claim of the defendant, provided the requirement for 
mutuality is met. It is narrow in the sense that the cross-claim must be liquidated or 
capable of precise calculation and it must be due at the time it is asserted and when 
judgment is given. 
14.11.2.2 Equitable set-off 
There are at least three different types of equitable set-off that might be relevant in a 
commercial context. They are transaction set-off, set-off as between a claim and 
cross-claim at a beneficial level which would not be available at law, and the set-off 
that is available to a debtor whose debt has been assigned. It is also important to 
consider the circumstances in which a right to equitable set-off may be denied. 
14.11.2.2.1 Transaction set-off 489 Transaction set-off, which arises as a substantive 
defence to a claim in litigation, is wide and narrow in the opposite way to legal set-
off. It is wide in the sense that the cross-claim does not have to be for a liquidated 
amount, as it can include a claim for damages to be assessed.490 It is narrow in the 
sense that it applies where it would be manifestly unjust to refuse to allow the set-off. 
For equitable set-off to apply there must be an inseparable connection between the 
claim and the cross-claim, as they must arise out of the same course of dealings and 
transactions.491 It seems that the connection will be  inseparable when two elements 
are present: a formal element of close connection, decided on the basis of “principle 
not discretion”, and a functional element of whether it would be unjust to enforce the 
claim without accounting for the cross-claims.492 When claim and cross-claim arise 
from one contract the formal element is likely to be satisfied  but need not be.493 By 
the same token, the formal element can be met even though the claim and the cross-
claim arise under different contracts. The courts have taken various factors into 
account when establishing this, for example the closeness of subject matter494 or 
whether the contracts have been negotiated independently or together.495 The parties 
can sometimes establish a close connection (or not) by the way in which the claims 
are treated.496     Establishing the presence of the functional element is even more fact 
specific, depending often on factors such as the strength of claims497 and the conduct 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
489 As to a legal right of set-off and the distinction between that and equitable or transaction set-off, see 
Hoffmann LJ in Aectra Refining & Marketing Inc v Exmar NV [1994] 1 WLR 1643, at 1649–1653; 
Clarke LJ in Glencore Grain Ltd v Agros Trading Co Ltd [1999] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 410, at 415–417; 
Buxton LJ in Smith v Muscat [2003] EWCA Civ 962; [2003] 1 WLR 2853, at [37]–[45]; and Benford 
Ltd v Lopecan SL [2004] EWHC 1897 (Comm), [2004] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 618. 
490 The amount of the cross-claim must then be assessed as part of the proceedings. 
491 See Potter LJ in Bim Kemi AB v Blackburn Chemicals Ltd [2001] EWCA Civ 457, [2001] 2 Lloyd’s 
Rep 93. 
492 See Rix LJ in Geldorf Metaalconstructie NV v Simon Carves Ltd [2010] EWCA Civ 667, [2010] 4 
All ER 847 who stresses, however, that these elements are not tests. 
493 Two claims under the same contract may not be sufficiently connected to meet the requirement: see 
Lord Hobhouse in Government of Newfoundland v Newfoundland Ry Co (1888) 13 App Ca 199 (PC) 
212-213.  See also Sankey v The Helping Hands Group plc CA, 5 Oct 1999. 
494 Bim Kemi AB v Blackburn Chemicals Ltd [2001] EWCA Civ 457, [2001] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 93, [35]; 
Geldorf Metaalconstructie NV v Simon Carves Ltd [2010] EWCA Civ 667, [2010] 4 All ER 847 [47]. 
495 Geldorf Metaalconstructie NV v Simon Carves Ltd [2010] EWCA Civ 667 paras 10 and 44.  
496 Geldorf Metaalconstructie NV v Simon Carves Ltd [2010] EWCA Civ 667, [2010] 4 All ER 847 
[46]; Addax Bank BSC (c) v Wellesley Partners LLP [2010] EWHC 1904 (QB), [44]–[45]. 
497 Esso Petroleum Co Ltd v Milton [1997] 1 WLR 938, 952 (Thorpe LJ); Star Rider Ltd v 
Inntrepreneur Pub Co [1998] 1 EGLR 53; Antiquesportfolio.com.plc v Rodney Fitch & Co Ltd [2001] 
ECDR 5 (Ch D). 
of the parties.498 , There are more specific lines of authority relevant to this chapter.   
For example, it has been held that where a provision for a contractual set-off was void 
because it created an unregistered charge, equitable set-off was not available.499 
Another example is that a mortgagor cannot unilaterally appropriate the amount of a 
cross-claim, even if it is both liquidated and admitted (and a fortiori if unliquidated), 
in the discharge of the mortgage debt.500 This would have the effect of discharging the 
mortgaged debt. Parties may expressly agree otherwise. 
14.11.2.2.1.1 Transaction set-off will usually arise where the original claim is for a 
liquidated sum and the set-off is in respect of an unliquidated cross-claim for 
damages. Nonetheless, the right to equitable set-off can also be asserted where both 
the claims are for unliquidated damages,501 and can be relied upon where both claims 
are liquidated. 
14.11.2.2.1.2 It used to be said that a claim to transaction set-off goes to ‘impeach’ 
the original claim.502 Such a description was thought unhelpful, so the nature of this 
type of set-off is now thought to have shifted away from impeachment and towards 
the ‘inseparable connection’ test. Thus, it is now reasonably clear that this type of set-
off right is considered to be a substantive defence, rather than merely a procedural 
one. This has implications for the treatment of the two claims as a matter of conflict 
of laws.503 However, while it operates as a substantive defence, it takes effect at the 
time the judgment is given on the claim or agreement is made and does not operate 
automatically to extinguish or reduce the claim before the judgment.504   One effect of 
it being a substantive defence, is that  where a payment is made taking account of 
transaction set-off, a self-help remedy for underpayment is not triggered.   If a 
creditor ignores the asserted set-off and goes ahead with the self-help remedy, he acts 
‘at his peril’:505 if the set-off is upheld, the creditor will be liable for wrongfully doing 
whatever the self-help remedy would otherwise entitle him to do.506 The debtor must, 
however, assert the set-off before it can act as a defence in this way,507 although its 
cross-claim need not be definitively quantified providing that the assertion is made 
reasonably and in good faith.508 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
498 Bluestorm Ltd v Portvale Holdings Ltd [2004] EWCA Civ 289, [2004] HLR 49	  
499 Smith (Administrator of Cosslett (Contractors) Ltd) v Bridgend [2001] UKHL 58, [2002] 1 AC 336 
[78]. 	  
500 Samuel Keller Holdings Ltd v Martins Bank Ltd [1971] 1WLR 43, 47-48 (Megarry J); Mobil Oil Co 
Ltd v Rawlinson (1982) 43 P & CR 221, Day v Tiuta International Ltd [2014] EWCA Civ 1246. 
501 See Potter LJ in the Bim Kemi AB v Blackburn Chemicals Ltd [2001] EWCA Civ 457, [2001] 2 
Lloyd’s Rep 93, [21]–[23].  
502 Rawson v Samuel (1841) Cr & Ph 161, 179. 
503 See the discussion at Chap 4. 
504 Fearns v Anglo-Dutch Paint and Chemical Co [2010] EWHC 2366 (Ch), [2011] 1 WLR 366;  
Stemcor UK Ltd v Global Steel Holdings Ltd, Pramod Mittal [2015] EWHC 363 (Comm), [2015] 1 
Lloyd's Rep 580. 
505 Federal Commerce & Navigation Co Ltd v Molena Alpha Inc (The "Nanfri") [1978] 2 QB 927, 974; 
Equitas Ltd &Anor v Walsham Bros Co Ltd [2013] EWHC 3264 (Comm) [179]. 
506 Federal Commerce & Navigation Co Ltd v Molena Alpha Inc (The "Nanfri") [1978] 2 QB 927, 974; 
Fuller v Happy Shopper Markets Ltd [2001] 1 WLR 1681. 
507 Equitas Ltd & Anor v Walsham Bros Co Ltd [2013] EWHC 3264 (Comm) [179]. 
508 Federal Commerce & Navigation Co Ltd v Molena Alpha Inc (The "Nanfri") [1978] 2 QB 927, 975; 
Santiren Shipping Ltd v Unimarine SA; (The "Chrysovalandou Dyo") [1981] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 159. 
14.11.2.2.1.3 There is considerable overlap between abatement of the price of goods 
or services for breach of warranty, and equitable set-off,509 so that both are often 
referred to collectively as ‘transaction set-off’.  The former, however, arises at 
common law as, for instance, under section 53(1)(a) of the Sale of Goods Act 1979.. 
14.11.2.2.2 Equitable set-off at the beneficial level This type of set-off arises where 
set-off would not be available between claims at common law, because the claims are 
not as between the same parties. It is allowed as a form of equitable set-off where, at 
the beneficial level, the claims are really between the same parties.510 For instance, it 
would arise where A is indebted to B and C is indebted to A, but where B is acting as 
trustee of C with respect to the debt due to B by A. A set-off would not be available at 
common law, but it would arise in equity. 
14.11.2.2.2.1 The onus is on the person that wishes to assert the set-off to establish 
the true relationship as between the trustee and the beneficiary. It is not sufficient for 
that person simply to assert that one of its counterparties is acting as a trustee, if it 
cannot establish that the trustee is acting for the other counterparty.511 
14.11.2.2.3 Set-off in the context of assignment or security The issue that arises at 
this point is the effect that an assignment of a debt may have on the rights to set-off 
that a debtor had or would have enjoyed against the assignor, and whether the debtor 
can assert those rights against the assignee. In other words, whether the debtor can 
continue to assert, as against the assignee, a set-off that it would have been entitled to 
assert against its original creditor, in the situation where its debt has been assigned so 
that, at least superficially, the element of mutuality has been broken. This matter is 
addressed in Chapter 12. The discussion there is equally applicable in the context of 
security being taken over the debt. Indeed, Business Computers Ltd v Anglo-African 
Leasing Ltd,512 which is one of the leading cases, concerned the effect on the debtor’s 
rights of set-off following upon its receipt of a notice of the crystallisation of a 
floating charge, the event of crystallisation being treated for these purposes as being 
equivalent to an assignment of the debt. 
14.11.2.2.4 Denying equitable set-off It would appear that a claim to equitable set-
off cannot be asserted by a defendant where the claim against the defendant arises 
from the defendant’s wrongful action, such as due to its wrongful conversion of goods 
or breach of a statutory obligation.513 It has also been held that where money is paid to 
a person in the position of a trustee or fiduciary, to be used for a specific purpose and 
the purpose cannot be achieved, then (in the absence of an agreement to the contrary) 
that person will not be allowed to set-off against its obligation to refund the money 
some other claim that it may have against the original payer of the money.514 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
509 Sim v Rotherham Metropolitan BC [1987] 1 Ch 216, 257 – 259. 
510 Cochrane v Green (1860) CB (NS) 448; Thornton v Maynard (1875) LR 10 CP 695; Bhogal v 
Punjab National Bank [1988] 2 All ER 296. 
511 Bhogal v Punjab National Bank [1988] 2 All ER 296; Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency v Dresdner 
Bank AG [2004] EWCA Civ 1074, [2005] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 12. 
512  [1977] 1 WLR 578. 
513 See Lords Hoffmann and Scott in Smith (Administrator of Cosslett (Contractors) Ltd v Bridgend 
CBC [2001] UKHL 58; [2002] 1 AC 336, at [34]–[36] and at [76]–[78], respectively. 
514 Re Niagara Mechanical Services International Ltd [2001] BCC 393. 
14.11.2.3 Contractual set-off 
It is open to the parties to an agreement to provide for the availability of set-off by 
either or both of them in circumstances that would not arise as a legal or equitable set-
off. For instance, they may agree that the set-off might be applied outside the 
parameters of litigation, so that a party could advance its right to set-off to a 
contractual date for payment under a contract, rather than having to wait for litigation 
to be commenced. If one of the parties is a bank, they might agree that it would be 
entitled to exercise a right or set-off outside the confines that normally apply to the 
implied right that a banker has to combine accounts (see below). The parties could 
also agree that the set-off might be applied to claims that would arise in different 
countries or as between claims in different currencies.515 
14.11.2.3.1 It is also possible for them to agree that one of them could set-off 
against the other a claim due to one of them by a third party, such as another company 
in the same group as one of the contracting parties. However, if it is sought to apply a 
set-off against a claim made by the third party, that party would have to agree. Thus, 
A and B may agree that A could set-off a debt due to it by C against a debt due to B 
by A. However, A and B could not agree, without C’s agreement, that A could avoid 
having to pay a debt due by it to C by setting-off a debt due by B to A. Of course, it is 
perfectly possible for a number of parties to enter into a multilateral agreement 
providing for netting and set-off on a multilateral basis between them all as, for 
instance, by having a settlement of debts on a periodic basis through a clearing house 
or central body and establishing an ultimate balance due as between the participants. 
14.11.2.3.2 Under English domestic insolvency law, contractual rights of set-off 
cease to be available upon the bankruptcy or liquidation of one of the parties to the 
contract,516 because the mandatory rules of insolvency set-off apply, whatever the 
contract might provide.517 However, there are statutory savings for the settlement of 
market contracts and the operation of the rules of recognised investment exchanges 
and clearing houses pursuant to sections 158 and 159 of the Companies Act 1989,518 
as well as other savings under the Financial Markets and Insolvency (Settlement 
Finality) Regulations 1999519 and, with respect to close-out netting, under the 
Financial Collateral Arrangements (No 2) Regulations 2003.520 
14.11.2.3.3 A contractual set-off agreement may be valuable, however, in the 
context of a cross-border insolvency of a party within the EU. Article 6 of the EU 
Insolvency Regulation,521 which is repeated in the relevant legislation concerning 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
515 In which case it would be necessary to provide for a mechanism for calculating the conversion of 
one currency into another so as to achieve the set-off. 
516 And, in limited circumstances, an administration of a party. 
517 National Westminster Bank Ltd v Halesowen Presswork and Assemblies Ltd [1972] AC 785; British 
Eagle International Airlines Ltd v Cie Nationale Air France [1975] 1 WLR 758; Re Maxwell 
Communications Corp PLC (No 2) [1993] 1 WLR 1402. 
518 And, pursuant thereto, the Financial Markets and Insolvency Regs 1991 (SI 1991/880). 
519 SI 1999/2979. 
520 SI 2003/3226. 
521 The Regulation No 1346/2000 on insolvency proceedings (EC1346/2000 OJ L160/1 30/6/2000). Art 
6 is discussed in Chap 5. For the new regulation entering into force on 26 June 2017, see article 9 of the 
Regulation (EU) 2015/848 of 20 May 2015 on insolvency proceedings (recast) (OJ L 141/19 of 
5/6/2015). 
insolvent credit institutions522 and insurance undertakings,523 provides for the 
preservation of rights of set-off where the law that governs the insolvent debtor’s 
claim would permit the set-off, despite the opening of insolvency proceedings under 
the law of a Member State which might not acknowledge such rights. In addition, the 
validity and effectiveness of a netting agreement to which an EU or EEA insolvent 
credit institution is a party, is governed by the law that governs the agreement.524 
14.11.2.4 The banker’s right of set-off 
By virtue of the relationship between banker and customer, the banker has a right in 
certain situations to combine or net the balances on the separate accounts that it holds 
for a customer so as to achieve a net balance due one way or the other. Although there 
is some doubt as to the basis of the right, it is submitted that it arises as a form of 
implied right of contractual set-off. This is because it springs from the contractual 
relationship between the parties and it is a right in favour of the bank, which it can 
determine to exercise if it wishes, rather than an automatic and continuous netting that 
arises in favour of both parties.525 
14.11.2.4.1 This form of set-off should be distinguished from the situation that 
arises on a single running account, to which debit and credit entries are made on a 
continuous basis as, for instance, on an overdraft account. The making of the debit 
and credit entries to the account does not give rise to the operation of set-off; rather, 
there is a single relationship with a balance being struck from time to time to show 
what is due one way or the other.526 
14.11.2.4.2 The implied right of the bank to combine accounts arises where the 
balance on each account is due and payable, as would be the case between two current 
accounts.527 It will not arise whilst the customer’s liability to the bank is contingent or 
payable in the future,528 nor where one account is a current account and the other is a 
deposit or term account,529 at least until the accounts have reached maturity or where 
the bank has an express right to combine the accounts. In light of the decision of the 
House of Lords in Miliangos v George Frank (Textiles) Ltd,530 to the effect that a debt 
in a foreign currency may properly be treated as a debt and is no longer to be treated 
as a claim for a mere commodity, it should now be possible for a bank to set off 
balances in different currencies. 
14.11.2.4.3 The implied right to set-off depends upon mutuality as between the 
entitlement in the accounts. Accordingly, if the accounts are maintained in the same 
name but the bank is on notice that the beneficial entitlement in one of the accounts 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
522 Art 23 of the EC Directive on the reorganisation and winding up of credit institutions (EC 2001/24 
OJ L125 5/5/2001). The Directive has been implemented in the UK by the Credit Institutions 
(Reorganisation and Winding Up) Regulations 2004 (SI 2004/1045, as amended by SI 2007/830). 
523 EC Directive on the reorganisation and winding up of insurance undertakings (EC 2001/17 OJ L110 
20/4/2001). The Directive has been implemented in the UK by the Insurers (Reorganisation and 
Winding Up) Regulations 2004 (SI 2004/353, as amended by SI 2004/546). 
524 Art 25 of EC 2001/24. 
525 See, for instance, Lord Denning MR in National Westminster Bank Ltd v Halesowen Presswork and 
Assemblies Ltd [1971] 1 QB 1, at 34 and Buckley J in Re EJ Morel Ltd [1962] Ch 21, at 31. 
526 See Buckley LJ in National Westminster Bank Ltd v Halesowen Presswork and Assemblies Ltd 
[1971] 1 QB 1, at 46, and Millett J in Re Charge Card Services Ltd [1987] Ch 150, at 174. 
527 Garnett v McKewan (1872) LR 8 Ex 10. 
528 Jeffryes v Agra & Masterman’s Bank (1866) LR 2 Eq 674. 
529 Bradford Old Bank v Sutcliffe [1918] 2 KB 833. 
530  [1976] AC 443. 
rests in a third party, the bank will not be entitled to combine the accounts.531 By 
contrast, if the bank can demonstrate that an account, although maintained in the 
name of one person, is held beneficially for another customer, it should be able to set-
off the entitlement on that account against a liability of that customer to the bank, but 
the onus rests on the bank to demonstrate the connection.532 
14.11.2.5 Precluding the exercise of rights to set-off 
Just as it is possible to enhance or create rights of set-off by contract, so it is also 
possible by contract to reduce or withdraw those rights,533 although this is subject to 
certain statutory limitations which will be mentioned. As a matter of interpretation, 
the intention to preclude or limit the exercise of the right must be clearly expressed.534 
Accordingly, an agreement that required payment to be made ‘without any 
deduction’535 or ‘without discount’536 were held not to preclude the exercise of a right 
of set-off, as was an agreement that a party’s payment obligations were unaffected ‘by 
any matter whatsoever’.537 
14.11.2.5.1 As with a contract which confers rights of set-off, an agreement that 
precludes or restricts the exercise of such rights will cease to have effect upon the 
bankruptcy or liquidation of one of the parties.538  This rule, though clear, is 
controversial, since a restriction on set-off may benefit the insolvent party, and the 
Cork Committee on Insolvency Law and Practice539 recommended in 1982 that 
contracting out of insolvency set-off should be permitted, but no legislation has yet 
been forthcoming. 
 
14.11.2.5.2 Statutory limitation There are two areas of potential statutory limitation 
to the effectiveness of a contractual provision that purports to preclude a party from 
asserting a right of set-off (a ‘no-set off clause’). The first arises under the Unfair 
Contract Terms Act 1977 (UCTA), which applies to business-to-business contracts 
and the other arises under the Consumer Rights Act 2015 (CRA), governing contracts 
with consumers. The latter entered into force on 1 October 2015 and replaced Unfair 
Terms in Consumer Contracts Regs 1999540 (UTCCR) and UCTA insofar as it applies 
to contracts with consumers. 
14.11.2.5.3 UCTA More detailed discussions of UCTA will be found in Chapters 9 
and 15. What follows here is intended to provide a summary of the provisions of 
UCTA that are of immediate relevance to the present discussion. 
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14.11.2.5.3.1 Section 3 of UCTA provides that where a contracting party is dealing 
on the other party’s standard terms of business,541 that other party cannot by a 
contractual term exclude or restrict his own liability for breach of the contract, nor 
purport to render no performance at all or a substantially different performance than 
was reasonably to be expected under the contract, except (in either case) in so far as 
the term satisfies the requirement of reasonableness in section 11 of UCTA. This is 
supplemented by section 13(1) of UCTA, the salient part of which provides as 
follows, 
To the extent that this Part of this Act [which includes both section 2 and 
section 3 of the Act] prevents the exclusion or restriction of any liability it also 
prevents— 
(a) making the liability or its enforcement subject to restrictive or onerous 
conditions; 
(b) excluding or restricting any right or remedy in respect of the liability, 
or subjecting a person to any prejudice in consequence of his pursuing 
any such right or remedy; 
(c) excluding or restricting rules of evidence or procedure . . . 
14.11.2.5.3.2 In Stewart Gill Ltd v Horatio Myer & Co Ltd 542 the Court of Appeal 
held that paragraph (b) applied to a no set-off clause which prevented the exercise by 
a customer of a right of equitable set-off or counterclaim in an instalment payment 
contract, where faulty goods had been supplied. The customer had wished to set off its 
counterclaim for the loss it had suffered due to the goods being defective, against the 
instalments that it was due to pay under the contract. It was held that the right of set-
off or counterclaim was a right or remedy that the customer would normally have 
been entitled to assert against the supplier. The clause prevented it from exercising the 
right. It would also subject the customer to prejudice, in that the clause would have 
the effect of forcing the customer to pursue its claim against the supplier separately, 
rather than being able to use the more effective and immediate right of set-off. An 
attempt by the supplier to limit or restrict its liability for the defective goods would 
have fallen within section 3 of UCTA. Accordingly, section 13 was engaged and the 
anti-set-off clause could only be saved if it met the requirement of reasonableness. 
That requirement had not been satisfied, as it could not be reasonable to prevent the 
customer in any and all circumstances from seeking to assert a right of set-off 
including, for instance, where it might have made an over-payment under an earlier 
instalment.543  
14.11.2.5.3.3 It is possible that much the same approach might be taken towards a no 
set-off clause which related to a cross-claim that a party might wish to assert 
concerning loss due to the negligence of the other party. Section 2 of UCTA applies to 
attempts by a contractual provision (or by a non-contractual notice) to limit or exclude 
liability for negligence. Assuming that the liability does not concern death or personal 
injury, any such provision (or notice) will only be effective if it satisfies the 
requirement of reasonableness in section 11 of UCTA. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
541 As to dealing on standard terms of business, see St Albans City and District Council v International 
Computers Ltd [1996] 4 All ER 481. 
542  [1992] QB 600.  
543 For a recent example of a case where an anti-set-off clause was held reasonable, see University of 
Wales v London College of Business Ltd [2015] EWHC 1280 (QB) at 97 (the clause was reasonable for 
the following reasons: both were commercial entities; the clause was clear; this was a common 
provision meant to facilitate cash flow; the lack of mutuality could be explained as only one party was 
supposed to be paying; and the clause was sensible in commercial context.)  
14.11.2.5.3.4 On the other hand, in Governor & Co of the Bank of Scotland v 
Singh544 it was held that section 3 (and therefore section 13) of UCTA would not 
normally apply to a no set-off clause in a guarantee that operated against the 
guarantor. This was because a guarantee is usually a form of unilateral contract under 
which it was the guarantor that had contractual obligations to the lender. The lender 
had no contractual obligations to the guarantor. It was, accordingly, difficult to see 
how a no set-off clause could be said to fall within section 3, as there were no 
obligations of the lender towards the guarantor under the contract which could be 
excluded, restricted, or abrogated. 
14.11.2.5.3.5 It was also said in the same case that, assuming sections 3 and 13 of 
UCTA were engaged, a no set-off clause might, nonetheless, satisfy the requirement 
of reasonableness under section 11 of UCTA, which had to be judged by the 
circumstances as at the time the guarantee was entered into. The purpose of a no set-
off clause in a guarantee was to ensure that the guarantor’s payment obligations, 
which arose because of the borrower’s default in making payment, could not be 
deferred or diminished by disputes concerning a cross-claim that the guarantor might 
allege it had against the lender (in that case, the cross-claim was for ‘reflective loss’ 
arising from the economic loss suffered by the guarantor due to the failure of the 
principal debtor which, it was alleged, was the fault of the lender). The lender wants 
its money, which it should have received from the borrower, without further delay. It 
was significant in that case that the clause did not prevent the guarantor from pursuing 
a claim separately if it wished to do so and so, in that sense, the clause did not have 
the effect of excluding or restricting the lender’s liability. For the same reason, such 
clauses are not subject to the strict rules that are applied to the construction of 
exclusion clauses.545 
14.11.2.5.3.6 By reference to the guidance given in Schedule 2 to UCTA,546 the 
clause was held to be reasonable. The guarantor had received independent legal 
advice on the meaning and effect of the document and, through its control of the 
principal debtor, it wanted the debtor to be able to borrow from the lender, which 
could only be achieved if it gave the guarantee. The guarantor knew that the guarantee 
would cover the borrowing. It could control the amount of the debt that was 
guaranteed. In so far as the clause prevented the guarantor from purporting to set off a 
reflective loss claim, it was likely that such a claim would be brought at a time when 
the guarantor had lost its control of the borrower because of the latter’s insolvency 
and it was not unreasonable for the lender to seek to protect itself in that situation.547 
14.11.2.5.4 CRA Part 2 (sections 61-76) of the CRA governs unfair terms and 
notices. Section 61 of the CRA548 provides that the Part applies in relation to contracts 
between a trader and a consumer, as defined in section 2 of the CRA.549 “Trader” 
means a person acting for purposes relating to that person’s trade, business, craft or 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
544 Unreported, HHJ Kershaw QC, sitting in the High Court in Manchester, 17/6/2005. 
545 See the approach taken by Parker LJ in the Court of Appeal in Continental Illinois National Bank & 
Trust Co of Chicago v Papanicolaou [1986] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 441, at 444. 
546 As to the relevance of which outside the express circumstances where the schedule applies, see 
Stuart-Smith LJ in Stewart Gill Ltd v Horatio Myer & Co Ltd [1992] QB 600 (CA) 608. 
547 For other examples of similar reasoning, see F. G. Wilson (Engineering) Ltd v John Holt & Co 
(Liverpool) Ltd [2012] EWHC 2477 (Comm), [2013] 1 All ER (Comm) 223 [99]; Deutsche Bank 
(Suisse) SA v Gulzar Ahmed Khan [2013] EWHC 482 (Comm), [329] 
548 Cf previously regulation 4(1) of UTCCR providing that ‘The Regulations apply in relation to unfair 
terms in contracts concluded between a seller or supplier and a consumer’. 
549 S2 juncto s76(2) of CRA. 
profession, whether acting personally or through another person acting in the trader’s 
name or on the trader’s behalf.550 “Consumer” means an individual acting for 
purposes that are wholly or mainly outside that individual’s trade, business, craft or 
profession. This seems wider than the previous understanding of a consumer551 
facilitating inclusion of individuals who act closely but still primarily outside their 
business etc. Section 62 of CRA provides a test when a contractual term (which need 
not be individually negotiated, unlike previously under UTCCR552) or a notice is 
unfair and provides that where it is found to be unfair – it is void. Either a term or a 
notice are unfair if, contrary to the requirement of good faith, it causes a significant 
imbalance in the parties' rights and obligations under the contract to the detriment of 
the consumer.553 In determining whether a term is fair nature of the subject matter of 
the contract should be taken into account and reference should be made to all the 
circumstances existing when the term was agreed and to all of the other terms of the 
contract or of any other contract on which it depends. Schedule 2 to the Act gives a 
non-exhaustive indication of unfair terms.554 Paragraph 2 of that Schedule includes a 
no set-off clause that applies to a debt owed to the trader against any claim which the 
consumer may have against the trader with respect to a total or partial non-
performance or inadequate performance.555	  
14.11.2.5.4.1 The CRA will apply, as the UCCTR did, to the provisions of standard 
form contracts for the provision of financial services to consumers. Accordingly, a no 
set-off clause in such a contract, by which the consumer is denied the opportunity to 
assert a set-off against a debt due to the provider of the services will fall within the 
scope of the Act. However, the CRA does not change the position which existed 
under the UCCTR in relation to a no set-off provision in a guarantee given by an 
individual with respect to a facility provided by a bank to the principal debtor. In a 
case556 decided under UCCTR it was held that such a guarantee would not normally 
fall within the scope of the UCCTR. The characteristic of the guarantee was that it 
was the guarantor who was undertaking obligations under the contract towards the 
lender, rather than the other way around. Hence, the effect of the no set-off clause 
could not be said to be causing any significant imbalance in the parties’ rights and 
obligations arising under the contract, because the obligations under that contract only 
went in one direction, from the consumer towards the lender. The same considerations 
apply under CRA given that the test for unfairness relates to imbalance in the parties’ 
rights and obligations. Schedule 2 of the CRA, as did Schedule 2 of the UCCTR 
includes no set-off clauses in the context of attempts to limit or exclude a consumer’s 
rights or remedies with respect to breaches by a trader of its obligations to the 
consumer under the contract. On the same basis, as already mentioned with respect to 
section 3 of UCTA, there were no relevant obligations of the beneficiary towards the 
guarantor under the contract which would be affected by the clause. However, it 
should be noted that the list of terms in Schedule 2 of each of the CRA and UCCTR is 
non-exhaustive list. It could be argued that the test for unfairness ought to look at the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
550 Cf previously regulation 3(1) of UTCCR referring to a seller or supplier who was defined  as a 
natural or legal person acting for the purposes of his or its trade, business, or profession. 
551 Cf previously regulation 3(1) of UTCCR: a natural person who is acting outside his trade, business, 
or profession. 
552 Previously regulation 5(1) of UTCCR. 
553 Previously regulation 5(1) of UTCCR. 
554 Previously Sch 2 of UTCCR. 
555 Previously para 1(b) of Sch 2 of UTCCR. 
556 Governor & Co of the Bank of Scotland v Singh, unreported, HHJ Kershaw QC, sitting in the High 
Court in Manchester, 17/6/2005. 
balance of parties’ rights and obligations globally, irrespective of who undertakes (the 
greater) burden of obligations. Arguably, the test was devised not only to ensure that 
the trader does not eschew obligations too lightly but also to see that the obligations 
imposed on the consumer are not too burdensome. If this is correct, there should be no 
objection on the grounds of the scope of the CRA preventing a no set-off clause in a 
guarantee given by a consumer to a trader from being tested for unfairness. 
14.11.2.6 Negotiable instruments 
Because a negotiable instrument generates an autonomous payment obligation, which 
is entirely separate from the underlying transaction in relation to which it was given, 
and the fact that it is treated as being equivalent to cash, it is not possible for a party 
that is liable on the instrument to set off an unliquidated cross-claim that it may have 
against its obligation to make payment on the instrument, even if the cross-claim 
relates to the underlying transaction and is against an immediate party to the 
instrument.557 Nonetheless, it should be possible to set off a liquidated cross-claim 
arising on a total or partial failure of consideration or fraud relating to the underlying 
transaction, except against a holder in due course of the instrument.558  The reasoning 
in this paragraph has also been applied to direct debits.559 
14.11.2.6.1 It has been suggested that a party which is liable on a negotiable 
instrument might be entitled to assert a legal set-off against a holder of the instrument 
if it is sued by the holder on the instrument,560 but this would appear to be contrary to 
the general approach that is taken towards such an instrument.561 
14.11.2.6.2 It has also been suggested that, in an exceptional case, a defendant 
which has been sued on a negotiable instrument and is unable to assert its cross-claim 
by way of set-off might be entitled to obtain a stay on enforcement of a judgment on 
the instrument, pending the hearing of its cross-claim,562 but that has been doubted.563 
14.11.2.6.3 It should at least be possible to assert a cross-claim so as to resist a 
petition for winding up that is presented on the basis of non-payment of a negotiable 
instrument.564 
14.11.3 Insolvency set-off 
This type of set-off applies in the bankruptcy or winding up of a party and, 
sometimes, in an administration of a party,565 where there are outstanding cross-
liabilities as between the insolvent debtor and its creditor. The effect of the set-off is 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
557 James Lamont & Co Ltd v Hyland Ltd [1950] 585; Nova (Jersey) Knit Ltd v Kammgarn Spinnerei 
GmbH [1977] 1 WLR 713. 
558 Ibid; Cebora SNC v SIP (Industrial Products) Ltd [1976] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 271. 
559 Esso Petroleum Co Ltd v Milton [1997] 1 WLR 938, 952–3 (Thorpe LJ), 954 (Sir John Balcombe) 
(Simon Brown LJ dissenting); Courage Ltd v Crehan [1999] ECC 455 (CA), [77] 
560 See Hirst J in Hongkong & Shanghai Banking Corp v Kloeckner & Co AG [1990] 2 QB 514, at 524. 
561 See Waller LJ in Safa Ltd v Banque du Caire [2000] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 600, at 606. 
562 Barclays Bank Ltd v Aschaffenburger Zellstoffwerke AG [1967] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 387. 
563 Cebora SNC v SIP (Industrial Products) Ltd [1976] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 271. 
564 Re Bayoil SA [1999] 1 WLR 147. 
565 The provisions as to set-off in administration are to be found in Rule 2.85 of the Insolvency Rules 
1986. They only apply if the administrator is to make a distribution pursuant to para 65 of Sched B1 to 
the Insolvency Act 1986. The provisions of Rule 2.85 correspond to those contained in Rule 4.90 of the 
Insolvency Rules 1986, so the commentary will concentrate on the latter rule.  It should be noted, 
though, that there is likely to be a longer period between the relevant date and the date the account is 
taken in the case of administration.  
that a balance should be struck as at the relevant date566, such as the date of the 
making of the bankruptcy or winding-up order or the date of the resolution to wind 
up, which will result in either a net amount due to the creditor, for which it can prove 
in the insolvency, or a net sum payable by the creditor to the insolvent estate.567  
14.11.3.1 The rules of insolvency set-off in bankruptcy and winding up are 
mandatory and self-executing,568 even if the other party does not lodge a proof of 
debt, and it is not possible to contract out of them.569 Their effect is extensive, being 
wider in scope than both the rules as to legal set-off and those for transaction set-off, 
as they apply to all claims as between the parties and not just those that would ground 
an entitlement to assert either a legal set-off or a transaction set-off. 
14.11.3.2 The rules as to bankruptcy set-off are contained in section 323 of the 
Insolvency Act 1986. The rules as to set-off in a winding up are contained in Rule 
4.90 of the Insolvency Rules 1986. Prior to 2005, they were to substantially the same 
effect. Rule 4.90 was effectively replaced by a new rule in 2005,570 and much of the 
previous difficulty in interpretation of the old rule, particularly as to the determination 
of what might be ‘due’ as between the parties, was addressed by the new rule. 
However, the wording of section 323 of the Insolvency Act 1986 was not changed571 
and so it is necessary to provide a summary of the law as it has developed in relation 
to the old provision. The new form of Rule 4.90 reflects much of what the case law 
had eventually determined was the position under the old wording. Rule 4.90 is set 
out at a later point in this discussion. 
14.11.3.3 Before embarking upon a summary of the relevant statutory provisions 
of insolvency set-off in bankruptcy and in winding-up, it is useful to provide a general 
overview the conditions which must be met before the rules of insolvency set-off can 
apply. These have been developed considerably by courts and what follows is a 
general overview. First, the claim by the solvent party must be a provable debt at the 
date of account572, so it cannot for example be time-barred573 or debarred by a rule 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
566 Rules 2.85(2) and 4.90(2) of the Insolvency Rules 1986. 
567 See Hoffmann LJ, sitting at first instance, in MS Fashions Ltd v Bank of Credit and Commerce 
International SA [1993] Ch 425 (affd [1993] Ch 439) and Lord Hoffmann in Stein v Blake [1996] AC 
243. Once the mandatory account is taken, the trustee in bankruptcy is entitled to assign the net balance 
like any other chose in action, see: Enterprise Managed Services Ltd v Tony McFadden Utilities Ltd 
[2009] EWHC 3222 (TCC), [2011] 1 BCLC 414. 
568 There is a departure from this principle in respect of set-off in an administration, as the rules will 
only apply if the administrator has given notice of his intention to make distributions to creditors. 
569 National Westminster Bank Ltd v Halesowen Presswork and Assemblies Ltd [1972] AC 785. See 
also Lord Hoffmann in Stein v Blake [1996] AC 243, at 253-254. While the creditor cannot agree with 
the debtor to contract out of its insolvency set-off, it may be possible for the creditor’s claim to fall 
outside the rules of insolvency set-off, for example for lack of a provable debt (a creditor may agree not 
to prove in debtor’s insolvency, see Kitchen’s Trustee v Madders [1950] Ch 134) or mutuality if the 
parties in all circumstances conduct their dealings as in fact not mutual (it is not likely to be sufficient 
that the parties merely intended the dealings not to be mutual), for instance, the creditor may declare 
itself as a trustee of the debt: see Jonathan Parker J in RE ILG Travel Ltd (In Administration) [1996] 
BCC 21, 48-49. 
570 In consequence of the Insolvency (Amendment) Rules 2005 (SI 2005/527).   
571 A relatively minor amendment to this section is introduced under Enterprise and Regulatory Reform 
Act 2013, Sch 19 para 27 on a date yet to be appointed, see immediately below.   
572 See Lord Hoffmann in Re West End Networks Ltd, Secretary of State v Frid [2004] UKHL 24, 
[2004] 2 AC 506 at para 13. 
573 Pott v Clegg (1847) 16 M & W 321. 
against double proof.574 While a provable debt may be future or contingent, it must 
accrue or arise out of an obligation incurred575 before the relevant date (i.e. the date 
on which the company goes into liquidation or enters administration or the date of the 
commencement of bankruptcy).576 Secondly, insolvency set-off requires mutuality of 
what is due at the beneficial level as between the parties to the set-off,577 so that, for 
instance, an assignment by one of the parties of its claim against the other before the 
commencement of its insolvency will destroy the mutuality of the claim as between 
the original parties,578 although the debtor whose debt has been assigned may be 
entitled to assert its original rights of set-off579 against the assignee (on the basis that 
the assignor could only assign what he had, which was a debt subject to set-off). The 
requirement of “mutual debts” requires the cross-claim to be a commensurable debt, 
arising out of an obligation incurred before the relevant date580, between the same 
people in the same capacity.581 It is not material how those debts arose, whether by 
contract, statute or tort, voluntarily or by compulsion.582 Subject to some rather 
difficult and imprecise qualifications, mutuality would also be destroyed where the 
creditor has assigned the debt due to it by way of mortgage or has charged it by way 
of fixed charge.583  Thirdly, the claim against the insolvent must arise from mutual 
dealings, so claim based on wrongdoing, such as an insolvent’s claim for conversion 
of its property584, cannot be subject to insolvency set-off. Fourthly, and linked with 
mutuality, is the requirement that claims on both sides must be such as will in their 
nature terminate in debts, so for example a trust beneficiary cannot set off his claim to 
the trust fund against an insolvent trustee.585  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
574 The rule prevents two creditors from proving against the insolvent company for what is substantially 
the same debt, for example a surety cannot prove against the principal debtor (in respect of its right of 
indemnity under the guarantee) in competition with the principal creditor. The rule also prevents the 
surety from competing with the principal creditor indirectly by setting off his right to an indemnity 
against any separate debt owed by the surety to the principal debtor. The basis of the rule against 
double proof was explained by Robert Walker J in In re Polly Peck International plc [1996] 2 All ER 
433, 442; a rule against double proof excludes the rule under Cherry v Boultbee (1839) 4 My & Cr 442 
(as applied in In re Melton [1918] 1 Ch 37 (CA)) that (1839) 4 My & Cr 442), see Mills v HSBC 
Trustee (CI) Ltd [2011] UKSC 48. 
575 The term “obligation incurred” has been clarified and given a wide meaning by the decision of the 
Supreme Court in Re Nortel Companies [2013] UKSC 52, see in particular paras 76-77, providing three 
criteria for determining whether an obligation arising out of a non-contractual source such as statute or 
tort falls within the definition.  
576 See section 382 of the Insolvency Act 1986 and rules 12.3 and 13.12 of the Insolvency Rules 1986. 
577 As to which, see Re West End Networks Ltd, Secretary of State v Frid [2004] UKHL 24, [2004] 2 
AC 506. 
578 Re City Life Assurance Co; Stephenson’s Case [1926] 1 Ch 191, at 214. 
579 This will usually be legal set-off rights that the debtor has until notice of the assignment and 
equitable set-off arising at any time, see Business Computers Ltd v Anglo-African Leasing Ltd [1977] 1 
WLR 578. 
580 Rule 4.90(2)(d) of the Insolvency Rules 1986; see for example HMRC v Millichap (unreported) 
[2011] CLY 1876. 
581 Secretary of State for Trade and Industry v Frid [2004] UKHL 24. 
582 Re DH Curtis (Builders) Ltd [1978] Ch 162, approved in Secretary of State for Trade and Industry v 
Frid [2004] UKHL 24. 
583 See Derham, The Law of Set-Off (4th edn, 2010) at paras 11.37–11.51. See discussion above in 
relation to charges taken over bank deposits 14.10.2. 
584 Smith (Administrators of Cosslett (Contractors) Ltd) v Bridgend CBC [2002] 1 AC 336 para 35 
(Hoffmann LJ). 
585 Lehman Brothers International (Europe) (In Administration) v CRC Credit Fund Ltd [2009] EWHC 
3228 (Ch) para 331 (Briggs J), appealed and reversed but not as to this point (CA [2010] EWCA Civ; 
14.11.3.3.1   There is some controversy about whether secured claims are 
automatically subject to insolvency set-off, or whether the secured party has a choice 
whether to rely on its security or on set-off.   If the insolvent party is the secured 
creditor, the position is clear: insolvency set-off applies.586   Where it is the non-
insolvent party who is secured, one view is that insolvency set-off operates 
automatically unless the secured creditor has already enforced its security by the onset 
of insolvency proceedings.587   Another view is that the secured creditor has a choice 
either to enforce its security, in which case insolvency set-off will not apply, or to 
prove in the liquidation.588  On this view, the secured solvent party who relies on his 
security is not a ‘creditor of the company proving or claiming to prove for a debt in 
the liquidation’ as required by r 4.90.589 Arguably, the position of such a secured 
creditor is the same as where a creditor agrees not to prove for its debt, in which case 
the debt is not a provable debt and cannot be the subject of insolvency set-off.590   The 
default position set out by the rules is that a secured creditor enforces its security 
outside insolvency, and only proves for the balance (if any): it needs to make a 
positive choice to surrender its security to prove for the entire amount due.591 Thus, 
unless that choice is made, the secured creditor does not fall within r 4.90, and has the 
right to choose whether to enforce its security or to rely on insolvency set-off (which 
will involve surrendering its security).592 
14.11.3.4 Set-off in bankruptcy 
Section 323 provides as follows: 
(1) This section applies where before the commencement of the 
bankruptcy there have been mutual credits, mutual debts or other 
mutual dealings between the bankrupt and any creditor of the bankrupt 
proving or claiming to prove for a bankruptcy debt.593 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
[2012] UKSC 6); Re Lehman Brothers International (Europe) (In Administration) [2012] EWHC 2997 
(Ch) para 55 (Briggs J). 
586 Ex p Barnett, re Deveze (1874) LR 9 Ch App 293, 295 
587 R Goode, Principles of Corporate Insolvency Law (4th edn, London: Sweet & Maxwell, 2011) 9-12; 
L Ho, ‘Book Review’ [2008] Journal of International Banking and Financial Law 426. See also Totty, 
Moss & Segal on Insolvency (London: Sweet & Maxwell, looseleaf), H10-09. 
588 Re Norman Holding Co Ltd [1991] 1 WLR 10; Stewart v Scottish Widows and Life Assurance 
Society plc [2005] EWHC 1831 (QB), [185] (appealed [2006] EWCA Civ 999, but not on this point). 
See also Re Bank of Credit and Commerce International SA (In Liquidation) (No 8) [1996] Ch 245, 
256, L Gullifer and P Pichonnaz, Set-off in arbitration and commercial transactions (OUP, 2014) 
12.86 and Derham, The Law of Set-Off (4th edn, 2010), 6.178. 
589 Rule 2.85 and Insolvency Act 1986, s 323 are in similar terms. 
590 Kitchen’s Trustee v Madders [1950] Ch 134. 
591 See rules 2.72(3)(vii), 2.83, 4.75(1)(e), and 4.88, Insolvency Rules 1986. 
592 This argument is supported by some commentators, see Sheelagh McCracken, The Bankers’ 
Remedy of Set-Off (3rd edn, London: Bloomsbury Professional, 2010), 295–7; Derham, The Law of 
Set-Off (4th edn, 2010) 6.178; S Majumdar, ‘Insolvency set-off and security: anomaly or principled 
exception?’ (2009) 11 JIBFL 652.  
593 There are some exclusions as to what constitutes a provable debt, for example a liability pay child 
support maintenance to any person is not a debt or liability: see section 382(5) of the Insolvency Act 
1986. 
(2) An account shall be taken of what is due from each party to the other 
in respect of the mutual dealings and the sums due from one party shall 
be set-off against the sums due from the other. 
(3) Sums due from the bankrupt to another party shall not be included in 
the account taken under subsection (2) if that other party had notice at 
the time they became due that a bankruptcy petition594 relating to the 
bankrupt was pending. 
(4) Only the balance (if any) of the account taken under subsection (2) is 
provable as a bankruptcy debt or, as the case may be, to be paid to the 
trustee as part of the bankrupt’s estate. 
14.11.3.4.1 Section 323, which concerns set-off in bankruptcy, is a re-enactment of 
the rules that had applied under section 31 of the Bankruptcy Act 1914. It requires an 
account to be taken of what is ‘due’ as between the bankrupt and the creditor arising 
from the ‘mutual credits, mutual debts or other mutual dealings’ between the parties 
prior to the commencement of the insolvency proceedings (the commencement of the 
bankruptcy being the date of the bankruptcy order).  
14.11.3.4.2 The principal difficulty that had arisen under the section concerned 
unquantified or contingent and unascertained liabilities of the bankrupt to the other 
party which had existed before the bankruptcy but had not crystallised into an actual 
liability for an ascertained amount prior to the bankruptcy. It was unclear whether 
such claims should be taken into account as being due in computing the set-off and, if 
so, how that should be done. At the same time, it had been decided that contingent 
and unascertained claims due to the insolvent debtor by the other party could not be 
taken into account if they had not crystallised and matured into quantified liabilities 
before the end of the bankruptcy.595 This is changed in the new form of Rule 4.90. 
14.11.3.4.3 In a series of decisions, particularly in the period since the mid-1980s, 
the courts have held that it is not necessary that the debt or other obligation of the 
insolvent debtor which is to be set-off should have been actually due and payable as 
well as quantified prior to the date of the commencement of the bankruptcy or 
winding up. Lords Hoffmann and Millett have played a significant role in those 
decisions. It has been held that it is sufficient that there had been a liability at that date 
which had crystallised into an actual monetary claim after the commencement of the 
insolvency proceedings or which could otherwise be anticipated and valued.596 It was 
also possible to take into account events that had occurred after the date of the 
commencement of the insolvency to ascertain the correct amount of the liability.597 
14.11.3.4.4 By way of example, the principles established in those cases have 
applied where there was a pre-existing contract which was breached after the 
commencement of the insolvency proceedings.598 The principle has also applied 
where a guarantor has claimed an indemnity from an insolvent debtor with respect to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
594 The Enterprise and Regulatory Reform Act 2013, Sch 19 para 27 (not yet in force) extends the 
exclusion to debts in relation to which the other party had notice that proceedings on a bankruptcy 
application relating to the bankrupt were ongoing. 
595 See Lord Hoffmann in Stein v Blake [1996] AC 243, at 253. 
596 See Millett J in In re Charge Card Services Ltd [1987] Ch 150; Lord Hoffmann in Stein v Blake 
[1996] AC 243; and Lord Hoffmann in Re West End Networks Ltd, Secretary of State v Frid [2004] 
UKHL 24, [2004] 2 AC 506. 
597 Sometimes referred to as the ‘hindsight principle’. Lord Hoffmann explained the application of the 
principle in Wight v Eckhardt Marine GmbH [2003] UKPC 37, [2004] 1 AC 147. 
598 In re Asphaltic Wood Pavement Co Ltd (1885) 30 ChD 216. 
a payment made under a guarantee, where the guarantee had been given before the 
debtor’s insolvency, even though the payment under it was made after the 
commencement of the insolvency proceedings.599 Of course, the surety must have a 
claim which it could prove in the debtor’s insolvency but for the set-off, so if the 
surety has not made any payment under its guarantee then the rule against double 
proof would operate to preclude the surety submitting a proof and so the set-off could 
not arise.600 
14.11.3.5 Set-off in a winding up 
As already said, much of the case law on insolvency set-off is now reflected in the 
new form of Rule 4.90, which concerns set-off in a winding up. The Rule provides as 
follows: 
(1) This Rule applies where, before the company goes into liquidation 
there have been mutual credits, mutual debts or other mutual dealings 
between the company and any creditor of the company proving or 
claiming to prove for a debt in the liquidation. 
(2) The reference in para. (1) to mutual credits, mutual debts or other 
mutual dealings does not include— 
(a) debts arising under obligations incurred after the creditor knew 
of the summoning of a meeting of creditors or the presentation 
of a petition for winding up; 
(b) debts arising under obligations incurred with notice of steps for 
a preceding administration of the debtor; 
(c) debts arising under obligations incurred in such an 
administration; 
(d) debts acquired by assignment or otherwise after the winding up 
or preceding administration began or which were acquired with 
notice of steps to achieve such a winding up or administration. 
(3) An account shall be taken of what is due from each party to the other 
in respect of the mutual dealings, and the sums due from one party 
shall be set-off against the sums due from the other. 
(4) A sum shall be regarded as being due to or from the company for the 
purposes of para. (3) whether— 
(a) it is payable at present or in the future; 
(b) the obligation by virtue of which it is payable is certain or 
contingent; or 
(c) its amount is fixed or liquidated, or is capable of being 
ascertained by fixed rules or as a matter of opinion. 
(5) Rule 4.86 enables the liquidator to estimate the value of any debt 
which, by reason of its being subject to any contingency or for any 
other reason, does not have a certain value.601 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
599 In re Moseley-Green Coal and Coke Co Ltd (1865) 12 LT (NS) 193. See also Lord Hoffmann in Re 
West End Networks Ltd, Secretary of State v Frid [2004] UKHL 24, [2004] 2 AC 506. 
600 See Re Fenton [1931] 1 Ch 85 and Lord Hoffmann in Re West End Networks Ltd, Secretary of State 
v Frid [2004] UKHL 24, [2004] 2 AC 506. 
601 This rule that the liquidator (or administrator, under rule 2.81 of the Insolvency Rules 1986) is in a 
position to take into account events that would occur after the relevant date when taking account for 
purposes of insolvency set-off is said to reflect the so-called principle of hindsight. 
(6) Rules 4.91 to 4.93 provide for converting debts which: are in foreign 
currencies602; are periodical in nature; or bear interest. 
(7) Rule 11.13 provides a method of ascertaining the value of debts which 
the creditor proved but which are payable in the future (there is a 
formula for reduction of such debts). 
(8) Only the balance (if any) of the account owed to the creditor is 
provable in the liquidation. Alternatively, the balance (if any) owed to 
the company shall be paid to the liquidator as part of the assets except 
where all or part of the balance results from a contingent or prospective 
debt owed by the creditor and in such a case the balance (or that part of 
it which results from the contingent or prospective debt) shall be paid 
if and when that debt becomes due and payable. 
(9) In this Rule, ‘obligation’ means an obligation however arising, whether 
by virtue of an agreement, rule of law or otherwise. 
14.11.3.5.1 The previous law as to the expansive interpretation of the words, 
‘mutual credits, mutual debts or other mutual dealings’ will continue to apply to those 
words as used in paragraph 1, so that the Rule will apply to the existence of mutual 
cross-obligations from which the claims to be set-off arose, howsoever they may have 
arisen. 
14.11.3.5.2 Paragraph (2) is wider than the equivalent provision in section 323(3) 
of the Insolvency Act 1986.603 In particular, section 323(3) does not contain any 
equivalent to paragraph 2(d) of Rule 4.90.604 
14.11.3.5.3 Paragraphs (4) and (9) emphasise the width in scope of the claims and 
liabilities that should be taken into account. It should be noted that paragraph (4) 
makes it clear that, unlike the old law, contingent and future claims due to the 
insolvent company by the other party should be taken into account. Paragraphs (5), 
(6), and (7) make provision as to the methods of valuing contingent and future claims 
and claims in foreign currencies. This might lead to an injustice if it eventuates, 
particularly after the winding up has been completed, that an incorrect valuation was 
placed on a claim. 
14.12 Quistclose Trusts 
14.12.1 The Quistclose case 
The decision of the House of Lords in Quistclose Investments Ltd v Rolls Razor Ltd605 
caused quite a stir. The leading speech in the case was delivered by Lord Wilberforce. 
In his decision, Lord Wilberforce recognised the possibility of the co-existence of 
legal and equitable remedies to protect a lender for the repayment of its loan. In 
addition to the right to sue at law for the repayment of the loan, a lender which had 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
602 Rule 4.91 (and also 2.86 in relation to administration) of the Insolvency Rules 1986 is disapplied 
under regulation 14 of the Financial Collateral Arrangements (No 2) Regulations 2003 in favour of the 
contractual provisions unless the arrangement provides for an unreasonable exchange rate. This applies 
where a party to a financial collateral arrangement, or a party to a close-out netting provision in a 
financial collateral arrangement, goes into liquidation or administration. 
603 Which, in any event, refers only to the creditor having notice of a pending bankruptcy petition 
concerning the insolvent debtor. 
604 14.11.3.5(2) above. 
605  [1970] AC 567. 
provided funds to a borrower to be used for some specific purpose might also be able 
to pray in aid the law of trusts for the lender’s protection in the event that the proceeds 
of the loan could not be used for that purpose. Such protection might be valuable in 
the event of the insolvency of the borrower. 
14.12.1.1 In the Quistclose case, the loan had been provided to enable a company 
to pay its shareholders a dividend which had been declared but which the company 
did not have the funds to pay. Before the date for payment of the dividend, the 
company went into voluntary liquidation, which meant that the dividend could not 
lawfully be paid. Although there was no evidence that the parties to the transaction 
had contemplated that their arrangements would constitute anything other than the 
usual relationship of debtor and creditor, the lender sought to recover its loan by 
asserting that the proceeds of the loan, which had been paid into a separate account at 
the borrower’s bank, were held on trust for the lender. 
14.12.1.2 Lord Wilberforce spoke of such arrangements giving rise in equity ‘to 
a relationship of a fiduciary character or trust, in favour, as a primary trust, of the 
[shareholders] and, secondarily, if the primary trust fails, of the [lender]’. In the event 
that the primary trust is carried out and the proceeds of the loan are used for the 
agreed purpose for which they were provided, then the lender would simply be left 
with its common law rights as a creditor to sue for repayment of the loan if it was not 
repaid. In the event of the borrower’s insolvency, the claim for repayment would 
suffer along with all the other claims of the unsecured creditors. If the primary trust 
could not be achieved and failed, so that the moneys were not applied for the relevant 
purpose, then the secondary trust would protect the lender, which could achieve 
repayment as the beneficial owner of the funds. The secondary trust arose because the 
money was to be held separate for a particular purpose and was not to be used for any 
other purpose. Not only is this a valuable right in the event of the borrower’s 
insolvency but it might also prevail over the competing interests of third parties who 
are on notice of the lender’s rights, as indeed was the case in the Quistclose case 
where the bank, which was holding the funds, was denied a right of set-off against 
those funds for its exposure to the company on facilities it had provided. 
14.12.2 Other cases 
The decision in the Quistclose case has been followed and applied in numerous cases, 
not just in relation to loans of money but also in connection with other payments 
made for some specific purpose. For instance, in Carreras Rothman Ltd v Freeman 
Mathews Treasure Ltd,606 the Quistclose case was invoked in relation to a payment 
made by a recipient of advertising services to the provider of those services, so as to 
enable the services provider to meet disbursements owing by it to third parties for 
work done in advertising the products of the services recipient. The services provider 
became insolvent before the money had been applied and the liquidator asserted that 
the money was part of the insolvent’s estate, available to meet the claims of the 
general body of its creditors. The services recipient was able to rely upon the 
Quistclose case to defeat the liquidator, although it is not entirely clear if it did so to 
force the funds to be used for payment of the third parties’ claims (of which it had 
taken an assignment) or for repayment to it of the funds on the basis that they had not 
been used for the agreed purpose for which they had been provided. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
606  [1985] Ch 207. 
14.12.3 The type of trust 
Trusts along the lines of the authority in the Quistclose case are sometimes referred to 
as ‘Quistclose Trusts’, as if they were a special class of trust. This reflects the 
difficulties that have been experienced in seeking to fit this type of trust within the 
established and orthodox categories of trust as traditionally understood by English 
law. Not the least of those difficulties concerns the manner of classifying the trusts 
that are said to arise and, indeed, if it is correct to say that such arrangements could 
give rise to any trusts at all. For instance, it is often a hard, if not impossible, task to 
locate sufficient evidence of any form of intention held by the relevant parties that 
would support the trusts and beneficial interests that are said to arise from the 
expression of some particular purpose for which the funds are to be used.607 If there 
are trusts then it may be questionable whether they are express or implied trusts, 
whether there is one trust or two trusts, if there is one trust, whether it has one or two 
limbs, whether in their primary form such trusts are for the benefit of identifiable 
beneficiaries or are for some purpose, how the interest arises under the secondary 
limb or trust, and the nature of the rights enjoyed by the potential beneficiaries under 
the two trusts or limbs, particularly in the period before it is certain if the primary 
trust or limb will be carried out. 
14.12.3.1 Although Lord Wilberforce in the Quistclose case said that the primary 
trust that he described was in favour of the shareholders to whom the dividend was 
payable, the language that he used and some of the subsequent cases would appear to 
indicate that such a primary trust might be described as a type of purpose trust. 
Indeed, Sir Robert Megarry V-C in In re Northern Developments (Holdings) Ltd 608 
seems to have identified the arrangements in that case as giving rise to a purpose trust 
which was enforceable by identified individuals, even though the beneficial interests 
under either trust or limb might not have vested but were held in suspense pending the 
outcome of the arrangements.609 In Re EVTR610 the Court of Appeal was willing to 
accept that there was a primary trust of the proceeds of a loan ‘for the purchase of 
equipment’. This is troubling because it is a fairly elementary principle of the law of 
trusts that, with very limited exceptions, it is not possible to have private purpose 
trusts.611 
14.12.4 The questionable need for protection 
It is questionable if lenders and other providers of funds really need the protection that 
the Quistclose case purports to give them. The Quistclose case is seen as furnishing a 
form of quasi-security as protection to an otherwise unsecured lender against the 
default of a borrower, where the lender has parted with its funds before they are 
needed for the requisite purpose. However, in devising unsecured loan facilities, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
607 See, for instance, the difficulties that were encountered in Re Goldcorp Exchange Ltd [1995] 1 AC 
74 and in Re Farepak Food and Gifts Ltd [2006] EWHC 3272 (Ch), [2007] 1 BCLC 1. The importance 
of ascertaining the structure of the arrangements and the contractual mechanisms involved was 
emphasised by Patten LJ in Raymond Bieber v Teathers Limited (in liquidation) [2012] EWCA Civ 
1466, [2013] 1 BCLC 24, paras 13-15.  
608 Unreported, 6/10/1978. 
609 See also the discussion by Peter Gibson J in the Carreras Rothmans case [1985] Ch 207, at 222. 
610  [1987] BCLC 646. 
611 See, however, Norris J in Bieber v Teathers Ltd [2012] EWHC 190 (Ch) [20], [2012] 2 BCLC 585 
saying that the trust is not a purpose trust but rather a resulting trust in favour of the payer with a 
mandate granted to the recipient to apply the money paid for the purpose state. 
lenders and their lawyers are quite familiar with employing structures which ensure 
that the funds can only be drawn down at the time they are required for application for 
the purpose identified in the facility. If the borrower is unable to meet the stipulated 
requirements then the funds will not be provided and the lender will still have its 
money. A similar device could be also be used in other forms of transaction. 
Furthermore, the law already provides protection for those lenders who wish to be 
protected from an insolvency of a borrower. The lenders could take security for 
repayment. That could have been done in the Quistclose case, where the lender could 
have taken security over the balance standing to the credit of the account at Barclays 
Bank, although it must be conceded that such security would probably only have been 
by way of floating charge. Following the decision of the House of Lords in Re Bank 
of Credit and Commerce International SA (No 8),612 security could now also be taken 
by a bank lender where the proceeds of the loan had been credited to an account with 
the bank itself. It is also possible for the provider of the funds, including a provider 
who has provided the funds, otherwise than by way of loan, to gain protection before 
the funds have been used, by stipulating expressly for the funds from the outset to be 
impressed with a trust in its favour pending disbursement of the funds as the provider 
of the funds has approved.613 A further possibility is that a recipient of funds can 
declare itself to be the trustee of them under an express trust.614   Since the Quistclose 
type trust is not a security interest, there is no obligation to register it, and it is 
therefore invisible to other creditors of the trustee. This objection, of course, also 
applies to express trusts, but the rigorous requirements of intention for such trusts 
tends to limit their use in this way. 
14.12.5 Sufficient intention or purpose 
There is also a difficulty in ascertaining when the intention or purpose of the 
arrangement has been defined with sufficient precision so as to invoke the aid of the 
Quistclose case. Lord Wilberforce made it clear that there must be a ‘specific 
purpose’ underlying the intended use of the money. The difficulty which then arises is 
to understand the point at which an arrangement will be incapable of identification 
with sufficient precision for the Quistclose case to apply. In the Quistclose case the 
purpose was specific enough for the protection to follow. It must be questionable, 
however, if the purpose of using funds for the purchase of equipment in Re EVTR was 
sufficiently specific to deserve the favourable result given to the lender of the funds in 
that case. On the other hand, in Re Challoner Club Ltd615 it was held that funds 
provided by the members of a club to its directors, to be used for the purpose of 
safeguarding its future, was too imprecise as a purpose to prevent the funds from 
falling into the hands of the club’s liquidator.616 It would also seem that a sufficiently 
clear purpose must be separate from a constitution of a trust. In a recent decision in 
Du Preez Ltd (formerly Habana Ltd) v Kaupthing Singer & Friedlander (Isle of Man) 
Ltd617 the High Court of the Isle of Man refused to find a Quistclose trust of money 
already in the account for two reasons: first, although instructions as to the account 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
612  [1998] AC 214. 
613 See, for instance, the example given by Lord Millett of the solicitor in Twinsectra Ltd v Yardley 
[2002] UKHL 12, [2002] 2 AC 164, at [99]. 
614 As was done in Re Kayford Ltd [1975] 1 WLR 279. See also OT Computers Ltd v First National 
Tricity Finance Ltd [2003] EWHC 1010 (Ch), at [14]–[16]. 
615 The Times, 4/11/1997. 
616 See also Re Holiday Promotions (Europe) Ltd [1996] BCC 671. 
617 [2011] WTLR 559. 
were routinely given, no new money was paid to the bank and secondly, there was no 
evidence that Kaupthing had expressly constituted itself as a trustee of the funds in 
issue. 
14.12.6 Acceptance of the principle 
Notwithstanding the various doubts that have arisen following the decision in the 
Quistclose case, it has to be admitted that a number of eminent judicial minds have 
accepted that trusts of the type described in the Quistclose case can exist, although 
there remains uncertainty as to the basis of the principles it established. Such a body 
of judges is headed by Lord Wilberforce, Lord Millett,618 and Lord Browne-
Wilkinson,619 and also includes Sir Robert Megarry, Sir Christopher Slade,620 and Mr 
Justice Gummow in Australia.621 There have been a number of attempts by academics 
to provide an analysis of the Quistclose case and the principles that flow from it.622 
14.12.7 Judicial analysis of Quistclose 
14.12.7.1  Lord Millett provided a useful analysis of the Quistclose case in 
Twinsectra Ltd v Yardley.623 Lord Millett said in the Twinsectra case that the 
beneficial interest in the funds should be considered, even if not expressed by the 
parties as such, as remaining from the outset in the lender or provider of the funds, so 
that the borrower or recipient is simply a trustee holding the funds for such a lender or 
provider of funds on a resulting trust, with a power or duty to disburse the funds in the 
circumstances contemplated by the arrangements agreed between them. On this basis, 
the third parties who were intended to receive the funds would not acquire any 
beneficial or other enforceable interest in them until such time as the funds had been 
disbursed to them. Lord Millett’s analysis provides a much needed rationale for this 
area of the law, although it has to be said that it is at variance with the views 
expressed in some of the other cases mentioned above. A difficulty that arises in Lord 
Millett’s analysis would concern the situation where the provider of the funds became 
insolvent and went into liquidation before the funds had been used for the agreed 
purpose. At that point, the authority of the borrower to disperse the funds would 
cease, despite the fact that the borrower had borrowed the funds and had contracted 
for the right to use them. 
14.12.7.2 A useful summary of principles determining whether a Quistclose trust 
arises has recently been provided in Bieber v Teathers Ltd (In liquidation).624 These 
are as follows.625 
(1) The parties must not intend that the money will be at the free disposal 
of the recipient.626  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
618 See Twinsectra Ltd v Yardley [2002] UKHL 12, [2002] 2 AC 164. 
619 See Westdeutsche Landesbank Girozentrale v Islington LBC [1996] AC 669, at 707–708. 
620 See R v Common Professional Examination Board, ex p Mealing-McCleod, The Times 19/4/2000. 
621 See Re Australian Elizabethan Theatre Trust (1991) 102 ALR 681. 
622 See William Swadling (ed), The Quistclose Trust: Critical Essays (Hart, 2004). 
623  [2002] UKHL 12; [2002] 2 AC 164, at [52]–[103]. 
624 [2012] EWHC 190 (Ch) paras 15-25 (Norris J).   
625 References to authorities that accompany each point below are cited after Norris J in Bieber v 
Teathers Ltd [2012] EWHC 190 (Ch) paras 15-25 (Norris J).   
626 Re Goldcorp Exchange [1995] 1 AC 74; Twinsectra Ltd v Yardley [2002] AC 164 para 74; Bieber v 
Teathers Ltd [2012] EWHC 190 (Ch), [2012] 2 BCLC 585 [16] (Norris J).  	  
(2) Payment for the recipient to use it in a particular way is not of itself 
enough; it could simply give rise to personal obligations.627 
(3) It must be clear that the mutual intention of payer and recipient is that 
the money should not become a part of the general assets of the 
recipient but should be used exclusively to effect particular identified 
payments628. 
(4) A trust arises as equity intervenes because it is unconscionable for the 
recipient to obtain money but disregard the terms on which he received 
it from a payer who had placed trust and confidence in the recipient to 
ensure the proper application of the money paid629 
(5) Such a trust is akin to a “retention of title” clause in that it does not 
entrench the payer's property rights more than necessary to enable the 
purpose to be achieved. The recipient is precluded from misapplying 
the money and has no beneficial interest in it.630  
(6) The subjective intentions of payer and recipient as to the creation of a 
trust are irrelevant; it is only necessary that the effect of the 
construction of the express terms of the parties’ arrangement or the 
circumstances is to create a trust.631  
(7) The particular purpose must be specified in terms so as to enable a 
court to say whether a given application of the money falls within its 
terms.632 
14.12.8 Money received when the recipient has stopped trading 
A different line of authority, but one which might also be raised in conjunction with a 
Quistclose case argument, is based upon what was said in Neste Oy v Lloyds Bank 
plc.633 In that case shipowners routinely paid sums of money to PSL as shipping 
agents for it to discharge harbor dues and other liabilities. The last payment was 
received by PSL (credited to PSL's account with Lloyds) after a decision was made 
that it should cease trading. The shipowners' bank sought repayment, which Lloyds 
refused and proceeded to exercise their right of set-off as between the group accounts. 
This was objected to by the shipowners arguing that it was held on trust by PSL to be 
applied for the payment of the shipowners' creditors.. While no Quistclose trust was 
found, a constructive trust was imposed on the money with PSL as a constructive 
trustee because it would be “short of sharp practice for PSL to take any benefit from 
the payment, and it would have seemed contrary to any ordinary notion of fairness 
that the general body of creditors should profit from the accident of a payment made 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
627 Twinsectra Ltd v Yardley [2002] AC 164 para 73, Bieber v Teathers Ltd [2012] EWHC 190 (Ch) 
para 17 (Norris J).   
628 Toovey v Milne (1819) 2 B&A 683, Barclays Bank v Quistclose Investments [1970] AC 567, 580, 
Bieber v Teathers Ltd [2012] EWHC 190 (Ch) [18] (Norris J).   
629 Twinsectra Ltd v Yardley [2002] AC 164 [76], Bieber v Teathers Ltd [2012] EWHC 190 (Ch), 
[2012] 2 BCLC 585 [19] (Norris J). 
630 Twinsectra Ltd v Yardley [2002] AC 164 [81], [87], [92], [100], Bieber v Teathers Ltd [2012] 
EWHC 190 (Ch), [2012] 2 BCLC 585 [20] (Norris J).   
631 Twinsectra Ltd v Yardley [2002] AC 164 [71], Bieber v Teathers Ltd [2012] EWHC 190 (Ch), 
[2012] 2 BCLC 585 [21] (Norris J).   
632 Twinsectra Ltd v Yardley [2002] AC 164 [16], Bieber v Teathers Ltd [2012] EWHC 190 (Ch), 
[2012] 2 BCLC 585 [22] (Norris J).   
633  [1983] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 658. 
at a time when there was bound to be a total failure of consideration.”634  The decision 
has been highly controversial. While it has been doubted635 there are also attempts to 
reconcile it with existing body of law. Recently, the Court of Appeal suggested that 
decision in Neste Oy turned on the gratuitous nature of payments made to PSL as they 
were made solely to enable it to pay the debts of the shipowners, not in satisfaction of 
any liability between the shipowner and PSL.636 In those circumstances, the use of 
payment to meet the claims in the PSL's insolvency would be a real windfall for its 
creditors.  
14.13 Company Registration Requirements 
14.13.1 Part 25 of the Companies Act 2006 (the ‘Act’) deals with the 
requirement for the registration of company charges, that is, security given by 
companies.637 It has been reformed by Companies Act 2006 (Amendment of Part 25) 
Regulations 2013, which replaced sections 860 – 892 with sections 859A – 859Q.  
These Regulations apply to charges created on or after 6th April 2013, the date on 
which they came into force. The reform was a result of the exercise of power granted 
in section 894 of the Act and because of this was limited to reforming aspects of 
registration of security granted by companies. As a result, the need for a wider reform 
and its shape continues to be the subject of a debate.638 
14.13.1.1 One of the key aims of the reform was to make use of the technological 
advances and facilitate electronic registration. Another was to enable the same 
registration system to apply to charges created by companies registered in Scotland  
as to those registered in England and Wales or Northern Ireland. The rules governing 
registration of charges found in the new sections 859A – 859Q are now contained in 
Chapter A1 of Part 25, which replaced both chapter 1 and chapter 2, the latter of 
which contained the provisions for companies that are registered in Scotland and 
which has been repealed. 639 Chapter 3 of Part 25 is still in force. It contains various 
powers for making secondary legislation. The discussion that follows will concentrate 
on the provisions of Chapter 1 of Part 25, with an additional reference to Chapter 3 of 
Part 25 at the end. It will also be necessary to refer to section 1052 of the Companies 
Act 2006, which contains a power to make provision about the registration of 
specified charges over property in the United Kingdom of a registered overseas 
company.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
634 See Bingham J in [1983] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 658, at 666. 
635 See the discussion by Mann J in in Re Farepak Food and Gifts Ltd (sub nom Dubey v HMRC) 
[2006] EWHC 3272 (Ch); [2007] 2 BCLC 1, at [37]–[40]. 
636 Re D&D Wines International Ltd (In Liquidation) (sub nom Angove Pty Ltd v Bailey) [2014] EWCA 
Civ 215, [2015] 1 All ER (Comm) 36  [41] (Patten LJ). 
637 It largely re-enacts the previous provisions of Part XII of the Companies Act 1985, which, in turn, 
replaced the corresponding provisions of s 95 et seq of the Companies Act 1948. The legislative history 
of these provisions goes back to s 14 of the Companies Act 1900, which was extended by s 10(1)(e) of 
the Companies Act 1907 and further extended by s 43(1) of the Companies Act 1928 and s 79 of the 
Companies Act 1929 to what was pretty much the same as the present legislation. The 1948 Act, which 
replaced the previous legislation was, in turn, replaced by the 1985 Act. 
638 See Chap 17 and L Gullifer and M Raczynska, ‘The English Law of Personal Property Security: 
Under-reformed?’ in L Gullifer and O Akseli (eds) Secured Transactions Law Reform: Principles, 
Policies and Practice (Hart 2016 forthcoming). 
639 The failure by a Scottish company to comply with the registration requirements would be a matter 
that was justiciable before the English courts: Arthur D Little Ltd v Ableco Finance LLC [2002] EWHC 
701 (Ch), [2003] Ch 217. See also for example Enviroco Ltd v Farstad Supply A/S [2011] UKSC 16, 
[2011] 1 WLR 921. 
14.13.1.2 Sections 859A to 859Q apply with appropriate modifications to limited 
liability partnerships under regulation 32 of the Limited Liability Partnerships 
(Application of Companies Act 2006) Regulations 2009/1804.640 
14.13.2 Registrable charges 
The new section 859A of the Act provides that all charges created by companies are 
registrable unless specifically excluded. The scope of what is registrable is therefore 
wider than previously, when there was a closed list of registrable charges641, which 
included some categories of fixed charge and all floating charges.642 
14.13.2.1 Exemptions from registration in section 859A of the Act include rent 
security deposits, charges securing underwriting obligations of corporate members of 
Lloyds and charges exempted under other legislation, the most important of which are 
the security financial collateral arrangements that fall within the Financial Collateral 
Arrangements (No 2) Regulations 2003.643 While the wording of the Act is open to 
the interpretation that the registrar has power to register charges which are not 
registrable charges, the Act only stipulates which interests the registrar must register, 
without making it clear whether the registrar may or must not register anything else. If 
the Act were interpreted permissively, it would be possible (but not necessary) to 
register charges that are exempted, and this would prevent Companies House being 
left with making what is sometimes a very difficult decision whether a charge is 
registrable or not, for example, whether it constitutes a security financial collateral 
arrangement or not. Thus far, it seems that the Act has unfortunately been understood 
restrictively so as to exclude any registrability of non-registrable charges, thus placing 
more pressure on the Companies House than otherwise.644  
14.13.2.2  For purposes of Part 25 of the Act, the term “charge” also includes a 
mortgage.645 
14.13.3 The process of registration  
As already mentioned, the most prominent change brought about by the 2013 reforms 
is the ability to register online as well as in paper format. Electronic registration of 
charges takes place via the Companies House WebFiling and it is necessary to apply 
for an authentication code in order to do so.646 The registrar must register the charge if 
the company or a person interested in the charge delivers to the registrar the statement 
of particulars within the period allowed for deliver.647 Where the charge is created or 
evidenced by an instrument, which is often the case, the registrar’s obligation does not 
arise unless a certified copy of that instrument is delivered with the statement 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
640 As amended by the Limited Liability Partnerships (Application of Companies Act 2006) 
(Amendment) Regulations 2013/618, Sch 1 para 1. 
641 Formerly s 860 of the Act. 
642 This means that it is no longer relevant to consider whether a charge is fixed or floating for the 
purposes of registration. The distinction is still relevant for other reasons, crucially in insolvency.  
643 See above 14.7.6. 
644 Anecdotal evidence (a telephone conversation with an employee at the Companies House) 
suggests that the practice of the Companies House is to refuse such registration when it 
decides that the charge falls within an exemption. 
645 S 859(7). 
646 The complexity of this process detracts from the usability of the online system in favour of using 
paper documentation.  
647 S 859A of the Act.  
particulars, which in the case of online registration is a pdf version of the document. 
The Act provides separately that the registrar has an obligation to register a charge 
when it is in a series of debentures648 and where the company acquired property 
subject to a charge.649  
14.13.3.1  The period is, as was previously, 21 days beginning the day after the 
date of creation of the charge. Charges created outside the UK no longer benefit from 
an extended period. What constitutes the date of creation is now comprehensively 
defined650, which was thought to be a necessary clarification in light of the UK-wide 
registration. 
14.13.3.2 The statement of particulars is delivered on one of the forms provided 
by the Companies House, which differ to some extent depending on whether the 
charge is created or evidenced by an instrument or not, whether the charge is in a 
series of debentures or whether the charge already existed on property acquired. There 
are also separate forms for LLPs. Where the charge is created or evidenced by an 
instrument, the statement of particulars must identify the chargor, the chargee and the 
date of creation of the charge and, it is necessary to describe the nature of the charge, 
the property charged and the obligations secured by the charge.651  It is now also 
possible, which was not previously, to indicate in the statement of particulars one of 
the following matters by way of a ‘yes or no’ tickbox:  
a) Whether the charge instrument creates a fixed charge over any other property. 
b) Whether the charge instrument creates a floating charge and, if so, whether it 
is over all the property and undertaking of the company. 
c) Whether the terms of the charge652 include a clause prohibiting or restricting 
the chargor from creating security which ranks equally with or ahead of the 
charge (a negative pledge clause). 
d) Whether the company is acting as trustee in relation to the charged property (it 
is optional to include this information). 
e) There is also a box to provide a short description of any land, ships, aircraft or 
intellectual property which are subject to a fixed charge in the charge 
instrument. 
In cases where the charge is not created or evidenced by an instrument, it is necessary 
to describe the nature of the charge, the property charged and the obligations secured 
by the charge. There is an optional tickbox to indicate whether the company is acting 
as trustee in relation to the charged property.653 Further details must be included if the 
charge is in a series of debentures.654 
14.13.3.3 When all the documents, which are required to be delivered, are 
received, the registrar issues a unique charge identification code655, which links the 
particulars with the instrument on the register.  Thus, both are available to be viewed 
on the register. The registrar must issue a certificate to the person who made the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
648 S 859B of the Act. 
649 S 859C of the Act. 
650 S 859E of the Act. 
651 Section 859D of the Act, formerly section 869 of the Act. 
652 And not, for example, the loan agreement. See further L Gullifer and M Raczynska, ‘The English 
Law of Personal Property Security: Under-reformed?’ in L Gullifer and O Akseli Secured Transactions 
Law Reform: Principles, Policies and Practice (Hart 2016 forthcoming). 
653 See s 859J of the Act. 
654 S 859B of the Act. 
655 S 859I(2) of the Act. 
delivery656, identifying the company who granted the charge and the unique reference 
code allocated to the charge657. Given that the registrar no longer checks the 
particulars against the charge document, the certificate cannot serve as conclusive 
evidence that any of the particulars registered are correct. It is only conclusive 
evidence only as to the fact that the charge is not invalid as a result of late delivery 
(or, if late, that the court granted leave for it).  
14.13.3.4  The register held by Companies House is searchable online, as was 
previously, via WebCHeck and CompaniesHouseDirect. A person searching the 
register cannot rely on the registered particulars or the certificate and should check the 
entire charge document.  
14.13.3.5  A company is no longer required to keep a separate register of charges 
but it must keep available for inspection copies of the full instrument, if any, as well 
as a copy of other documents containing charge particulars or particulars relating to 
the property.658 The Act provides the manner in which copies of these documents are 
to be kept by the company.  
14.13.3.6  For convenience, the process of delivering the charge and the 
prescribed particulars to the registrar is referred to below as ‘registering’ the charge, 
although the statutory language refers to making the delivery. 
14.13.4 The consequences of a failure to register 
Pursuant to section 859H of the Act the consequence of failure to register within the 
prescribed period is invalidity of the charge against ‘creditors’, liquidator or 
administrator. .The money secured by a charge which becomes invalid under this 
section becomes immediately payable.659 This civil sanction is the same as under the 
previous law,660 and its purpose is to provide an incentive to the obligor to grant a 
new charge to the secured party, rather than the secured party having to applying for 
leave to register the charge late.661    By contrast, the criminal sanction of a fine for 
failure to register imposed on the company or officers in default662, which has 
attracted much criticism, has now been abolished in the 2013 reforms. This means 
that registration is no longer mandatory in the sense that there is no obligation to 
deliver the charge to the registrar. A company or a person interested in the charge is 
free to decide not to deliver although will need to face the consequences of lack of 
registration when the issue of validity arises against the creditors or insolvency 
officers, and also the consequences of the secured debt becoming immediately 
payable.663 
14.13.4.1 As previously, a ‘creditor’ for the purposes of the section, that is, a 
creditor against whom the unregistered charge is void, means a creditor with a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
656 S 859Q of the Act. 
657 S 859I(3) and (4) of the Act, previously section 869(6)(b) of the Act. 
658 S 859P of the Act. This could be relevant, for example, where a negative pledge clause is included 
in the terms of the loan agreement and not the charge instrument. 
659 S 859H of the Act. 
660 Formerly s 874 of the Act. 
661 See 14.13.6. 
662 Formerly ss 860 (4) and (5) of the Act. 
663 For example, these consequences could be commercially severe even if the charge is rescued from 
invalidity on insolvency by other legislation, such as a charge over an aircraft which is registered in the 
International Registry under Regulation 14 of the International Interests in Aircraft Equipment (Cape 
Town Convention) Regulations 2015. 
proprietary interest in the charged assets, namely, a secured creditor or an execution 
creditor.664 This is because unsecured creditors have no proprietary entitlement in the 
assets before the onset of an insolvency of the chargor, and their interests are 
represented by the liquidator or administrator in the liquidation or administration of 
the chargor. 
14.13.4.2 In Smith (Administrator of Cosslett (Contractors) Ltd) v Bridgend 
CBC665 the House of Lords considered what was meant when the (predecessor) 
section said that the unregistered charge was void as against a liquidator or 
administrator of the company. The wording meant that the charge was void as against 
the company in liquidation or administration, as represented by that person. The 
intention was to protect the interests of the company, so that the charged assets would 
be available to the company and its creditors as if the charge did not exist. One result 
of this was that the liquidator or administrator was entitled to pursue the invalidity on 
behalf of company, including the right of the company to bring an action for 
conversion against the chargee which had wrongly enforced the void security and 
disposed of the charged assets. 
14.13.4.3 Where the charged property consists of debts that have been assigned 
to the chargee under an unregistered charge, and the chargor goes into liquidation or 
administration, the chargee is not entitled to receive the debts because they are treated 
as being the unencumbered property of the chargor. This also has the effect, as it had 
under previous law, that the chargee cannot demand payment of the debts and the 
debtor is entitled to rely on the section to refuse to pay the chargee and, instead, to 
account to the chargor.666 Otherwise, the debtor would be at risk of being in double 
jeopardy in being obliged to pay both the liquidator or administrator of the chargor, as 
well as the chargee. 
14.13.4.4 It should be noted that a purchaser of charged assets is not entitled to 
rely on the section to assert the invalidity of the security.667 That deficiency would 
have been cured by the amendments to the companies charges registration regime that 
were contemplated by the Companies Act 1989.668 Although this was noted, and a 
relevant proposal was made in the period leading up to the 2013 reform669, no change 
was unfortunately introduced. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
664 See Lord Brightman, sitting in the Court of Appeal, in Re Ashpurton Estates Ltd [1983] Ch 110, at 
119, relying upon the earlier decision of the Court of Appeal in Re Ehrmann Brothers Ltd [1906] 2 Ch 
697. 
665  [2001] UKHL 58, [2002] 1 AC 336. 
666 Orion Finance Ltd v Crown Financial Management Ltd [1996] BCC 621, at 631–635. 
667 A point that was overlooked in E Pfeiffer Weinkellerei-Weineinkauf GmbH v Arbuthnot Factors Ltd 
[1988] 1 WLR 150. 
668 See s 399(1)(a) of the Companies Act 1985, as inserted by s 95 of the Companies Act 1989 (never 
in force). 
669 See Department for Business Innovation and Skills (BIS), Government Response—Consultation on 
Registration of Charges created by Companies and Limited Liability Partnerships (BIS, December 
2010) proposal F and see BIS, Revised Scheme for Registration of Charges created by Companies and 
Limited Liability Partnerships: proposed revision on Part 25, Companies Act 2006 (BIS, August 2011, 
URN 11/1108) para 37 (stating that the discussion with the stakeholders resulted in the rejection of the 
proposal). 
14.13.5 Other entries on the register 
14.13.5.1 Section 859K of the Act670 provides that if a receiver of a company’s 
property is appointed, either by the court or under a security instrument, the person 
who obtained the court appointment, or who appointed the receiver under the security, 
must notify the registrar of the appointment within seven days after the appointment 
and provide the unique reference code allocated to the charge (in relation to charges 
created on or after 6th April 2013). Upon relinquishing his appointment, if appointed 
under a security instrument, the receiver must notify the Registrar of that fact. It is an 
offence if those requirements are not met. In both cases (of taking up and cessation of 
appointment) the registrar must include the fact of which it was notified in the 
register. This section therefore preserves the previous law. It only applies to receivers 
appointed under the law of English and Wales or Northern Ireland.671 
14.13.5.2 Section 859L of the Act672 provides for the registrar to enter on the 
register a note of the satisfaction, in whole or in part, of the amount secured by, or the 
assets comprised within, a registered charge. This is triggered by the delivery to the 
registrar of a statement along with the particulars of the person delivering it along 
with the particulars of company and the charge. It is not required that a deed of 
discharge is delivered to the registrar, nor will the registrar record the absence of such 
evidence. This may open door to abuse of this section, even fraudulent filing, for 
which the only sanction is the sanction for false statements made to the registrar under 
section 1112 of the Act.  
14.13.5.3 Under section 859O of the Act it is possible to register an amendment 
or the addition of certain types of terms to the charge after its creation. This applies to 
terms of the charge adding or amending a negative pledge clause and a variation of 
priorities agreement. 
14.13.5.4 Following a relevant court order delivered to the registrar, the registrar 
includes an entry of rectification of any statement or notice, which were delivered to 
him, and removes the copy of the instrument, replacing it with a new one. Sections 
859M and 859N of the Act provide, respectively, the grounds on which the court 
issues such orders.  
14.13.6 Late registration 
Where the documents required for delivery to register a charge have not been 
delivered within the prescribed period, the court may to grant the permission for the 
late registration of a charge under section 859F of the Act. The period for delivery 
may be extended by the court673 on the same grounds as before674, namely where the 
failure to deliver was accidental or is not of a nature to prejudice creditors or 
shareholders or a relief is just and equitable.675 Given the similarity to how this was 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
670 Formerly s 871 of the Act. 
671 Ss 859K(8) and (9) of the Act. 
672 Formerly s 872 of the Act. 
673 S 859F of the Act. 
674 Formerly s 873 of the Act.  
675 The permission would likely be refused where there had been a deliberate decision by the chargee 
not to register when it knew that the charge should be registered because it would not be a result of 
accident or inadvertence, see: Barclays Bank PLC v Stuart Landon Ltd [2001] EWCA Civ 140; [2002] 
BCC 917, 621 (Chadwick LJ) (while the decision was made on the basis of section 404 of the 
Companies Act 1985, the current law mirrors the grounds that were contained in that section). 
framed prior to the 2013 reform, the case law that developed under previous law 
remains relevant. 
14.13.6.1 The court’s power of discretion to permit late registration, albeit 
wide676, has some limits. In the first place, the court is not likely to look favourably on 
an application where there has been knowing delay in seeking relief after the failure to 
register has been discovered.677 Secondly, the court is likely to refuse to permit 
registration where proceedings for winding up have been commenced when the 
application is made for permission.678 Where winding-up proceedings were imminent 
at the time of the application, but had not yet been commenced, that fact was a 
relevant factor for the court to consider but the court should still be prepared to grant 
permission unless it was certain that a later application to have the permission set 
aside (as shortly to be referred to) was bound to succeed.679 
14.13.6.2 If the court grants permission for late registration, it will normally 
provide in its order that the late registration is to be without prejudice to the interests 
of third parties that have been acquired in the charged assets prior to the date that late 
registration takes place.680 However, if a third party took its interest on the basis that 
its rights would be postponed behind those of the unregistered charge, then an 
exception is likely to be made to make it clear that the rights of such a person will 
remain postponed behind the charge.681 Similarly, if a person who is responsible for 
the failure to register the charge has itself obtained an interest in the charged property, 
that person’s interest should be under current law, as was the case previously, 
postponed behind the charge.682 
14.13.6.3 The court order may issue the order on such terms and conditions as 
seem just and expedient to the court.683 For example, if permission is given at a time 
when winding-up proceedings are imminent, then the court is likely to require that its 
order may be challenged by an unsecured creditor or the liquidator if liquidation of 
the chargor occurs within a set period after the late registration is achieved.684 The 
point of this is to permit such a creditor to show that it gave credit to the company, 
having searched, believing that its property was unencumbered. It also permits the 
liquidator to challenge the order on the basis that there were no proper grounds for 
permitting late registration, such as because the liquidator can establish that there had 
been a deliberate decision not to register the charge in the first place.685 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
676 Re Braemar Investments Ltd [1989] Ch 54. 
677 Re Ashpurton Estates Ltd [1983] Ch 110. On this point, it might be argued that the court was unduly 
sympathetic in Re Fablehill Ltd [1991] BCC 590. 
678 Re Ashpurton Estates Ltd [1983] Ch 110. In that case, the court also refused permission where the 
insolvency proceedings had been commenced whilst an appeal against a refusal to grant permission 
was pending. As to the position where an administrator had been appointed, see Millett J in Re Barrow 
Borough Transport Ltd [1990] Ch 227. 
679 Re Ashpurton Estates Ltd [1983] Ch 110; Re Braemar Investments Ltd [1989] Ch 54; Barclays Bank 
PLC v Stuart Landon Ltd [2001] EWCA Civ 140, [2002] BCC 917. 
680 See Re Ashpurton Estates Ltd [1983] Ch 110, at 122–124. Section 859F(2) of the Act explicitly 
refers to the failure to deliver the documents being not of a nature to prejudice the position of creditors 
or shareholders of the company.  
681 Barclays Bank PLC v Stuart Landon Ltd [2001] EWCA Civ 140, [2002] BCC 917. 
682 Re Fablehill Ltd [1991] BCC 590. 
683 Section 859F(3) of the Act. 
684 This is the so-called ‘Re Charles’ order: Re Charles (LH) & Co Ltd [1935] WN 15. 
685 Barclays Bank PLC v Stuart Landon Ltd [2001] EWCA Civ 140, [2002] BCC 917. 
14.13.7 The power to make secondary legislation 
Chapter 3 of Part 25 of the Companies Act 2006, comprising sections 893 and 894 of 
the Act, contains provisions to permit secondary legislation to be made dealing with 
the effect of a registration in another register and the ability to make amendments to 
Part 25. Another power to make secondary registration is contained in section 1052 of 
the Act and concerns registration of charges over property of a registered overseas 
company.  
14.13.7.1 Under section 893 of the Act, secondary legislation may be made as to 
the sharing of information between the Companies Registry and other registries, 
including foreign registries, the consequence of which could be that charges that are 
registered in such other registries need not be registered separately in the Companies 
Registry. In such instances, there would be a cross-reference made in the Companies 
Registry to the registration in the other registry. Examples of where this might occur 
would be registration of a legal charge in the Land Registry or of security in the 
specialist registries dealing with ships, aircraft, or intellectual property.   The power in 
section 893 has not yet been exercised. 
14.13.7.2 Power under sections 894 was exercised686, as discussed above. The 
issues concerning section 1052 of the Act are discussed in the part that follows. 
14.13.8 Security given by a registered overseas company 
The state of law on registration of security granted by foreign companies has been 
rather unstable. The rules provided under the Companies Act 1985 were 
unsatisfactory, as explained below. The 2006 Act gave a power under section 1052 to 
make secondary legislation for registration of a charge over property in the UK 
granted by an overseas company if the company was registered in the UK.687 The 
presence of the power was generally a welcome change from the position that had 
applied previously despite the limitation that the company be registered in the UK. 
The power was exercised in by making the Overseas Companies (Execution of 
Documents and Registration of Charges) Regulations 2009.688 The Regulations came 
into force on 1 October 2009 but the relevant part of these Regulations governing 
registration of charges by foreign companies (Part 3) was revoked with effect from 1 
October 2011.689 These Regulations continue to impose various duties in relation to 
charges, which are discussed after addressing the key historical developments of this 
area of law.  
14.13.8.1 Under section 409 of the Companies Act 1985, if a company that was 
incorporated outside Great Britain, which had established a place of business in 
England and Wales, gave a charge of a registrable category over property in England 
and Wales (or acquired property subject to such a charge), the charge had to be 
registered as if it had been given by an English company. The section applied whether 
or not the company had registered as an ‘overseas company’ under Part XXIII of the 
1985 Act and it applied with respect to property which was in England and Wales 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
686 Companies Act 2006 (Amendment of Part 25) Regulations 2013/600. 
687 That is, a company that has registered particulars under s 1046(1) of the Act. 
688 SI 2009/1917. 
689 Overseas Companies (Execution of Documents and Registration of Charges) (Amendment) 
Regulations 2011/2194, reg 2(3). 
when the charge was created, or which came within that jurisdiction subsequently.690 
The establishment of a place of business in England and Wales was a question of fact 
to be assessed as at the time the charge was created and implied a place of 
establishment of some permanence,691 which it might be difficult to ascertain. 
14.13.8.2 Because of the difficulties in knowing if the charge had to be 
registered, the practice had developed, in cases where the chargor was a foreign 
company and there was a possibility of the charged assets being or coming within the 
jurisdiction, of sending the charge to the Companies Registry, together with an 
attempt at supplying the relevant prescribed particulars, in the hope that this would 
satisfy the requirements of section 409 (commonly referred to as a ‘Slavenburg 
registration’). The ‘Slavenburg register’ had a limited functionality as there was no 
facility to submit enquiries to search it.  
14.13.8.3 The Overseas Companies (Execution of Documents and Registration 
of Charges) Regulations 2009 introduced registration of charges granted by overseas 
companies in its Part 3. When they were in force the regulations applied to 
registration of charges granted by an overseas company that had a registered 
establishment in the UK and to property that was situated in the UK at the time the 
charge was created.692 This did not extend to charges over property brought into the 
UK after the charge was created. Only certain categories of charge were registrable693, 
which corresponded to the law governing registration of charges granted by domestic 
companies under the former section 860 of the Companies Act 2006. The sanction for 
lack of registration was limited to civil consequences (invalidity against a liquidator, 
an administrator and a creditor of the company).694 This contrasted with the law 
governing at that time the granting of charges by domestic companies in relation to 
which the criminal sanction applied.  
14.13.8.4 While the provision governing registration of charges granted by 
overseas companies have now been revoked,695 so that charges granted by overseas 
companies are no longer registrable in the Company Charges register, certain other 
provisions of the Overseas Companies (Execution of Documents and Registration of 
Charges) Regulations 2009 continue to apply. First, a registered overseas company696 
has a duty to keep for inspection copies of every instrument creating a charge. This 
applies to charges on land or interest in land situated in the UK; charges on ships, 
aircraft697 or intellectual property registered in the UK and any floating charge on the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
690 Slavenburg’s Bank NV v Intercontinental Natural Resources Ltd [1980] 1 WLR 1076 (the case was 
decided on the basis of section 95 of the Companies Act 1948, which was later replaced by section 395 
of the Companies Act 1985). 
691 Re Oriel Ltd [1986] 1 WLR 180. 
692 Overseas Companies (Execution of Documents and Registration of Charges) Regulations 2009, reg 
9(1) (now revoked).  
693 Overseas Companies (Execution of Documents and Registration of Charges) Regulations 2009, reg 
9(3)-(6) (now revoked). 
694 Overseas Companies (Execution of Documents and Registration of Charges) Regulations 2009, reg 
19 (now revoked). 
695 By the Overseas Companies (Execution of Documents and Registration of Charges) (Amendment) 
Regulations 2011, SI 2011/2194 
696 As defined in the Overseas Companies (Execution of Documents and Registration of Charges) 
Regulations 2009, reg 8. 
697 This requirement applies even to a charge over an aircraft which is an international interest under 
the International Interests in Aircraft Equipment (Cape Town Convention) Regulations 2015. 
whole or part of the company’s property or undertaking situated in the UK698 unless 
the floating charge exclude all the property of the company situated in the UK or it 
purports to be a fixed charge.699 Failure to comply with this duty knowingly or 
willfully is met with a criminal sanction.700 The company must notify the registrar of 
the place, which must be at a location in the UK at which the company carries on 
business, at which the documents and the register are kept for inspection and of any 
change in that place.701 A criminal sanction is imposed on the company and every 
office of the company for lack of compliance.702 There is also a provision for 
inspection by electronic means.703 
14.13.9 Re-characterisation 
One consideration of relevance in relation to registration of charges is re-
characterisation, which is understood as the process by which a transaction that has 
the superficial appearance of being in one form is treated, as a matter of law, as being 
of a different type. In the context of financing and similar transactions, the issue that 
arises is whether a transaction by which a financier or other type of creditor obtains a 
proprietary interest in an asset in the form of what appears to be outright ownership of 
the asset is nonetheless treated as having provided credit on the basis of only having 
security over the asset, so that its apparent outright proprietary interest is held as 
security, to which the recipient of the credit has an equity of redemption. The issue is 
pertinent in English law because of the traditional tolerance that the courts have 
shown in addressing the matter, although there appears in more recent times to have 
been a change in judicial approach.704 This subject is discussed in more detail in 
Chapter 12, as well as in Chapter 15, and the reader is referred to the discussion in 
those places for further reference.705 
14.13.9.1 If a proprietary transaction is re-characterised as being, in reality, a 
form of security, then it would be necessary to consider if it amounts to a registrable 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
698 Overseas Companies (Execution of Documents and Registration of Charges) Regulations 2009, reg 
24. 
699 Overseas Companies (Execution of Documents and Registration of Charges) Regulations 2009, reg 
24(2A). 
700 Overseas Companies (Execution of Documents and Registration of Charges) Regulations 2009, reg 
24(3)-(4). 
701 See the Overseas Companies (Execution of Documents and Registration of Charges) Regulations 
2009, reg 25(1)-(4). 
702 Overseas Companies (Execution of Documents and Registration of Charges) Regulations 2009, reg 
25(5)-(6). 
703 Overseas Companies (Execution of Documents and Registration of Charges) Regulations 2009, reg 
26A. 
704 Two decisions in the Court of Appeal and two in the House of Lords serve to illustrate the change in 
judicial attitudes. The high water mark of a tolerant and laissez-faire approach is illustrated by the 
decision of the Court of Appeal in Welsh Development Agency v Export Finance Co Ltd [1992] BCLC 
148. The tide was on the turn only a few years later in the decision of the Court of Appeal in Orion 
Finance Ltd v Crown Financial Management Ltd [1996] BCC 621, particularly in the discussion of 
Millett LJ, at 626–627. His Lordship was much more definite in delivering the advice of the Privy 
Council in Agnew v Inland Revenue Commissioner [2001] UKPC 28, [2001] AC 710. The approach 
that he took there was approved by the House of Lords in Smith (Administrator of Cosslett 
(Contractors) Ltd) v Bridgend CBC [2001] UKHL 58, [2002] AC 336 and in National Westminster 
Bank PLC v Spectrum Plus Ltd [2005] UKHL 41, [2005] 2 AC 680. 
705 See also the Australian case of Beaconwood Securities Pty Ltd v Australia and New Zealand 
Banking Group Ltd [2008] FCA 594, which concerned the effectiveness and characterisation of title 
transfer provisions in securities lending transactions. The court held that they did not amount to secured 
transactions. 
charge under section 859A of the Act. If not registered the consequences will be as 
mentioned above. 
14.14 Priorities 
14.14.1 In English law it is possible for several people to claim proprietary 
interests in the same asset, whether by way of ownership or security. This arises from 
the fact that legal and equitable interests may exist in an asset, that there may be more 
than one equitable interest subsisting at the same time, and that transactions may take 
place at law or in equity.706 Accordingly, it is possible that different types of interest 
may exist in the same asset, which may or may not naturally be in harmony (e.g. legal 
v equitable, equitable v equitable, security v security, purchaser v security, and 
purchaser v purchaser). The parties may have agreed as to the order in which their 
respective interests will rank under a priority agreement and such an agreement will 
normally bind them to what they have agreed.707 In other situations, however, there 
may be a need to resolve the disharmony between the competing interests, which 
English law achieves through its priority rules. The rules are complex, piecemeal in 
nature and tend to depend upon a mixture of some general rules and the nature of the 
particular asset concerned. One general preliminary point that can be made is that the 
concept of notice (including constructive notice) is an important part of the rules. 
Another is that the date of registration of charges in the Companies House does not 
play a determinative or even a principal role in establishing priority708, a position 
which is in stark contrast with the simpler and more transparent priority rules found in 
numerous other jurisdictions, where priority is typically determined by date of 
registration, for instance under Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code, Personal 
Property Security Acts in Canada, New Zealand, Australia, Jersey, Malawi, Qatar709 
or secured transactions laws in, for example, Bulgaria710, Ghana711, Liberia712, Sierra 
Leone713, Ireland714, Poland715,  Romania716, Serbia717, Colombia718 and Mexico.719  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
706 Note, however, that if there is only one person with an interest in an asset, that interest can only be 
the full comprehensive legal title, as it is not possible to have a separate legal and equitable title vested 
in one person if there is no other person with an interest in the asset: see Viscount Radcliffe in 
Commissioner of Stamp Duties (Qld) v Livingstone [1965] AC 694, at 712; Slade J in Re Bond Worth 
Ltd [1980] Ch 228 and Lord Browne-Wilkinson in Westdeutsche Landesbank Girozentrale v Islington 
LBC [1996] AC 669, at 706. 
707 Cheah Theam Swee v Equiticorp Finance Group Ltd [1992] AC 472. See also s 94(1)(a) of the Law 
of Property Act 1925.   See section 14.15 
708 Registration under section 859A of the Companies Act 2006 constitutes notice to all those who 
could reasonably be expected to search the register although it is not clear who counts as such a person 
(a creditor seeking to take registrable security is likely to be one but the position is less clear in relation 
to e.g. a creditor a security which is not registrable). Another area of difficulty is of what is registration 
notice. This is unclear but it is likely that notice is in relation to both the registered charge instrument 
and the registered particulars and it seems that in the case where the two are inconsistent, the former 
prevails, see further L Gullifer and M Raczynska, ‘The English Law of Personal Property Security: 
Under-reformed?’ in L Gullifer and O Akseli Secured Transactions Law Reform: Principles, Policies 
and Practice (Hart 2016 forthcoming).	  
709 The Qatar Financial Center Security Regulations are based on Personal Property Security Acts.  
710 Bulgarian Law on Registered Pledges 1997. 
711 Ghanaian Borrowers and Lenders Act 2008. 
712 As part of Liberian Commercial Code (2010). 
713 Sierra Leone Borrowers and Lenders Act 2014. 
714 The Irish Companies Act 2014. 
715 The Polish Act on Registered Pledge and Register of Pledges in 1996. 
716 Romanian Civil Code 2011. 
14.14.1.1 The rules are generally more straightforward if there is a specialist 
registration system for the particular type of asset involved than where such 
registration does not exist. This is the case with land, ships,720 aircraft,721 and some 
types of intellectual property.722 In general, priorities are determined by date of 
registration or notification of an interest on the register. In some instances, that might 
be defeated by an equity that has priority, as, for instance, one of which a party has 
notice. The rules governing priority become very complex and uncertain in relation to 
security granted by a company and registrable in the Companies House as well as in a 
specialist register. In addition, if none of the competing interests have been properly 
registered or notified then it will be necessary to fall back on the general principles. 
What follows will concentrate on the position for the general body of assets where no 
specialist register exists. 
14.14.1.2 It should be noted that each of the rules that follow is subject to the 
special rules that apply in the case of further advances, which are discussed below. 
14.14.2 Some general principles 
There are some general principles, or themes, which appear when looking at the 
priority rules, which will now be described, although it must be borne in mind that 
they may be overtaken by specific rules that apply to particular types of assets. 
14.14.2.1 The role of notice 
The most important of the general principles concerns the effect upon a party if it has 
notice, including constructive notice (such as in consequence of registration of 
security at Companies House), of an interest in the same asset that is earlier in time to 
its own interest. Generally speaking, such notice will serve to defer the interest of the 
later party behind that of the earlier interest. This matter is discussed in Chapter 12, to 
which the reader is referred for further guidance. 
14.14.2.2 Purchaser for value of the legal estate 
Where a person (or a trustee acting on his behalf) acquires the legal estate in an asset 
and does so for value and without having notice (including by virtue of constructive 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
717 The Serbian Law on Registered Security Interests in Movables 2003 (priority determined by date of 
registration following the 2011 reforms). 
718 Law no 1676. 
719 The Mexican registry of security interests was launched in 2010. 
720 For mortgages in statutory form, priority is regulated by date of registration in the British Ship 
Register: para 8 of Sched 1 to the Merchant Shipping Act 1995. This is subject to the earlier filing of a 
priority notice under that para. Notice of an earlier unregistered mortgage will not defeat the statutory 
priority: Black v Williams [1895] 1 Ch 408. 
721 Priority of mortgages is by date of registration at the Aircraft Registry: Art 14 of the Mortgaging of 
Aircraft Order 1972 (SI 1972/1268). This is subject to the earlier filing of a priority notice under that 
article. Notice of an earlier unregistered mortgage will not defeat the statutory priority: Art 14(4).  
Those taking a security interest in an aircraft may now register it in the International Registry, and 
obtain priority over all other interests in the aircraft except any prior interest registered in the 
International Registry, see International Interests in Aircraft Equipment (Cape Town Convention) 
Regulations 2015 Regulation 16. 
722 I.e. trade marks, patents, and registered designs, as previously described.  Note, however, the 
complexity of the priority rules in relation to patents and trade marks, see 14.8. 
notice) of an earlier equitable interest in the asset,723 the legal estate will prevail over 
the equitable interest.724 This does not apply, however, in relation to debts and similar 
choses in action.725 It would appear that the relevant time for determining if a party 
had notice of an earlier interest is at least the time when the purchaser gave value. The 
position is not entirely clear if the purchaser (i.e. an outright purchaser or a 
mortgagee) acquires notice of an existing equitable interest in the interval between 
giving value and then acquiring the legal title. It would appear that if the earlier 
equitable interest exists otherwise than under a trust, the purchaser (provided that it is 
not a mortgagee) can rely upon the doctrine of tabula in naufragio and take free of the 
equitable interest.726 However, if the earlier equitable interest is that of a beneficiary 
under a trust, the conveyance of the legal title will involve a breach of trust upon 
which the purchaser cannot rely.727 
14.14.2.2.1 To that qualification there is a separate further exception in relation to 
the acquisition of a legal estate in shares, through becoming registered as the 
shareholder. If the purchaser both provided its consideration and acquired the share 
certificate and a valid transfer form duly executed by the existing registered holder 
without having notice of an existing beneficial interest in the shares, the purchaser 
will prevail over the earlier beneficial interest (howsoever it exists), even if the 
purchaser acquired notice in the intervening period before it became registered as the 
holder of the shares.728   Purchases of dematerialized shares registered in the CREST 
register will normally take free of any previous equitable interests by the operation of 
the CREST rules.729 
14.14.2.2.2 It would also appear to be the case that a purchaser who acquired a 
good legal title having done so for value and without notice of an existing beneficial 
interest can pass on that title to a sub-purchaser that does have notice of the beneficial 
interest, provided the sub-purchaser is not involved in a fraud or has otherwise 
participated in a breach of trust involving the original transfer to the first purchaser.730 
14.14.2.3 The nemo dat rule 
The other side of the coin to the rule favouring a bona fide purchaser of the legal 
estate, is the rule encapsulated in the Latin maxim, ‘nemo dat quod non habet’, 
namely, that a person cannot confer a better estate than he possesses. Accordingly, a 
person without a legal estate cannot confer such an estate on someone else. There are 
certain exceptions to the rule. The most important relate to goods and the exceptions 
contained in the Sale of Goods Act 1979, the Factors Act 1889, and Part III of the 
Hire Purchase Act 1964. More generally, there is an exception where a person is 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
723 If the purchaser is using a trustee to acquire for him then both the purchaser and the trustee must be 
without notice. 
724 See Pilcher v Rawlins (1872) LR 7 Ch App 259; Macmillan Inc v Bishopsgate Investment Trust (No 
3) [1995] 1 WLR 978, 1000 (the case was subject to an appeal that did not deal with this issue: [1996] 
1 WLR 387). 
725 See Phillips J in E Pfeiffer Weinkellerei-Weineinkauf GmbH v Arbuthnot Factors Ltd [1988] 1 WLR 
150, 161 
726 Macmillan Inc v Bishopsgate Investment Trust (No 3) [1995] 1 WLR 978, 1002–1003. 
727 Harpham v Shacklock (1881) 19 ChD 207; Macmillan Inc v Bishopsgate Investment Trust (No 3) 
[1995] 1 WLR 978, 1003–1004. 
728 Dodds v Hills (1865) 2 H&M 424; Macmillan Inc v Bishopsgate Investment Trust (No 3) [1995] 1 
WLR 978, 1003–1004. 
729 Uncertificated Securities Regulations 2001 reg 35(4) and CREST Rule 7 3.2 
730 Wilkes v Spooner [1911] 2 KB 473. 
conferred with actual or apparent authority by the true owner to deal with the owner’s 
title. 
14.14.2.4 Competing equitable interests 
In a competition as between equitable interests, the starting point is the general rule 
that where the equities are equal, the first in time should prevail.731 
14.14.2.4.1 Under the doctrine of tabula in naufragio, the holder for value of a 
later equitable interest in tangible property732 which gets in the legal estate can 
overreach an earlier equitable interest, provided it did not have notice of the earlier 
equitable interest when it gave value for the acquisition of its own equitable 
interest.733 For the reasons already stated, this does not apply if the earlier equitable 
interest was that of a beneficiary under a trust and the holder of the later interest knew 
of it at the time it acquired the legal estate. Nor does it apply in favour of a mortgagee, 
because of section 94(3) of the Law of Property Act 1925.734 
14.14.2.4.2 There is a series of cases where the holder of a prior equitable interest 
in tangible property has been held to have lost its priority to the holder of a 
subsequent equitable interest because the merits of the holder of the subsequent 
interest were greater than those of the earlier interest.735 Some of the cases are based 
on a concept of ‘negligence’ or ‘postponing conduct’ on the part of the earlier holder, 
the consequence of which is that the subsequent holder was misled into believing that 
the earlier interest did not exist, as, for instance, where title deeds were left available 
to a mortgagor so that it could represent that the property was unencumbered,736 
where the prior holder has postponed its interest by waiver,737 or where the prior 
holder was a mere volunteer and the subsequent holder gave value and had no notice 
of the earlier interest.738 
14.14.2.5 The purchase money security interest 
The concept of ‘purchase money security’ refers to an interest that protects the 
position of someone who advances money for the purchase of an asset on the basis of 
an agreement, on which the advance is made, that it will be given fixed security by the 
borrower over that asset to secure the advance. The interest of the holder of the 
security is a ‘purchase money security interest’. Under English law the concept is 
generally thought to be limited to a situation where the holder of such security enjoys 
priority over an earlier general security interest which would catch the relevant asset 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
731 See Phillips J in E Pfeiffer Weinkellerei-Weineinkauf GmbH v Arbuthnot Factors Ltd [1988] 1 WLR 
150, 161–163 
732 This rule does not apply to choses in action, because the rules for choses are entirely derived from 
the equitable rules as to competitions between equitable interests, for the reasons explained by Phillips 
J in E Pfeiffer Weinkellerei-Weineinkauf GmbH v Arbuthnot Factors Ltd [1988] 1 WLR 150, 161. 
733 Bailey v Barnes [1894] 1 Ch 25; McCarthy & Stone Ltd v Julian S Hodge & Co. Ltd [1971] 1 WLR 
1547, 1555–1556. 
734 See McCarthy & Stone Ltd v Julian S Hodge & Co Ltd [1971] 1 WLR 1547, at 1,556; Macmillan 
Inc v Bishopsgate Investment Trust (No 3) [1995] 1 WLR 978, 1002. 
735 The cases are discussed by Meagher, Gummow and Lehane, Equity: Doctrines and Remedies (5th 
edn, 2015), paras 8-030 to 8-080. 
736 Farrand v Yorkshire Banking Co (1888) 40 ChD 182; Walker v Linom [1907] 2 Ch 104. 
737 Fung v Tong [1918] AC 403. 
738 Taylor v London and County Banking Co [1901] 2 Ch 231. 
by way of an after-acquired property clause.739 This will be the result even if the 
purchase money security holder knew of the earlier interest, provided that it was 
unaware of any negative pledge which prevented the chargor from giving the 
purchase money security.740 
14.14.2.6 Floating charges 
The position as to floating charges has already been discussed. By way of general 
summary, if security is held by way of a floating charge then essentially it will 
concede priority to almost every other competing interest in the assets covered by the 
charge, so long as such an interest was acquired in circumstances that were within the 
ordinary course of business of the chargor (which is a concept that has been 
interpreted very widely) and before the charge crystallised, subject to the holder of the 
competing interest not having notice of a negative pledge which prevented the chargor 
from creating that interest.741 Even after crystallisation, the holder of the charge must 
defer to a number of other interests that are preferred before it by statute. 
14.14.2.6.1 If the competing interest was acquired after the charge had crystallised 
then the position is assessed by treating the charge as a fixed equitable charge from 
the time of crystallisation. However, for the purpose of determining if the holder of 
the other competing interest had notice of the crystallised charge, it is notice of the 
fact of crystallisation that is the relevant issue as, otherwise, such a holder will only 
have notice of a floating charge and the apparent entitlement of the chargor to deal 
with its assets in the ordinary course of its business. It may also be arguable that if the 
chargee permits the chargor to continue to deal with the charged assets after the 
charge has crystallised, the chargee may be precluded from denying the chargor’s 
entitlement to do so. 
14.14.2.7 Priority agreements 
As mentioned above, the parties with competing interests in an asset may agree as to 
the order in which their respective interests will rank under a priority agreement, and 
such an agreement will normally bind them to what they have agreed.742 The parties 
to such an agreement should bear in mind the potential pitfall of the decision in Re 
Portbase Clothing Ltd 743 which has been previously discussed. In that case it was 
held that where, by agreement, the fixed chargee conferred priority upon a floating 
chargee, the preferential creditors could assert their statutory priority ahead of both 
charges. The same result would apply in favour of the liquidator for his liquidation 
expenses under section 176ZA of the Insolvency Act 1986 and the right of unsecured 
creditors under section 176A of the Insolvency Act 1986. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
739 For an argument that the doctrine of purchase money security interest is not a coherent or certain 
doctrine under English law, see R Boadle, ‘A Purchase Money Security Interest in UK Law?’ [2014] 
LMCLQ 76.  See also L Gullifer (ed), Goode on Legal Problems of Credit and Security (Sweet & 
Maxwell 2013 5th edn) paras 5-63 to 5-67. 
740 See Lord Oliver in Abbey National Building Society v Cann [1991] 1 AC 56, at 89–93 and Jonathan 
Parker LJ in Whale v Viasystems Technograph Ltd [2002] EWCA Civ 480. 
741See 14.6.8.2.. 
742 Cheah Theam Swee v Equiticorp Finance Group Ltd [1992] AC 472. See also s 94(1)(a) of the Law 
of Property Act 1925. 
743  [1993] Ch 388. 
14.14.3 Goods 
Turning now to priorities concerning competing interests in goods (except for ships 
and aircraft where the interests are registered on the relevant register and other than 
where one such interest is by way of a floating charge) the starting point is the ‘nemo 
dat’ rule outlined above. An example of this rule is to be found in The Shizelle 744 
which was a case concerning a ship that fell outside the regime for the registration of 
ships. It was held that where a legal mortgage had been granted, the owner (having, 
via the mortgage, divested itself of the legal title in the vessel) could not confer a later 
legal interest by way of sale. Accordingly, a later purchaser took subject to the 
mortgage, even though he was unaware of the mortgage and, in fact, could not have 
discovered it.745 
14.14.3.1 There are exceptions to the nemo dat rule in the Sale of Goods Act 
1979 and the Factors Act 1889,746 as well as in Part III of the Hire Purchase Act 1964 
in relation to motor vehicles. Further difficulties can arise for an owner of goods in 
relation to the rights of lien holders and the loss of title through goods becoming 
fixtures and incorporated in land or where the goods are mixed with or incorporated 
into other goods. These matters are discussed in Chapter 15. 
14.14.3.2 The next rule is that a bona fide purchaser (a purchaser being a person 
who has given value, who could be an outright purchaser or a person taking security) 
of the legal estate in goods, who takes without notice of an earlier equitable interest, 
will prevail. Here, constructive notice would be relevant. 
14.14.3.3 In the absence of the application of the previous rules, priority will be 
governed by the residual rules, of which the most salient is likely to be that the first in 
time will prevail, unless it is defeated by a purchase money security interest. 
14.14.4 Debts 
The position as to competing priorities in debts is discussed in Chapter 12. 
14.14.5 Further advances 
The above has referred to the priority position of the holder of security for securing a 
fixed sum or advance. There are special rules to deal with priorities where the holder 
of a fixed security with priority learns, before it makes a further advance, of another 
fixed security or purchase interest in the charged assets,747 which will now be 
discussed. 
14.14.5.1 Section 94(3) of the Law of Property Act 1925 abolished the old 
general law concept of ‘tacking’, under which a person with security for a specific 
advance might in certain limited circumstances have been able to use its security to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
744  [1992] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 444. 
745 This still seems to be the rule despite section 24 Sale of Goods Act 1979, since this only relates to a 
seller in possession and sale is specifically stated not to include a mortgage (section 62(4) Sale of 
Goods Act 1979) 
746 I.e. s 24 of the Sale of Goods Act 1979 and s 8 of the Factors Act 1889 (a further disposition by a 
seller who remains in possession), and s 25(1) of the Sale of Goods Act and s 9 of the Factors Act (a 
disposition by a purchaser or a person who has agreed to buy and obtained possession). 
747 What follows does not deal with the priority of the proprietor of a registered charge over registered 
land, to which the provisions of s 49 of the Land Registration Act 2002 apply. 
cover further indebtedness of a borrower.748 The previous concept of tacking was 
replaced by section 94(1) of the Law of Property Act 1925, which provides that the 
holder of a prior ranking security will continue to enjoy priority over a subsequently 
ranking security for any further advance it makes if it meets any one of three 
conditions, namely: 
(a) that it was unaware of the other security at the time of making the advance; 
(b) if the security instrument obliges it to make the further advance; or 
(c) if there is an agreement between the security holders which continues the 
priority of the prior security holder. 
 
14.14.5.2 There are a number of difficulties in the application of the section. 
14.14.5.2.1 First, section 94(1) refers to further ‘advances’ that are made by the 
prior ranking security holder. It is not clear if this would also cover other financial 
accommodation that is granted by it or other obligations that become due to it by the 
chargor. Nor is it clear if the section would apply where the security secures a 
guarantee in circumstances where advances were being made to a third party in 
reliance upon the guarantee. 
14.14.5.2.2 Secondly, it is uncertain if the priority would be lost only if the prior 
security holder had actual notice of the subsequent security or if constructive notice 
would be sufficient. It is submitted that the latter construction would be unjust, as it 
would, for instance, have the consequence that the security holder would have to 
conduct a search each time it wished to make an advance in case a later security had 
been registered at Companies House. 
14.14.5.2.3 Thirdly, the provision in section 94(1) that refers to an obligation to 
make the further advance provides for the obligation to be contained in the security 
instrument itself, not just somewhere else, and it must be an obligation to make the 
further advance, not simply a discretion to do so. Hence, if an event of default has 
occurred and the lender has the contractual right to refuse to make an advance, there 
will not be an obligation to make the advance. 
14.14.5.2.4 Fourthly, if the prior security holder cannot claim the benefit of 
protection under section 94(1) then the risk that the prior security holder has of losing 
its priority for further advances may be accentuated by the operation of the rule in 
Clayton’s case.749 Accordingly, if the borrower makes payments into its account, such 
payments would have the effect under the rule of paying off the indebtedness incurred 
on that account before the prior security holder received notice of the later security.750 
This can be overcome by the prior security holder ruling off the account and opening 
a new account from which further advances are made and into which repayments are 
credited. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
748 As, for instance, used to be case under the rule in Hopkinson v Rolt (1861) 9 HL Cas 514. It has 
been held, however, that s 94(3) did not also have the effect of abolishing the doctrine of tabula in 
naufragio in cases that did not involve a mortgagee. Under that doctrine, the holder of an equitable 
interest in a tangible asset that was second in time could, by getting in the legal interest, overreach an 
earlier equitable interest of which the holder had no notice at the time it acquired its own equitable 
interest: see McCarthy & Stone Ltd v Julian S Hodge & Co Ltd [1971] 1 WLR 1547, 1556. 
749 Devaynes v Noble, Clayton’s Case (1816) LJ Ch 256, 35 ER 767. 
750 This was the position under the general law before s 94: see Deeley v Lloyds Bank Ltd [1912] AC 
756. 
14.14.5.2.5 Finally, section 94(1) only applies to a situation where there are 
competing security interests. It does not apply if the later interest is that of a 
purchaser. This final situation was addressed, however, by Slade J in Siebe Gorman & 
Co Ltd v Barclays Bank Ltd.751 His Lordship held that it would be inequitable to allow 
the security holder to assert its priority for advances it made with notice of the 
purchaser’s interest, to the detriment of the purchaser, when it had not been obliged to 
make those advances. It is not clear what the position would be if the security holder 
was obliged to make the further advances despite having notice of the subsequent 
interest. It had been held at common law752 that the further advances would not have 
priority, although it would appear to follow from Slade J’s reasoning in the Siebe 
Gorman case that the security holder should be able to assert its priority for further 
advances made in those circumstances. 
14.15 Subordination  
14.15.1 Introduction 
Subordination is a process by which an unsecured creditor (or creditors) agrees to 
subordinate its right to payment by a debtor, particularly in an insolvency of the 
debtor, behind the claims of one or more other unsecured creditors. The subordinated 
creditor is often referred to as the ‘junior creditor’ and the indebtedness due to the 
junior creditor (including principal and interest) is referred to as the ‘junior debt’. The 
other creditors in whose favour the subordination exists are called the ‘senior 
creditors’ and their debt is referred to as the ‘senior debt’.  
14.15.1.1 Subordination has the effect that if there are any assets of the debtor 
available for distribution to unsecured creditors, the junior creditor will only be 
entitled to receive and retain payments in the distribution with respect to the junior 
debt once the senior creditors have been paid out in full for the senior debt. 
Accordingly, it is not a matter that concerns rights in security or of regulating such 
rights. By contrast, an agreement as to priorities concerns the competing interests of 
secured creditors under their respective securities and how those interests should rank. 
Such priority agreements, which are sometimes also referred to as subordination753, 
have been discussed above, so the term ‘subordination’ is used here to refer to 
subordination of unsecured debt. Although subordination does not involve matters of 
security, it is still a matter of relevant interest and it is convenient to discuss it at this 
point. 
14.15.1.2 If the junior creditor agrees to put its claims with respect to the junior 
debt behind those of all the other creditors of a debtor (except, perhaps, other 
subordinated creditors) then the consequence will be that its junior debt will have the 
appearance of a form of quasi-equity, ranking just ahead of the claims of the 
shareholders in a winding up of the debtor. It is not correct, however, to treat 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
751  [1979] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 142. The case is famous for dealing with the question whether it was possible 
for a fixed charge to be taken over a company’s book debts. It is not so well known for its decision on 
the issue presently under discussion. The effect of the decision on this point meant that the bank really 
obtained a pyrrhic victory, as nearly all of the benefit of having a fixed charge was lost to the priority 
gained by the purchaser of the relevant debts, as the vast majority of the outstanding indebtedness 
secured to the bank had arisen after the bank received notice of the assignment. 
752 West v Williams [1899] 1 Ch 132. 
753 See L Gullifer (ed), Goode on Legal Problems of Credit and Security (Sweet & Maxwell 5th edn 
2013) at para 1-86. 
subordinated debt as being assimilated to equity, for a number of reasons. In the first 
place, because it is debt that still ranks ahead of the claims of the shareholders in a 
distribution upon winding up of the debtor. Secondly, subordinated debt can carry a 
contractual right to interest, whereas dividends can only be paid out of distributable 
profits and certain reserves. Thirdly, a repayment of subordinated debt does not 
amount to a reduction of a company’s capital, which can only be achieved in 
accordance with the requirements of the Companies Act 2006. Fourthly, subordinated 
debt can be issued at a discount, whereas share capital cannot be issued at a 
discount.754 Fifthly, the tax treatment of interest that is payable on subordinated debt 
is likely to be different to that which applies to dividends on shares. Finally, to the 
extent that the company is a worthwhile and profitable enterprise, the shareholders are 
likely to make a greater return upon their investment than the holders of debt. For that 
reason, there is an incentive to keep the number of shareholders limited by arranging 
for funding via a subordinated debt issue.755 
14.15.1.3 Subordinated debt may comprise loans as well as capital markets debt 
issues. It is often used to provide a part of private equity financing, as one or more of 
the layers of debt to fund the acquisition. The thought is that some investors will be 
prepared to take a greater level of risk in return for more profitable rewards via higher 
interest rates on the debt. If they do so then that will encourage others to provide 
funding that is less risky, although the safer debt does not carry such a high return. 
The sense of such freestyle thinking has been sorely tested by the crisis in the world’s 
financial markets in the second part of 2007, although the structures that were used 
before that time are now commonplace again. Subordinated debt may also be used as 
a method of providing funds within a group of companies, as an alternative to the 
parent company injecting the funds through a subscription of share capital. 
Subordination also occurs in some forms of guarantee, by which the guarantor agrees 
not to compete with the creditor by proving in the winding up of the primary debtor, 
and to subordinate its claims against the primary debtor behind those of the creditor. 
This is particularly important if the guarantee does not cover the whole of the 
indebtedness of the primary debtor to the creditor. Subordinated debt may also be 
issued for regulatory purposes, as it may qualify as part of regulatory capital in 
computing capital adequacy ratios and requirements. 
14.15.1.4 The subordination may be in favour of all of the debtor’s other 
creditors or only one or a particular class of them. The former is likely to be the case 
when subordination is used to achieve a regulatory capital requirement or in situations 
where it is wished to encourage third parties to grant credit to the debtor, whereas the 
latter is more likely to occur in private financing transactions where it is simply a 
matter of ranking the claims of the various debt holders. 
14.15.1.5 Something similar to subordination can be achieved through the use of 
a corporate group structure. In such a structure, debt could be raised by a parent 
company which is then passed down to its subsidiary, either by a subscription for 
shares in the subsidiary or by making a subordinated loan to the subsidiary. By virtue 
of the legal distinction between the two entities, the creditors of the subsidiary would 
have a first claim against it before the claim of the parent. Assuming that the only 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
754 S 580 of the Companies Act 2006. 
755 There has been considerable development of ‘hybrid’ securities in the capital markets using the 
concept of subordinated debt for the reasons in the text, see L Gullifer and J Payne, Corporate Finance 
Law : Principles and Policy (2nd edn, Hart Publishing 2015), 2.4. 
asset of the parent was its investment in the subsidiary, the debt of the parent would, 
in a practical sense, be dependent upon receipts from the subsidiary which, in turn, 
would only be payable after the subsidiary’s own creditors had been satisfied. By 
process of similar reasoning, lenders to a subsidiary company will rank ahead of the 
claims of the parent company as a shareholder in the subsidiary.756 
14.15.2 Types of subordination arrangement 
14.15.2.1 There are two principal methods of achieving a subordination as 
between creditors of the same debtor. Sometimes a combination of these methods 
might be appropriate as, for instance, by providing for the junior creditor to turn over 
to the senior creditor any rights it has and any payment it receives, so as to cover the 
possibility that the contingent debt method fails (whether wilfully or otherwise) to 
achieve what is required. 
As a preliminary matter, it is also necessary to determine which of the indebtedness 
that might be owing to the junior creditor should be treated as junior debt. This will 
not cause a difficulty where the junior debt is to comprise all such indebtedness. The 
position will be more problematic where only part of that indebtedness is to be treated 
as junior debt. In such a case it will be necessary to ensure that the junior creditor is 
not unduly favoured in receiving payments of its unsubordinated debt and that junior 
debt cannot surreptitiously be paid in the guise of being unsubordinated debt. 
14.15.2.2 Turnover subordination and subordination trusts 
The first method is often referred to as ‘turnover subordination’. Under it, the junior 
creditor agrees to account to the senior creditor, or to turn over to the senior creditor, 
the benefit it has of the junior debt in specified circumstances, particularly if the 
debtor has become subject to insolvency proceedings. This may be achieved by a 
purely contractual arrangement, but the senior creditor will then be taking the risk that 
the contractual arrangements will wither in an insolvency of the junior creditor. For 
that reason, the senior creditor would usually prefer that the arrangement should take 
the form of a subordination trust, by which the junior creditor undertakes to hold its 
rights and any payment that it receives on trust for the senior creditor. An example of 
such a trust can be seen in Re British and Commonwealth Holdings PLC (No 3).757 
Where the junior debt is comprised in a bond issue, then the trustee for the bond 
holders can be joined in the arrangement, so that the trust deed will provide that its 
obligations under the subordination trust, including as to making distributions, will 
take precedence over those in favour of the bond holders. It is advisable that the 
senior creditor should possess authority, preferably in the form of a power of attorney, 
to take action on behalf of the junior creditor with respect to the junior debt, including 
lodging proofs and pursuing claims. If the senior creditors comprise all of the other 
unsecured creditors of the debtor then the trustee or junior creditor can be directed to 
make payment to the liquidator of the debtor for distribution by him amongst the 
senior creditors. Similarly, a subordination trust could be in favour of a trustee on 
behalf of the senior creditors in a case where there were more than one such creditor. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
756 Structural subordination by this method is particularly common, among other places, in 
leveraged buyout involving private equity. 
757  [1992] 1 WLR 672. 
14.15.2.3 Contingent debt subordination 
By this method, it is a term of the contract under which the junior debt arises, usually 
reinforced by agreement between all the parties, that in the event that the debtor is 
subject to insolvency proceedings, the junior debt will only be payable to the junior 
creditor if the senior creditor has been paid out in full. The junior creditor will also 
usually agree not to claim against the debtor or prove in its insolvency whilst any 
amount of the senior debt remains outstanding. An example of this type of 
subordination will be found in Re Maxwell Communications Corp PLC (No 2),758 
where the relevant governing law of the jurisdiction concerned was unable to 
accommodate a subordination trust. This method of subordination is not suitable 
where there are unsecured creditors of the debtor who are not senior creditors. This is 
because the effect of the arrangement is not to direct the junior creditor’s share to the 
senior creditors but, in effect, to swell the pot that is available for distribution to all 
the unsecured creditors other than the junior creditor. In consequence, it will usually 
also have the effect of prolonging the subordination of the junior creditor’s claims. 
14.15.2.4 Situations outside the insolvency of the debtor 
Strictly speaking, subordination looks to the situation that will apply in the debtor’s 
insolvency. For practical reasons, however, it might be desirable to extend any 
restrictions and turn over obligations that apply with respect to payments that fall due 
to the junior creditor so that they, or something to similar effect, will also apply even 
when the debtor has not entered insolvency proceedings. Accordingly, a well drafted 
subordination agreement will impose various tests and conditions that have to be met 
in the ordinary course before the debtor may make, or the junior creditor is entitled to 
receive or retain, payments of interest, fees and the like, and repayments of principal. 
Such tests will usually address: 
(i) the debtor’s solvency at the time the payment falls due; 
(ii) that there are sufficient reserves which are held by the debtor and available to 
pay the indebtedness due to the senior creditors as measured and projected 
over a certain period of time; and 
(iii)  that there has been no actual or anticipated default by the borrower in meeting 
its obligations under the relevant agreements between it and the senior 
creditors. 
14.15.2.5 It is also desirable to ensure that in a financial re-construction of the 
debtor and its liabilities, the position of the junior creditor is carried through into the 
new arrangements. It may also be necessary to consider the ability of the junior 
creditor to vote as a separate class and to provide that it should vote in accordance 
with the directions of the senior creditors. 
14.15.3 Legal issues that arise in connection with subordination 
There are a number of legal issues that arise in connection with subordination 
arrangements, which will now be discussed. Some of these issues concern matters that 
relate to the relationships that will exist between the junior creditor, the debtor, and 
the senior creditor; others would arise in an insolvency of the debtor; and yet others of 
them concern issues that might arise in an insolvency of the junior creditor. One 
consequence of this is the necessity to keep in mind when considering these issues the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
758  [1993] 1 WLR 1402. 
possibility that either or both of the debtor and the junior creditor might enter 
insolvency proceedings which may remain current. 
14.15.3.1 Pari passu distribution in a winding up of the debtor 
It is rather surprising that it took a relatively long time for English law to determine if 
subordination arrangements might offend against the pari passu principle, which is  
encapsulated in sections 107 and 328(3) of the Insolvency Act 1986 and in Rule 4.181 
of the Insolvency Rules 1986. An arrangement which would have the consequence of 
subverting that principle is void.759 It had been argued that the intended effect of a 
subordination was to subvert the principle and was therefore ineffective, because the 
subordination had the effect that the junior creditor would rank behind the senior 
creditors in a winding up or bankruptcy of the debtor, rather than equally with them. 
14.15.3.1.1 A series of cases beginning in the early 1990s has now established the 
validity of the concept of subordination in English law.760 Two early cases, which 
actually concerned issues arising in schemes of arrangement, so were not of binding 
authority in relation to a bankruptcy or winding up, were the decisions of Vinelott J in 
Re British and Commonwealth Holdings PLC (No. 3)761 and Re Maxwell 
Communications Corp. PLC (No.2).762 In the first of those cases, his Lordship upheld 
the validity of a subordination trust. In the second case, his Lordship upheld the 
validity of a contingent debt subordination. More recently, both types of 
subordination arrangement have been held valid in a winding up of a debtor in Re 
SSSL Realisations (2002) Ltd; Manning v AIG Europe Ltd.763 The essential reasoning 
of those cases is that the pari passu principle is intended to prevent the debtor 
agreeing with one or a few of its creditors to an arrangement which is for the benefit 
of that one or few creditors but not for the equal benefit of all of its creditors. The 
principle does not prevent an arrangement by which one or a few creditors agree with 
the debtor to postpone their rights behind those of other creditors. Furthermore, the 
Court of Appeal in Re Lehman Brothers International (Europe) decided that it is 
possible for a creditor with a provable debt to agree to a subordination lower down the 
order of priority, after statutory interest and non-provable liabilities..764 It was held 
that the mandatory provisions of payment of statutory interest in administration and 
liquidation765 could constitute debt “payable or owing by the Borrower” under the 
terms of the agreement and were not merely directions to the insolvency officer on 
how to deal with a fund under his control.766 It was also confirmed (a point made at 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
759 British Eagle International Airlines Ltd v Cie Nationale Air France [1975] 1 WLR 758; Revenue 
and Customs Commissioners v Football League Ltd [2012] EWHC 1372 (Ch) [4].  
760 A little earlier, subordination arrangements had been held valid in Australia: Horne v Chester & 
Fein Property Developments Pty Ltd (1987) 5 ACLC 245. See also Re NIAA Corporation Ltd (1994) 
12 ACLC 64 and United States Trust Co of New York v Australia & New Zealand Banking Group Ltd 
(1995) 17 ACSR 697. 
761  [1992] 1 WLR 672. 
762  [1993] 1 WLR 1,402. 
763  [2004] EWHC 1760 (Ch), [2005] 1BCLC 1 (Lloyd J), upheld [2006] EWCA Civ 7, [2006] Ch 610. 
764 [2014] EWHC 704 (Ch), [2015] Ch 1, affirmed on this point unanimously [2015] EWCA Civ 485, 
[2015] BCC 431.  
765 Rule 2.88(7) of the Insolvency Rules 1986 and section 189(2) of the Insolvency Act 1986 
766 See also Vinelott J in In re Maxwell [1993] 1 WLR 1,402 expressly contemplated that a preferential 
creditor could agree that his debt would rank equally with the unsecured non-preferential debts, 
notwithstanding that the payment of preferential debts in priority to the general body of unsecured 
debts is itself the subject of provisions expressed in mandatory terms: section 175(1) of the Insolvency 
the first instance only) that subordination could be effected on a purely contractual 
basis, rather than a trust, and did not contravene the pari passu rules.767  
14.15.3.2 Insolvency set-off as between the insolvent debtor and the junior 
creditor 
As previously explained, the rules as to insolvency set-off are mandatory in the 
bankruptcy or winding up of a debtor and they may also come into play in the 
administration of the debtor, where the administrator proposes to make a distribution 
to creditors. The question which arises at this point is whether the rules apply where 
the junior creditor has a liability to the debtor which, but for the subordination, would 
be taken into account for insolvency set-off purposes. If the set-off is not available 
then the junior creditor will be forced to pay its liability and it will be unable to 
reduce the amount of that liability by reference to the set-off. The question assumes 
that at the time the bankruptcy or winding up commences, the subordination remains 
in place because the senior creditors have not been paid out. 
14.15.3.2.1 In the case of a subordination trust, where the junior creditor has 
effectively disposed of its rights in the junior debt outright, there will be no mutuality 
as between the junior creditor and the debtor on which the set-off could be based. The 
junior creditor would be forced to pay to the liquidator or trustee in bankruptcy the 
full amount of its liability to the debtor (assuming that its amount is determined). It is 
submitted that the same consequence should follow if the trust is over all of the junior 
debt, albeit limited as to the amount recoverable by the senior creditor under it. 
14.15.3.2.2 Where the subordination is achieved through the means of a contingent 
debt arrangement, without the back-up of a subordination trust, it was argued in the 
previous edition that theoretically the set-off could apply, because contingent 
liabilities might still be taken into the account for the purposes of the set-off. This was 
recently confirmed by the Court of Appeal.768 However, it was said in the previous 
edition, and these considerations still apply, that such a set-off only arises in particular 
circumstances.  It is necessary to put a value on the contingent debt for the purpose of 
taking the account of the respective amounts to be set off.769 If the senior debt will not 
be paid out in full then nothing will be payable by the insolvent debtor with respect to 
the contingent debt, so that no value should be placed on it. The practical consequence 
would be that there would be nothing available to be set off. The junior creditor would 
be obliged to pay to the liquidator or trustee in bankruptcy the debt that it owes to the 
insolvent debtor and no set-off would be available to it to reduce that payment. 
14.15.3.2.3 By way of extra precaution, it would be sensible in the subordination 
arrangements to provide that the junior creditor should account to the senior creditors 
for the benefit it receives in any set-off that is applied. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Act 1986 (liquidation), which applies also in an administration: paragraph 65(2) of Schedule to the 
Insolvency Act 1986. 
767 See David Richards J in Re Lehman Brothers International (Europe) (in admin) [2014] EWHC 704 
(Ch), [2015] Ch 1 [82]-[85]. 
768 Re Lehman Brothers International (Europe) (in admin)  [2015] EWCA Civ 485, [2015] BCC 431. 
769 See Briggs LJ in Re Lehman Brothers International (Europe) (in admin)  [2015] EWCA Civ 485, 
[2015] BCC 431 at [152]. 
14.15.3.3 Participation of the junior creditor in the prescribed part of floating 
charge property 
Section 176A of the Insolvency Act 1986 provides for a prescribed part of the 
recoveries under a floating charge to be made ‘available for the satisfaction of 
unsecured debts.’ Under a subordination trust, the junior debt should still qualify to be 
taken into account under the section as an unsecured debt, and the junior creditor 
would be required to hold the benefit of any amount it received pursuant to the 
operation of the section for the senior creditors. The position is not so clear in relation 
to a contingent debt subordination, because it is arguable that there is no debt due by 
the debtor to the junior creditor which would qualify to be taken into account for the 
purposes of the section. 
14.15.3.4 Subordination trusts by way of security 
This issue concerns whether a subordination trust constitutes a form of third party 
security that is given by the junior creditor to the senior creditors, over the junior debt, 
as security for the payment of the senior debt. If so, then the further question that 
arises is whether the security is registrable as a charge under section 859A of the 
Companies Act 2006.770 If the charge is registrable, and it is not registered, then it will 
be void in the liquidation or administration of the junior creditor, and it will also be 
void as against other secured creditors of the junior creditor. Whether or not the 
charge is registrable, it might also infringe the terms of a negative pledge which the 
junior creditor has agreed in favour of a third party. In addition, if the trust constitutes 
security that has been given by the junior creditor, it would be subject to the 
restrictions and other provisions that would apply to such security in an administration 
of the junior creditor or if a proposal has been made for a company voluntary 
arrangement of the junior creditor.771 
14.15.3.4.1 It is possible that a trust which a person declares over the benefit of an 
asset might be absolute, in the sense that it confers a sole beneficial ownership of the 
trust property in favour of the beneficiaries and, accordingly, that the trustee gives up 
all its real rights in the trust property, or a joint beneficial interest in which the trustee 
holds the trust property jointly for itself and the beneficiary.772 Alternatively, such a 
trust might be held to be by way of charge, even by way of floating charge, because 
the trustee has not given up all of its interest in the trust property.773 It is also 
important to remember that in English law security may be given to secure the 
obligations of a third party without the security giver undertaking a personal 
obligation to pay the liability for which the security has been given. The essential 
question in resolving this issue is whether the person that declares the trust (in this 
case the junior creditor) intends to create an absolute interest (in the whole or part of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
770 See discussion above. 
771 See para 12(1) of Sched A1, and paras 43 and 44 of Sched B1, to the Insolvency Act 1986. 
772 The ability of a trustee to declare a trust over part of a fund is supported by a number of recent 
authorities, see In the Matter of Lehman Brothers International (Europe) (In Administration) [2009] 
EWHC 2545 (Ch) [56]; Lehman Brothers International (Europe) (in admin) [2010] EWCA Civ 917 
[171]; Re Lehman Brothers International (Europe) (In Administration) [2010] EWHC 2914 (Ch) 
[232]–[239].  See also Re Kayford Ltd [1975] 1 WLR 279; Re Lewis’s of Leicester [1995] BCC 514.  
For further discussion of the argument in this context, see L Gullifer and J Payne, Corporate Finance 
Law : Principles and Policy (2nd edn, Hart Publishing 2015), 6.4.4.1.1. 
773 See Slade J in Re Bond Worth Ltd [1980] Ch 228, at 247 and Jonathan Parker J in Re ILG Travel Ltd 
[1996] BCC 21, at 44–45. 
the fund) or intends to create a security interest, as demonstrated by the terms of the 
subordination agreement. 
 
14.15.3.4.2 In the context of a subordination trust, it is unlikely that a junior creditor would 
give up all of its entitlement in the junior debt, even to the extent of parting with its interest in the 
debt once the senior creditors had been paid out in full.   Thus, the only two possible analyses are 
that it intends to create a charge, or to declare a trust over part of the fund (namely, the amount it 
recovers from the debtor).    . In Re SSSL Realisations774 Lloyd J held that, on construction of the 
relevant clause, the trust obligation was limited to the sums due to the senior creditor, and 
therefore was not a charge.775  Even if a charge were created, it would not be registrable if it were 
a security financial collateral arrangement, which, if it were a charge over the junior creditor’s 
bank account, it could be.776 
. 
14.15.3.5 The pari passu principle in the insolvency of the junior creditor 
In Re SSSL Realisations (2002) Ltd; Manning v AIG Europe Ltd 777 it was also argued 
that the agreement by the junior creditor to the subordination arrangements might 
offend against the pari passu principle in relation to a bankruptcy or winding up of 
the junior creditor. The argument was put on the basis that by agreeing that its rights 
to payment by the debtor would be restricted, the junior creditor had prejudiced its 
own creditors by making one of its assets unavailable in its own insolvency. The 
argument was rejected. The pari passu  principle relates to arrangements which have 
the effect of putting the claims of certain unsecured creditors of an insolvent debtor, 
without their consent, behind the claims of other unsecured creditors of that insolvent 
debtor. The principle has nothing to do with the availability or quality of the assets of 
the insolvent debtor to meet those claims. In effect, the fact that the asset was 
impaired by the subordination arrangements agreed by the junior creditor with the 
senior creditors was not relevant to the application of the pari passu principle.778 It is 
worth noting that a similar point was considered by Peter Gibson J in Carreras 
Rothman Ltd v Freeman Mathews Treasure Ltd,779 which concerned a company that 
was in liquidation and which, in relation to a debt that was owed to it, had agreed 
before the commencement of the liquidation to give up that debt (i.e. to give up the 
asset being the debt due to it) in return for its former debtor participating in the 
establishment and funding of a Quistclose trust arrangement (see the decision of the 
House of Lords in Barclays Bank Ltd v Quistclose Investments Ltd780) in favour of 
certain debtors of the company.     
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
774 [2004] EWHC 1760 (Ch) [49], [51]. 
775 This was upheld by the Court of Appeal in Re SSSL Realisations, sub nom Squires v AIG Europe 
(UK) Ltd [2006] EWCA Civ 7 [122]. 
776 See 14.7.5 for discussion of security financial collateral arrangements. 
777  [2004] EWHC 1760 (Ch), [2005] 1BCLC 1 (Lloyd J), upheld [2006] EWCA Civ 7, [2006] Ch 610. 
778 The anti-deprivation principle might be more appropriate, but is unlikely to be relevant as 
the deprivation is not triggered by the entry of the junior creditor into insolvency proceedings. 
779  [1985] Ch 207. 
780  [1970] AC 567. 
14.15.3.6 Disclaimer of a subordination arrangement as an unprofitable 
contract in the insolvency of the junior creditor 
This issue, which particularly concerns the contingent debt aspects of a subordination, 
was explored by Lloyd J at first instance and by Chadwick LJ in the appeal in Re 
SSSL Realisations (2002) Ltd; Manning v AIG Europe Ltd.781 The explanation that 
follows is taken from the judgments of Lloyd J and Chadwick LJ, the latter upholding 
the judgment of the former. 
14.15.3.6.1 The right to disclaim onerous property is exercisable by a trustee in 
bankruptcy782 and by a liquidator.783 The provisions concerning bankruptcy are in 
much the same terms as those for winding up, so the discussion will concentrate on 
the provisions that apply in a winding up, principally section 178 of the Insolvency 
Act 1986. The effect of a disclaimer by a liquidator is that the rights and liabilities of 
the company in liquidation with respect to the relevant contract or asset are 
terminated, so that the company will be released from having to make further 
performance of its obligations under the contract or with respect to the asset. A 
counterparty that is adversely affected by the disclaimer is given a right to prove for 
the loss or damage that it sustains, but that will usually be of little real benefit. There 
is a saving provision as to the associated liabilities of a third party, which has given 
rise to difficulties in areas such as guarantees of property leases that have been 
disclaimed.784 
14.15.3.6.2 Section 178(3) of the Insolvency Act 1986 defines ‘onerous property’ 
to mean (a) an unprofitable contract or (b) other property which is unsaleable or not 
readily saleable or which has onerous liabilities attached to it. In light of the definition 
of ‘Property’ in section 436 of the Act, Lloyd J came to the view that something could 
only qualify as property within (b) if it involved some element of benefit or 
entitlement for the person holding it. The obligations of a junior creditor are unlikely 
to fit that requirement. That view was approved by Chadwick LJ. Accordingly, 
section 178 should only apply in the case of a subordination by the junior creditor if 
its liquidator could establish that the relevant subordination arrangement was an 
unprofitable contract for the junior creditor. 
14.15.3.6.3 In relation to the concept of an unprofitable contract, Lloyd J referred 
to the decision of Chesterman J in the Supreme Court of Queensland, Australia, in 
Trans-metro Corporation Ltd v Real Investments Pty Ltd785 in which his Honour, in 
considering a similar legislative provision, had said that an unprofitable contract was 
one which imposed on the company in liquidation continuing financial obligations 
without sufficient reciprocal benefits. It must give rise to prospective liabilities. A 
contract is not unprofitable merely because it is financially disadvantageous or 
because the company could have made a better bargain. Contracts that will delay the 
winding up, which will have to be performed over a substantial period of time and 
which will involve irrecoverable expenditure are unprofitable. This was approved by 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
781  [2004] EWHC 1760 (Ch); [2005] 1BCLC 1, at [56]–[71] (Lloyd J), upheld [2006] EWCA Civ 7; 
[2006] Ch 610, at [33]–[54]. 
782 Under s 315 of the Insolvency Act 1986. 
783 Under s 178 of the Insolvency Act 1986. 
784 See Hindcastle v Barbara Attenborough [1997] AC 70; Active Estates v Parness (2002) 36 EG 147; 
Scottish Widows v Jane Tripipatkul [2003] EWHC 1874 (Ch). 
785  (1999) 17 ACLC 1314. 
Chadwick LJ who referred to the decision in the Transmetro case, together with a 
series of other Australian cases which supported the view taken in that case.786 
14.15.3.6.4 Chadwick LJ also referred to a summary of the purposes for which the 
power to disclaim is conferred on a liquidator, which had been provided by Professor 
Sir Roy Goode.787 They were, first, to enable the liquidator to bring the liquidation to 
an end without being held up by continuing obligations under unprofitable 
contracts,788 and secondly, in an insolvent liquidation to avoid the continuance of 
liabilities which would be payable as expenses of the liquidation to the detriment of 
unsecured creditors. 
14.15.3.6.5 On the facts of the case, Chadwick LJ upheld the finding by Lloyd J 
that the subordination arrangements entered into by the junior creditor did not amount 
to an unprofitable contract. Although it was disadvantageous to the interests of the 
junior creditor’s own creditors, it did not impose continuing financial obligations on 
the junior creditor, it did not give rise to prospective liabilities to be performed by the 
junior creditor, it did not involve expenditure by the junior creditor, nor did it require 
performance over a substantial period of time. Furthermore, the junior creditor had 
obtained its reciprocal benefit from the senior creditor in consideration of entering 
into the subordination arrangement. 
14.15.3.6.6 Chadwick LJ did go on to say, however, that he could envisage 
circumstances where a subordination arrangement might fall to be considered as an 
unprofitable contract because future obligations that had to be performed under it 
were such as to impede the liquidator in realising the junior creditor’s property and 
paying a dividend to its creditors within a reasonable time. He gave as an example a 
situation (which would be rare) where a junior creditor in a solvent liquidation might 
be required to provide cash cover against a future obligation it might have to the 
senior creditor in an amount that was not then capable of being quantified. His 
Lordship also said that a provision which prevented the junior creditor from proving 
in the debtor’s liquidation might be considered as an unprofitable contract if the facts 
were such that there was a prospect that at some future date the senior creditor would 
be paid off so that the restriction on proving would have the effect that the junior 
creditor had been prevented from proving in the debtor’s liquidation for the junior 
debt. 
14.15.3.7 Administration of the junior creditor 
If the junior creditor enters administration then the various restrictions that apply to 
the enforcement of security and pursuing creditors’ rights in such an administration 
will apply.789 This will act as a restriction on the action that the senior creditors may 
take against the junior creditor. Similar restrictions will apply in the case of the 
moratorium that arises where a proposal has been made for a voluntary arrangement 
of an eligible company, should the junior creditor be such a company.790 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
786 Namely the decisions of Santow J in Global Television Pty Ltd v Sportsview Australia Pty Ltd 
(2000) 35 ACSR 484; Hodgson J in Rothwells Ltd v Spedley Securities Ltd (1990) 8 ACLR 783; and 
Young J in Dekala Pty Ltd v Perth Land & Leisure Ltd (1989) 12 ACLR 585. 
787 Principles of Corporate Insolvency Law (3rd edn, 2005), at para 6-20. 
788 See also Lord Millett in Re Park Air Services PLC [2000] 2 AC 172, at 184. 
789 See, for instance, paras 43 and 44 of Sched B1 to the Insolvency Act 1986. 
790 See para 12 of Sched A1 to the Insolvency Act 1986. 
14.15.3.8 The junior creditor as a surety 
Where a subordination trust constitutes a form of third party security, as discussed 
above, then the junior creditor might be seen as taking on the mantle as a surety for 
the senior debt. The analogy is less clear in a purely contingent debt arrangement but 
it is not entirely fanciful. In either case, it is possible that the junior creditor might be 
able to argue, in principle, that the subordination arrangements were only intended to 
apply with respect to the circumstances as they existed at the time it entered into the 
subordination arrangements. Just as a surety is entitled to insist that the underlying 
agreement as between the creditor and principal debtor, and security and other 
suretyships, should not be changed or abrogated to the potential detriment of the 
surety, so also the junior creditor might be entitled to insist that the terms and 
conditions of the senior debt (and other matters relevant to it) should not be changed 
or released without its consent. This could be relevant to matters such as the amount 
and maturity date of the senior debt and other financial conditions that relate to it, as 
well as other matters that might be material to it, such as the continued existence of 
guarantees and of subordination arrangements entered into by other junior creditors. If 
changes occur without the consent of the junior creditor then the junior creditor might 
be entitled to say that it has been discharged (either in whole or in part) from the 
obligations and restrictions that apply with respect to it and the junior debt under the 
subordination arrangements. 
14.15.3.8.1 In an attempt to defeat any arguments of that nature which the junior 
creditor might raise, it would be advisable to include in the subordination 
arrangements provisions that are similar to those usually found in well drawn forms of 
guarantee, by which the guarantor effectively consents to changes and amendments, 
as well as the discharge of security and other sureties, and confirms that its liability 
under the guarantee will continue unaffected by the occurrence of any such matters.791 
Of course, the junior creditor may not wish to concede a wide amount of liberty in 
that regard and a negotiated position may have to be found. 
14.16 Upsetting Prior Transactions Entered into by an Obligor 
14.16.1 The Insolvency Act 1986 (the ‘Act’) provides a number of grounds 
upon which a transaction which had been previously entered into by an obligor might 
be upset. All but one of them arises in the context of the liquidation, bankruptcy or 
administration of the obligor, where the liquidator, trustee, or administrator is given 
the right to challenge the transaction. The discussion that follows will concentrate on 
the grounds upon which a transaction might be challenged, but it is important to bear 
in mind that there are also other provisions of the Act under which liability may be 
imposed upon the directors and others concerned with an insolvent company in 
relation to misfeasance and other wrongful action on their part which may have 
caused loss to the company and its creditors.792 For simplicity, the discussion will 
concentrate on the grounds for upsetting transactions entered into by a corporate 
obligor, but there are similar provisions that apply in the case of an individual. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
791 See generally the discussion in Chap 16. 
792 See ss 206–214 of the Insolvency Act 1986. 
14.16.2 Avoidance of dispositions of property in a compulsory 
winding up 
Section 127(1) of the Act793 provides that where a company is being wound up by the 
court, a disposition by a company of its property (and any transfer of its shares or 
alteration in the status of its members) made after the commencement of its winding 
up is void unless validated by the court.794 Generally, as validation orders are not 
awarded unless the transaction was in good faith and did not result in a significant 
reduction in the value of assets available to the creditors, courts are slow to award 
them.795 A disposition would include a payment or the granting of any interest in 
property of the company, whether outright or by way of security.796 For this purpose, 
the winding up is deemed to have commenced on the date on which the petition for 
winding up was presented or, if earlier, the date of the passing of a resolution for 
winding up. A number of points arise in considering section 127(1). 
14.16.2.1 A payment into a company’s overdrawn account with its bank 
constitutes a disposition in favour of the bank for the purposes of section 127(1).797 
This is in contrast to a payment into a bank account that was in credit.798 When a bank 
honours a cheque drawn by a company on its account with the bank, where the 
account is in credit, that is a disposition by the company in favour of the payee but the 
bank will not incur liability under section 127(1) for acting in accordance with its 
mandate. The same would probably apply if the account was overdrawn.799 
14.16.2.2 The following principles should apply when the court is deciding if it 
should grant a validation order:800 
(i) the court has a discretion, which is at large; 
(ii) the basic principle underlying the purpose of the section is that of achieving a 
pari passu distribution as between all of the unsecured creditors of the 
insolvent company for the benefit of the general body of creditors and to 
prevent the dissipation of the company’s assets contrary to that purpose;801 
(iii) the court should ensure that the interests of the unsecured creditors are not 
prejudiced; 
(iv) except unusually where it was in the interests of creditors generally, the court 
should not validate a transaction which would have the effect of one pre-
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
793 For bankruptcy see s 284 of the Insolvency Act 1986. 
794 The position is far less severe with respect to a company that is in voluntary winding up which has 
not been converted into a compulsory winding up: see ss 87 and 88 of the Act. 
795 Wilson v SMC Properties Ltd [2015] EWHC 870 (Ch), [2015] 2 BCLC 17.	  
796 But it must be property in which the company has a beneficial interest: Re Margart Pty Ltd (1985) 9 
ACLR 269; Re Branston & Gothard Ltd [1999] BPIR 466. The receipt by the chargee of the proceeds 
of a disposition of charged property would not amount to a disposition in favour of the chargee because 
of the chargee’s pre-existing equitable interest in the proceeds: Re Margart Pty Ltd (1985) 9 ACLR 
269. 
797 Re Gray’s Inn Construction Co Ltd [1980] 1 WLR 711. 
798 Re Barn Crown Ltd [1995] 1WLR 147. 
799 Hollicourt (Contracts) Ltd v Bank of Ireland [2001] Ch 555. 
800 These principles were set out in Rose v AIB Group (UK) PLC [2003] EWHC 1737, [2003] 1 WLR 
2791, which drew upon Re Gray’s Inn Construction Co Ltd [1980] 1 WLR 711and Denney v John 
Hudson & Co Ltd [1992] BCLC 910. For a summary of approaches to validation orders see Wilson v 
SMC Properties Ltd [2015] EWHC 870 (Ch), [2015] 2 BCLC 173.	  
801 See also Lightman J in Coutts & Co v Stock [2000] 1 WLR 906, which was approved by the Court 
of Appeal in Hollicourt (Contracts) Ltd v Bank of Ireland [2001] Ch 555, Mr Registrar Briggs in 
Wilson v SMC Properties Ltd [2015] EWHC 870 (Ch); [2015] 2 BCLC 173, at [20]-[32].. 
liquidation creditor being paid off in full where other creditors would only 
receive a dividend802; and 
(v) a disposition carried out by the parties in good faith at a time when they were 
unaware that a petition had been presented might be validated unless there 
were grounds for thinking that the transaction was an attempt to prefer the 
disponee (‘prefer’ in this sense not having its technical meaning under the Act 
but, rather, something generally having the effect of circumventing the pari 
passu rule). In this regard, however, good faith by itself is not sufficient to 
justify validation. 
There are two further requirements that should be met. First, that the parties were 
acting in the ordinary course of business and secondly, that the relevant transactions 
were likely to be for the benefit of the creditors generally. The second point 
demonstrates that the decision of the Court of Appeal in Re Gray’s Inn Construction 
Co. Ltd 803 should not be taken as authority that a court will always validate payments 
made into an overdrawn bank account where the payments were apparently in the 
ordinary course of business. 
14.16.2.3 The claim by a liquidator for recoupment of an invalid payment or 
other disposition is in the nature of a restitutionary claim, as section 127(1) does not 
provide a statutory right to recover assets that have been wrongfully disposed of by 
the company.804 As the claim is restitutionary in nature, the recipient of a disposition 
may be able to assert a defence based upon a change of its position. Such a defence 
would be available where the recipient was unaware or had genuinely overlooked the 
fact, when it changed its position, that the payment might be invalid or where it had 
acted upon an assurance from the liquidator that he would not claim against the 
recipient.805 
14.16.2.4 It has been suggested that if the claim which is pursued by the 
liquidator relates to property which had been the subject of an uncrystallised floating 
charge when it was disposed of then the charge will apply to what is recovered by the 
liquidator under section 127(1) of the Act.806 It is submitted, with respect, that this is 
incorrect, at least in the situation where the original disposition was absolute and fell 
within the broadly understood concept of being in the ordinary course of the 
company’s business. If so, then the charge would have ceased to apply to the relevant 
property at the time the disposition took place. As has been seen above, the claim of 
the liquidator is restitutionary in nature and does not automatically give a full right to 
recovery. Defences, such as based upon a change of position, may be asserted to 
defeat the claim or, alternatively, the court may validate the disposition. Accordingly, 
whilst the word ‘void’ is used in the section, the consequence is not to treat the 
disposition as being void ab initio so that the disposition is treated as never having 
occurred with the consequence that the property must be returned in specie, but 
merely to give the liquidator a claim which he can pursue. The claim vests in him. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
802 Similarly, a validation order is not awarded to a company where the only reason it is sought is to 
buy time to pay off liability to HM Revenue & Customs as the company’s creditor, see RC Brewery Ltd 
v Revenue and Customs Commissioners [2013] EWHC 1184 (Ch). 
803  [1980] 1 WLR 711. 
804 Hollicourt (Contracts) Ltd v Bank of Ireland [2001] Ch 555; Rose v AIB Group (UK) PLC [2003] 
EWHC 1737, [2003] 1 WLR 2791. 
805 Such a defence may be difficult to make out on the facts: Rose v AIB Group (UK) PLC [2003] 
EWHC 1737, [2003] 1 WLR 2791. 
806 Mond v Hammond Suddards [1996] 2 BCLC 470. The point was accepted on appeal: Re RS&M 
Engineering Co Ltd, Mond v Hammond Suddards [2000] Ch 40, at 50. 
The chargee has no right to bring the proceedings, nor can it compel the liquidator to 
bring them. If he does pursue the claim, he does it for the benefit of the general body 
of the company’s unsecured creditors and not to restore to the company the property, 
nor to restore to the chargee the charged property, as if it had never been the subject 
of the original disposition. 
14.16.3 Transactions at an undervalue 
Section 238 of the Act807 concerns transactions at an undervalue that a company may 
have entered into at a relevant time prior to its entry into winding up or 
administration. The liquidator or administrator is given power to challenge any such 
transaction. Section 238 is addressed in more detail in Chapter 16 and the reader is 
referred to the discussion in that chapter for a fuller explanation of the section. 
14.16.3.1 By way of brief summary, the section applies if the debtor company 
has entered into a transaction at an undervalue at a ‘relevant time’ (which, essentially, 
is a period of two years prior to the onset of the insolvency proceedings,808 provided 
that the company met the relevant insolvency tests809 when the transaction occurred or 
became insolvent in consequence of the transaction). The court has a wide amount of 
discretion as to the order that it might make if such a transaction has occurred.810 
14.16.3.2 A transaction at an undervalue entered into by a debtor company is 
defined to be one which meets either of the following tests: 
(a) the debtor company makes a gift to another person or otherwise enters 
into a transaction with that person on terms that provided for the 
company to receive no consideration, or 
(b) the debtor company enters into a transaction with that other person for 
a consideration the value of which, in money or money’s worth, is 
significantly less than the value, in money or money’s worth, of the 
consideration provided by the company. 
It should be noted that the term “transaction” is defined widely in section 436 of the 
Insolvency Act as including a gift, agreement or arrangement and that it must be the 
company (not, for example, a trustee holding trust money for it or its managing 
director) that enters into the relevant transaction, which means the company must take 
some step or show an act of participation.811  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
807 The comparable section for bankruptcy is s 339 of the Insolvency Act 1986. Similar provisions will 
also be found in s 423 of that Act (transactions defrauding creditors), which applies to both companies 
and individuals. 
808 The period of two years is laid down in s 240 of the Act, but note also the alternative period 
provided in s 240(1)(c) and (d)   (to which the solvency tests do not apply). The period is five years for 
insolvent individuals: see s 341 of the Act. 
809 Section 123 of the Insolvency Act 1986. The relationship between the two tests: the ‘cash-flow’ test 
and the ‘balance-sheet’ test was considered by Lewison LJ in Re Casa Estates (UK) v Bucci [2014] 
EWCA Civ 383, [2014] BCC 269 [27]. To the extent that liabilities are taken into account it is 
necessary to consider future and contingent liabilities and, in assessing them, to consider whether and 
when they are likely to fall due: see BNY Corporate Trustee Services Ltd v Eurosail-UK 2007-3BL plc 
[2013] UKSC 28, [2013] 3 All ER 271.  
810 The powers of the court to make an order are discussed below. 
811 A sale by a bankrupt’s mortgagee was not a sale ‘entered into’ by the bankrupt: see Jonathan Parker 
J in Re Brabon, Treharne v Brabon [2001] 1 BCLC 11; a dishonest transfer of company’s funds by the 
managing director into his own account was not a company’s act: see Lord Phillips in Stone & Rolls 
Ltd (in liquidation) v Moore Stephens (a firm) [2009] UKHL 39, [2009] 1 AC 1391 at [46]; a trustee’s 
14.16.3.3 The court may not make an order, however, if it can be shown that the 
debtor company entered into the transaction:812 
(a)  . . . in good faith and for the purpose of carrying on its business, and 
(b) at the time it did so there were reasonable grounds for believing that 
the transaction would benefit the company. 
14.16.3.4 Giving security 
There has been some debate as to whether the giving of security could ever amount to 
a transaction at an undervalue. In Hill (as Trustee in Bankruptcy of Nurkowski) v 
Spread Trustee Co Ltd,813 which was a case that concerned section 423 of the Act but 
in which the same two limbs of the definition are used, the Court of Appeal held that 
the giving of security without the receipt of any consideration in return will fall within 
the first limb of the definition. In that case, security had been given for an existing 
debt. There had been no consideration provided to the security giver for doing so, 
such as by way of a forbearance in suing for the debt. 
14.16.3.4.1 With respect to the second limb of the definition, Millett J in Re MC 
Bacon Ltd 814 said that the granting of security could not constitute a transaction at an 
undervalue within the second limb. This was because the granting of the security did 
not deplete the debtor company’s assets nor diminish their value. The debtor retained 
the right to redeem, sell, or remortgage the charged assets. All it lost in giving the 
security was the ability to apply the assets otherwise than in satisfaction of the secured 
debt. That was not something which was capable of valuation in monetary terms and 
was not customarily disposed of for value. 
14.16.3.4.2 The view that had been taken by Millett J was contradicted by Arden 
LJ in obiter comments in Hill (as Trustee in Bankruptcy of Nurkowski) v Spread 
Trustee Co Ltd.815 Her Ladyship expressed the view that the granting of security by 
the debtor could amount to a transaction at an undervalue within the second limb of 
the definition. She said that the definition did not necessarily require that there should 
be a diminution in the debtor’s assets or in their value, nor did it require that there was 
a grant of proprietary rights by the debtor. A grant by the debtor of other rights could 
be considered as falling within the definition and so could constitute the giving of 
consideration by the debtor. In any event, she considered that the grant of security 
might involve a disposition of property rights by the debtor. Whilst the grant of 
security does not involve an outright transfer of ownership in assets so as to deprive 
the debtor of its physical connection with them (although a legal or equitable 
mortgage does involve a notional transfer of title, subject to the debtor’s equity of 
redemption), it does involve the granting of a right of recourse to the assets and a 
commensurate granting of priority in the assets over the claims of other creditors of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
transfer of trust money held for a company was not the company’s act, see Kitchin LJ in Re Ovenden 
Colbert Printers Ltd; Hunt v Hosking [2013] EWCA Civ 1408, [2014] 1 B.C.L.C. 291, at [32]-[38]. 
812 It should be noted that there is no equivalent provision in s 339 of the Act in relation to insolvent 
individuals. 
813  [2006] EWCA Civ 542; [2006] BCC 646. 
814  [1990] BCC 78, at 91–92, [1990] BCLC 324, at 340–341. The view expressed by Millett J was 
approved by Balcombe LJ in the Court of Appeal in Menzies v National Bank of Kuwait SAK [1994] 
BCC 119, at 129. 
815  [2006] EWCA Civ 542; [2006] BCC 646, at [138]. 
the debtor.816 There was no reason why the value of the right to have such recourse 
and to such priority should be left out of the account in determining if there had been 
a transaction at an undervalue. 
14.16.3.4.3 If the view expressed by Arden LJ is correct then a rather curious 
consequence could follow. This consequence is that the security might be capable of 
challenge under section 238 when it is not possible, or it is more difficult, to mount a 
successful challenge under section 239, which is the section that is more appropriately 
tailored to challenging the validity of security. For instance, the security may have 
been granted outside the more limited time period that might apply under section 239, 
or it may not be possible to establish the necessary motive on the part of the company 
in terms of the desire to prefer the recipient of the security. In that regard, the task of 
the liquidator or administrator is easier under section 238 than under section 239. 
Under section 239, the liquidator or administrator has the task of showing that the 
requisite desire existed on the part of the company. Under section 238, the liquidator 
or administrator has to establish that a transaction at an undervalue took place but it is 
then for the person that is seeking to uphold the transaction to defend it by showing 
that in entering into the transaction the company did so both (i) subjectively in good 
faith and for the purpose of carrying on its business, and (ii) objectively, in that that 
there were reasonable grounds to believe the transaction would be for the company’s 
benefit. 
14.16.4 Preferences 
Section 239 of the Act817 concerns preferences that a company may have given in 
favour of another person at a ‘relevant time’ prior to its entry into winding up or 
administration. The liquidator or administrator is given power to challenge any such 
preference and the court is given a wide discretion as to the order which can be made 
to restore the position to what it would have been had the preference not been 
given.818 
14.16.4.1 There are three essential ingredients that must be established by the 
liquidator or administrator before an order may be made. First, that the preference was 
given by the company at a relevant time. Second, that what occurred constituted a 
preference in favour of another person. Thirdly, that the company was influenced by a 
desire to prefer the beneficiary of the preference. Each of those requirements will now 
be examined. 
14.16.4.2 Relevant time 
Subject to meeting the insolvency tests819, a relevant time can be any of three possible 
periods. First, it is a period of two years prior to the onset of the insolvency 
proceedings, if the person preferred was connected with the company.820 Secondly, it 
is a period of six months before the onset of the insolvency proceedings.821 Thirdly, it 
is the preliminary period before the appointment of an administrator.822 However, it 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
816 As to the consequences of granting security, Arden LJ referred to what was said by Lord Hoffmann 
and Lord Millett in Buchler v Talbot [2004] UKHL 9; [2004] 2 AC 298, at [29] and [51], respectively. 
817 The comparable section for bankruptcy is s 340 of the Insolvency Act 1986. 
818 The powers of the court to make an order are discussed below. 
819 See 14.16.3.1 
820 S 240(1)(a) of the Act. The test for connection is contained in s 249 of the Act. 
821 S 240(1)(b) of the Act. 
822 S 240(1)(c) and (d) of the Act. 
will only be a relevant time in either of the first two situations if the company was 
insolvent (i.e. unable to pay its debts within the meaning of section 123 of the 
Insolvency Act 1986) at the time the preference was given, or became insolvent in 
consequence of the giving of the preference.823 
14.16.4.3 A preference824 
A company gives a preference in favour of another person if: 
(a) that other person is one of the company’s creditors or a guarantor or 
surety of any of the company’s debts or other liabilities, and 
(b) the company does anything or suffers anything to be done which (in 
either case) has the effect of putting that person in a better position 
than he would otherwise have endured in an insolvent liquidation of 
the company. 
14.16.4.3.1 It is a question of fact as to whether or not the relevant person has been 
put in a better position than it was in before the relevant act was done. It follows that 
there cannot be a preference in favour of someone who was not an existing creditor, 
guarantor, or surety. Hence, the granting of security to a new lender will not amount 
to a preference. In addition, on the basis that it would not put the lender in a better 
position than it was in beforehand, the granting of security simply to cover a new 
facility that is made available by an existing lender should also be safe, so long as the 
facility does not amount to a re-financing of existing indebtedness and the security 
does not extend to cover the existing indebtedness.  
14.16.4.3.2 Examples where a person would be put in a preferential position would 
include repayment of existing indebtedness of the company, the granting of security 
for existing indebtedness825, repaying a creditor so as to relieve a guarantor of 
exposure under the guarantee, and any other act which has the effect of putting an 
existing creditor in a better position than it would be in should the company go into 
insolvent liquidation. 
14.16.4.3.3 The fact that the act was done pursuant to a court order does not 
prevent it from being a preference.826 
14.16.4.4 Influenced by a desire 827 
The court may only make an order if the company, in giving the preference, was 
‘influenced by a desire’ to achieve the result mentioned in (b) above (i.e. to put the 
other person in that better position). This will be presumed (unless the contrary is 
proved) where the other person was connected with the company.828 It is the decision 
to give a preference, rather than the giving of the preference pursuant to that decision, 
which must be influenced by the desire to produce the effect829 although the decision 
to give preference may coincide with the act that has the effect of preference.830 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
823 S 240(2) of the Act.   
824 S 239(4) of the Act. 
825 See David Richards J in Green (Liquidator of Stealth Construction Ltd) v Ireland [2011] EWHC 
1305 (Ch) at [61]. 
826 S 239(7) of the Act. 
827 S 239(5) of the Act. 
828 S 239(6) of the Act. 
829 See David Richards J in Green (Liquidator of Stealth Construction Ltd) v Ireland [2011] EWHC 
1305 (Ch) at [56]. 
830 Wills v Corfe Joinery Ltd [1997] BCC 511. 
Hence, the relevant date is the date of the decision to give preference, not the date 
when the preference is given.831 The question of when the decision is made is a 
question of fact to be determined in the particular circumstance of each case; a mere 
existence of a contractual obligation to do a particular act (which has the effect of 
preference) is neither necessary nor of itself sufficient.832 There must probably have 
been some contemplation that the company may not be able to pay its debts. It is the 
subjective desire of the company which is relevant, not that of the recipient of the 
preference, although it might be possible to infer the desire from the relevant 
circumstances.833 Because the company must have been influenced by the desire, 
there must be a positive desire to prefer, although it need not be the only or 
predominant intention of the company; it can be one of the factors that influenced the 
company.834 A decision that is taken for proper commercial considerations should be 
contrasted with one that was intended to put the other party in a preferred position.835 
An intention to keep the support of the company’s bank by giving it security may not 
amount to a desire to prefer the bank.836 
14.16.5 Sections 238 and 239: remedies 
Each of sections 238 and 239 of the Act provides that the court may make such order 
as it thinks fit to restore the position to what it would have been but for the impugned 
transaction or giving of the preference. Section 241 of the Act837 amplifies upon this 
by setting out a non-exhaustive list of the orders that the court may make. The 
remedies available under sections 238 and 239 are without prejudice to any other 
remedies that might be available at general law.838 
14.16.5.1 It is clear that the power of the court is discretionary and that the court 
is given a wide discretion as to the orders that it might make, although the court 
should not act oppressively or unreasonably.839 The court should take into account 
whether it would be appropriate to make an order that would have extra-territorial 
effect.840 It has been held that the circumstances may justify the court in making no 
order at all.841 
14.16.5.2 The court might order monetary compensation or a reversal of the 
transaction and appropriate compensatory adjustments for any compensation that had 
been received.842 In relation to a transaction or preference which had the effect of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
831 See Millet J in Re MC Bacon Ltd [1990] BCC 78, at 88, see also Mummery J in Re Fairway 
Magazines Ltd [1992] BCC 924. 
832 See David Richards J in Green (Liquidator of Stealth Construction Ltd) v Ireland [2011] EWHC 
1305 (Ch), [2012] 1 BCLC 297 [63]. 
833 Re Fairway Magazines Ltd [1992] BCC 924. For example, a preference claim was not made out 
where a director of a company was not shown to be "influenced" by a desire to avoid paying another’s 
claim in circumstances in which he had a genuinely held belief that another’s claim had no merit, even 
though objectively it was possible to conclude otherwise, see Green v El Tai [2015] BPIR 24, paras 
[86], [99]-[101] (Registrar Jones). 
834 Re MC Bacon Ltd [1990] BCC 78. 
835 Re Fairway Magazines Ltd [1992] BCC 924. 
836 Re MC Bacon Ltd [1990] BCC 78. 
837 The comparable section for bankruptcy is s 342 of the Insolvency Act 1986. 
838 S 241(4) of the Act. 
839 See Sir Donald Nicholls V-C in Re Paramount Airways Ltd [1993] Ch 223, at 239. 
840 Re Paramount Airways Ltd [1993] Ch 223; Re Unigreg Ltd (unreported, 12/2/2004, Judge Weeks 
QC sitting in the High Court). 
841 Singla (Trustee of Brown) v Brown and Malden-Browne [2007] EWHC 405 (Ch), [2007] BPIR 424. 
842 Re Thoars (Decd), Ramlort Ltd v Reid [2004] EWCA Civ 800, [2004] BPIR 985. 
releasing or discharging a surety, the court is specifically given the power to reinstate 
the surety’s obligations.843 
14.16.5.3 Third parties 
Section 241(2) of the Act provides that the order that the court makes may affect a 
third party or property of a third party, even if the third party was not the direct party 
to an impugned transaction or the direct recipient of a preference. It goes on, however, 
to provide a defence to a third party with a derivative, rather than direct, connection 
with an impugned transaction or preference, if it acted in good faith and for value. 
The onus is on the defendant to make out the defence.844 There are several further 
factors which must be taken into account in relation to such a defence.845 
14.16.5.4 Secured parties 
The question arises as to whether the recovery that a liquidator or administrator might 
make under section 238 or section 239 would be subject to security that had been 
given by the company prior to the onset of the insolvency proceedings. At the outset, 
the question must be distinguished from the position where property which is the 
subject of proceedings brought by the insolvency official was disposed of by the 
debtor company at a time when it was within the compass of fixed security and such 
disposition was without the security holder’s consent. In such a case, the property 
might continue to be the subject of the security, on the basis as discussed earlier in 
this chapter. In such a case, the proceedings brought by the insolvency official should 
not overreach the security holder’s interest under its pre-existing security. On the 
other hand, if the property was only subject to an uncrystallised floating charge at the 
time of its disposition, and the disposition was by way of absolute transfer, then it 
would have ceased to be subject to the charge at the time of the disposition, provided 
the disposition fell within the broadly understood concept of being in the ordinary 
course of business. 
14.16.5.4.1 Bearing those points in mind, the question might become whether the 
benefit of the recovery by the liquidator or administrator in proceedings brought under 
the sections would fall within the compass of pre-existing security where the security 
contains an after-acquired property clause which, in its terms, seeks to catch such 
benefit. Generally speaking, the answer to the question should be that the benefit of 
the recovery by the insolvency official would not be caught by the pre-existing 
security, particularly where the recovery is seen as being compensatory, such as 
where the defendant is required to make a payment to redress any unfair benefit it had 
received under the impugned transaction. This is because the right of action is vested 
in the insolvency official. The proceedings are brought by him for the benefit of the 
general body of unsecured creditors. The recoveries are held by the insolvency 
official for the benefit of the general body of creditors,846 which should be seen as 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
843 S 241(1)(e) of the Act. 
844 Re Sonatacus Ltd [2007] EWCA Civ 31, [2007] BCC 342. The court can only properly exercise its 
discretion against a third party if the order is required to restore the company’s position to what it 
would otherwise have been, and the third party is in possession of assets or, at least, had otherwise 
personally benefited in monetary terms from the payment in some direct and tangible way, see Mark 
Cows QC obiter in Re Oxford Pharmaceuticals Ltd (sub nom Wilson v Masters International Ltd) 
[2009] EWHC 1753, [2009] 2 BCLC 485 at [83]-[90].  
845 See ss 241(2A) to (3C) of the Act. 
846 Re Yagerphone Ltd [1935] 1 Ch 392; Re MC Bacon Ltd [1991] Ch 127, at 137. 
being distinct from the property rights of the company prior to the onset of the 
insolvency proceedings. 
14.16.5.4.2 Some qualification may have to be made to that analysis, however. As 
mentioned above, it has been held that, amongst the armoury of orders that are 
available, the court might require that a previous transfer of property by the debtor 
should be reversed, so that the property is revested in the debtor. This is recognised by 
section 241(1)(a) of the Act, which includes amongst the orders that the court may 
make, an order that any property which the company had transferred should be vested 
in the company. In such a case, it might be arguable that the effect of the vesting in 
the company is that its property is restored to it in specie, so that it resumes its 
ownership of the property as if the impugned transaction had not taken place.847 
Alternatively, it might be argued that the vesting has the effect of conferring a 
property right on the company. Thus, the vesting might be seen either as restoring the 
situation to that which existed before the impugned original transfer by the company, 
so that the asset would be subject to the security that had then existed, or the vesting 
might be seen as having the effect of conferring a property right on the company 
which would then fall under the after-acquired property clause in the security. 
However, those arguments must still be viewed in light of the fact that the order of the 
court revesting the property only occurs in consequence of the pursuit of a right of 
action that is settled on the insolvency official for the benefit of the general body of 
the debtor’s creditors. The right is not exercisable by or for the benefit of the security 
holder. In policy terms, it is difficult to see how it would be correct to finish up with 
the result that the outcome of the proceedings should benefit the security holder. 
14.16.6 Transactions defrauding creditors 
Section 423 of the Act concerns transactions at an undervalue that a debtor has 
entered into to defraud or prejudice one or more of its creditors. That section is 
supported by further provisions in sections 424 and 425 of the Act. Section 423 
applies to both company debtors and individual debtors and it applies whether or not 
insolvency proceedings have been commenced against the debtor. There is no 
necessity to show that the debtor was insolvent at the time of the relevant transaction 
and there are no time limits in terms of when the transaction took place.848 The court 
has a wide discretion in the orders it may make to restore the position to what it would 
have been had the transaction not occurred and to protect the interests of persons who 
were victims of the transaction. This is amplified in section 425 of the Act, which also 
provides for certain defences that are available to third parties. 
14.16.6.1 The ingredients of the section are that there should have been (i) a 
transaction at an undervalue that was entered into by the debtor, (ii) which was 
entered into for a relevant purpose, and (iii) which has been to the actual or potential 
prejudice of one or more victims, by whom or on whose behalf a claim is brought 
under the section. Those ingredients will now be examined. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
847 See NA Kratzmann Pty Ltd v Tucker (1968) 123 CLR 295 for a similar view that has been taken in 
Australia. 
848 Although the Limitation Act 1980 will apply: see Hill (as Trustee in Bankruptcy of Nurkowski) v 
Spread Trustee Co Ltd [2006] EWCA Civ 542, [2006] BCC 646; Giles v Rhind [2008] EWCA Civ 
118. 
14.16.6.2 Transaction at an undervalue 
The expression ‘transaction at an undervalue’ as used in section 423 of the Act is, 
essentially, the same as that used in section 238 of the Act, with the additional ground 
of a transaction that was entered into in consideration of marriage or a civil 
partnership.849 
14.16.6.3 Purpose 
Section 423(3) of the Act provides that the court may only make an order if the court 
is satisfied that the purpose of the debtor in entering into the transaction at an 
undervalue was either: 
(a) to put assets beyond the reach of a person who is making, or may at 
some time make, a claim against the debtor, or 
(b) otherwise to prejudice the interests of such a person in relation to the 
claim which he is making or may make. 
 
14.16.6.3.1 The purpose must have been a real or substantial purpose but it need 
not be the only or dominant purpose for the transaction.850 Arden LJ made a number 
of further comments as to the concept of purpose as it is relevant to section 423 in Hill 
(as Trustee in Bankruptcy of Nurkowski) v Spread Trustee Co Ltd.851 Her Ladyship 
said that it was not necessary to show that the purpose of the debtor could be achieved 
by entering into the transaction. Similarly, the debtor might have the necessary 
purpose even though he was mistaken in believing that he could achieve that purpose 
by entering into the transaction. It was the entry into the transaction, not the outcome 
of the transaction itself, which must have the necessary purpose. The concept of 
purpose would not be satisfied by evidence that the debtor only had a mere hope, but 
it would be sufficient to show a positive intention, which substantially motivated the 
debtor in entering into the transaction. 
14.16.6.4 Victims 
Proceedings under section 423 might be instituted by either an insolvency official or a 
‘victim’ of the transaction.852 Such proceedings are brought on behalf of all of the 
victims of a transaction,853 although it is still possible for proceedings to be brought if 
there is only one victim, such as where its security has been adversely affected by the 
transaction.854 In a situation where the insolvency officer declines to bring 
proceedings to set the transaction aside, a victim of the transaction may apply to the 
court but must demonstrate that he has a realistic prospect of establishing, first, that 
the transaction in question comes within the scope of section 423 and that he is a 
victim of the transaction and, second, that there is good reason why he should bring 
the proceedings even though the liquidator or administrator does not.855 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
849 S 423(1) of the Act. 
850 Inland Revenue Commissioners v Hashmi [2002] EWCA Civ 981, [2002] BCC 943. 
851  [2006] EWCA Civ 542; [2006] BCC 646, at [102]. 
852 This is subject to s 424(1) of the Act in a case where the debtor is subject to insolvency proceedings. 
853 S 424(2) of the Act. 
854 National Westminster Bank PLC v Jones [2001] EWCA Civ 1541, [2002] 1 BCLC 55. 
855 See Sir Christopher Slade in National Bank of Kuwait SAK v Menzies [1994] BCC 119 (CA) at 125 
and Sir William Blackburne in Re Simon Carves Ltd; Carillion Construction Ltd v Hussain [2013] 
EWHC 685 (Ch), [2013] 2 BCLC 100 [25]-[27]. 
A victim of the transaction is a person who is, or is capable of being, prejudiced by 
it.856 It is a wider category than simply creditors.857 A person may be a victim of a 
transaction, and thus a person whose interests may be protected by an order under 
section 423(5), even though the debtor’s purpose in entering into the transaction, as 
referred to in section 423(3), may not have been to prejudice that person but, rather, 
someone else; indeed the debtor may have been unaware of the victim when the 
transaction was entered into.858  
14.16.7 Avoidance of floating charges 
Section 245 of the Act applies to floating charges.859 It gives the liquidator or 
administrator of a debtor company the right to challenge (in whole or in part) a 
floating charge that was given by the company, if the charge was created at a ‘relevant 
time’ prior to the onset of the relevant insolvency proceedings. It should be noted, at 
the outset, that section 245 of the Act does not apply to a floating charge which is 
within a security financial collateral arrangement, as discussed earlier in this 
chapter.860 
14.16.7.1 Relevant time 
There are three alternative periods in which a ‘relevant time’ might have occurred in 
relation to the granting of the charge.861 Where the charge was created in favour of a 
person that is connected to the company,862 a relevant time can be any time within a 
period of two years prior to the onset of the insolvency proceedings.863 Where the 
chargee was not a connected person, a relevant time can be any time within a period 
of one year before the onset of the insolvency proceedings, provided that the debtor 
company was either then insolvent or it became insolvent in consequence of the 
transaction under which the charge was created. Whether or not the chargee was 
connected to the company, a charge will also be created at a relevant time if it was 
created in the preliminary period before an administrator was appointed. 
14.16.7.2 The invalidity 864 
If the floating charge was created at a relevant time then it is invalid except to the 
extent of: 
(a) the value of so much of the consideration for the creation of the charge 
as consists of money paid, or goods or services supplied, to the 
company at the same time as, or after, the creation of the charge, 
(b) the value of so much of that consideration as consists of the discharge 
or reduction, at the same time as, or after, the creation of the charge, of 
any debt of the company, and 
(c)  interest thereon.. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
856 S 423(5) of the Act. 
857 Clydesdale Financial Services Ltd v Smailes [2009] EWHC 3190, [2011] 2 BCLC 405 [69]-[74].	  
858 See Arden LJ in Hill (as Trustee in Bankruptcy of Nurkowski) v Spread Trustee Co Ltd [2006] 
EWCA Civ 542; [2006] BCC 646, at [101]. 
859 I.e. a charge which was created as a floating charge, even if it has crystallised: see s 251 of the Act. 
860 See Reg 10(5) of the Financial Collateral Arrangements (No 2) Regs 2003 (SI 2003/3226). 
861 Ss 245(3) and (4) of the Act. 
862 The test for connection is contained in s 249 of the Act. 
863 As defined in s 245(5) of the Act. 
864 S 245(2) of the Act. 
14.16.7.3 Points arising 
Unlike the position under section 239 of the Act, there is no need for the insolvency 
official to prove any intention to prefer the interests of the chargee. In other words, to 
the extent that the charge secures a pre-existing liability of the chargor to the chargee, 
the charge is invalid. Nor can the charge be saved by a defence like that which is 
provided in section 238(5) for transactions at an undervalue (i.e. bona fide intention 
and reasonable belief of benefit to the company). On the other hand, the charge is 
only invalid under the section to the extent that it secures such pre-existing 
indebtedness; it is not invalid under section 245 with respect to any value provided at 
the same time as, or after, its creation. 
14.16.7.3.1 Cases decided under predecessor legislation had taken a liberal view as 
to the saving condition that the secured value should have been contemporaneous or 
subsequent to the granting of the charge. It had been held that the requirement would 
be taken as met, even if the value was provided before the charge was created, 
provided that the value was provided in consideration of an agreement that the charge 
would be provided.865 That view no longer applies. The requirement is now that the 
charge should truly be contemporaneous with, or precede, the giving of value by the 
chargee, although it might be permissible to save a later formal security document 
which merely implements a preceding, but enforceable, charge.866 
14.16.7.3.2 The value of goods or services supplied is their monetary value at the 
time of supply to the company, taken as the amount which could reasonably have 
been obtained for their supply in the ordinary course of business on the same terms.867 
It should be noted that the money or the goods and services must be paid or supplied 
to the company, hence a charge to secure an advance to a third party would not be 
saved. However, it is legitimate for the charge to secure a payment made to a third 
party on behalf of the company, if the company was indebted to the third party, as that 
would be done in discharge of the indebtedness of the company to the third party. 
14.16.7.3.3 The charge can legitimately cover money lent for a re-financing or 
discharge of existing indebtedness of the company. It is submitted, however, that this 
must be the re-financing or discharge of indebtedness due to a third party and not to 
the lender itself, as that would not constitute the provision of new value to the 
company.868 
14.16.7.3.4 The effect of the section is to avoid the charge, not any debt obligation 
purportedly secured under it, so that the section cannot be relied upon to challenge a 
repayment of the debt.869 
14.16.7.3.5 Section 245 represents a rare situation where the rule in Clayton’s 
case870 may be applied for the advantage of a bank.871 By the application of the rule, 
indebtedness on a running account that was existing at the time the charge was taken 
can be treated as discharged by payments that are made into the account, whereas 
drawings from the account after the charge was taken are treated as effectively 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
865 Re Columbian Fireproofing Co Ltd [1910] 1 Ch 758. 
866 Re Shoe Lace Ltd, Power v Sharp Investments Ltd [1993] BCC 609. 
867 S 245(6) of the Act. 
868 See Re GT Whyte & Co Ltd [1983] BCLC 311. 
869 Mace Builders (Glasgow) Ltd v Lunn [1987] Ch 191. 
870 Devaynes v Noble, Clayton’s Case (1816) LJ Ch 256, 35 ER 767. 
871 See Re Yeovil Glove Co Ltd [1965] Ch 148. 
secured under the charge and will not be treated as paid off until all of the old debt has 
been repaid. 
14.16.8 Extortionate credit transactions 
Section 244 of the Act872 concerns extortionate credit transactions. It gives a 
liquidator or administrator the power to challenge such a transaction (whether it 
remains current or has terminated) if it was entered into by the debtor company within 
a period of three years preceding the onset of the relevant insolvency proceedings.873 
The court is given a number of wide powers to re-order or otherwise qualify the 
transaction, an obligation under it or any relevant security, or to require payments to 
be made to the insolvency official or for accounts to be taken.874 The burden is on the 
person defending the transaction to show that it was not extortionate.875 Because of 
the language that it used, it is submitted that the court could re-open a transaction and 
review the effect of the transaction with reference to the position at the outset of the 
transaction or with respect to the effect of changes in an interest rate or other matters 
which came into effect or occurred after the date on which the transaction took 
effect.876 
14.16.8.1 Section 244(3) provides that: 
. . . a transaction is extortionate if, having regard to the risk accepted by the 
person providing the credit— 
(a) the terms of it are or were such as to require grossly exorbitant 
payments to be made (whether unconditionally or in certain 
contingencies) in respect of the provision of credit, or 
(b) it otherwise grossly contravened ordinary principles of fair dealing. 
14.16.8.2 The concept of an extortionate credit transaction was considered by the 
Court of Appeal in Paragon Finance plc v Staunton.877 That was a case which 
concerned comparable provisions in what was then sections 137 and 138 of the 
Consumer Credit Act 1974 (now repealed). The court quoted from Professor Sir Roy 
Goode’s book, Consumer Law and Practice,878 that: 
the concepts of extortion and unconscionability are very similar. 
‘Extortionate’, like ‘harsh and unconscionable’, signifies not merely that the 
terms of the bargain are stiff, or even unreasonable, but that they are so unfair 
as to be oppressive. This carries with it the notion of morally reprehensible 
conduct on the part of the creditor in taking grossly unfair advantage of the 
debtor’s circumstances.879 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
872 The comparable provision for individuals will be found in s 343 of the Act. 
873 S 244(2) of the Act. A challenge to a transaction may be mounted under this section concurrently 
with a challenge under s 238 of the Act: see s 244(5) of the Act. 
874 S 244(4) of the Act. 
875 S 244(3) of the Act. 
876 This is different from the position under comparable provisions that used to apply under ss 137 and 
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1466; [2002] 1 WLR 685, at [63]–[66]; Broadwick Financial Services Ltd v Spencer [2002] EWCA 
Civ 35; [2002] 1 All ER (Comm) 446, at [48]–[56]. 
877  [2001] EWCA Civ 1466, [2002] 1 WLR 685. 
878 At para 47.26. 
879 See also Sir John Donaldson MR in Wills v Wood [1984] CCLR 7. 
14.17 Enforcement of Security 
14.17.1 Determining whether to enforce and the position before 
enforcement 
The rights and duties of a secured creditor in relation to the enforcement of its 
security are grounded in equity. Assuming that the right to enforce has arisen due to 
the default of the obligor,880 the creditor is then entitled to determine in its own 
interests when and how it wishes to enforce its security, and, if the security involves 
more than one item of property, the order in which it will enforce its security over 
those items of property.881 The security holder is under no obligation to preserve the 
security prior to the exercise of its enforcement rights.882 If the obligor is unhappy 
with the situation and the delay in the enforcement of the security, it can either 
exercise its right of redemption, pay off the outstanding liability, and retrieve the 
security, or it can apply to the court for an order for sale of the property.883 The 
obligor’s right of redemption was mentioned earlier in this chapter. 
14.17.1.1 There are statutory limitations upon the right of enforcement of 
security where the obligor is in administration884 or, if it is an eligible company, 
where proposals have been made for a voluntary arrangement concerning it.885 
14.17.1.2 Prior to the right to enforcement arising, generally speaking the 
security holder does not have rights to intervene in relation to the secured property, 
unless it can show that the sufficiency of its security was threatened. However, there 
is no legal restriction on the security holder from doing so if it is given the appropriate 
power by the security instrument. Accordingly, it would be entitled to require that an 
option should be exercised if the benefit of the option formed part of the security. It 
would be a matter of interpretation to see if the parties had agreed that the security 
holder should have such a right.886 
14.17.1.3 Where the security holder’s consent was required before the obligor 
could take certain action with respect to the secured property prior to the enforcement 
of the security then, in the absence of a contractual provision to the contrary, the 
security holder is entitled to have regard to its own interests, rather than those of the 
obligor, in deciding if it should grant its consent.887 Yet the courts have shown some 
sympathy, in the context of a requirement of consent to letting in land mortgages, for 
a qualification to such requirement that consent is not to be unreasonably withheld, 
although a separate covenant not to withhold consent unreasonably (giving rise to a 
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right to damages) would not be implied.888 This position was confirmed in 
Commercial First Business Ltd v Atkins,889 where the judge made a more detailed 
analysis of the position.890    A mortgagee is entitled to require consent to letting for 
its own protection and, while it must not refuse that consent on grounds which have 
nothing to do with the mortgage, and there may be exceptional cases where there is 
such a disproportion between the benefit to the mortgagee and the detriment to the 
mortgagor if the mortgagee were to withhold his consent to a proposed letting, that it 
would be unreasonable for the mortgagee to refuse such consent, generally the 
mortgagee is free to consider its own interests and to justify the reasonableness of its 
decision on objective grounds.  It is for the mortgagor to prove that consent was 
unreasonably withheld.  This analysis mirrors the statutorily qualified requirement of 
consent to letting under the Landlord and Tenant Act section 19(1) and, in modified 
form, the analysis of the qualification of reasonableness in International Drilling 
Fluids Ltd v Louisville Investments (Uxbridge) Ltd.891 This approach is an attempt to 
balance the interests of both parties, while not imposing a free-standing covenant on 
the mortgagee; parties are, of course, free to expressly  agree otherwise. 
 
14.17.1.4 The methods of enforcement that exist under English law, at least in 
theory, are foreclosure, the application of financial collateral under a security 
financial collateral arrangement, and the application of cash balances, taking 
possession of the secured property, the exercise of a power of sale, the appointment of 
an administrator, and the appointment of a receiver. Each of those methods of 
enforcement will now be looked at in turn. 
14.17.2 Foreclosure 
14.17.2.1 Foreclosure is the most ancient of the powers of enforcement, although 
it rarely arises and so it is more of a theoretical than real power of enforcement. It is 
the method by which the obligor’s equity or redemption is closed out or, in effect, 
extinguished, so that the creditor becomes the full and unencumbered owner of the 
property.892 Once the foreclosure has been completed, the creditor loses its right to 
pursue the obligor for the debt that was secured on the property, unless it gives up its 
rights and allows the foreclosure to be re-opened, which the security holder cannot do 
if it has sold the property.893 Foreclosure is only available where the security is a legal 
mortgage894 or an equitable mortgage which can be perfected by being turned into a 
legal mortgage pursuant to an agreement by the mortgagor to give a legal mortgage.895 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
888 See Citibank International Plc v Kessler [1999] Lloyds's Law Reports Banking 123, 129; Starling v 
Lloyds TSB Bank PLC [2001] EGLR 101,104.	  
889 [2012] EWHC 4388 (Ch). 
890 At [107]. 
891 [1986] 1 Ch 513, 519–521.  There have been a number of recent cases considering reasonableness 
of consent in different contexts, for example (in the context of consent to assignment of a syndicated 
loan) see Barclays Bank plc v Unicredit Bank AG [2014] EWCA Civ 302; BG Global Energy Limited v 
Talisman Sinopec Energy UK Limited [2015] EWHC 110 (Comm) [109].	  
892 See Silberschildt v Schiott (1814) 3 Ves&B 45; Le Gros v Cockerell (1832) 5 Sim 384; Carter v 
Wake (1877) 4 ChD 605; and Re Farnol Eades Ervine & Co [1915] 1 Ch 22. 
893 Lockhart v Hardy (1846) 9 Beav 349. 
894 General Credit and Discount Co v Glegg (1883) 22 ChD 549. 
895 Perry v Keane, Perry v Partridge (1836) 6LJCh 67; Cox v Toole (1855) 20 Beav 145. 
It is not available to enforce a pledge of goods,896 nor to enforce an equitable charge 
or an equitable mortgage which cannot be turned into a legal mortgage.897 
Foreclosure requires an order of the court which extinguishes the obligor’s equity of 
redemption, which will not be given without allowing the obligor time to pay, failing 
which the order will be made absolute and the equity of redemption will be 
extinguished.898 The court can order the property to be sold in any foreclosure 
action,899 which is what it would normally do.   Given these formalities, the remedy of 
foreclosure is not attractive to secured creditors and is rarely used. 
14.17.3 Application of financial collateral 
A legal or equitable mortgagee of financial collateral under a security financial 
collateral arrangement may appropriate the collateral by way of enforcement, if the 
security instrument permits it to do so. This has been discussed earlier in this chapter. 
14.17.4 Application of cash balances 
Where security has been taken over the benefit of a bank account, that is, the cash 
balance on the account, then if the cash balance comprises financial collateral under a 
security financial collateral arrangement, and that arrangement is by way of legal or 
equitable mortgage, it should be possible to appropriate it by the method just referred 
to (provided that the security instrument permits such action). In the alternative, the 
appropriation could be effected at common law. This method of enforcement was 
acknowledged by Lord Hoffmann in Re Bank of Credit and Commerce International 
SA (No 8),900 which was a case where the cash balance arose on an account that was 
held with the security taker.  Of course, when cash is appropriated there is no need to 
value the collateral,901 so appropriation is very straightforward and takes place by 
book entry. 
14.17.4.1 It is submitted that where the bank account over which security has 
been taken is held with a third party, the security would be enforced by requiring the 
third party to pay the balance in the account to the security taker, which would then 
effect the application as the final step in the enforcement, repaying any surplus to the 
security provider. The same analysis should also apply in the case of any other debt 
that is the subject of security, where the security holder obtains payment of it and then 
applies that payment in satisfaction of the secured liability. 
14.17.5 Taking possession 
The right to take possession is usually associated with a mortgage of land, by which 
the mortgagee becomes entitled to collect the rents on the property. It also applies to 
other types of property, although the right to take possession of goods under a security 
bill of sale given by an individual is restricted.902 For instance, the right to take 
possession of the mortgagor’s business has been permitted where the security 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
896 Carter v Wake (1877) 4 ChD 605. 
897 Tennant v Trenchard (1869) 4 Ch App 537; Re Owen [1894] 3 Ch 220. 
898 Platt v Mendel (1884) 27 ChD 246. 
899 S 91(2) of the Law of Property Act 1925. 
900  [1998] AC 214. 
901 See 14.7.6.4. 
902 See s 7 of the Bills of Sale Act (1878) Amendment Act 1882. 
extended to the business.903 At common law, the right to take possession by 
implication of the security only arises if the security is by way of legal mortgage. It 
does not extend to equitable mortgages or charges.904 This problem is often  overcome 
by an express provision in the security instrument. Possession may not be taken of a 
dwelling house without a court order.905 
14.17.5.1 A security holder which goes into possession undertakes onerous 
duties with respect to the secured property and, for that reason, it is generally 
considered best not to go into possession. By going into possession, the security 
holder assumes a duty to take reasonable care of the property and to protect and 
exploit it, maximising the return but without taking undue risks.906 For example, the 
security holder has a duty, albeit limited,907 to execute repairs to real property and is 
liable for waste, that is, destruction or damage to the property.908 The security holder 
is liable to account for both the income it receives from the property whilst in 
possession as well as what it would have received but for its wilful default or 
negligence in failing to exploit the property.909 A security holder in possession of land 
may find itself responsible for environmental liabilities. 
14.17.6 The power of sale 
When examining the right of a security holder to sell the secured assets by the 
exercise of its power of sale, a distinction needs to be drawn between the right of a 
pledgee to sell the goods that are subject to the pledge, and the position as it relates to 
non-possessory security. 
14.17.6.1 Pledges 
A pledgee, who, of course, has possession already, has a power of sale at common 
law which is an inherent incident of the security.910 The duties as to the exercise of the 
power are pretty much the same as those that apply to a sale under non-possessory 
security.911 
14.17.6.2 Non-possessory security 
The position at common law as to an implied power of sale under non-possessory 
security was not very satisfactory.912 To overcome those difficulties, it became 
common to include an express power of sale and to take a power of attorney from the 
security giver, so that an equitable security holder could convey the legal title.913 The 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
903 Chaplin v Young (1863) 33 Beav 330. 
904 Western Bank Ltd v Schindler [1977] Ch 1. 
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907 Perry v Walker (1855) 3 Eq Rep 721; Silven Properties Ltd v Royal Bank of Scotland PLC [2003] 
EWCA 1409, [2004] 1 WLR 997. 
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909 Chaplin v Young (1863) 33 Beav 330; Rigby LJ in Gosling v Gaskell [1896] 1 QB 669, at 691 
(approved on appeal at [1897] AC 575). 
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(1886) 18 QBD 222, at 232. 
911 See the Privy Council in The Odessa [1916] 1 AC 145, at 159. 
912 The power did not exist for a legal mortgage of land, because of the right to apply for an order for 
foreclosure. It did exist in relation to mortgages of personal chattels: see Cotton LJ in Re Morritt, ex p 
Official Receiver (1886) 18 QBD 222, at 233. 
913 It remains possible to take an express power of sale: The Maule [1997] 1 WLR 528. 
position is now dealt with by statute. Section 101(1)(i) of the Law of Property Act 
1925 provides for an implied power of sale of any secured property914 under any 
mortgage or charge915 which has been made by deed. The right to exercise the implied 
power is regulated by section 103 of the Act, but this is usually overcome by express 
wording, as permitted by section 101(3) of the Act. It is also possible to apply to the 
court for an order for sale under section 91 of the Act. 
14.17.6.2.1 The effect of the exercise of the statutory power of sale is provided for 
in section 104 of the Act. In effect, the sale overreaches any interests that were 
subordinate to those of the security holder which has exercised the power of sale, but 
the sale will be subject to interests which had priority over the interest of that security 
holder. However, if at the time of sale the security holder’s power of sale has not 
arisen, its effect will be only to assign the security holder’s own interest.916 Section 
105 provides for the disposition of the proceeds of the sale. 
14.17.6.3 Duties in exercising the power of sale 
The security holder in exercising its power of sale is subject to important equitable 
duties.917 The duties are owed to the security giver and others interested in the equity 
of redemption, such as other security holders of the property and,  guarantors.918 The 
first is the duty to act in good faith so as not deliberately to set out to injure the 
mortgagor.919 The second duty is to obtain a proper price, being the fair or true market 
value of the property at the time of sale.920 In meeting that duty, the security holder 
must take proper care, such as by fairly and properly advertising the property, to 
obtain the best price reasonably obtainable at the date of the sale. Accordingly, the 
security holder may not act in a way which unfairly prejudices the security giver by 
selling hastily at a knock-down price.921 On the other hand, the security holder is 
entitled to accept a firm offer to purchase, rather than having to wait so as to see if a 
higher, but uncertain, offer will materialise.922 The security holder is entitled to sell 
the property in its existing state and, accordingly, there is no duty to improve the 
property or take other action to make it more saleable.923 The security holder is 
obliged to ensure that any extra potential improvement that might be available for 
increasing the value of the property is properly advertised so as to influence the sale 
price, but the security holder is not obliged to undertake action to make the 
improvement.924 If the security giver wishes to obtain greater protection than the 
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916 Cherry Tree Investments Ltd v Landmain Ltd [2012] EWCA Civ 736, [2013] Ch 305. 
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foregoing then it must stipulate for that expressly in the security instrument.925 Any 
agreed limitation on the duty owed by a security holder to a security giver when 
exercising its power of sale, such as the need to establish wilful misconduct, also 
applies in relation to a residual beneficiary to whom the security holder’s duty was 
also owed.926 
14.17.6.4 Mortgagee must not sell to itself 
There is a settled rule that a mortgagee must not sell the secured assets to itself.927   
The remedy of appropriation,928 permitted by the Financial Collateral Arrangements 
(No 2) Regulations 2003, is therefore an exception to this rule.   However, in a recent 
case a sale to a mortgagee, which was agreed in advance in the mortgage agreement, 
was permitted.929   If a mortgagee sells to a company in which it has an interest, the 
burden of proof is reversed so that it is for the mortgagee and the company to show 
that the sale was in good faith and that the mortgagee took reasonable precautions to 
obtain the best price reasonably obtainable at the time.930 If there is a possibility of 
such conflict arising, a mortgagee would be well advised to seek an order from the 
court for sale, since, if a court thinks it proper to make an order, such a sale would be 
immune from challenge.931    
 
14.17.7 Appointment of an administrator 
The ‘holder of a qualifying floating charge’ may appoint an administrator of a 
corporate debtor out of court.932 Such a holder is, essentially, a secured creditor which 
holds comprehensive security (by one or more instruments) over the whole or 
substantially the whole of the debtor’s assets, where such security includes a floating 
charge and the charge instrument purports to give the holder the power to appoint an 
administrator or an administrative receiver, or states that the relevant statutory 
provision applies to it.933 There are various restrictions and procedures that must be 
followed in making the appointment (including as to giving notice to the holder of a 
prior floating charge and the charge must have become enforceable)934 and the 
appointor must indemnify a person whom it has wrongly appointed.935 
14.17.7.1 The company and the directors also have the power to appoint an 
administrator out of court,936 and this is often the preferred route, although it will 
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926 Alpstream AG v PK Airfinance Sarl [2013] EWHC 2370 (Comm); [2014] 1 All ER (Comm) 441 (at 
the time of writing there was an outstanding appeal).  
927 Martinson v Clowes (1882) 21 Ch D 857. 
928 See 14.7.6.4.1–14.7.6.4.2. 
929  See Royal Bank of Scotland plc v Highland Financial Partners LP [2010] EWHC 3119 (Comm), 
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930 Tse Kwong Lam v Wong Chit Sen [1983] 1 WLR 1349, 1355 (PC).   
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932 Para 14(1) of Sched B1 to the Insolvency Act 1986. 
933 Paras 14(2) and (3) of Sched B1 to the Insolvency Act 1986. 
934 See paras 7–9 and 15–20 of Sched B1 to the Insolvency Act 1986. 
935 Para 21 of Sched B1 to the Insolvency Act 1986. 
936 Para 22 of Sched B1 to the Insolvency Act 1986. 
usually be as a result of pressure from the floating charge holder.937 However, the 
notice to be filed when making this appointment must state that the company is, or is 
likely to become, unable to pay its debts, while this is not necessary if the 
appointment is made by the qualifying floating charge holder. 
14.17.7.2 Despite the power of appointment that is vested in the security holder, 
the administrator is an officer of the court938 and must perform his duties for the 
statutory purposes as laid down.939 Accordingly, he does not owe his duties to the 
appointor and the latter cannot give instructions to the administrator. Thus, the ability 
to appoint an administrator might be thought to be of limited benefit to a security 
holder. However, the security holder can choose the administrator and the 
appointment does allow an insolvency practitioner to take charge of the debtor 
company, which may lead to a more realistic appraisal and order of its affairs than the 
company’s own management might have been able to achieve. The administrator 
might also be able to achieve a sale of the business of the company as a going 
concern, especially with the co-operation of the security holder. In fact, a practice has 
developed of so-called ‘pre-packaged’ administrations, under which the sale of the 
business and assets of the debtor company is organised in advance of the appointment 
of the administrator, who then effects the sale shortly after his appointment, with the 
co-operation of the security holder which appointed him. A word of caution must be 
sounded at this point. As mentioned above, the administrator has statutory duties, he 
is an officer of the court, and he must conduct the administration for the statutory 
purposes. He must therefore ensure that the transaction is one which it is proper for 
him to enter into on behalf of the company.   Pre-packaged administrations, though 
common, have been the subject of much criticism, partly for lack of transparency, 
partly for potential damage to the interests of unsecured creditors and partly as they 
enable connected parties to buy the business at a low price. A Statement of 
Insolvency Practice (SIP 16) was issued in 2009, in order to improve transparency, 
and a wholescale review of pre-packs has just taken place.940 The review found that 
pre-packs had a valuable role to play, but that certain ‘cleaning up’ was needed, and 
made certain recommendations to be implemented by the market, mainly related to 
‘connected party’ pre-packs.  
 
14.17.7.3 Once an administrator has been appointed, there is a moratorium on 
the enforcement of all security, including quasi-security such as hire-purchase 
agreements and finance leases.941   This moratorium does not apply, however, to 
security financial collateral arrangements.942   The administrator, however, may 
realise the secured assets and may make a distribution to the secured creditors without 
leave of the court.943   As mentioned, in many cases the administrator will sell the 
business as a going concern: in that case, distributions would be made out of the sale 
proceeds as appropriate. 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
937 S Frisby, ‘Not quite Warp Factor 2 yet? The Enterprise Act and Corporate Insolvency (Pt 1)’ (2007) 
22 Journal of International Banking and Financial Law 327. 
938 Para 5 of Sched B1 to the Insolvency Act 1986. 
939 Para 3 of Sched B1 to the Insolvency Act 1986. 
940 The Graham review into Pre-pack Administration (June 2014). 
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14.17.8 Appointment of a receiver 
A receiver may be appointed by the court under section 37 of the Supreme Court Act 
1981 but that is unusual.944 Such a receiver must act fairly as an officer of the court.945 
Such appointments at the behest of a security holder are rare and will not be explored 
further. 
14.17.8.1 By far the greater number of appointments of receivers are made by 
security holders pursuant to their security, which will be the subject of the remaining 
discussion. There are two types of such receiver, being the receiver appointed over 
specific assets, and a receiver and manager who is appointed under comprehensive 
security given by a company, called an ‘administrative receiver’. 
14.17.8.2 The power to appoint a receiver is limited by the provisions of the 
Insolvency Act 1986 which deal with administration. Essentially, any receiver who is 
in office must vacate his office if an administrator is appointed.946 Furthermore, the 
appointment of a receiver would amount to an act in enforcement of security, which is 
prohibited by the moratorium mentioned above  unless the administrator consents or 
the court permits,947 neither of which would be likely. A floating charge holder cannot 
now appoint an administrative receiver unless the charge falls into one of the 
exceptions discussed below.    In that situation, if an administrative receiver is in 
office then it is not possible for a company to go into administration, unless the 
security holder who appointed the administrative receiver consents948 (at which point 
the administrative receiver would have to vacate office). 
14.17.8.3 A person who appoints, or who obtains a court appointment of, a 
receiver must give notice of the appointment to the Registrar of Companies within 
seven days of the appointment.949 When the receiver ceases to act, he must give notice 
of that fact to the Registrar.950 
14.17.8.4 Receivers of specific assets 
Section 101(1)(iii) of the Law of Property Act 1925 provides that a security holder 
under security made by deed may appoint a receiver. This is regulated by section 103 
of the Act which, in turn, is usually overcome by an express provision in the security 
instrument, in accordance with section 101(3) of the Act. A receiver appointed under 
the statute is expressed by section 109(3) of the Act only to be a receiver of income. 
Accordingly, it is common in security instruments to use section 101(3) to extend the 
powers of the receiver so that he can manage the charged property and sell it. In the 
alternative, the security instrument might contain an express power of appointment of 
a receiver, as well as a statement of his powers. It should be noted that section 109(2) 
of the Act provides that the receiver is deemed to be the agent of the security giver, 
which alone is responsible for the receiver’s acts and omissions, unless the security 
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instrument provides otherwise. It would be a very rare security instrument which so 
provided. There is usually an express statement in the security instrument that the 
receiver acts as the agent of the security giver. 
14.17.8.4.1 Essentially, this type of receiver is appointed to take possession of and 
manage the specific assets subject to the security and to receive the income from 
them, with the principal intention of selling the assets. The receiver may be appointed 
irrespective of whether the security giver is a corporate entity or an individual. 
14.17.8.4.2 Duties of a receiver 
The duties of a receiver in the exercise of his powers were reviewed in Silven 
Properties Ltd v Royal Bank of Scotland PLC951 and what follows is largely a 
distillation of the decision in that case. A receiver has duties in equity, not common 
law.952 The duties are owed to the security holder who appointed him, as well as to the 
security giver and others with an interest in the equity of redemption, but the duty to 
the security holder to bring about a repayment of the secured debt is paramount.953 
Accordingly, the receiver’s powers of management are not exercised for the benefit of 
the security giver but, rather, for the benefit of the security holder and are ancillary to 
that paramount obligation. If the receiver does breach his duty, that does not give rise 
to a claim in damages but, rather, to a duty to account. On the same basis as the duty 
of a security holder in exercising the power of sale, a receiver when selling property is 
obliged to take care to obtain the best price reasonably obtainable at the time of 
sale,954 but he is entitled to sell the property as he finds it without a duty to make any 
improvement or to await an increase in value.955  
14.17.8.6.1 There are two important statutory duties of a receiver which must not 
be overlooked. Under section 40 of the Insolvency Act 1986, if the company is not in 
the course of liquidation, the receiver must apply recoveries out of assets subject to a 
floating charge (as taken) in payment of preferential creditors, ahead of the claims of 
the security holder. In addition, under section 176A of that Act, the receiver must set 
aside the prescribed part from the recoveries under such a charge to meet the claims 
of unsecured creditors. 
14.17.9 Administrative Receivers. 
Administrative receivership only applies where the security giver is a company, and is 
only available to a security holder in certain specific cases, defined below. The 
definition of an administrative receiver will be found in section 29(2) of the 
Insolvency Act 1986. It has a certain resonance with the definition of the holder of a 
qualifying floating charge. An administrative receiver is a receiver and manager 
appointed under comprehensive security over the whole or substantially the whole of 
the company’s property, where such security comprises, or at least includes, a floating 
charge, no matter how insignificant the floating charge might be as a part of the 
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overall package of security.956 By the appointment of an administrative receiver (if 
permitted), the secured creditor can prevent the appointment of an administrator of the 
company.957 
14.7.9.1.  Section 72A of the Insolvency Act 1986 provides that, with certain 
exceptions, an administrative receiver may not be appointed under security taken on 
or after the date that the section came into force, which was 15 September 2003.958 
There is no restriction upon appointments made under security granted before that 
date, but this must now be reasonably rare.   There are a number of exceptions to 
section 72A, where it remains possible to appoint an administrative receiver under 
security taken after the above-mentioned date. These are contained in sections 72B to 
72H of the Act.959 The exceptions apply to the following situations: capital market 
arrangements (section 72B); public–private partnerships (section 72C); utility projects 
(section 72D); urban regeneration projects (section 72DA); project finance (section 
72E); financial markets charges (section 72F); registered social landlords (section 
72G); and protected railway, transport, and water companies (section 72GA). Some of 
these exceptions are discussed below.    
14.17.9.2 Capital market arrangements (section 72B) 
This exception is discussed at some length in Chapter 12. By way of summary, the 
exception applies to the appointment of an administrative receiver under an agreement 
that is or forms part of a ‘capital market arrangement’ which involves an actual or 
expected debt of at least £50 million (in any currency) and an arrangement for the 
issue of a capital market investment. The expressions ‘capital market arrangement’ 
and ‘capital market investment’ are defined in Schedule 2A to the Act. 
14.17.9.3 Public–private partnerships (section 72C) 
This exception applies to the appointment of an administrative receiver of a project 
company of a public–private partnership project which includes step-in rights. 
14.17.9.3.1 A public–private partnership project is defined in the section as a 
project under which either: 
(a) the resources [for the project] are provided partly by one or more 
public bodies and partly by one or more private persons, or 
(b) [the project] is designed wholly or mainly to assist a public body to 
discharge a function. 
14.17.9.3.2 The expression ‘resources’ is given a widely inclusive definition in 
Schedule 2A to the Act and that schedule also defines the expression ‘public body’. 
There is no statutory definition of function but it probably means a function which the 
relevant public body was established or exists to perform. 
14.17.9.3.3 The meaning of ‘project’ is left undefined, although it will be noted 
that it is used in conjunction with the concepts of ‘project company’ and ‘public–
private partnership project’. In Feetum v Levy,960 which was a case concerning the 
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exception in section 72E but which would also be relevant in the present context, 
Lewison J, whilst declining to provide a complete definition of the word as it is used 
in these sections of the Act, said that the meaning of ‘project’ was not limited just to 
construction and engineering operations. It would also include the scheme in that case 
where the relevant company had entered into an agreement to purchase IT rights, 
which it intended to exploit. 
14.17.9.3.4 A ‘project company’ is, essentially, a company which is dedicated to 
the project. In more detail, it is defined in paragraph 7 of Schedule 2A for the 
purposes of the exceptions contained in section 72C and other sections, as follows: 
(1)  . . . a company is a ‘project company’ of a project if— 
(a) it holds property for the purpose of the project, 
(b) it has sole or principal responsibility under an agreement for 
carrying out all or part of the project, 
(c) it is one of a number of companies which together carry out the 
project, 
(d) it has the purpose of supplying finance to enable the project to 
be carried out, or 
(e) it is the holding company of a company within any of 
paragraphs (a) to (d). 
(2) But a company is not a ‘project company’ of a project if— 
(a) it performs a function within sub-paragraph (1)(a) to (d) or is 
within sub-paragraph (1)(e), but 
(b) it also performs a function which is not— 
(i) within sub-paragraph (1)(a) to (d), 
(ii) related to a function within sub-paragraph (1)(a) to (d), 
or 
(iii) related to the project. 
(3) For the purpose of this paragraph a company carries out all or part of a 
project whether or not it acts wholly or partly through agents. 
14.17.9.3.5 ‘Step-in rights’ in relation to a project are defined in paragraph 6 of 
Schedule 2A for the purposes of this and other exceptions, as follows: 
(1)  . . . a project has ‘step-in rights’ if a person who provides finance in 
connection with the project has a conditional entitlement under an 
agreement to— 
(a) assume sole or principal responsibility under an agreement for 
carrying out all or part of the project, or 
(b) make arrangements for carrying out all or part of the project. 
(2) In sub-paragraph (1) a reference to the provision of finance includes a 
reference to the provision of an indemnity. 
14.17.9.3.5.1 In considering the definition of ‘step-in rights’ it should be noted that 
the word ‘agreement’ is given a widely inclusive meaning in Schedule 2A, to include 
‘an agreement or undertaking effected by (a) contract, (b) deed, or (c) any other 
instrument intended to have effect in accordance with’ the law of any jurisdiction. It 
should also be noted that the definition requires that it is the person who provides the 
finance (including by the provision of an indemnity) who must have the conditional 
entitlement to assume the relevant responsibility or make the arrangements. A 
‘person’ is defined in Schedule 2A to include a partnership or another unincorporated 
group of persons, so a syndicate of lenders could be considered to be a person which 
has provided the finance. However, it is not so clear that a security trustee, which 
simply held the security on behalf of the syndicate, would be considered to be such a 
person, although perhaps a facility agent acting as agent within the authority of the 
syndicate might be considered sufficient to meet the requirement.961 
14.17.9.3.5.2 In Feetum v Levy, it was argued that the security holder (whose 
security was to secure an indemnity within sub-paragraph (2) of the definition of 
‘step-in rights’) had the relevant entitlement by virtue of its right under the security 
either to appoint an administrative receiver of the project company or to appoint an 
administrator of the company. That argument was dismissed by the judge. If an 
administrative receiver was appointed, he would be acting as the agent of the 
company, as expressly provided in the security document (and, incidentally, as also 
provided by section 44(1)(a) of the Insolvency Act 1986). As such, the receiver would 
not be acting on behalf of the security holder but on behalf of the project company, 
and it would be up to the receiver to decide whether and how he should act. Similarly, 
an administrator would not be acting on behalf of the secured creditor who appointed 
him but would act on behalf of the company pursuant to his statutory powers. Hence, 
it could not it be said that the receiver or the administrator was assuming 
responsibility on behalf of the secured creditor to carry out the project, nor could the 
appointment of either of them be tantamount to the secured creditor making 
arrangements for carrying out the project. 
14.17.9.4 Project finance (section 72E) 
This exception permits the appointment of an administrative receiver of a project 
company of a project which is a ‘financed project’ and includes step-in rights. As to 
the concepts of a ‘project company’, a ‘project’, and ‘step-in rights’, see the 
discussion above concerning section 72C of the Act. See also that discussion as to the 
meaning of ‘agreement’, which is used in the definition that is about to be mentioned. 
14.17.9.4.1 Section 72E provides that: 
a project is ‘financed’ if under an agreement relating to the project a project 
company incurs, or when the agreement is entered into is expected to incur, a 
debt of at least £50m for the purpose of carrying out the project. 
14.17.9.4.2 It should be noted that in paragraph 5 of Schedule 2A to the Act, it is 
provided that the debt of £50 million: 
(a) may be incurred at any time during the life of the . . . financed project, 
and 
(b) may be expressed wholly or partly in foreign currency (in which case 
the sterling equivalent shall be calculated as at the time when the 
project begins). 
14.17.9.4.3 Guidance as to the components of the definition of ‘financed project’ 
was provided by Lewison J in Feetum v Levy.962 His Lordship said, first, that although 
the debt must be incurred by a project company, it need not necessarily be incurred by 
the project company over which the administrative receiver is appointed. Secondly, 
that the debt must be incurred under an agreement relating to the project, but not 
necessarily the agreement under which the administrative receiver is appointed. 
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Thirdly, as to the requirement that a debt of at least £50 million is incurred (or, when 
the agreement is entered into, is expected to be incurred) under an agreement relating 
to the project, his Lordship said that, as a matter of construction of the statutory 
wording, the ‘agreement’ had to be the same agreement under which the debt was 
incurred, or, alternatively, was expected to be incurred, so as to finance the project. 
Fourthly, his Lordship distinguished between hope and the more objective concept of 
an expectation, the latter being what was required if there was to be an expectation of 
incurring a debt of at least £50 million under the relevant agreement. An expectation 
depends on the likelihood of meeting the conditions to its fulfilment. He also noted 
that the section requires an expectation that ‘at least’ £50 million will be borrowed, 
rather than ‘up to’ a figure, even if higher. Whilst a borrower might initially have 
hoped that it could borrow above the figure of £50 million, there would not be the 
requisite expectation if, in fact, it had realistically been entitled under the agreement 
to borrow only a lower sum because of circumstances that were known or appreciated 
at the time. 
 
14.17.9.5. The role and powers of an administrative receiver An administrative 
receiver acts as the agent of the company until it goes into liquidation.963 In that role, 
he has extensive powers to manage and realise the business and assets of the 
company.964 In effect, his powers override the management functions of the directors, 
although technically they remain in office with responsibilities under the Companies 
Acts and some very limited power to bring proceedings, so long as that does not 
impinge on the assets that are subject to the security.965 The administrative receiver is 
personally liable on any contract that he enters into in carrying out his functions, 
unless the contract otherwise provides (as it will almost invariably do).966 He is also 
liable for existing contracts of employment that he ‘adopts’.967 
14.17.8.5.2.1 As the administrative receiver acts as the agent of the company, the 
person who appointed him is not responsible for his acts and defaults, unless the 
appointor intervenes in the receivership, such as by giving the receiver instructions as 
to the conduct of the receivership.968 Despite the fact that he is the agent of the 
company and not the agent of the security holder which appointed him, the receiver 
owes his primary duty to the appointor, to realise the assets, and pay off the secured 
debt.969 The company, on whose behalf he acts, has no right to say who should be 
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appointed, to dismiss the receiver, or to give him instructions.970 In a sense, this leads 
to something of a split personality. 
14.17.8.5.2.2 The position of the receiver concerning existing contracts971 that were 
in place prior to his appointment reflects a combination of factors: first, his position as 
the agent of the company; secondly, the fact that he is appointed under security that is 
or has become fixed security; thirdly, his primary duty to manage that security so as to 
pay off the secured debt. The consequence of this is that, generally speaking, the 
receiver is not bound by such contracts and can cause the company to breach them by 
not performing them.972 Whilst the company may incur a liability in damages due to 
the breach, the receiver will not be personally liable for causing or procuring a breach 
of contract.973 
14.17.8.5.2.3 Notwithstanding what has just been said, a receiver will be bound by 
an interest that ranks ahead of the security under which he was appointed.974 In 
addition, it has been said that he may not seriously damage the goodwill of the 
company if there might be a surplus of assets after the security has been discharged or 
if the security does not extend to all of the assets of the company and his actions 
might impair the ability of the company to continue to trade with its other assets.975 It 
has also been said that if a pre-existing contract were of a type that would normally be 
susceptible to an order for specific performance, then the court may be willing to 
make such an order, even though the receiver does not wish to perform the contract, 
unless the receiver has decided to end the business.976 It is submitted that this ignores 
the interest of the security under which the receiver was appointed. By ordering 
performance of the contract, the company will probably have to use charged assets 
over which the security holder has a paramount claim. 
14.17.8.5.2.4 The agency of the administrative receiver ends if the company goes 
into liquidation.977 This means that he can no longer run the business of the company. 
Nonetheless, the receiver remains in possession of the assets over which he was 
appointed. The loss of his agency to act on behalf of the company does not mean that 
he becomes the agent of the appointor.978 He remains in possession of the secured 
assets and is entitled to sell the assets in the realisation of the security under which he 
was appointed.979 The receiver may also continue litigation which had been 
commenced before the liquidation, whether it had been commenced by the company 
or by the receiver.980 
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